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1 Introduction:  
EU, China and food safety – a case to be made 
 
 
 
 
The globalization of food production has increased the probability for markets to import unsafe 
food (Gustafson, 2011; Vogel and Ansell, 2006; EFSA, 2009; Zach et al., 2012; Kennedy, 2013). 
Against this backdrop, in December 2001 China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO).1 
With this step the country effectively became part of the globalized food production. This study 
analyses how the European Union (EU) – understood as an entity comprising public as well as 
private actors – responded to this challenge. More specifically, the objective is to understand the 
motivation behind the EU’s observed activities to influence China’s food safety regulation. Two 
hypotheses are deduced from theories of regulatory interdependence. The first assumes a supply 
safety hypothesis. With its massive food safety problems, China quickly posed risks to global food 
safety and thus also to EU’s food safety. This happened at a time, when the EU itself had 
reinforced its food safety regulation with a stronger focus on consumer interests. Any influence by 
EU actors on China’s food safety regulation thus could be the result of heightened import safety 
concerns. The second hypothesis offers an alternative explanation. China presents an attractive 
export market for EU companies. Although lagging behind the internationally established 
benchmark for safety, China’s food safety regulation still potentially created market entry barriers 
for EU food exports. Activities to influence China’s food safety regulation hence could be based on 
the interest to reduce such regulatory barriers to trade. Based on a mechanistic understanding of 
causality and the method of process tracing, this study specifies which combination of both 
motivations explains the observed activities by EU actors to influence China’s food safety 
regulation between 2001 and 2014. 
1.1 EU food safety regulation and the challenge of globalized food production 
Since the Second World War, the liberalization of global trade led to an increase in the amount of 
traded agricultural goods, feed and food. Food production and food markets have become globally 
                                                          
1 Henceforth, by China I refer to the People’s Republic of China. 
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integrated (cf. Clapp and Fuchs, 2009, p. 3; Senauer and Venturini, 2005; Roth et al., 2008).2 
Different steps in the increasingly complex production chain of food are now located in different 
countries and food increasingly consists of more ingredients (van Waarden, 2006, pp. 50–53; 
Josling et al., 2004; Hoffmann and Harder, 2010). Following the horse meat scandal in Europe in 
2013, the UK’s National Audit Office found that a single pizza contained 35 ingredients that passed 
through 60 countries (National Audit Office, 2013, p. 34). The globalisation of food production has 
a major downside from a consumer protection and public health perspective. With foodstuffs 
travelling across the world, risks associated with food also can spread faster and more easily across 
national borders: 
“Indeed, because of the ever-increasing food trade, regulatory failure, in the food safety 
system in the food-exporting country can easily endanger the health of the 
unsuspicious consumers of the importing country. Moreover, amid contemporary 
global interconnectedness, contaminated food can spread more rapidly and affect wider 
regions, thus causing global illness worldwide. Today not only new food safety risks can 
spread among countries, but also old, previously controlled, risks can be re-introduced 
into countries” (Alemanno, 2015, p. 10) 
Consequently, food safety was increasingly appreciated by governments as a public concern (Sun, 
2012). Around the turn of the millennium, the EU made historical changes in its food safety 
regulation which were a response to the interconnectedness of markets when it comes to food 
safety. During the 1990s, a series of food safety scandals, most prominently the BSE-crisis, had 
spread across national borders within the EU.3 They showed that regulatory failures in one 
member state quickly affected other EU countries because of the free movement of foodstuffs 
within the internal market (Böschen et al., 2004, p. 105). These negative experiences led to a 
fundamental political conflict, in which not only policies but food safety governance in the EU as 
a whole was contested (Vogel and Ansell, 2006). Both national and EU authorities had failed to 
deal with the crisis – in terms of containing food risks and in terms of responding to consumer 
needs (Jasanoff, 1997). This resulted in a massive loss of trust, which made substantial policy and 
governance changes necessary (Renn and Dreyer, 2009, p. 3, see also Bernauer and Caduff, 2006). 
The main outcome was the General Food Law (GFL) in 2002 (European Union, 2002). It led to the 
                                                          
2 Under the interchangeably used terms food and agri-food, I subsume all food products following the 
Standard International Trade Classification section 0 (food and live animals) and section 1 (beverage and 
tobacco). According to the WTO definition, section 4 (animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes) and 
division 22 (oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits) are also part of food and agricultural products (World Trade 
Organization, 2011, p. 188). However, I exclude them from my consideration as they mainly represent 
inedible products. For a clarification of the Standard International Trade Classification system see footnote 
70 on page 121. 
3 Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a deadly disease affecting cattle. It was first discovered in 
England end of 1984 and spread across Europe and beyond during the 1980s and 1990s (Böschen, et al. 2004, 
pp. 102–106). At the peak of the epidemic in 1992, there were over 37,000 cases worldwide (anonymous, 
2012). In 1996, the British Minister of Health admitted that BSE potentially is a risk to human health 
(Böschen et al., 2004, p. 104). 
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communitisation of food safety policy and at the same time to substantial changes in the EU 
approach to food safety regulation – often referred to as a Europeanization of food safety 
regulation (Alemanno, 2008; Havinga, 2012).  
Among the many changes the GFL brought about, scholars have pointed to a major policy shift 
towards consumers’ interests underlying the new regulatory approach (Marsden et al., 2010, p. 
118). Unlike before, the objective to protect the health of consumers became a central element of 
food safety regulation in the EU (Wendler and Vos, 2006). Before, it was the common market 
agenda and hence harmonization that EU food regulation was most concerned with (Alemanno, 
2008). It primarily served to facilitate the exchange of goods between EU member states and was 
aimed at reducing trade barriers that resulted from diverging regulation. A prominent example for 
trade barriers due to differing regulations is the Cassis de Dijon case, in which the European Court 
of Justice overruled the attempt by Germany to forbid the import of the French liquor based on 
specific German beverage regulations. Thus, the institutional setup before 2002 implied that 
“consumer and health interests have been routinely subordinated to the objectives of furthering 
the commercial interests of farming and the food industry” (Millstone and van Zwanenberg, 2002, 
p. 595) and consumer safety was a “subsidiary consideration” (Alemanno, 2009, p. 172, see also 
Marsden et al., 2010, p. 80; Vos, 1999). With the GFL, consumer health and consumer protection 
became the ultimate objective. For example, the farm-to-fork-approach, which overcame the 
traditional distinctions between the actors in the supply chain, was born out of this new approach.  
The new EU food legislation furthermore underlined food businesses’ responsibility for ensuring 
that the food they produce or handle is safe. The need to ensure compliance with the law, 
together with the previous food safety scandals, spurred the development of private forms of food 
safety regulation (cf. Meulen, 2011b; Fulponi, 2006). Retailers and food producers developed 
private food safety standards to safeguard them from problems of unsafe food from their suppliers. 
This development has been described by scholars as hybrid forms of food safety governance 
(Marsden et al., 2010; Verbruggen and Havinga, 2017). Several private food safety standards 
evolved since the early 2000s in the EU. Thus, character, forms and types of private food safety 
regulation and the resulting hybridity are still subject to analysis and debate (Havinga et al., 
2015b). However, the growing phenomena of private food safety standards underscore their 
relevance (Havinga et al., 2015a). 
1.2 China’s lack of food safety poses a risk for importing countries 
Within the globally organised food production, China swiftly has developed into a major supplier. In 
fact, it has become one of the largest food exporters to the world. Measured in US dollar (USD), China’s 
export volume of food has grown nearly seven-fold from 1990 until 2011 (World Trade Organization, 
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2012, p. 75). By 2015 it was the fourth biggest exporter of agricultural products with a share of 4.6 per 
cent of global exports (World Trade Organization, 2016, p. 104). This development has led the WTO to 
identify China as an increasingly relevant food exporter (World Trade Organization, 2010). This 
development itself does not pose a major problem. However, China has repeatedly experienced food 
safety scandals. Many of these incidents are as frightening as bizarre: Chinese and western media 
reported about pork glowing in the dark, “ping-pong eggs” bouncing off the ground, exploding 
watermelons, ham soaked in pesticides and cooking oil derived from gutter and drains (Thompson, 
2012). This also includes cases of the deaths of infants in 2004 and in 2008 due to purposely 
adulterating infant milk powder (Tam and Yang, 2005; Pei et al., 2011). In April 2004, in Fuyang, 
Anhui province, it was discovered that fake baby milk had led to the severe malnutrition of infants.4 It 
left at least 13 babies dead and over 200 ill (Liu, 2010b, p. 253; China Daily, 2004b). The case was first 
reported one year earlier in local media, but “local authorities turned a blind eye to consumer 
complaints” (Burns et al., 2010, p. 11). The most well-known food safety incident in China, however, is 
the melamine scandal of 2008 (McGregor, 2010; Pei et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2009). In September 2008, 
media reported that Chinese dairy farmers and milk traders had for many years used the chemical 
melamine to hide the fact that their milk had insufficient protein levels (for a detailed description of 
the scandal see Burns et al., 2010; Pei et al., 2011). Sanlu, a major dairy producer located in 
Shijiazhuang, the capital city of Hebei province nearby Beijing, was buying the milk and knew all 
along about the practice. They used the milk to produce infant formula. By the end of November 2008, 
at least six infants died, 51,900 were hospitalized and an estimated 294,000 fell ill according to official 
figures (Yang et al., 2009).5  
Even before this tragedy, an article in the German online magazine Spiegel Online from 2007 
summarized the situation as “food horror in China”. The article discussed a book by Chinese journalist 
Zhou Qing about food safety problems in China. His advice: “Never visit a restaurant” (Schönmann, 
2007). In 2013, 16,000 pig carcasses floated down the Huangpu river through Shanghai, passing the 
famous colonial-style buildings on the waterfront of the Bund as well as the skyline of the city’s financial 
district Luijiazui. Standing for China’s massive economic rise since the 1980s, the scene was one of irony. 
This was an event so unusual and weird, that it was widely picked up by foreign media, reminding 
everybody that something was seriously was wrong with food production and food safety in China.6  
                                                          
4 I use the official transcription for Chinese, pinyin, except for names such as the Yangtze River, for which 
specific spellings have become de facto standard. I furthermore follow the Chinese tradition and put 
surnames first followed by the family name (e.g. Xi Jinping). The bibliography, however follows the rules 
for western names. 
5 Note that in my interviews these figures were disputed as not capturing the whole extent of the incident. 
6 It only later turned out to have most likely not been an incident directly connected with food safety 
(Jourdan, 2013). 
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Food safety problems had already occurred in the 1990s in China. For example, use of unregistered 
pesticides led to public health crises early in the decade (Thiers, 2003, p. 243). With steady continuity, 
food safety incidents came to the forefront in China and attracted nationwide and sometimes global 
attention. It was little surprise that, despite all regulatory changes by the Chinese government, in 2013 
food safety still was China’s “top public concern” (Wang, 2013). Table 1 lists major food safety 
incidents for the period from 2002 until 2014.7 
Table 1: Selected food safety incidents by year, 2003-2014 
Year Incident Year Incident 
2003 Jinhua ham soaked in pesticides 2010 Gutter oil 
2004 Fuyang baby formula incident  Fake green peas 
 Carcinogenic pickled vegetables  Pesticide-drenched ‘yard-long’ beans 
 Soy sauce made from human hair 2011 Clenbuterol poisoning 
2005 Sudan red dye in foods  Glowing pork scandal 
2006 Turbot fish antibiotic scandal  Mengniu milk aflatoxin scandal 
 Illegal pesticides on vegetables  Exploding watermelons 
 Meningitis snail meat  Toxic bean-sprouts 
 Poisonous mushrooms  Leather milk 
2007 Carcinogenic cooking oil 2012 Chlorine tainted cola 
 Melamine laced wheat gluten  Fake eggs 
 Sewage laced tofu 2013 Cadmium laced rice 
2008 Infant melamine incident  16.000 dead pigs floating down the 
Huangpu river 
 Insecticide laced Dumplings  Fake meat scandal (rats sold as mutton) 
 Contaminated Ginger  Toxic ginger 
 Contaminated Eggs 2014 HUSI/OSI tainted meat scandal 
2009 Plastic tapioca  Fox meat scandal 
 Pesticide laced buns   
(Source: own, based on Yasuda, 2013, p. 2; Foster, 2011; anonymous, 2011; Newcomb, 2011; Boehler, 2012; Lin, 2013; Li, 
2014) 
                                                          
7 This is not a comprehensive list of food safety incidents. It shall rather provide an impression of the extent 
of food safety incidents in China. 
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Scholars have acknowledged that China suffers from a high and unusual degree of food safety 
problems (FORHEAD, 2014; Bian, 2004; Collins and Gottwald, 2011, p. 147; Thompson, 2012; 
Gale and Buzby, 2009). In his analysis of China’s food safety regulation between 2004 and 2013, 
Zhou Guangqi, asserts a “systemic failure” (2017). In 2007, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
estimated that at least 300 million Chinese fall ill due to foodborne diseases every year (Asian 
Development Bank, 2007). According to a study conducted by the China National Center for Food 
Risk Assessment (CFSA), a central government authority, from 2010 until 2011, there were 202 
million official cases of foodborne illnesses in China. This means, one in 6.6 persons had been 
affected at least once per year by foodborne disease (Wu and Chen, 2013). China Daily, a 
newspaper owned by the Chinese government reported in 2012 that every year 15 per cent of 
Chinese were “made ill by food” (Cai, 2012). Notably, such figures do not include chronic diseases 
potentially caused by unsafe food but which cannot easily be traced back to their original cause 
(e.g. cancer). For comparison, in the EU, the number of cases of foodborne diseases per 100 
inhabitants was a mere 0.12 in 2009 (Eurostat, 2011). 
Given that food supply chains are globally connected, China’s fundamental problems with food 
safety are not only a problem for the health of Chinese consumers, but for the well-being of 
consumers around the world (Roth et al., 2008). Drew Thompson, a China analyst, described 
China’s food safety regulation as “a challenge to global health governance” (Thompson, 2007). 
Importing nations and indeed importing companies have to find ways how to ensure that China’s 
food safety problems are not imported. After China joined the WTO, the EU Commission reported 
a sharp increase in imported counterfeit produces, including foodstuffs. The increase between 
2002 and 2003 was 77 per cent. Sixty per cent of all detected counterfeit products originated in 
China (European Commission, 2005c). Table 2 provides a selective list of food import safety 
incidents and shows that unsafe imports from China did cause actual food safety problems in 
importing markets, including the EU. Accordingly, media and experts discussed the issue of unsafe 
imports from China. The Wall Street Journal pointed at the problem and wondered “Who is 
monitoring Chinese Food Exports?” (Zamiska, 2007). The topic gained more momentum especially 
during the drafting process of the United States food safety modernisation act (FSMA).8 Seafood 
and chicken imports from China especially raised fears (Flynn, 2013; Huehnergrath and Siegel, 
2014). European media also pointed to the risks of Chinese food imports (Spiegel Online, 2012). 
“Food from China foisted on Germans”, a newspaper lamented (Dowideit, 2014). The topic has lost 
little of its importance over time. In 2014, the Lancet pointedly titled a story on the prevailing 
situation: “China’s food safety: a continuing global problem” (The Lancet, 2014). 
                                                          
8 I owe the hint to the connection between FSMA and the public debate about unsafe food imports from 
China to Alberto Alemanno. 
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Table 2: Selected food import safety incidents, 2002-2014 
Year Food product Importing country Food safety issue 
2002 Meat EU residues of veterinary medicines 
2001-2002 exportation of tea, 
shrimps, honey, frozen 
chicken, beef  
EU Not specified 
2002 Frozen spinach Japan Excess pesticide residues 
2001 Shrimp European Union Excessive antibiotic residues 
2001 Poultry EU, Japan Excessive antibiotic residues 
2002 Honey EU Excessive antibiotic residues 
2002-2003 Frozen spinach Japan Excessive pesticide residues 
2002 Tea EU, Japan Excessive pesticide residues 
2005 Fermented Cabbage South Korea Parasites 
2005 Fish South Korea, Japan, 
and Singapore 
the cancer-causing anti-fungal 
agent, malachite green 
2006 Turbot Fish Not specified cancer-causing veterinary drugs 
2008 Dumplings Japan Excessive pesticide residues 
2008 Mackerel Japan, EU Excessive pesticide residues 
2012 Strawberries Germany Norovirus 
2014 Meat Japan Expired meat, redeclaration of meat 
(Source: own, based on Ellis and Turner, 2008, p. 18; Calvin et al., 2006, p. 18; Bian, 2004; Dong and Jensen, 2007; Wei, 
2012; Spiegel Online, 2012; The Lancet, 2014; Thompson and Hu, 2007) 
1.3 Research question and its relevance 
How should the EU react to the risk posed by importing food from China? This question is the 
more relevant, given that food safety had become such a sensitive topic within the EU during the 
era of “contested governance” and the fact that new institutional frameworks and policies has only 
recently been set up to improve consumer protection. Indeed, the EU engaged early with China 
on food safety topics. In answer to China’s accession to the WTO, the EU Commission ran a more 
than decade-long major project in collaboration with the Chinese government on supporting the 
countries harmonization with WTO, the EU-China Trade Project. It continuously included the 
topic of food safety. Also, the EU established a food safety dialogue with China. This seemingly fits 
well with a new approach, in which the EU has started to solve import safety problems at its 
source:  
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„The EU, aware that systematic controls at the border are not a realistic option, seems 
likely to shift its regulatory focus to where the source of a possible safety issue is 
located: the country of origin. Indeed, the Community is currently focussing its efforts 
in extending its reactive ‘safetynet’ regulatory model beyond its borders, thus inevitably 
giving rise to an interesting legal export of its own approach to import safety.” 
(Alemanno, 2009).  
In making my argument for the need to research EU responses to China’s food safety regulation 
more carefully and thoroughly, some additional points are necessary. I explain them in detail in 
chapter 2 and 3 where I lay out the status of theoretical debate and the relevant context for my 
case respectively.  
First, in theoretical terms, the phenomena described above addresses the notion of 
interdependence in the international sphere (Keohane and Nye, 1977). National food safety 
regulations, just as other areas of social regulation are highly interdependent (cf. Lazer, 2001, p. 
475; Büthe, 2009, pp. 102–103).9 Scholars researching regulatory interdependence analyse and 
discuss how states and markets deal with external effects caused by the behaviour of other states 
and arguments for specific responses. This theoretical debate shows that there are two types of 
external effects – physical externalities and regulatory externalities. With regard to food safety 
physical externalities are risks for public health and the environment derived from importing 
unsafe food. Regulatory externalities, in contrast, manifest themselves as non-tariff market 
barriers in food trade which results from different food safety regulations between trading 
partners. From the history of the EU, as I discussed above, we already know that discussions about 
food safety regulation among trading partners is not necessarily motivated by the motive of 
consumer protection. Trade plays an important role, too. In essence, the issue of EU market access 
towards China reflects the issues during the development of the internal market. However, unlike 
for the case of the Cassis de Dijon, no European Court of Justice solves the matter. Theoretical 
reflections on regulatory interdependence help to clarify the different types of motives the EU 
potentially may have to influence China’s food safety regulation. Next to the motivation to ensure 
safe food imports from China, the EU potentially has an interest to influence China’s regulation to 
improve the access to the Chinese market for EU products and businesses. Thus, the mere fact that 
EU and China engaged on food safety topics is not enough information for a clear assessment, 
whether such activities were a response to import safety challenges. It cannot be ruled out that 
business interests in seamless trade were the driver for EU-China exchanges on food safety. 
                                                          
9 When discussing regulation, henceforth, I refer to social regulation as opposed to economic regulation. 
According to a definition by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), social 
regulations thus “protect public interests such as health, safety, the environment, and social cohesion” 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2002). Social regulation thus addresses negative 
externalities and information asymmetries while economic regulation deals with problems of 
interconnectivity and sets rules for market entry and competition (Abbott and Snidal, 2009, p. 507; Young, 
2006, p. 377).  
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Therefore, the research question of this study is: What is the motivation behind EU’s activities to 
influence China’s food safety regulation? 
Second, as I introduced above, the EU should be understood as more than its public actors. 
Especially in the field of food safety regulation, we are confronted with a relatively strong and 
growing role of private forms of regulation (Marsden et al., 2010; Havinga, 2012). This 
phenomenon has already been picked up in the ongoing discussion about new forms of regulatory 
governance, as I show in detail in chapter 2. Most importantly, the research strongly suggests that 
state-centred understandings of regulation no longer account for the reality. Instead, society-
centred concepts of regulation, which also extend the definition of regulation to non-public, non-
legal and non-obligatory forms, help to capture what is going on. Consequently, the perspective 
on international regulatory issues become transnational. Specifically, private standards, which I 
refer to as transnational private food safety standards (TPS) have developed as a major 
phenomenon in transnational regulatory governance of food safety (Havinga, 2006; Fulponi, 2006; 
Hatanaka et al., 2005; Trienekens and Zuurbier, 2008; Campbell, 2005; Epps, 2010; Henson and 
Reardon, 2005; Herzfeld et al., 2008). This additional aspect directly affects the research question. 
The hypothetical result of the analysis that EU public actors are not concerned with consumer 
protection in their exchanges with China on food safety, would need to be interpreted differently 
depending on the role of private regulation. EU public actors could – explicitly or implicitly – 
have delegated the task of ensuring safe food import to private actors. This would be a different 
situation from a total neglect of consumer protection interests at all. 
The research question is inherently political. It asks which interests are served – the interest in the 
protection of consumers health or the interests in fluent trade for businesses. This is not to say that 
both objectives contradict each other. What is more, food safety is not exclusively an interest of 
consumers and trade is not exclusively an interest of businesses. As far as trade generates positive 
economic effects, consumers also profit from it. Likewise, import of unsafe food and food scandals 
are bad for business, too. Nevertheless, it is the balance between them that matters. It has effects 
on consumers and markets and thus is likely to be subject to influence from different interests. At 
the end, the balance reflects power distribution and interest constellations. Likewise, the 
relationship between public and private regulation itself is of political nature. Shifting 
responsibilities for ensuring import safety would go along with shifting abilities for public actors 
to control food safety, shifting power relations and new questions about legitimacy.  
1.4 A case that fills a blank spot in the existing literature 
Researchers have touched upon many of the topics relating to the research question presented 
here. I will present the relevant literature in detail in chapter 2 and 3. Here, I use a brief review of 
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existing research to demonstrate that an analysis of regulatory interdependencies between EU and 
China in the area of food safety has not yet been sufficiently provided. 
Firstly, regulatory interdependencies in the area of food indeed are a long-standing topic in the 
literature, especially with relation to the WTO (e.g. Dawson, 1995; Boutrif, 2003; Gehring, 2004; 
Büthe, 2009). However, scholars studying bilateral regulatory interdependencies so far have 
focused on the conflicts between highly regulated markets (see especially the debates about beef 
hormones, genetically modified organisms and the precautionary principle between the United 
States of America (USA) and the EU, e.g. Jasanoff, 2005; Clavier, 2008; Eggers, 2001; Scherzberg, 
2006; Alemanno, 2004; Josling, 2008; Vogel and Lynch, 2001; Drezner, 2005) and between less 
developed countries and highly regulated markets (e.g. Frohberg et al., 2006; Laforce, 2010; 
Wilson and Otsuki, 2004; Chemnitz, 2012). As I show in detail 2.2.2.2.1, the relation between the 
EU and China does not match neither of the categories, because the EU and China present markets 
of similar size but differing qualities of food safety regulation. Secondly, the EU’s import safety 
policy and measures have hardly been subject to research. Weimer and Vos (2015) deserve credit 
for providing a general analysis of the EU’s approach based on the GFL. However, their focus lies 
on discussing activities explicitly addressing import safety problems. Thus, they do not cover the 
wider picture in which economic interests may motivate activities to influence third states food 
safety regulation. Thirdly, a number of studies have analysed China’s perspective on regulatory 
interdependence and how the country has been affected by international food safety norms or 
food safety regulation of importing states. Indeed, China has struggled to comply with import 
regulations (Disdier et al., 2008; Dong and Jensen, 2007). For example, Chen et al. show, that 
China’s agricultural exports were significantly restrained by import countries food safety 
regulations (2008). Yue et al. provide a similar analysis for tea exports to the EU after the 
introduction of a stricter regulation and found that tea exports did not drop as sharply in reality as 
their model suggested (2010). Mangelsdorf et al. suggest, based on their findings, that China 
should harmonise its standards with international norms to avoid such export losses (2012). Lu and 
Kjeldsen-Kragh argue that indeed international standards already had positive impact on China’s 
food safety regulation (2008). While this research is helpful for understanding the situation for 
China, it does not provide answers on the specific EU-China relation. What is more, research on 
the role and influence of private food safety regulation on China is fragmentary at best. Jensen and 
Zhou (2015) as well as Sheng et al. (2009) and Zhang et al. (2015b) discuss the development of 
private standards, certification systems and voluntary forms of food safety regulation in China, but 
all fail to discuss the role of TPS. Unnevehr and Hoffmann (2015) urge China to make more use of 
public-private forms regulation, including TPS. However, they do not analyse whether and how 
such private standards exert influence on China’s food safety regulation. 
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1.5 The approach to the single case study 
I place this study in a research tradition that values the insights of a detailed description of a single 
case. Representatives of this tradition argue that the widely used scientific concept of identifying 
causal effects by statistical means falls short of reflecting the causal complexity of social 
phenomena (Mayntz, 2002a). In fact, such variable-based research runs into numerous problems 
when applied to social research, as for example there often are not enough comparable cases to 
isolate specific causal variables (the so-called small-N problem) (Mayntz, 2002b, p. 11). The 
discussion above illustrated the complexity of the case already. First, it does not fit into the 
typically discussed categories of regulatory interdependence. Hence, identified mechanisms of 
how actors deal with regulatory interdependency may not hold true for China. What is more, the 
inclusion of a public and private level additionally adds to the complexity of the process. Thus, I 
rather aim at identifying a causal explanation of the phenomena that is based on an as detailed as 
possible description to do justice to the specifics of the case. The task is to search for an 
explanation that is just as complex as it needs to be to explain the phenomena (Mayntz, 2002b, p. 
13). A deterministic understanding of causality provides an alternative methodology to the 
probabilistic, variable-centric thinking dominant in social sciences. In this approach, the task is to 
identify causal mechanisms instead of causal effects, which provide a step-by-step explanation of 
the phenomena. The method to identify causal mechanism is process tracing, a qualitative method 
which aims at retracing the causal elements within a historical development (George and Bennett, 
2005, pp. chap 10). The idea is to identify all causal parts which are each necessary and together 
sufficient to explain the result. The aim of the study is to develop an explanation of a specific 
outcome, namely the EU’s activities to influence China’s food safety regulation. Thus, I conduct an 
explaining-outcome variant of process tracing.  
The analysis includes the period starting in 2001 and ending in 2014. The starting point is marked 
by the accession of China to the WTO, when it truly became part of the world food economy 
(Wang et al., 2013, p. 114). With the accession, the WTO rules applied to EU-China trade and 
thus the institutional framework for the trade relations was set. The observation period ends by 
the end of 2014, when China had started to revise its 2009 Food Safety Law. Based on the theories 
of regulatory interdependence I deduced a research heuristic that guides my research. It identifies 
ex ante four potential causal parts for the causal mechanism: trade direction, the state of China’s 
food safety regulation, third parties, and public-private interactions. Reflecting the differentiation 
between public and private actors, the essential unit of my analysis are actors. My research 
heuristic furthermore is based on rationalist assumptions. While the research heuristic served as a 
guidance, the analysis was conducted in an explorative manner so that potential additional case-
specific parts of the causal mechanism would not be missed. The research was based on official 
documents, media reports and interviews with European and Chinese experts. 
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1.6 Structure of the thesis 
In this introduction, I rode rather quickly through my argument for the case and I made several 
assumptions and claims that require more exploration. The next three chapters serve this end and 
unfold the case more in detail. Chapter two provides clarification with regard to the theoretical 
foundation and deduces the hypotheses and research heuristic step by step. Chapter 3 proceeds by 
clarifying the context for the case. This is an important step, as a single case-analysis should not 
operate with a “ceteris paribus” assumption, but needs to account for the specific historical 
circumstances (Mayntz, 2002b, p. 22). As part of this, I substantiate the claim that China 
experienced an especially severe case of food safety crisis. I furthermore explain the EU’s existing 
import safety regime as well as the history and development of TPS. I also introduce the structures 
and regime of the intergovernmental global food safety. Lastly, I recap the relationship between 
public food safety regulation and TPS. Chapter 4 details the ontological and epistemological 
foundations and specific methods applied in the following research. Chapter 5 presents the 
empirical data, the case itself, in a structured manner following the research heuristic. In chapter 6 
I proceed by discussing additional conditions that I found during the process tracing. I use them in 
conjunction with the no empirically specified and validated pre-defined conditions to formulate 
four causal mechanisms. Each causal mechanism explains a specific part of the outcome. In the last 
chapter, I conclude by summarizing the results, discussing how my findings connect to existing 
theories and suggest areas for further research. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to produce a heuristic model and hypotheses that guide my research 
of the motives and mechanisms behind public and private EU influence on China’s food safety 
regulation. My starting point is that any measures undertaken by the EU to exert influence on 
China’s food safety regulation are a response to regulatory interdependence. Therefore, I firstly 
review theories that address questions of regulatory interdependence. This literature reflects the 
appreciation of regulation scholars that regulatory politics have a strong international dimension – 
partly due to the nature of regulatory problems and partly due to the globalisation of markets. 
Regulatory interdependence and response thereto is strongly connected to the specific concept of 
regulation. Since the late 1990s scholars increasingly question a number of assumptions of 
regulation theories. In doing so, the theoretical discourse reflects changes in the relationships 
between governments, markets and civil society which have been observed. A distinction can be 
made between “old” state-centred approaches and “new” society-centred approaches (Levi-Faur, 
2011a, p. 3).10 While society-centred approaches are better equipped to grasp the full picture – 
which per se makes them especially useful for a single case study – state-centred theories 
contribute to our understanding of the potential mechanisms and motives of transfer of regulatory 
policies between states. Besides, society-centred theories are not in strict opposition to state-
centred approaches. They rather widen the perspective for analysis for example in terms of actors, 
instruments and mechanisms. Consequently, the following literature review in the firsts section of 
this chapter includes both state-centred and society-centred perspectives. I discuss the different 
approaches with the research question in mind and ask: what can they contribute to our 
understanding of the motives and mechanisms behind EU’s activities to influence of China’s food 
safety regulation?  
                                                          
10 Admittedly, portraying different perspectives on regulation as an evolution of a theoretical development is 
a simplification. Of course, different understandings of regulation did and do exist in parallel and concepts 
do overlap. Nevertheless, scholarly view of regulation did change over time. For the idea to think of 
different perspectives on regulation as evolutionary see for example Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004) as well as 
Salles-Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson (2007a, p. 5). 
Theory: 
Responses to regulatory interdependence 
 
14 
The second section of this chapter builds on the literature review. I identify import safety and 
market access as two motivations why EU public and private actors may exert influence on 
China’s food safety regulation. Furthermore, I describe the set of conditions which potentially are 
relevant for the causal mechanism behind theses motivations. Taken together, they form the 
research heuristic for guiding the analysis of the specific case. In this section, I also operationalise 
the research heuristic by defining expectations for each of the research heuristic’s aspects. The 
expectations determine what I need to concentrate on when analysing the case. The last section 
provides a conclusion of the theoretical discussion. 
2.1 Review of regulatory interdependence literature 
The review of the literature in this section shows how the academic discourses about regulation 
and about regulatory interdependence developed together. International relations theory and 
especially literature on international political economy contribute to the analysis and 
understanding of regulation beyond the nation state and which addresses regulatory 
interdependencies.11 The approaches generally differ in which actors are to be considered in the 
analysis. Some theories maintain the assumption that international relations are predominantly 
shaped by nation states, as (neo)realist international relations theory argues (Waltz, 1979). 
However, the idea of transnationalism has led to the inclusion of a wider set of public and private 
actors and institutions (Keohane and Nye, 1971; Risse-Kappen, 1995). This thinking is based on 
the claim that reality has changed. As Cerny argues, from a rationalist perspective, globalization – 
and with this the rise of regulatory externalities – has changed the rules of the game states find 
themselves in, affecting the logic of collective action and paving the way to transnational 
approaches (1995, p. 595). The distinction between these two broadly summarized schools of 
thought connects with the state-centred vs. society-centred distinction in regulation studies made 
above. The different assumptions of state-centred and society-centred are reflected on the 
international level by intergovernmental accounts on the one side and transnational approaches 
for regulation on the other side. Intergovernmental approaches focus on how states cooperate to 
address regulatory interdependencies, aim at explaining the emergence of specific international 
regulations, and explore the conditions for and ways by which regulation of one state influences 
the regulatory approaches of others. Transnational literature focuses on the emergence of private 
global politics and how such private regulation relates to, influences and interacts with state 
regulation. Both will now be discussed in turn with regard to their theoretical value for the 
                                                          
11 For definitional clarity: By “international”, I refer to the system in which states interact with each other. 
By “transnational”, I refer to the system in which numerous multilevel-interactions are possible conducted 
by a wide set of actors including states, public and private profit and non-profit organisations and 
individuals. I agree with Salles-Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson that the term “global” is too unspecific and 
avoid its usage (cf. 2007a, pp. 3–4). 
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research objective. Before entering into this review, however, I first clarify the rationalist concept 
of regulatory interdependence itself. 
2.1.1 Types of externalities in regulatory interdependence 
It is a simple observation that there are specific regulatory problems which embody an 
international or even global dimension. Climate change and the regulation of global commons are 
two examples among many (cf. Vogler, 1995). Conceptualized theoretically, the international 
character derives from interdependencies. There are different types of regulatory 
interdependencies. The purpose here is to specify, what nature of regulatory interdependencies 
apply in the case of EU-China relation with respect to food safety regulation. The starting point is 
to interpret interdependencies in social regulation as externalities (Abbott and Snidal, 2001, p. 
351). Abbott and Snidal distinguish physical and regulatory externalities. A physical externality 
refers to the traditional understanding of externalities originally defined by Pigou as a situation “in 
which one actor’s conduct physically affects another”, and they “occur relatively independently of 
the affected actor’s conduct” (Abbott and Snidal, 2001, p. 351). This is most evident with 
environmental issues. While a nation state experiences the negative effects of some sort of 
pollution, the sources might reside outside of the nation’s territory and thus outside the regulatory 
reach of the national government. Similarly, in other cases regulatory coordination and 
cooperation between nations is needed because single national regulations are insufficient to 
tackle a specific problem. For example, international regulation is necessary where global common 
goods are involved – i.e. the oceans, North and South Pole, outer space, atmosphere (Vogler, 1995; 
Janning, 2008, pp. 116–117).  
In contrast, regulatory externalities describe a situation in which national regulation itself 
negatively affects foreign actors (Abbott and Snidal, 2001, p. 352).12 The transmitter for these 
regulatory externalities is the market. Thus, globalization, here defined with Drezner as “the 
cluster of technological, economic, and political processes that drastically reduce the barriers to 
economic exchange across borders” (2008, p. 10), created and amplified regulatory externalities for 
states. Firstly, the more supply chains have spread across the world, the less single nation states are 
able to achieve their desired regulatory objective. Market actors can escape the regulatory reach of 
single states, leading in turn to a demand for international regulation by nations (Baldwin et al., 
2012, p. 373). Secondly, globalization intensified regulatory interdependence between countries. 
Domestic regulation of a specific state potentially affects others: protective social regulation in 
nation A has effects on markets and welfare in other nations while relaxed regulation may 
increase negative physical externalities effects for them. Thus, with increasing trade, the 
distinction between domestic and international regulation gets blurred (Vogel, 1995, pp. 12–13).  
                                                          
12 Abbott and Snidal use the term “policy externality” (2001, p. 352). 
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To be sure, international regulatory interdependence also goes the other way. Portraying states 
only as “victims” that need to react to external pressures is only part of the full picture. The 
concepts of special interest and capture theory (Stigler, 1971, p. 3), see also (Mitnick, 2011)) 
remind us that regulation can equally be used to pursue specific goals other than serving public 
interests of public health or environmental protection – just to mention some examples. Protective 
regulation can generate competitive advantages for a country’s economy or even for single firms 
within this country over other countries (and their firms). Similarly, international regulation can 
be used to further aims of specific states at the costs of others. In other words, regulation can be a 
tool of statecraft as well (Vogel, 1995, p. 13, see also Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 375). 
The differentiation between physical and regulatory externalities contributes to the understanding 
of the motives behind the EU’s activities to influence China’s food safety. Safeguarding oneself 
against unsafe imports is a reaction to physical externalities of food and food safety regulation. 
However, I also need to verify, whether regulatory externalities may theoretically be a motive for 
the EU to exert influence on China’s food safety regulation. 
2.1.2 State-centred perspective 
This part will give an overview of state-centred international political economy theories that deal 
with regulatory interdependencies and international regulation. The literature broadly aims to 
answer two questions. First, scholars in this field discuss how international regulation emerged, 
how it is organized and how both can be explained. This also includes the question, who has most 
influence on the specific content of regulation. While the learnings from this research strand are 
very valuable for our understanding, it is the second body of literature that provides clues for the 
case under investigation. It discusses how and why certain nation states adopt external regulatory 
approaches of other nations. Therefore, I will provide a summary of literature concerned with the 
former aspect. The related theories deliver insights in mechanisms and causal chains. Before 
starting with the review, the corresponding state-centred definition of regulation will be provided 
which I will later contrast with the society-centred definition (see 2.1.3). 
2.1.2.1 State-centred understanding of regulation and regulatory regimes 
Selznick defines regulation as “sustained and focussed control exercised by a public agency over 
activities that are valued by the community” (Selznick, 1985, p. 363). His widely used and cited 
definition is rooted in a strong state-centred perspective and highlights the importance of 
regulating actors. The state-centred perspective (implicitly or explicitly) assumes that relevant 
regulators are those which have a legal mandate (i.e. governments, EU administrative bodies, 
international treaty-based organisations). Regulation moreover is based on hard law, which is 
legally binding and mandatory. Even within the state-centric academic discourse, it has been 
acknowledged that this understanding is too narrow. The concept of the (new) regulatory state 
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(Majone, 1997; Braithwaite, 2000) made two important contributions the discussion about 
regulation. First, the concept of the regulatory state introduced a number of aspects that go 
beyond an understanding of regulation as being exerted by government bodies in a command-and-
control style (Levi-Faur, 2011b, p. 663). It draws the attention to the fact that regulation can be 
exerted in different ways and via various mechanisms including soft law. Moreover, the discussion 
of the regulatory state drew attention to the expanding role of regulatory politics and with this to 
a changing character of many (western) nation states that opened up spaces for private actors to 
take over regulatory responsibilities. Lastly, the regulatory state acknowledges the international 
regulatory interdependence of nation states. In sum, the major achievement of the regulatory state 
was to expands the focus of analysis beyond a mere discussion of what governments do to regulate 
national societies and markets.  
The discussion about the regulatory state was mostly concerned with observation that regulation 
had increased in importance as a means for state to carry out is functions. Institutionalists added 
regulatory regimes as yet another concept to the analysis of regulatory politics. It has been 
introduced to denote a more complex understanding of how regulation constitutes itself. Analysts 
of regulatory regimes adopt the concept of regimes established in international relations theory 
(Krasner, 1983a). According to the widely used definition by Krasner, international regimes are 
"sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actor's expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Krasner, 1983b, p. 2).13 
The core idea behind applying the regime concept is that regulatory policies can better be 
understood as combinations of different aspects that together form specific types of regulation 
which in turn can be distinguished from other types. The notion of regulatory regime thus can be 
seen as an anatomy to a view of regulation by a single regulator (Levi-Faur, 2011a, p. 13; Scott, 
2011, p. 564). Accordingly, Eisner initially defined a regulatory regime as “a historically specific 
configuration of policies and institutions which structures the relationship between social 
interests, the state, and economic actors in multiple sectors of the economy” (Eisner, 1993, p. 1). 
The concept found wide acceptance and has initially been used in national (e.g. Eisner, 1993), EU 
(e.g. Hood et al., 2001; Eberlein and Grande, 2005) and in international contexts. In the latter case, 
it was applied to analyse state responses to regulatory interdependencies (e.g. Gehring and 
Oberthür, 1997).14 This in turn marks the concept’s relevance for the analysis here. 
                                                          
13 To be sure, international regime analysis comprises more than the analysis of international regulatory 
regimes, e.g. security regimes (Janning, 2008; Hasenclever et al., 1997). 
14 Regulatory regimes can be differentiated further. For example, Janning distinguishes three types of 
regulatory regimes discussed in the literature: social welfare regimes, regulatory regimes, and risk regulation 
regimes (2008, pp. 119–120). Risk regulation regimes themselves are not a uniform phenomenon but vary 
strongly in number of ways, as Hood et al. showed in their analysis of nine UK and EU risk regulation 
regimes (2001).  
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2.1.2.2 Intergovernmental analysis of regulatory interdependence 
From a state-centred perspective, regulation on the international level has an intergovernmental 
character and is based on treaties among nation states. It has become subject to a virtually 
unmanageable amount of international relations literature. International regulation is explained 
by cooperation and/or coercion (by more powerful states over less powerful states), depending on 
the theoretical perspective on international relations. In many instances, this literature is 
interested in explaining why specific forms international cooperation between states have 
emerged, which limits its relevance to the topic of my thesis. Nevertheless, selected parts of the 
literature are especially enlightening with regard to why and how state actors exert influence on 
regulations of others. In the following paragraphs, I review those parts of the literature that 
provide insights in this regard. 
I start with those scholars, who highlight cooperation rather than coercion. For them, the concept 
of international regimes plays a major role in state-centred interpretations of international 
regulation. Early and later work of neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Keohane, 
1984; Keohane, 1989; Milner and Moravcsik, 2009) and regime theory (Krasner, 1983a; 
Hasenclever et al., 1997) provide the explanatory arguments for international institutions and 
regimes. Large parts of the international regime literature deal with environmental regulation (cf. 
Breitmeier et al., 2007; Gehring, 1994). In essence, neoliberal institutionalism argues that the very 
nature of the issue itself plus the ability of nation states to build trust in each other via repeated 
interaction form the basis for international cooperation. What this rich body of literature shows is 
that an analysis about regulatory interdependence needs to consider the existing international 
institutions in this regulatory field and their potential influence. However, the specifics of 
international regulation remain under-theorized in this literature, as Mattli and Woods argue 
(2009c, p. 2). They developed a theoretical framework that aims to explain why need for 
international regulation is articulated and what other conditions are necessary for the 
establishment of international regulation (Mattli and Woods, 2009a). They explicitly contribute to 
the theoretical debate that aims at explaining international regulation as part of a state-centred 
perspective. They are distinct however in that they include non-governmental actors. To his end, 
they apply the concept of “entrepreneurs of regulatory change” (Mattli and Woods, 2009a, p. 32). 
Entrepreneurs are actors that have the ability to mobilize societal support for a specific regulation. 
Which regulation a nation state supports on the international level depends on the power of such 
entrepreneurs of regulatory change to influence the respective governments position. Here, the 
concept of regulatory capture comes in, which (Mattli and Woods) transfer from the domestic to 
the transnational level. Just as for regulation in domestic boundaries, the question remains, 
whether regulation serves public interest or whether it serves special interests that are able to 
influence regulatory politics in a given field (Mattli and Woods, 2009a). In essence, they argue 
that for regulation to be in public interest it needs institutional supply of procedural quality and 
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robust societal demand (Mattli and Woods, 2009a, p. 15). The concept of Mattli and Woods shows 
that specific interest groups may influence the objective with which nation states try to influence 
international regulatory regimes. Thus, the position of nation states may reflect “narrow vested 
interests” rather than “wider public purposes” (like food safety) (Mattli and Woods, 2009b).  
Theories stressing coercion over cooperation are less specific about where the specific motivation 
for a nation state to influence international regulation comes from. Their strength lies in providing 
arguments, how regulation is shaped in the powerplay between nation states. Drezner (2008) and 
Simmons (2001) both offer explanations for regulatory regimes and for harmonisation of 
international regulation. They share the neo-realist inspired assumption, that coercion and thus 
power is the crucial causal element explaining specific regulation. One must look at the 
hegemonic state or “great powers” respectively, they argue. In this perspective, internationally 
agreed regulation in treaties, institutions and regimes are subordinated under a more fundamental 
logic of coercion. Simmons aims at explaining harmonization processes by showing what role 
market incentives, international institutions and political pressure play. She models regulatory 
coordination around a hegemon, a dominant “regulatory innovator”. Using financial regulation as 
a case with the USA as the dominant regulatory innovator, she argues, that two factors are 
decisive for the variation of harmonisation. First, the incentive to emulate the regulation of the 
dominant power by other states. Second, the significance of the external effects of non-emulation 
as seen from the hegemon’s perspective (Simmons, 2001, p. 591). With this framework, she 
explains the emergence of four types of harmonisation, namely market harmonization with 
institutional assistance (high incentive to emulate and significant negative externalities in case of 
no emulation), political harmonization through centralized pressure (low incentive to emulate and 
significant negative externalities), decentralized market harmonization (high incentive to emulate 
and insignificant negative externalities), and no harmonization (low incentive to emulate and 
insignificant negative externalities). By going through four cases, each representing one of the four 
types, Simmons can confirm the expectations derived from her theoretical argument.15 Namely, 
she showed for each type a different strategy by the dominant power and accordingly different 
roles for institutions to play. Mattli and Woods point out a major weakness of Simmons approach: 
The field of finance is unique and a dominant innovative regulator cannot be assumed for many 
other regulatory areas. Without such a dominant state, however, the theory falters (Mattli and 
Woods, 2009a, p. 7). Thus, while Simmons may have identified important causal drivers, she looks 
at a somewhat narrow constellation. 
Drezner (2008) avoids the restrictive condition of a single hegemon by arguing that global 
regulation predominantly depends on the two great powers EU and USA and their preferences and 
                                                          
15 The cases she chose are capital adequacy, anti-money laundering, accounting standards for public 
offerings, information sharing among securities regulators. 
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capabilities. With his framework, he explicitly puts forward the argument that nothing but states 
matter in global regulation. The great powers, he argues, are capable of forcing other nations to 
adopt standards that serve their preferences. Whenever they can agree on a specific regulation, it 
becomes global standard. In case both cannot agree on a standard, both standards compete over 
other nations to follow them and the outcome is convergence to both standards across the globe. 
He also argues that once a great power feels that international institutions are against its 
preferences, it will start forum shopping, trying to dwarf unfavourable institutions. The 
capabilities of a great power are based on its market size and thus market power. Nation states’ 
preferences originate in domestic circumstances, he argues, and derive from the costs an economy 
has to bear if it adjusts to a foreign regulation (Drezner, 2008, p. 32). Although heavily based on 
neorealist thinking, Drezner does include private actors in a liberal intergovernmentalist sense. 
On the domestic level, private actors, namely companies, account for preference formation. This 
thus is an indirect reference to state-centred theories to explain how companies influence 
government regulation (e.g. capture theory). However, Drezner is more concerned with the 
international level. Here, his theory holds that non-state actors do not affect the outcome of the 
interplay between the two great powers. While all sort of actors may have influence on global 
governance processes, the ability to conduct forum-shopping marginalizes their effect on global 
regulation (Drezner, 2008, pp. 63–64).  
Simmons and Drezner both show that the question of international regulation and international 
regulatory regimes is directly connected to the question, why specific regulation is adopted by 
certain states which comes from other countries. Their works indicate, how closely international 
regulation research is connected to policy diffusion literature (and its variations like policy 
convergence, policy learning, and policy transfer literature, Baldwin et al., 2012, pp. 384–386; 
Holzinger et al., 2007; Stone, 2012).16 In this perspective, the international dimension of regulation 
manifests itself in what has been termed the “second image reversed”, that is the “international 
sources of domestic politics” (Gourevitch, 1978). In this academic and popular debate, a re-
occurring notion is that globalized markets put pressure on nation states to relax their regulation, 
because strict regulation is a competitive disadvantage. This, the argument goes, results in a race to 
the bottom. This causal logic has been questioned by many scholars, because empirical evidence is 
limited (e.g. Vogel, 1995; Drezner, 2008; Lazer, 2001). This strand of literature makes and qualifies 
the important point that markets and market power play specific causal roles in shaping 
regulation. A prominent theory that qualifies the effects of trade on domestic regulation has been 
                                                          
16 I do not use the terms policy diffusion and its variations as they are misleading with regard to my research 
objective. The policy diffusion and policy transfer discourse is widely associated with the analysis of the 
country which has transferred policy from somewhere else. My analysis, in contrast, is concerned with the 
“provider” of policies to be transferred. While policy transfer allows for this perspective, the prevailing 
understanding in the literature and its focus on the “receiver” side is misleading for the analysis presented 
here (cf. Evans, 2009a, pp. 238–239). 
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developed by Vogel (1995). On the case of Californian automobile emission standards for air 
quality, Vogel shows that stricter regulation by one US state can lead to the adoption of similarly 
strict standards by others, thereby spiralling air quality regulation upwards. The logic of the 
“California Effect” (CE), he argues, can be applied internationally as well. Trade can lead to 
domestic pressures in the exporting country to upgrade regulation: „In sum, the California effect 
focuses on the role of market forces in leading to the adoption of stricter regulatory standards by 
producers in a nation's trading partners” (Vogel and Kagan, 2004, p. 14). Drawing on Baptist-
bootlegger-argumentation (Yandle, 2011), the CE is strongly based on the self-interest of 
exporting producers. They have to fulfil stricter standards for export anyway. Therefore, they have 
a strong interest in gaining competitive advantage domestically by upgrading regulation to this 
export-standard (Vogel, 1995, p. 260). In a critical revision, Vogel and Kagan developed four 
criteria for the CE to take effect: First, the exporting nation's biggest export market has to have 
„significantly stricter standards”. Second, the larger the relative size of the importing market with 
stricter standards compared to the exporting nations market, the more likely is an adoption of the 
stricter standards by the exporting country. Third, the cost of the regulatory change in the 
exporting nation needs to be lower compared to the benefits of gaining access to the importing 
nation's market. Fourth, the CE is more likely for product standards than production standards 
(Vogel and Kagan, 2004, pp. 14–15). 
Lazer (2001; 2006) includes the CE in a more comprehensive framework to explain diffusion of 
regulatory policies. He distinguishes three modes of regulatory interdependence: competitive 
mode, coordinative mode, and informational mode (Lazer, 2001). Interdependence in a given 
regulatory field is not exclusively driven by one of these factors, rather some element of all three 
can be involved. The competitive mode denotes a prisoner’s dilemma situation, just as introduced 
above, which implies that every nation state has an advantage in choosing a different regulation 
but all are worse off when all countries do so (Lazer, 2001, p. 476). The assumption is that nation 
states essentially care about their competitiveness, potentially leading to a “race to the bottom”. In 
the coordinative mode, Lazer specifies the logic of the CE and extends the argument towards other 
scenarios – aspects, on which Vogel and Kagan only touch upon (see 2004). In this situation, the 
prisoner dilemma situation is overcome, because market access and economies of scale drive the 
convergence of exporting states regulations to those of the importing state. Market access refers to 
the product and process standards. If different standards for domestic and export markets apply, 
different products might need to be produced. Depending on the cost structure, it is more efficient 
to apply the export market standard to all products produced (Lazer, 2001, p. 477). Economies of 
scale raise the incentive for businesses to follow one standard in order to reduce the cost per unit. 
High transaction costs due to differing product or process standards and strong economies of scale 
thus form the incentive for exporting states to adjust their regulation to the importing markets 
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regulation.17 Under the coordinative mode, four outcomes are theoretically possible: race to the 
top, race together, hegemony and no convergence (Lazer, 2001, pp. 477–480). The third mode 
acknowledges that regulatory interdependency also leads to diffusion of information. The 
informational mode implies that information about regulation and the experience with specific 
regulation in one country informs regulators in other countries. There a myriad of ways, this 
information may flow and Lazer specifically includes non-governmental connections (Lazer, 2006, 
pp. 480–481).18 I close this discussion by changing the perspective. The above discussed 
mechanisms provide the EU with abilities to influence other countries regulation. Damro argues 
that therefore, the EU can be conceptualized as a Market Power Europe. This power, he argues, at 
times may be an unintentionally exerted power, but also explicitly is used intentionally by the EU 
(2012). 
2.1.2.3 Summary: learnings for analysing the case 
The state-centric literature on regulatory interdependence delivers a number of insights. To start 
with, states do cooperate internationally to resolve problems that result from externalities. In this 
context, research on international regulatory interdependence teaches us that international 
regimes and organisations play an important role in structuring and shaping bilateral relationships 
in many regulatory areas. The nature of the specific area, including the type of externalities, 
however, is an important factor in shaping international regulation. Food safety, without doubt, is 
one of those areas. However, doubt is in order with regard to the question how much they de facto 
affect actors’ behaviour. This depends on their effectiveness in serving the actors’ interests, as 
Drezner suggests. This requires a closer look at the international food safety regime and how it 
potentially affects EU-China relation. 
As regards the content of the regulation, neo-realist approaches stress that powerful states or 
sizeable markets have higher chances to establish their regulatory approaches within other 
countries. On a bilateral level, we can assert that regulatory interdependence leads to regulatory 
adaption. Such regulatory adaption is more likely, the bigger the markets size of the economy 
exported to. For Simmons, this is a basis for the incentives to emulate. For Drezner market size is 
the crucial criteria for defining great powers. Smaller markets bear the adjustments costs for 
regulation, he argues. For the CE and Lazer’s argumentation, export market size is an important 
condition for adopting regulation. They furthermore provide more specific arguments, how 
                                                          
17 In fact, Lazer’s modes of regulatory interdependence are similar to the different causal mechanisms for 
policy transfer that Holzinger et al. identified (2007). 
18 Vogel and Kagan also acknowledge ways beyond market mechanisms, in which nations with stricter 
regulation may influence the regulation of other states. First, international agreement or institutions can 
globalize standards. Second, informal mechanisms like demonstration effect. Vogel and Kagan explicitly 
stress, that those mechanisms can equally apply to product and process standards. However, they do not 
further elaborate on this mechanisms alternative to the CE (Vogel and Kagan, 2004, p. 15). 
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adaption process work. In short, all agree that a sizeable market is a sine qua non (Bach and 
Newman, 2007, p. 842). The core (implicit) argument is, that the economic attractiveness or even 
the dependency on export effect the willingness to adopt regulation from the export markets.  
The theoretical considerations on international regulatory interdependence presented here 
provide different causal mechanisms that either explain the occurrence of regulatory regimes or 
the adaption of regulation in bilateral relations. However, they do not provide much insights on 
the driving motives for states to push others to adopt a specific regulation. This void is filled by the 
proposition of (Mattli and Woods; 2009a) that both, public interest as well as special interests may 
play a role.  
There are further limitations to the state-centric perspectives on regulatory interdependence. 
First, the theories do not provide answer to the question how trading partners affected by physical 
externalities behave in a situation in which the relative market size is inconclusive. By 
inconclusive I refer to a situation in which the exporting nation’s market is not considerably 
smaller and therefore less or not at all depending on the importing market. The only mode that 
remains is the informational mode of regulatory diffusion suggested by Lazer. However, this mode 
and the related concepts of policy learning suggest a process which is rather driven by the 
exporting country itself. This, however, does not give any insights into why and how those 
affected by negative external effects behave. In other words, it is able to analyse the “pull” for 
regulatory adaption but not a “push”. Thus, the market-size-argument does provide theoretical 
guidance, but the explanatory power declines with the difference in market size in bilateral 
relations.  
Secondly, state-centred theories tend to not consider the possibility of harmonization of regulation 
on paper while, in reality, a lack of enforcement thwarts the supposed convergence. Linking 
regulatory harmonization with costs, like Drezner does, shows that implementation and 
enforcement are simply assumed to automatically follow rule-making. This however is a bold 
assumption. When enforcement cannot be assumed, the externality stays. Depending on the 
character and severity of this externality, such a situation runs counter to the interest of the state 
that longs to establish stricter regulation in order to ensure the safety of imports. Yet again the 
question remains, how actors behaves in such a situation. What therefore is needed, is a 
distinction between the rule- and enforcement-level of regulation. 
Lastly, these theories ignore the development of private regulation on the transnational level since 
they root in a state-centric understanding. As will be shown in the next section, a society-centred 
understanding of regulation on the transnational level adds important aspects to understand the 
full picture and furthermore is more open to distinguishing different aspects of regulation.  
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2.1.3 Society-centred perspective 
The society-centred perspective provides answers to the limitations of the state-centred 
perspective, which is why I will discuss it at lengths on the following pages. The focus of the 
society-centred discourse on regulatory interdependence primarily lies on describing the observed 
new phenomena of private regulation, explaining its emergence, assessing its relevance and 
developing a theoretical understanding of the connections within private regulation and in its 
relation to public regulation. I start with summarizing the understanding of society-centred 
regulation and contrast it with state-centred regulation (2.1.3.1 and 2.1.3.2). I then turn to the 
transnational dimension and show that regulatory interdependence becomes a much more 
complex assembly of actors and mechanisms if understood as transnational regulatory governance. 
2.1.3.1 Society-centred understanding of regulatory governance 
The regulatory state acknowledges that private actors are involved in regulation, however, 
ultimately it remained caught in the state-paradigm. The difference lies in what role private actors 
are being prescribed to. The regulatory state and other state-centric theories make reference to 
private regulation in the sense of outsourced regulatory service delivery. This renders it blind for a 
more complex understanding of regulation that includes transnational and hybrid forms (Levi-
Faur, 2011b, p. 668; Salles-Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2007a, p. 9). To do justice to the empirical 
observation of private actors getting involved in regulation, a post-regulatory state, that is an 
understanding of regulation decentred from the state, is necessary (Scott, 2004).19 
This shift follows a wider discussion, as regulation is closely tied to the concept of governance and 
the respective debate about “governance without government” (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). 
Regulation is an integral part of structuring and guiding human and social activities, while 
“[g]overnance includes regulation but goes well beyond” (Salles-Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 
2007a, p. 7, see also Eberlein et al., 2014, p. 3). On the other hand, regulation is distinct from 
governance since regulatory politics differ from other form of policies, like distributional and re-
distributional policies (Lowi, 1972, see also Levi-Faur, 2011a).20 This understanding is reflected in 
the notion of regulatory governance that implies firstly a concentration of the discussion on those 
aspects of governance that relate to regulatory politics only and secondly that regulatory politics 
follow broader trends of governance (Levi-Faur, 2011a). The academic discourse about governance 
introduced the idea that actors other than governments as well as modes other than hierarchy and 
market contribute to the organization of societies on more than just a single political level (cf. 
Benz et al., 2007; Schuppert and Zürn, 2008). Consequently, we need to analyse non-state actors 
and multi-level constellations when analysing regulation (Levi-Faur, 2011a). 
                                                          
19 This might well be understood in an evolutionary sense, just as Scott does when he argues for a decentred 
understanding of regulation with his notion of a post-regulatory state (Scott, 2004). 
20 In other traditions, distributional policies are included in the definition of regulation. For a brief summary 
of different understandings of regulation in this regard see Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004). 
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To name this wider understanding of regulation, I borrow the term “society-centred” from Levi-
Faur (2011a) and use it synonymously with “decentred”. I prefer the former, because it specifies 
where regulatory authority shifted to. The term “decentred regulation”, as it was introduced by 
Black, is associated with kicking off the debate and it did well in underlining the research task to 
“take seriously the notion [sic!] a ‘regulatory society’ in which we recognise that regulation is not 
‘centred’ on the state, but instead is ‘decentred’, diffused throughout society” (Black, 2002, p. 1). 
The same argument holds true for Abbott and Snidal (2009). They made strong contributions to 
the early development of the evolving area of research. Yet their term “new governance” 
remained too vague. 
In society-centred regulation actors can be non-state and lacking a legal mandate – an idea the 
regulatory state-debate did not consider. This leads to a wide range of public and private actors 
(representing business and civil society) and institutions that involve in regulation.21 Society-
centred regulation acknowledges that private actors are an important base for the government’s 
expertise, which cannot solely rely on bureaucratic knowledge. Regulation increasingly manifests 
itself in forms of soft law, which is often made by private actors and more importantly is non-
binding (Abbott and Snidal, 2009, pp. 509–532; Black, 2008, p. 139). The society-centred 
perspective takes into account that various ways of mixed forms of state- and non-state regulation 
are possible and is interested in analysing and understanding such hybrid forms of regulation 
(Black, 2008, p. 139; Levi-Faur, 2011a, p. 3).  
The central aspect of society-centred regulation is the change of the specific role ascribed to 
private actors. While from the early beginning of regulation research it has been acknowledged 
that private actors can influence regulation, a decentred view goes further in portraying private 
actors as regulators. The relevance of the fundamental new claim of the society-centred 
perspective that non-state actors act as regulators becomes most obvious by contrasting it to the 
understanding of private actors in regulatory politics that prevailed in previous regulation 
theories. Indeed, the influence of private actors does play a role in state-centred theories. 
However, it does so always in an indirect manner, mediated by public actors and institutions. The 
still influential economic theories of regulation like capture theory as well as the Baptist and 
bootlegger theory (Yandle, 2011) argue that special interests are able to influence regulation to 
their advantage. Stigler famously made the point that “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the 
industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit” (Stigler, 1971, p. 3). Hence, what 
looks like public regulation in fact serves the purpose of certain fractions of the society. In this 
perspective, private actors had influence on regulation, but did not exert regulation. 
                                                          
21 This reflects both a change in reality and a change in theoretical perspective. Abbott and Snidal argue that 
it is necessary to change the perspective to capture changes in regulatory politics in the world (Abbott and 
Snidal (2009). 
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A point on which scholars of society-centred approaches diverge is the degree to which 
government retain control. For Abbott and Snidal, the government maintains an important role in 
domestic regulation as the “orchestrator” of regulation on the national level. It “authorizes, 
empowers, and orchestrates the public and private actors and institutions to which it assigns 
regulatory responsibilities” and “acts to structure the regulatory network, e.g., to limit excessive 
influence by firms or other groups within private schemes, or to require that schemes observe 
basic procedural and substantive norms” (Abbott and Snidal, 2009, p. 544). It also keeps the 
capacity to intervene, when private regulation does not yield the results desired or otherwise 
needs modification (Abbott and Snidal, 2009, p. 544). In governance wording, new governance 
presumes a “shadow of hierarchy” (cf. Börzel, 2008). Studies confirm that the capacity of the 
government to be the ‘intervener of last resort’ can be important for the functioning of private 
regulation (Verbruggen, 2013). A strictly decentred perspective disputes this view. In this 
perspective, the behaviour of regulated actors is neither constant nor predictable and thus actors 
are considered to be ungovernable. No single actor can gain complete control over regulation. 
Decentred regulation therefore leads to the assumption that the distinction between public and 
private has collapsed and distinguishing between both is increasingly misleading (Black, 2002; 
Salles-Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2007a, p. 9). Rather, regulation “happens” without formal 
sanctions and manifests itself in hybrid forms comprising both public and private actors, organized 
in networks (Black, 2002, pp. 2–6). 
Given the multitude of actors and institutions involved in regulating a specific field, proponents of 
society-centred regulation picked up the idea of regulatory regimes (see 2.1.2.1) as a useful 
concept for the analysis of regulatory governance (Black, 2008; Cafaggi, 2011; Scott, 2011). The 
analytical value of the regime concept for regulatory governance research lies in softening the 
agency-focus and its flexibility to include a wider array of actors and institutions in the analysis 
(Scott, 2011; Levi-Faur, 2011a; Abels and Kobusch, 2010, p. 5). Indeed, regulatory regime analyses 
have shown the fragmentation of regulation at various levels of governance (Scott, 2011, p. 563). 
Black, with reference to (Hood et al; 2001), suggests that in society-centred perspective a 
“regulatory regime is a set of interrelated units which are engaged in joint problem solving to 
address a particular goal, its boundaries are defined by the definition of the problem being 
addressed, and it has some continuity over time” (Black, 2008, p. 139; Hood et al., 2001). 
Regulatory regimes are furthermore understood as polycentric with the degree of polycentricity 
depending on the fragmentation and dispersal of the regimes actors (Black, 2008, p. 139). 
2.1.3.2 Dimensions of regulation  
The society-centred understanding of regulation implies a concept of regulation, which 
distinguishes several dimensions. Among the first who developed such a multifaceted 
understanding of regulation were Ayres and Braithwaite with their notion of responsive 
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regulation (1992). They focused on the methods of enforcement and made suggestions how to 
improve its effectivity and efficiency. Based on the idea, others have separated regulation into a set 
of further dimensions (cf. Salles-Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2007a, pp. 12–13). While several 
authors suggest slightly different dimensions, they agree on the core idea to unfurl regulation 
along the policy cycle.22 For example, leading scholars in the field suggested to “disaggregate 
regulatory governance into six components: (i) framing the regulatory agenda and setting 
objectives; (ii) formulating rules or norms; (iii) implementing rules within targets; (iv) gathering 
information and monitoring behaviour; (v) responding to non-compliance via sanctions and other 
forms of enforcement; and (vi) evaluating policy and providing feedback, including review of 
rules” (Eberlein et al., 2014, p. 6). A large part of regulation literature – explicitly or implicitly – 
focusses on the first two dimensions. Indeed, some understand regulation as being primarily rule-
making (Levi-Faur, 2011a, p. 4). State-centred regulation theories like capture theory implicitly 
are concerned with the processes and outcomes of rule making only (cf. Mitnick, 2011; Yandle, 
2011). The explanation for this presumably lies in the strong command-and-control understanding 
of regulation in combination with the countries in which these theories root. For western 
democracies, it is simply assumed that regulatory rules that have been adopted will be enforced. 
With the disappearance of strict state-controlled forms of regulation, this assumption has become 
questionable.  
The analogy to the policy cycle already indicates that, arguable, the phenomena and challenges of 
regulatory governance in each of these dimensions differ. For example, for rule-making the 
discussion is about who has influence on the content of regulation, why and how so, as well as 
what are the interests behind it? This relates to the questions of legitimacy and accountability. As 
regards enforcement, for example, other issues become relevant – like effectivity, efficiency, and 
capabilities. Conflating the phases or treating one of them as the full picture of regulation obscures 
the understanding of regulatory governance. If the mechanism and tools for regulation become 
more diverse, as the society-centred understanding of regulation suggests, forms of rule making, 
implementation, enforcement and evaluation do so, too. Consequently, the character and quality 
of regulatory governance increasingly depends on the properties of the different dimensions of 
regulation. Society-centred analyses of regulation furthermore profit from differentiating separate 
dimensions of regulation, because the composition of actors can vary between the different 
dimensions. For example, rule may be set by government alone while the responsibility for 
enforcement is shared between public and private organisations.  
                                                          
22 The policy cycle is widely used heuristic to analyse policies which assumes a number of typical subsequent 
steps in the development of a specific policy: (1) problem definition, (2) agenda setting, (3) formulation of 
policy, (4) implementation, (5) evaluation, (6) determination of policy (Blum and Schubert, 2009, p. 102). 
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2.1.3.3 Transnational regulatory governance perspective on regulatory interdependence 
Arguably, in society-centred perspective regulation transcends national borders. Private actors are 
not as much bound to them as nation states are. This has been reflected in the discourse of 
researchers about transnational regulatory governance. Regulatory governance has a transnational 
dimension when “regulation can have behavioural effects across territorial borders, while being 
driven by private constituents” (Verbruggen, 2013, p. 514, see also Fulponi, 2006, p. 4). 
Transnational regulatory governance research is supported by work focussing on private authority 
and on the global governance discourse.23 Scholars made the point that private authority in 
international politics, as they framed it, should not be neglected and needed a more thorough 
analysis (Cutler et al., 1999; Hall and Biersteker, 2002). Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) with their 
seminal work on global business regulation were one of the first who showed the importance of 
transnational actors and institutions in global regulatory affairs. In their empirical study across 13 
regulatory areas they made transparent that a wide array of different actors is involved in shaping 
regulation. This study marked the beginning of a still evolving academic discussion about 
transnational regulation (Levi-Faur and Starobin, 2014, pp. 9–10).24 It showed that non-state actors 
involve in regulatory affairs as response to regulatory interdependencies. Thus, they not only deal 
with technical conformity standards, but deeply reach into the field of regulatory standards 
dealing with physical or regulatory externalities (Eberlein et al., 2014, p. 3).  
Scholars inquiring into transnational regulatory governance share the believe that a transnational 
perspective adds to the understanding of regulation, because otherwise important developments 
are not captured. Transnational regulatory governance thus accounts for a change in the 
international regulatory landscape now characterized as pluralistic with regards to actors, 
institutions, mechanisms, and forms of governance (Baldwin et al., 2012; Levi-Faur and Starobin, 
2014; Salles-Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2007a; Abbott and Snidal, 2009; Cafaggi, 2012; Scott, 
2011). Abbott and Snidal (2009) provide a model of transnational regulatory governance (“new 
transnational governance” in their words) to account for these changes of regulation in the 
international realm that proves useful to discuss the phenomena in detail. As they point out, no 
domestic model of regulation can readily be applied to the international level. Thus, society-
centred regulation – like state-centred regulation –, they argue, looks different on the global level 
than it presents itself on the domestic level (Abbott and Snidal, 2009, p. 533). I discuss the features 
of transnational regulatory governance in the following paragraphs. 
First, in transnational regulatory governance regulatory authority is highly dispersed and 
decentralized, not only between states and non-state actors and institutions but also among the 
                                                          
23 It is my suggestion to use the term „transnational regulatory governance”. In the existing literature, no 
agreement on a label has been reached yet. 
24 The policy implications of private sector regulation in food business have already been discussed at a very 
early state of the development (Caswell and Henson, 1997, quoted in Buzby, 2003). 
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private. Private actors include non-governmental organisations (NGO) as well as businesses. This 
wide array of actors goes beyond an understanding of transnationalism in a transgovernmental 
sense as it is inherent in the concept of the regulatory state, that accounts for roles of international 
organisations, international activities of national public agencies or for example epistemic 
communities (Abbott and Snidal, 2009, p. 505). Like society-centred regulation claims for the 
domestic context, private actors complement or even have taken over regulatory tasks on the 
transnational level formerly solely performed by nation states (Büthe, 2010b, p. 1; Cafaggi, 2012). 
It thus has been argued, that on the international level the boundaries between state and non-state 
are increasingly blurring (Scott, 2011, p. 564). Such new forms of regulation constitute themselves 
in various forms of coalitions of either only private or private and public actors. Abbott and Snidal 
(2009) suggested a now widely used ‘governance triangle’ to map all possible actor-combinations 
in transnational regulatory governance. In this triangle, state actors are set in one corner, business 
actors in a second and civil-society actors in a third. Regulatory activities solely driven by one of 
these types are placed in the respective corner. Combinations either two types of actors are 
denoted between the respective corners. For example, instances in which NGOs and states jointly 
set, promulgate and implement regulation are placed between the state and NGO corner. Cases in 
which all three types of actors are involved cover the middle of the triangle. Following this logic, 
the governance triangle consists of seven zones of which three represent situation with one type 
of actor, another three represent cases of two types of actors and a single one represents cases of 
three types of actors. A number of different terms have been introduced in the discussion to 
denote such coalitions. Abbott and Snidal refer to them as “regulatory standard setting schemes” 
(Abbott and Snidal, 2009), other terms used are “transnational private regulation” (Scott et al., 
2011), “transnational standards” (Bartley, 2011), “private standards” (Marx et al., 2012), and 
“transnational business governance” (Eberlein et al., 2014), each of which highlights other aspects 
of the phenomena under discussion.  
The plethora of terms indicates a lack of clarity, what such new forms of regulatory initiatives are. 
Such new forms of regulatory initiatives can best be understood by transferring the regime 
concept. They are governance regimes concerned with regulation that combine networks of actors 
with institutional arrangements, sets of governance tools and methods (cf. Levi-Faur, 2011a; Scott, 
2011). With the regime concept a theoretical foundation is given for analysing the phenomena. 
Based on Scott, such governance regimes can be specified as coalitions of actors (state with non-
state or among non-state), which conduct all or some of the regulatory tasks (reaching from rule-
making to enforcement) in areas of social regulation. They are furthermore “transnational, rather 
than international, in the sense that their effects cross borders, but are not constituted through the 
cooperation of states as reflected in treaties (the latter being the principal territory of international 
law)” (Scott et al., 2011, p. 3). Non-state actors can represent civil society or business (also in form 
of associations and NGOs). Such regimes are often completely non-state (thus private), but public-
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private forms exist as well (as depicted in the governance triangle). I suggest denoting such 
regimes as transnational regulatory regimes, which encompasses (and thus can assume) the specific 
shapes of transnational private regulation, transnational private standards (TPS) and so forth.25 It is 
the latter, this case study is concerned about. The regime approach moreover allows for an 
aggregation of transnational regulatory regimes. For example, a number of transnational 
regulatory schemes in combination with intergovernmental regulation can be summarized and 
conceptualized as a forest protection regime or a food safety regime.  
The second feature of transnational regulatory governance directly flows from the previous: 
Expertise is similarly dispersed among a wide set of actors. The expertise of regulatory initiatives 
thus depends on the actors involved. The assumption is that regulation which involves different 
types of actors can mobilize a wider range of expertise compared to single-type regulation schemes 
(Abbott and Snidal, 2009, p. 543). This provides society-centred forms of regulation with an 
advantage compared to state-centred regulation. Third, transnational regulatory governance not 
only is characterized by a much wider range of regulatory mechanisms but more importantly by 
voluntary regulation, like codes, principles, procedures, standards (Abbott and Snidal, 2009, p. 
543). In comparison to hard law applied in traditional state or intergovernmental regulation, 
coerciveness is reduced or less direct. While most voluntary modes are associated with the 
emergence of new, private, actors, states also move to less coercive modes of regulation by 
applying soft law (Salles-Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2007b, p. 5). In line with these three 
identified features, Baldwin et al. have eloquently summarized the nature of transnational 
regulatory governance:  
“[…] [G]lobal regulation shifted from its basis in intergovernmental agreements and it 
came to represent an intermeshing of domestic and international, and often 
overlapping, regimes. As such, it came to follow the patterns associated with ‘decentred 
regulation’. Purely intergovernmental processes became less prominent and, instead, 
global regulation witnessed a pluralization of engaged parties, along with a growing 
number of regulatory orders that were engaged in a continuous process of 
renegotiation.” (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 426) 
The diagnosis of a transnational regulatory governance raises an essential question: why do private 
actors get involved in transnational regulatory governance? This question is directly linked to my 
research question, because the answers help to theorize about the motives of TPS to get involved 
in China. What is more, the answers to this question in the literature lead us into a deeper 
understanding of the characteristics of TPS. Salles-Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson (2007a) propose a 
framework for explaining transnational governance that explicitly does extend theories that were 
developed to explain intergovernmental regulation. However, it draws on sociological 
institutionalism, namely world society theory, stressing the importance of culture and institutions 
                                                          
25 For the conceptualisation of private standards as transnational regulatory regimes see Scott et al. (2011). 
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for the emergence and development of particular modes of governance. From this theoretical 
viewpoint, actors and their motives are not relevant to explain the phenomena. Yet, research 
suggests that motives and interests do matter. In their study of private regulatory rule-making on 
the global level, Büthe and Mattli (2013) demonstrate the limits of world society logic. They show 
that conflicts of interest between different actors, and hence motives, are of relevance and are 
only “obscured by the emphasis on culture, professional norms, technical expertise, or similar 
widely shared beliefs […]” (Büthe and Mattli, 2013, p. 201). 
Another explanation for the emergence of private regulation on the global level utilizes a supply 
and demand model, which implicates the consideration of interests. This theoretical concept has 
already been convincingly applied to analyse the emergence of regulation in other non-
transnational settings (Spruyt, 2001). Abbott and Snidal (2009) offer a straight forward variant of 
this approach to explain the emergence of transnational regulatory governance. Private regulation, 
they argue, has developed as a response to the ineffectiveness of state regulation on the 
international level. They remind us that – due to the nature of the international system that lacks 
a superior authority – states have a limited opportunity to “orchestrate” overall regulation. This is 
a fundamental difference compared to their power within the domestic context (Abbott and 
Snidal, 2009, pp. 541–545). In other words, transnational private regulation is a response to 
regulatory interdependencies and the nation states inability to regulate it. Cutler et al. (1999) 
exploit the demand and supply thinking more in detail to come to more detailed conclusions. Any 
economic activity, they argue, requires governance and thus some form of authority. If such 
authority is not provided, private actors may create institutions to provide it. They do so, because 
either nation states are not quick enough, lack (or are unwilling to provide) the resources or 
expertise or because states follow the ideological ideas of economic neoliberalism to leave this task 
to the market. Regardless of the specific reason, in any case, public actors leave a regulatory void 
for private actors to fill: “Private regulation may enhance public regulatory power by achieving 
goals, public actors alone would not (or only with considerable problems) have achieved” (Büthe, 
2010b, p. 22).26 The supply is provided by private actors, only when they gain from it. Potential 
benefits are increase in efficiency or market dominance (Cutler et al., 1999, see also Büthe, 2004).  
Private regulation offers some corresponding strengths to fill the void. For example, for private 
food standards it has been argued that they can be more specific and prescriptive compared to 
public standards (Havinga, 2006). They often add specifications about the “how” to public 
standards that only set the “what” (Epps, 2010, p. 75). Transnational regulatory governance 
                                                          
26 This view contrasts with literature that does acknowledge the emergence of non-state actors, however 
puts them in competition to states over influence. In such a zero-game perspective, the more influence non-
state actors gain, states loose influence (Salles-Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2007a, pp. 10–11). Indeed, it is 
one of the central issues of private regulation research to understand better whether private regulation 
diminishes public authority or strengthens overall regulation (Büthe, 2010a, p. 19; see also Cafaggi, 2011). 
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systems also have been argued to be more flexible and facilitate the adaption of regulation to 
specific circumstances (Abbott and Snidal, 2009, p. 552). Private food standards have been 
portrayed as much faster in adapting to new risks compared to public standards (Henson and 
Humphrey, 2012, p. 105). With regard to this discussion about effectivity of private regulation, the 
differentiation of regulation in separate dimensions – that is the agenda setting, rule-making, 
implementation and so forth as introduced above (2.1.3.2) – seems helpful. As Hood et al. point 
out, components of regulation other than standard setting are those components by which 
regulatory regimes “can often best be judged” (Hood et al., 2001, p. 21). Likewise, it has especially 
been argued for transnational regulatory governance that a focus on the first two dimensions of 
regulation (agenda setting and rule-making) is insufficient (Scott, 2011, p. 572). Its strengths may 
rather lie with implementation and enforcement. 
Büthe (2010b) makes the important point that while the demand and supply concept is valuable, 
one should be aware of its limitations. The assumptions of this microeconomic model cannot fully 
be transferred to the analysis of regulation. As there is no easy-to-exchange-unit like money, we 
cannot assume a long-term equilibrium between demand and supply of regulation. In contrast, the 
curves of supply and demand of regulation do not necessarily meet. Therefore, Büthe suggests that 
both – supply and demand – need to be analysed separately and in addition to that also their 
interaction (2010b, pp. 7–8). A second analytical trap lies in the assumption that on the demand 
side buyers and users are the very same actors. For regulation, in contrast, we need to differentiate 
between those demanding a specific regulation and those who may need to comply with it. 
Considering this difference is “crucial for understanding interests and agency in global regulation” 
(2010b, p. 8). Regardless of these limitations, the demand and supply theories provide an insightful 
approach to research the potential motives and interests that lead to involvement of private 
organisations in regulatory activities.  
Transnational regulatory governance furthermore raises the question of the exact relationship 
between private and public regulation. Depending on the specific field of regulation, the 
relationship has inter alia been described as intertwined (Havinga, 2012, p. 11), coexisting and 
competing for authority (Meidinger, 2009, p. 242), co-regulation (Garcia Martinez et al., 2007), 
meta-regulation by the state (Bomhoff and Meuwese, 2011), and in a most integrated version as 
hybrid (Levi-Faur, 2011a; Marsden et al., 2010).27 Eberlein et al. (2014) provide a suggestion, how 
to approach this question more systematically. They present a framework to analyse what they 
call transnational business governance interactions, defined as “the myriad ways in which 
governance actors and institutions engage with and react to one another” (2014, p. 2). This 
definition is broad by purpose in order to cope with the partly observed and partly presumed 
                                                          
27 Note that for Levi-Faur there are three different types of hybridity. Here I only refer to hybridity in the 
sense of a combination of public and private regulation (cf. Levi-Faur, 2011a). 
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variety of interactions, which “may be symmetrical or asymmetrical, antagonistic or synergistic, 
intentional or unintentional” (Eberlein et al., 2014, p. 3). The framework also goes beyond a mere 
analysis of interactions between public and private and explicitly includes within-private 
interactions as well. Existing research on interactions reveals that different analytical perspectives 
are possible. Interactions can be analysed on a micro-level (i.e. individuals and organisations 
interacting), meso-level (i.e. interaction between standards), and macro-level (i.e. regulatory 
complexes). Furthermore, interactions can be studied as factors producing effects or as outcomes 
(Eberlein et al., 2014, p. 6). The discussion of transnational business governance interactions 
primarily shows that interactions between public and private regulation (and the corresponding 
actors) needs to be taken seriously when analysing transnational regulatory governance, because 
the type of interaction is an important factor shaping the regulation in a given sector. 
Transnational regulatory governance suffers from a number of shortcomings, too. First, the sum of 
all public, private and public-private regulation does not necessarily cover all industries and 
products. Rather, overlaps have been observed (Abbott and Snidal, 2009, p. 547). Secondly, there 
is a disproportionate high number of single-actor regulation schemes. This point revives the 
debate about whether special interests are capable to put forward regulation that serves public 
interest, rather than merely their self-interest (Abbott and Snidal, 2009, p. 548). Third, its multi-
actor and multi-institutional character decreases efficiency of new transnational regulatory 
governance while at the same time opens opportunities for the regulated to subvert it by 
conducting “regulatory standard shopping” (Abbott and Snidal, 2009, pp. 551–552). What is more, 
legitimacy and accountability of transnational regulatory governance is questionable at best 
(Black, 2008; Levi-Faur, 2011a, p. 14). While the latter discussion is highly relevant for a 
normative assessment of transnational regulatory governance, it is not central to the question of 
my research.  
2.1.3.4 Summary: learnings for analysing the case 
If one is to accept the relevance and sophistication of private food safety regulation, it would be 
insufficient to explain public motivations for influencing China’s food safety regulation without 
considering transnational regulatory governance. This is the central finding from the above 
discussion. Society-centred regulation is the theoretical perspective on regulation which enables 
to include TPS in the analysis. It also requires a wider conception of regulation, as private 
regulation may appear as soft law. Society-centred regulation also includes the analytical 
distinction of separate dimensions of regulation. Differentiating between rule making, 
implementation and so forth helps to understand the different influence of public and private 
actors on the regulated.  
Transnational private regulation appears to have developed as a response to regulatory 
interdependence and the states inability (or unwillingness) to mitigate related externalities. Here, 
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transnational regulatory governance directly connects to the state-centred discourse laid out 
above. The rationalist approach to explain the emergence of private regulation by supply and 
demand delivers potential motives for private regulators. The suggestion is that the interest of 
private actors is to fill a regulatory void to their own benefit. A case-specific explanation therefore 
seems impossible without analysing the nature of this void. Arguably, the void also affects the 
nature of the interaction between public and private regulators and regulation which needs to be 
part of this analysis.  
The state-centred and society-centred discourses on regulatory interdependence provide a number 
of learnings which, however, so far appear as loose ends. In the following part, I draw some first 
conclusions for my research before I proceed with constructing a research heuristic based on these 
insights.  
2.1.4 Summary and discussion 
When relating the extended discussion of regulatory interdependence literature, state-centred as 
well as society-centred, to the specific case of EU’s motives to influence China’s food safety 
regulation and the question for the related causal mechanisms, the following considerations can be 
made. I order them alongside the line of my argument: 
 As discussed above (see 2.1.3.3), for regulation demand and supply do not necessarily meet 
and thus demand cannot explain supply. Supply needs to be explained out of itself. There 
may be oversupply or there may be undersupply. In any case, there needs to a closer look 
at the preferences for supply. Therefore, I concentrate my analysis on the supply side, the 
push from the European side to influence Chinese regulation. In this, this study differs 
from much of the theoretical literature on regulatory interdependence. 
 Only if we differentiate between public and private regulatory regimes (and their 
respective actors), we can grasp the full picture of influence by the EU on China’s food 
safety regulation. By differentiating regulation with regard to its dimensions, we are able 
to understand better the external effects and the differences between public and private 
actors.  
 Two separate but potentially intertwined motives can explain efforts made by both public 
and private actors in changing China’s food safety regulation. The first objective is to 
protect against unsafe food supply from China – reflecting problems with physical 
externalities. By distinguishing between product and process regulation in food safety, we 
can understand the nature of the physical externalities better. The second motive is 
gaining access to the Chinese food market, because regulatory externalities hinder market 
access. Furthermore, we can relate both motives theoretically to interests in specific 
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dimensions of regulation (with market access focussing on changes in rules and import 
safety being more interested in implementation and enforcement). 
 Arguably, responses to regulatory interdependence depend on the severity of the 
externalities. Therefore, the status of China’s food safety regulation and its changes should 
be considered in the analysis. 
 Likewise, theories of regulatory interdependence like the California Effect lead to the 
assumption that the motive for influencing China’s food safety regulation is connected to 
the direction and intensity of food trade between the EU and China. 
 The activities of public and private EU actors are not happening in an empty room. There 
are other actors and international regimes which potentially follow similar objectives 
which in turn may have influence on the EU’s behaviour. 
 In a similar manner, the discussion about interactions in transnational regulatory 
governance informs us that public and private activities are not completely separated from 
each other and may have influence on each other. Here again the regime concept may 
prove to be helpful, as, potentially, public and private may have formed some sort of 
regime to deal with the regulatory interdependencies. The analysis of interaction needs to 
pay attention to the question of the void left by public regulation as a theoretically 
deduced motive for private actors to engage in food safety regulation. 
These points will be further elaborated in the next section when I utilize them to construct a 
research heuristic. 
2.2 Case specific research heuristic and operationalisation 
The heuristic model presented in this section takes a rationalist viewpoint and applies it to the 
above review of regulatory interdependence. The model has been deduced from the theoretical 
discussion above but is also the result of an inductive reasoning based on empirical observations 
prior to a detailed analysis (for details on the iterative process, see chapter 4). In this manner, I 
discuss the specifics of actors, their motivations and potential additional causal parts for this case 
and assume that combinations of these are essential building blocks for the causal mechanisms I 
long to identify. Before I proceed with specifying the heuristic model, I clarify the understanding 
with which I approach the case. 
2.2.1 Foundations of research heuristic 
In the following two parts, I discuss my rationalist approach as well as the specific understanding 
of regulation, I apply in this analysis. The rationalist perspective leads to the focus on motivation 
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and interests of actors. With a rather broad understanding of regulation, I am able to include 
private non-binding forms of regulation in my analysis. 
2.2.1.1 Rationalist approach 
My rationalist approach to this case is already implied in the research objective of this study, 
which longs to analyse the intentional (and possibly strategic) behaviour by European actors to 
influence China’s food safety regulation. The interest in intentional, strategic behaviour excludes 
the perspective on ideas and contingent processes (cf. Silzer, 2014, p. 38). Behaviour that is based 
on achieving objectives implies a “logic of consequentialism” as opposed to a “logic of 
appropriateness” (March and Olsen, 1989; March and Olsen, 1998). At the same time, 
intentionality implies an analytical focus on agents (cf. Evans, 2009b, p. 244). Rational actors act to 
achieve an objective which is based on their given preferences. They strive to maximize or 
optimize their benefits in interactions with other actors, anticipate the behaviour of the others 
they engage with and include this anticipation in their decisions (Risse, 2003, p. 9, see also Braun, 
1999, pp. chapt. 1). Rationalism asks for the incentives for actors to behave a specific way, in other 
words it asks for opportunity costs (Keohane, 1984, p. 80). Preferences (over outcomes) in turn are 
based on the comparison of different possible courses of actions, hence based on material interests 
and cost/benefit calculations that take opportunity costs into consideration (cf. Steinhilber, 2006, 
p. 178). However, costs and benefit shall not strictly be interpreted in pecuniary way. Costs can 
also be for example a loss of public trust in an institution in the sense that they (possibly) affect 
material interests (e.g. re-election for governments, regulatory decisions for businesses). A change 
of behaviour can therefore be explained by changing preferences or by changing circumstances. 
Internal and external factors furthermore constrain rational decisions. “Internally”, strict 
rationalism has long been relaxed to bounded rationalism which assumes that actors cannot have 
full information about their options and related costs and benefits. They thus strive for satisfaction 
instead of maximising utility (Keohane, 1984, pp. 111–114). 
2.2.1.2 Definition of regulation 
My understanding of regulation results from the above review and reflects the development 
towards a society-centred concept of regulation. Clearly, Selznick’s definition of regulation no 
longer captures the whole phenomena. It needs to be widened. On the other hand, decentring and 
thus relaxing the criteria of what constitutes regulation risks to end up with a too broad and 
unspecified definition (Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2004, pp. 3–4). Baldwin et al. for example suggest 
three different understandings of regulation, “a specific set of commands”, “a deliberate state 
influence”, and “all forms of social or economic influence” (2012, p. 3). The latter understanding 
allows for non-state regulation. However, Baldwin et al. at the same time drop intentionality as a 
criterion. However, in order to be compatible with a rationalist approach, it needs to include 
central elements of rationality, namely intentionality and objective-driven behaviour. I therefore 
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suggest with others to understand society-centred regulation as “an intentional and problem-
solving process that extends beyond state activity” (Havinga, 2006, p. 516). More specifically, I 
adopt but slightly amend the definition of regulation provided by Black (Black, 2008, p. 139) and 
define as follows: By regulation is meant intentional, sustained and focused attempts to change the 
behaviour of others in order to address a collective problem or attain an identified end or ends, 
usually through a combination of rules or norms and some means for their implementation and 
enforcement, which can be legal or non-legal. The regulatory functions can be exercised primarily 
by one actor or dispersed between a number of actors, which can be public or private.  
The definition accounts for decentred regulation in that it allows for regulation by state as well as 
non-state actors (and combinations of them). At the same time, it narrows down regulation to an 
intentional action that serves an objective. This is important as otherwise regulation becomes hard 
to distinguish from other phenomena (Levi-Faur, 2010, p. 8). At the same time, the definition is 
open to various forms and mechanisms of regulation. Also, it clearly states that regulation consists 
of several dimensions. For the analysis, I simplify the differentiation of regulation into separate 
dimensions and primarily distinguish between agenda-setting and rule-making on the one hand 
side and implementation and enforcement on the other. The reason is, that I am merely interested 
in the distinction between merely putting regulation on paper and de facto putting it into practice. 
2.2.2 Developing the research heuristic 
Based on such a rationalist and society-centred understanding of regulation and regulatory 
interdependence, the development of the case specific research heuristic is guided by the 
considerations in 2.1.4 which present the essence of the theory review. The research heuristic 
defines key concepts and their conditions and related expectations in order to achieve 
operationalisation. This procedure shall briefly be explained. 
The analysis of causal mechanisms does not look for variables and their variance (see chapter 4). 
Instead, Beach and Pedersen suggest defining “key concepts”. They are the basis to achieve 
operationalisation without variables. Instead of specifying the potential variance, researches need 
to clarify the conditions which are necessary and/or sufficient for key concepts to be present. 
Following set-theoretical lines of thought, for each condition, it needs to be specified what 
constitutes the presence and absence of this condition (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, pp. 46–49). This 
is analogous to indicators in variable-based research. Blatter et al. suggest using the terms 
“potential indicators” or “expectations” instead of “indicator” in qualitative research to stress its 
interpretative nature (2007, p. 174).  
The key concepts derive from the research heuristic: import safety and market access. However, 
the term import safety seems misleading for TPS. Therefore, I prefer to use the term supply safety 
instead, especially when also referring to private actors. As these concepts represent alternative 
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explanations, I refer to them as supply safety hypothesis (SSH) and market access hypothesis 
(MAH). The selection of conditions for each key concept reflects the ex-ante theorized elements 
of the causal mechanism (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 48). Table 3 in the summary of this section 
provides an overview over the conditions which have been theoretically deduced for the SSH. 
Table 4 depicts the conditions for the alternative MAH. For the discussion of the expectations, I 
differentiate between the public and private actors. It is important to note at this point that, 
strictly logically, these two alternatives hypothesis are not mutually exclusive. A combination of 
both may be a possible result of the analysis. 
For the MAH, the expectations especially differ between EU public actors and TPS. The reason lies 
in the specific character of TPS, which leads to a difference in what constitutes accessing a market. 
For EU public actors, I discuss market access as access to the Chinese market for EU food products. 
For TPS, it would be meaningless to analyse this type of market access. There simply is no logical 
causal connection between food export to China and TPS activity in China. What I am looking for 
is the analogous alternative hypothesis to the SSH. For TPS, I therefore understand market access 
as being active in China for the domestic Chinese market.  
2.2.2.1 Actors 
In this part, I discuss which are the public and private actors and what characteristics can be 
theoretically assumed for the case at hand. Actors here shall be understood as organisations, not 
individuals. As long as an actor is easily demarcated against its environment by insiders and 
outsiders, is able to appear unified internally as well externally and can be assumed to have own 
consistent preferences as well as the ability to strategic behaviour. Rational assumptions thus can 
be applied to collective actors (Braun, 1999, p. 44). 
2.2.2.1.1 Public actors 
Two types of major public actors can be thought of for the EU. The first actor is the European 
Commission. Charged with the responsibility of the common market, the Commission also plays 
the major role in ensuring the safety of imports into this market (within a wider network of actors 
within the EU, cf. Alemanno, 2009; Weimer and Vos, 2015). As it is furthermore solely 
representing the EU on trade issues, it is justifiable generalisation to treat the EU commission on 
the international level in these particular areas as an actor like a nation-state.28 The second type of 
public actors are national governments of EU member states. Member state governments can 
collaborate with third countries on food safety independently from the EU Commission. Public 
actors bear a limitation when engaging with other states. They always have to follow diplomatic 
channels. Exerting influence on China’s food safety regulation therefore requires a prior consent 
by the Chinese government, if not cooperation. 
                                                          
28 As Drezner puts it: “Treating the EU as a single actor in the coordination of global economic regulations is 
a significant assumption, but it is no longer a heroic one” (2005, p. 844). 
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2.2.2.1.2 Transnational private standards as private actors 
When it comes to private actors, I concentrate my analysis on transnational private food safety 
standards (TPS) as a specific variation of transnational regulatory regimes (see 2.1.3.3).29 As such, 
TPS are foremost an institution. However, actors drive the promulgation and usage of private 
standards – and presumable they do so to further their interests. For a thorough understanding of 
the functioning and variety of TPS as well as the differences to other types of private standards, it 
is crucial to unpack them into their three central elements: the actors involved, the content, and 
the process of conformity assessment (Henson and Humphrey, 2012; Marx, 2011). 
In the following, I concentrate my discussion on private food safety standards.30 They can be 
classified based on which actors define the rules of the standards (Marx, 2011). Three types occur: 
(1) individual companies’ standards, mostly from retailers; (2) collective national standards 
introduced by national producer associations; (3) collective international standards jointly 
developed and run by retailers and producers from various countries (Henson and Humphrey, 
2012, pp. 99–101). It is the third version of private food safety standards that I will focus on and 
refer to as TPS. A private organisation acts as standard owner for TPS, which in turn is co-
financed by food businesses. For example, Food Safety System Certification 22000 (FSSC 22000), is 
owned the by Foundation FSSC 22000. Likewise, GlobalGAP is run by the company FoodPLUS 
GmbH. International Featured Standards (IFS) is owned by the German and French retailer 
associations Hauptverband des Einzelhandels (HDE) and the Fédération des Entreprises du 
Commerce et de la Distribution (FCD) (Havinga, 2006, p. 524). The organisations provide a 
secretariat for the daily business. The governance of private standards again varies at this point. 
However, while the form varies, food businesses are always involved in the formulation of the 
standards content (directly or indirectly via consultation processes). In cases like GlobalGAP and 
IFS, food businesses are – via representation in a board – directly involved in steering a private 
standard as regards strategic decisions (for an individual discussion of TPS see Meulen, 2011b). 
This classification is instructive to the question of what actors we can assume on the private side: 
it is individual businesses which drive the usage of private standards by demanding respective 
certifications from their suppliers. TPS are furthermore administrated and steered by organisations 
that own the specific standard. Those are the two types of actors behind TPS.  
Regarding the content, private standards primarily deal with food safety and quality issues. Some 
have the purpose to differentiate standard products from premium products with the latter 
                                                          
29 As private standards are legally voluntary, that is not required by public regulation to comply with them, 
they are sometimes also referred to as voluntary standards. However, public standards can as well be 
voluntary. Thus, private standard is the more precise term (Henson and Humphrey, 2009b, p. iii).  
30 Private food safety standards are TPS and consequently I use both terms interchangeably. The term TPS 
simply lays the focus on the transnational dimension. TPS organisation themselves also use “scheme” as a 
replacement for “standard” in order to avoid being mixed up with public standards (interview 26). 
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carrying additional characteristics. The fair-trade certificate is one example, which certifies that 
production and trade of a good have gone beyond standard market practice in taking special 
account for a fair treatment of the supplier. Such private standards are not part of the following 
discussion. What is of interest here, are so-called baseline standards. Such standards aim at 
ensuring that minimum requirements are met to enter a specific market segment (Henson and 
Humphrey, 2012, pp. 101–103). Baseline standards pre-dominantly are run by businesses. NGO-
driven private regulation is therefore excluded from further discussion. The content of the 
standard itself is a document describing in detail the obligations a business which longs for a 
certification must meet. It comprises a set of technical specifications for example for food 
production, handling, transport, and processing. Such specifications mostly are based on concepts 
like the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point System (HACCP), Good Agricultural Practice 
(GAP) and Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP).31 Horizontal scope, that is the extent to which a 
standard applies to various different products, and vertical scope, that is the extent to which the 
standard covers various parts of the supply chain (e.g. only farming or also including food 
processing), vary from standard to standard (Henson and Humphrey, 2012, p. 99). Technical 
specification may also go beyond the field of food quality and safety and include other aspects of 
social regulation like worker’s rights and environmental protection (Fulponi, 2006). Given their 
geographical source, TPS represent approaches to food safety of Western markets and their 
respective acceptance of risk-levels. More specifically, TPS deriving from Europe tend to reflect 
EU food safety regulation. In any case, they do not contradict EU regulation. 
A third criterion to differentiate between private food standards is based on the conformity 
assessment mechanism. The regulatory relevance of private standards does not rest alone on their 
content but rather on the inclusion of conformity assessment and enforcement systems. In this 
regard, certification is the crucial mechanism. Certification is a procedure that checks whether a 
company complies with the rules set by the standard. Positive certification often enables the 
tested actor to use a label proving the successful certification. There are three types of 
certification, first-party, second-party and third party certification. For better understanding, we 
need to differentiate between standard-adopter and standard-taker. Standard-adopter is a 
company which decides to use a specific private standard. This involves requiring the suppliers of 
this company to fulfil the criteria of this standard. Such suppliers thus are standard-takers. First-
party certification essentially describes self-certification in which the standard-adopter itself 
assesses conformity as part of a self-declaration. Second-party certification rests on tests of the 
standard-taker by the standard-adopter and involves an inspection. Third-party certification 
                                                          
31 GAP and GMP are guidelines which represent the state of the art of sustainable agriculture and food 
manufacturing respectively, integrating aspects of environmental, economic and social sustainability (cf. 
Meulen, 2011b, p. 92). Likewise, HACCP is guideline to prevent risks in the production process. It will be 
explained more in detail in 2.2.2.2.1. 
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decouples the relationship between standard-adopter and standard-taker by introducing a third 
party, a certification body (CB), whose task is to test and verify the compliance of the standard-
taker with the rules set by the standard. In other words, the conformity assessment is delegated to 
CBs. CBs are typically private companies providing testing, inspection, verification and 
certification services in a wide field of areas going beyond food safety. Examples are globally 
acting companies like SGS S.A. from Switzerland, TÜV Rheinland from Germany or Buereau 
Veritas from France. CBs need an accreditation for being allowed to issue certifications by another 
organisation which can be national, international, private or public or both (Hatanaka et al., 2005, 
p. 357).32 Additionally, CBs in most cases have to obtain a license from a TPS owner in order to be 
able to offer certification services for the respective TPS. Obviously, the effectivity and thereby 
output legitimacy rises from first- to third party certification.33 Arguably, this is (also) why we can 
witness a trend towards third party certification, especially for TPS (van Waarden, 2011, pp. 483–
484). Third-party certification also has been made part of the International Organisation for 
Standardisation’s (ISO) guidelines for operating private standards (Henson and Humphrey, 2012, 
pp. 100–101). Conformity assessment furthermore is the mechanism establishing the transnational 
relevance of TPS. By this logic, TPS project their rules – and thereby food safety regulation – 
across national borders. This adds a regulatory layer on the pre-existing regulation in the 
respective country. Thanks to third party certification, TPS do not necessarily need to follow 
diplomatic channels and they are technically able to enforce regulation across national borders. 
This marks a contrast to public actors. Thus, third party certification has a transnational 
dimension. Empirical evidence already has shown that TPS indeed can impact food safety 
regulation in affected countries (Lazer, 2001, p. 482; Henson and Jaffee, 2008, p. 552). 
Following this discussion, I can now define TPS as private collective international baseline 
standards that define rules primarily to regulate food safety and food quality and which are 
enforced by a third party certification conformity assessment mechanism. 
2.2.2.2 Motivations 
The discussion above has shown that, in an international context, the type of externality defines 
the character of regulatory interdependence. Since China is both, a source for supply of food and 
an attractive market for food, preferences of EU actors can go both ways: for ensuring a safe supply 
and for getting access to the Chinese market. In the following two parts, I explain in detail, why 
supply safety and market access are potential motivations based on specifying the physical and 
regulatory externalities and I thereby establish a SSH and a MAH. 
                                                          
32 For a more detailed discussion of certification modes see van Waarden (2011). 
33 For a critical reflection on output legitimacy see Marx (2011, p. 598). 
Theory: 
Responses to regulatory interdependence 
 
42 
2.2.2.2.1 Supply safety hypothesis 
The notion of supply safety describes the situation where safety problems occur because of the 
import of unsafe goods – regardless of the cause of the problem (Coglianese et al., 2009b; Ellefson 
et al., 2013). Such unsafe products are seen as results of “lapses in the safe practises” (Coglianese et 
al., 2009a, p. 7). They thus by definition appear despite preventive actions by the importing state. 
In other words, unsafe imports are a negative physical external effect resulting from the behaviour 
of actors other than the importing state. It is important to note, that the negative externality in the 
case of food safety is physically attached to the traded foodstuff. This has the important 
consequence that production externalities potentially become product externalities. Safety lapses 
in the production may cause unsafe products. This leads to a fundamental difference compared to 
other types of social regulation, most notably typical cases of environmental protection and social 
welfare. The negative production externalities, for example like soil, air and water pollution or 
workers’ health protection stay physically at the site of the production. Such production 
externalities, where the external effects of production stay within the country of origin, have little 
direct effect on other countries and their consumers, which in turn limits the willingness to 
influence regulation in states of origin by states with stricter regulation (Abbott and Snidal, 2009, 
pp. 539–540). For food safety, in sharp contrast, the potential food risk deriving from production 
externalities travels with the foodstuff around the globe, as far as into the bodies of the consumers. 
This, in theory, fundamentally changes the incentive and rationale for action. Taking measures 
against production externalities in food are an action of consumer protection, while avoidance of 
negative external effects in the realm of environmental protection is about limiting negative 
effects that are more indirect, less tangible and potentially not to be experienced within a lifespan.  
Based on this consideration, my argument for the motive of supply safety is furthermore based on 
the theoretically deduced insight, that the EU can neither rely on the mechanisms of the 
California Effect or related arguments which explain why exporting states adjust to regulation of 
the importing market nor is it in the position to reduce the risk of food imports below a specific 
point. I first discuss the former point. The EU has very limited market power vis-à-vis China. For 
China’s economy, the relative importance of food exports compared to overall exports is 
comparably low. In 2012, China exported foodstuff including beverages and tobacco worth 54,665 
million USD while the total amount of all exports was more than 37 times higher (2,048,714 
million USD) (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2014). Additionally, from a government’s 
perspective, exports tend to undermine China’s goal of self-sufficiency in food, which further 
questions the importance attached to food exports (Ghose, 2014). Vogel and Kagan are right to 
point out that market size is also a relative category with regard to the size of the export market 
compared to the domestic market of the exporter (Vogel and Kagan, 2004, pp. 14–15). The larger 
the export market in relation to the domestic market, the higher the comparative attractiveness. 
For China, this condition leads to inconclusive results. The estimate for the purchasing power 
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parity gross domestic product (GDP) of the EU in 2013 is 15.85 trillion USD. For China, the 
estimate is 13.39 trillion USD (CIA). This indicates that both markets do not largely differ in size. 
The difference between both markets shrinks more when considering the potential of the Chinese 
market given its growth rate combined with the size of the population which is roughly 1.5 times 
the combined EU and US population. This argument is especially strong for the food sector 
compared to other sectors since food does not follow the rule of elasticity of demand (every 
consumer purchases food). Thus, while the EU market due to its size is an attractive export 
market, China itself has an attractive domestic market. The costs of the regulatory change in 
China to adjust to EU regulation are hardly lower compared to the benefits of gaining access to the 
EU market – which is a precondition for China’s adaption (Vogel and Kagan, 2004, pp. 14–15). In 
Simmons’ terminology, the EU thus is not a dominant centre for China and consequently cannot 
hope for a China to harmonize with EU regulation. As this leads to physical external effects for the 
EU, it should become active to “promote harmonization” (Simmons, 2001, p. 598). 
The second argument for the SSH is based on the distinction between production and product 
safety. The EU’s public activities to influence China’s food safety regulation potentially are based 
on a supply safety motivation, because EU public actors are not able to effectively ensure 
compliance with production standards for imports from China: “Ensuring that imports are safe 
presents special challenges as production takes place in third countries, outside the direct control 
of the member states” (Alemanno, 2009, p. 183). Compliance with production standards to achieve 
safe production is important for the safety of a product. As discussed above, it lies in the technical 
nature of food risks that the safety of food can best be assessed when information about the safety 
of the production process is available. It therefore has been regarded as one of the major 
achievements in developed countries to focus on process standards in order to increase the 
effectiveness of food safety regulation (Unnevehr and Roberts, 2003, p. 9). This is exemplified by 
HACCP which has been included in EU legislation in the 1990s. HACCP is built on the insight 
that especially microbiological food safety cannot be controlled by merely testing and control final 
products (Caswell et al., 1998, p. 554). The HACCP requires producers to identify hazards to 
human health in their production process. For every hazard, critical control points need to be 
defined for each of which in turn intervention criteria, measures for control, correction, and 
evaluation need to be specified. Furthermore, HACCP requires the documentation of all measures 
taken (Caswell et al., 1998, p. 553). If we accept the importance of process regulation like HACCP, 
this has implications for import safety effectiveness of public regulation. Standards for production 
(i.e. process standards) are hard to implement and enforce if production of the products lies 
outside of the geographical borders of the importing state. Consequently, the EU, for example, 
cannot apply the same standards on imported products compared to domestic production. A move 
to do so would imply quite high costs for, first, conducting the controls outside the EU and, 
second, for negotiating with the Chinese government an allowance to do so in the first place. 
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Thus, the EU has to rely on product standards for imports which basically is a regulation of the 
outcome of production processes (cf. Bamberger and Guzman, 2009, cf. Vogel, 1995). This 
however leaves the EU with uncertainty and limited protection. This holds true for 
microbiological hazards as mentioned above but also for those negative effects that can only be 
observed over very long periods, like for example contamination with pollutants (Bamberger and 
Guzman, 2009, p. 196). Thirdly, cause and causer of the food safety problem are hard to identify 
ex-post (Bamberger and Guzman, 2009, p. 196). The difficulty to assign blame in turn potentially 
reduces the incentive for producers to ensure the safety of their products.34 In total, “conventional 
regulatory strategies are insufficient to address the safety challenges of importing products from 
foreign jurisdictions” (Bamberger and Guzman, 2009, p. 210). This technical logic also limits the 
import safety effects of import bans, the most stringent of all conventional methods. What is 
more, the WTO, as the institution primarily concerned with safeguarding free trade, formulates 
strict conditions for an importer to close its boarders for food imports. Its free trade bias rather 
complicates effective import safety from an importer's perspective (Epps and Trebilcock, 2009). 
The two agreements essentially regulating trade in food – the agreement on sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures (SPS agreement) and the agreement on technical barriers for trade (TBT 
agreement) of the WTO – are primarily concerned with free trade and subordinate food safety 
under this objective (Lin, 2014, pp. 143–144; Henson and Jaffee, 2008, p. 550). As Alemanno 
points out, this trade-bias is inherent in all international organisations dealing with food safety:  
“Indeed, contrary to conventional wisdom, the main drive behind the creation of most 
of these international organizations is not to be found in food safety but in the 
international efforts aimed at overcoming regulatory divergence stemming from 
different domestic food standards. As a result, the raison d’être of virtually all these 
organisations is – at least in relation to their food-related mandate – to achieve 
harmonization of food safety standards so they cannot be used as discriminatory non-
tariff barriers to trade. In other words, the food related responsibilities that have been 
entrusted to those organizations have more to do with the free trade imperative than 
with food safety per se” (Alemanno, 2015, pp. 10–11) 
This void left by public actors provides the basis for TPS to engage in supply safety activities. It is 
the very purpose of TPS to address the risks of international supply chains: "Their primary 
function is to ensure that internationalized supply chains in the food industry meet certain 
minimum standards. The primary aim of all of these standards is to ensure that, even though 
global food value chains are becoming more organizationally complex and more geographically 
dispersed, food companies have some confidence that the food they are purchasing and selling to 
consumers is safe” (Henson and Humphrey, 2012, p. 102). The difference in effectivity between 
TPS and EU public regulation has pointedly described by distinguishing what equivalence each 
                                                          
34 Vogel and Kagan make a similar point when they argue that the CE is more likely for product standards 
than for production standards (2004, pp. 14–15). 
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asks for. Public regulation asks for an equivalence of outcomes (product safety). TPS, in contrast, 
ask for the equivalence of systems, “thereby transferring a management and regulation system into 
the exporting country. This indicates that private regulation more extensively influences (self-
)regulation of food business in the exporting country, eventually rendering domestic regulation 
useless for export” (Lee, 2006, p. 36). As a representative of the TPS GlobalGAP argued: „Wenn 
alle Regierungen ihren Job machen würden, dann würde es ein System wie GlobalGAP nicht 
geben. [If all governments would do their job properly, GlobalGAP would not exist – translation 
by the author]” (interview 10).35 With this overall objective and as public actors struggle to 
enforce production standards, it can be assumed that TPS become active in China in order to fill 
this void. Crucially, as it has been discussed above, private actors like TPS are capable to achieve 
this goal because in contrast to public actors, they can forego diplomatic hurdles. Thereby, they 
have the potential to at least narrow this gap of enforcement that public regulation is struggling to 
close (Garcia Martinez et al., 2007, p. 313).  
Besides problems with lapses in the safe practices, less tangible effects support the supply safety 
hypothesis. They refer to the nature of food safety regulation as being the regulation of food safety 
risks. The notion of risk has been mentioned repeatedly already, but deserves are more explicit 
discussion. It goes beyond the technical understanding of risk and refers to a wider debate in social 
sciences, especially the concept of the risk society (cf. Beck, 1986, for an overview about sociological 
understandings of risk see Renn, 1998; WBGU, 1999).36 Risks, the argument is, correspond with reality 
but also include a strong component of social construction (Krohn and Krücken, 1993, p. 13). In other 
words: experts’ assessments of risks based on scientific methodology and public perception of risks may 
deviate strongly. Mechanisms of social amplification further contribute to a comparably high 
awareness of risks (Kasperson et al., 1988). Much research has been undertaken to understand the 
factors contributing to the rational of risk perception (cf. Renn, 2009). A crucial element to bridge this 
division is trust in the regulating actors, as studies have shown (Jonge et al., 2007). This trust in public 
authorities to adequately regulate food safety, however, had been lost gravely in the EU following the 
BSE-crisis and other food safety scandals of the late 1990s (Jasanoff, 1997; Vogel and Ansell, 2006; 
Renn and Dreyer, 2009). Therefore, after 2000, regulators faced a double challenge. Not only were 
they confronted with a public demand for full control of risks and a corresponding unwillingness to 
accept any food safety-related risk.37 In addition to that, they faced specific historic circumstances 
                                                          
35 A statement which has also been made by two other experts – in an interview (26) and in a side-talk with 
a representative of a US food processing company during the GFSI Global Food Safety Forum in Kuala 
Lumpur on 4 March 2015. 
36 The technical, quantitative understanding defines risk as the probability of an accident occurring 
multiplied by the expected loss of the accident (WBGU, 1999, p. 7). 
37 The confrontation between the USA and the EU over diverging positions on food safety-related topics as 
beef hormones and genetically modified organisms (GMO) exemplifies this notion (e.g. Alemanno, 2004; 
Goldstein and Carruth, 2004; Vogel and Lynch, 2001; Clavier, 2008). Note that this conflict furthermore 
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which heightened the awareness of food safety scandals and fuelled the public impatience with public 
regulation. Returning to the supply safety hypothesis, the argument is, given this state of affairs, public 
regulators had additional incentives to avoid any scandals deriving from import of unsafe food. 
For the supply safety hypothesis to materialize, we can expect according formulations and statements 
from EU sources. It is also possible to infer the motive from the concrete measures. If measures 
undertaken by EU public actors addressing China’s food safety regulation are truly about reducing 
import safety risks, they focus on those areas where other measures are not effective enough. As 
discussed above, this is especially the case for production safety. Therefore, I expect a focus on 
implementation and enforcement of food safety standards.38 An additional aspect is the specific food 
product involved and the role it plays in trade relations between the EU and China. An import safety 
related motivation can be expected when products are at the centre of the discussion, which are indeed 
imported from China. These expectations are the same for EU public actors and TPS with one 
exception: the need for enforcement and implementation is not decisive for TPS as it would also apply 
to the MAH and thus would not make any difference in the analysis (see condition 4 in Table 3). 
2.2.2.2.2 Market access hypothesis 
In general, regulatory externalities caused by food safety regulation are well documented and 
object of international regulation. International harmonisation is a common objective of nation 
states, because food safety regulation which aims at protecting the safety of consumers potentially 
hinders trade (cf. Hüller and Maier, 2006, p. 267; Marx, 2011). The numerous cases of supposedly 
unjustified food regulation brought up within the WTO framework exemplify the potential of 
food safety regulation for regulatory externalities (e.g. the beef hormone case, the GMO case, the 
salmonella case, the Japan apples case, see Goldstein and Carruth, 2004; Peel, 2004; Scherzberg, 
2006). However, these conflicts occurred mainly between actors which share an equally high level 
of food safety regulation (e.g. EU and the USA on beef hormones, see Alemanno, 2004) or less 
developed countries which suffer from too high levels of regulation in highly regulated markets 
(e.g. African countries against the EU on the case of aflatoxin regulation; see Otsuki et al., 2001). 
China’s food safety regulation potentially also creates regulatory externalities for others. At first, 
this seems contra-intuitive: if EU’s food safety regulation is stricter compared to Chinese 
regulation, how can then food products compliant with EU regulation not fulfil the requirements 
of Chinese regulation? The reason lies in the cultural embeddedness of food. Unlike with other 
traded goods there is a strong cultural definition of food (on the connection of food regulation and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
raised substantial doubt on the European side, whether the SPS agreement was protecting European 
consumers from unsafe food. 
38 For the analysis, I simplify the differentiation of regulation into separate dimensions and primarily 
distinguish between agenda-setting and rule-making on the one hand side and implementation and 
enforcement on the other. The reason is, that I am merely interested in the distinction between merely 
putting regulation on paper and de facto putting it into practice. 
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culture see also van Waarden, 2006). Food safety regulation reflects these cultural aspects of food. 
A prominent example is soft cheese made of unpasteurized, that is raw, milk. As this is a typical 
French food product and very much part of French eating tradition, it is allowed under EU food 
law. In the USA, in contrast, raw milk cheese is not part of the culinary culture. Compared to 
Europe, regulation is focussing more on the risks of unpasteurized milk and soft cheese made out 
of unpasteurized milk is only allowed on the market if aged at least 60 days (Albright, 2015). 
Due to the closure of its market to the outside world until the 1990s and the predominate role 
food plays in Chinese culture, China retained its specific diet. Consequently, food regulation 
lacked rules and standards for Western foodstuff which traditionally was not on the table of 
Chinese households. Prominent example are dairy products. Chinese consumers only recently 
started to consume milk. Per capita consumption of dairy products more than tripled from 8 kg in 
1996 to 25 kg one decade later (Xiu and Klein, 2010). Similar developments can be found for wine 
and processed food. Thus, Chinese food safety experts had no experience in regulating such 
products. As a result, Western companies often did and do face regulation which is stricter or at 
least more complicated than Western regulation for the same product (interview 40). In addition, 
potentially, Chinese government also might use food safety regulation to protects its own 
companies. Hence, the fact that China’s food safety regulation generally can be considered of 
providing lower levels of safety compared to US or EU food safety regulation does not imply that 
products which comply with the latter necessarily fulfil the requirements of Chinese regulation. 
In theoretical terms, China’s food safety regulation potentially generates regulatory externalities. 
Nation states as well as the EU have an intrinsic interest in export opportunities for their 
businesses. In fact, for agricultural and food products EU member states run export facilitation 
programs.39 In this vein, the public interest reflects the aggregated interest of food and agricultural 
business for accessing foreign markets. The specific interest of TPS as private actors in market 
access, however, is less obvious and requires closer scrutiny. Two theoretically deduced points can 
be made to argue for a market access motivation of TPS that leads to influencing China’s food 
safety regulation. On the first level, TPS organisations as a “business” have an interest in accessing 
the Chinese market, because their success TPS is based on their proliferation. The wider the usage 
of a TPS the more relevant it becomes and the more power it accumulates. Likewise, the wider the 
usage, the higher the sum of licensing fees paid to a TPS. With an increasing relevance of the 
domestic Chinese market for global food production and consumption, TPS have an interest to 
establish themselves on this market, too. On a second level, the interests of the companies behind 
a TPS, may imply a market access motivation. It is their interest to have access to the Chinese 
                                                          
39 See for example the website run by the German Federal Ministry for Food and Agriculture 
(Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft, 2016). Other EU member states run similar 
programs. 
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domestic food market. To this end, however, they need the TPS to follow them on this market. As 
Western companies, they have a strategic interest to keep the level of food safety they bring with 
them for safeguarding their reputation and distinguishing themselves from Chinese competitors. 
The condition 4 in Table 4 operationalizes the motivation for market access. Firstly, for EU public 
actors, a focus on rules and standards indicates a market access motivation – mirroring the focus 
on implementation and enforcement for the SSH. This may be articulated in general or more 
specifically for specific product groups. As for TPS, the expectation for condition 4 most notably is 
the observation that the focus lies on regulating the domestic Chinese market. For the TPS 
organisation’s market access interest, the analysis would show activities that primarily aim at 
proliferating the usage of the respective TPS.  
2.2.2.3 Causal components with potential influence 
Actors’ preferences are preferences over outcomes, not means. Changing circumstance thus have 
an effect on the particular means and strategies actors will choose. In other words, the question is, 
which changes of circumstances may theoretically lead to an adaption of behaviour? For the 
supply safety preference, those circumstances influence behaviour that imply a change of physical 
externality. Such circumstances can be observed or anticipated changes in the safety of imported 
food or changes in the food safety regulation of the exporting country. The dimension of physical 
externality also is connected to the sheer amount of food coming from a specific country. 
Activities by third parties that have an effect on food safety regulation in China also change the 
circumstances. As for the market access motive, trade also plays an important role, albeit in the 
opposite direction. It can be assumed that the higher the business need to export products to 
China, the stronger the interest for favourable conditions for market access in China. Changes in 
the Chinese food safety regulation additionally may affect activities, depending on whether they 
ease or complicate market access. Here, I need to differentiate the situation for TPS. For them, 
changes in the regulation of certification is relevant. Lastly, public-private interaction may 
intervene and affect which motive leads to activities to influence China’s food safety regulation. 
Each of these potential parts of the causal mechanism will briefly be discussed in turn. 
2.2.2.3.1 Changes in China’s food safety situation and regulation 
Changes in the regulation of food safety in China potentially have effects on the activities by EU 
public actors and TPS which are directed at supply safety. A thought experiment validates this 
point: If China would fulfil international standards of food safety regulation in all regards, EU 
actors would have no reason to take action. And vice versa: If China would take no measures after 
joining the WTO to improve its food safety regulation, the motive for supply safety is very likely 
to lead to specific actions by European actors to mitigate negative external effects. From the 
discussion of supply safety and market access, I furthermore deduce that the reaction to changes in 
China’s food safety regulation depends on which dimensions of regulation are affected. The 
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different components can be understood as steps in a process in which each builds upon the 
previous. It follows that this differentiation can be applied to describe the effectiveness of 
regulation, with mere rule-making being the weakest form of regulation, while enforced 
regulation (including rule-making and implementation, of course) is the strongest form. The state 
of food safety regulation in China as a condition for supply safety is represented as condition 2 in 
Table 3 with two expectations for public actors as well as TPS. First, the degree to which China’s 
food safety regulation resembles international standards and/or EU standards. While international 
and EU standards may differ, they roughly represent a similar level of food safety. I generalize this 
point and assume that from a supply safety perspective food safety standards from all major 
developed countries, including the EU, and international standards provide a roughly similar level 
of food safety, especially when compared to China.40 This seems justifiable, because especially the 
EU and the USA have a major influence on the definition of food safety standards in the system of 
the Codex Alimentarius which in turn is the reference for national standards (Post, 2005; Hüller 
and Maier, 2006, see also 3.4.2). Secondly, I apply the differentiation of regulation and focus on 
deficiencies in implementation and enforcement. 
Changes in China’s food safety regulation potentially also trigger market access-motivated actions. 
Especially in cases in which regulation leads to or keeps trade barriers for European products. The 
more China’s food safety regulation is moving towards the desired norms, the less market access-
driven actions are assumed. Thus, here the focus lies on the rules of China’s food safety regulation, 
as presented in condition 2 of Table 4. The potential indicator is a situation in which the rules of 
China’s regulation prevent market access, because they are not in line with the international or 
more specifically EU understanding. 
For TPS, changes of the regulatory environment additionally have an influence on their 
behaviour, if the regulation of certification changes. While TPS are not part of public regulation, 
they do have to conform with the legal rules for their operation in the specific country (if there 
are any). Especially the aspect of enforcement of TPS draws attention to the embedding of 
transnational regulatory schemes in national regulatory frameworks (cf. Bartley, 2011; 
Verbruggen, 2013). National regulatory systems thus intervene in the effectiveness of private 
regulation. The potential expectation for condition 2 therefore is regulation that actually allows 
for or even supports the usage of private standards and certification systems. This should not be 
assumed easily given the different political system of China, in which the distinction between 
private and state is much less clear compared to in Western capitalist systems.  
                                                          
40 There are certainly exceptions to this rule, like the disputes between the USA and the EU about GMO and 
hormones in beef. However, notably, it has been argued for both of the cases that the dispute is less about 
factual food safety but rather cultural aspects of food and differing risk perceptions (Jasanoff, 2005; Durant 
and Legge, 2003; Scherzberg, 2006; Goldstein and Carruth, 2004). 
Theory: 
Responses to regulatory interdependence 
 
50 
2.2.2.3.2 Importance of trading partner 
In my research, I also need to ask, what effect trade has on the behaviour of public EU actors and 
TPS. Like the theories of regulatory interdependence already suggested, the precondition for 
physical and regulatory externalities to take effect is trade. Without trade of foodstuff, the 
negative physical externality does not “travel”. This suggests a relationship between the objective 
and content of measures, European actors conduct to influence China’s food safety regulation. For 
import, the following situations are theoretically possible: First, import for already traded products 
increases and thus increases supply safety pressure. Even with the relative number of unsafe 
imports from a specific country being stable, with rising import volume the number of absolute 
unsafe food imports rises and thus the exposure of consumers in import markets rises alongside. 
Second, new products are traded which brings up new, potentially unknown risks. In both cases 
the need for public and private EU actors to ensure supply safety increases. This connection 
between trade and supply safety is denoted as condition 1 in Table 3. Import volume is measured 
in weight.41 As indicated in Table 3, also the change over time is of interest as a rising import 
would imply an increased motivation for supply safety measures. 
Likewise, without trade of foodstuff there cannot be a negative regulatory externality of hindered 
market access for exports. Thus, I assume that it is the need to increase exports to China which 
triggers market access activities by EU actors to influence China’s food safety regulation. I assume 
furthermore that rising food exports from the EU to China indicate a general interest or pressure 
to acquire China as an export market. With this general trend, the number of instances in which 
China’s food safety regulation appears (in exporters perception) as trade barrier and furthermore 
the pressure to change China’s food safety regulation in the desired direction increases. The 
economic “pressure” for export goes back to an agriculture and food production system based on 
scale effects. With stagnating of demand in existing markets, food companies in Europe are in 
need for additional markets. This aspect is denoted as condition 1 in Table 4. Here I firstly expect 
high or rising trade volume (now measured in Euros as the economic value matters). As the mere 
trade volume remains a vague indicator, I additionally consider to what extent the EU was 
searching for export opportunities due to overproduction. The argument is that overproduction 
leads to increased export pressure which in turn increases the pressure on the EU public actors to 
intensify market access-activities. For TPS, trade is not relevant for the MAH. 
2.2.2.3.3 Third parties 
International regimes and organisations potentially have impact on China’s food safety regulation 
which in turn may affect physical externalities. Therefore, the question is, to what degree activities of 
third parties lead to changes in the behaviour of EU public actors and TPS? For the SSH, I assume that 
                                                          
41 Of course, there is no strict causal connection between the weight of a food product and its potential food 
safety risk. However, measuring in currency would more severely obscure the picture as changes in the 
costs of products would imply higher import risks. 
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if international organisations direct activities at China’s food safety regulation, they pursue the 
objective of increasing consumer and environmental protection. I already made argued above, that 
from a supply safety perspective, international food safety standards are similar to EU regulation. If, 
then, EU public actors or TPS are aware of activities conducted by a relevant international organisation 
addressing China’s food safety regulation, rationalism suggests that they would recalculate. In 
rationalist thinking, actors weighing up for which end to invest their resources most effectively. If they 
see that others support their objective (here: supply safety), they are likely to reduce their investment 
in this objective. The respective expectations are formulated for condition 3 in Table 3. It is the non-
influence of international governmental organisations (IGO) on improving import safety which is 
necessary for the SSH. And vice versa: If IGOs contribute substantially to improve import safety from 
China, this can be a reason for less involvement of the EU in this task. 
In contrast, third parties have no relevance for the MAH (see condition 3 in Table 4). If third 
parties prove to be active in influencing China’s food safety regulation, I expect EU public actors 
to ignore or neglect those activities. This is, because market access-driven measures are necessarily 
very specific and addressing specific products and cases. It is unlikely that any other actor has the 
same specific objective. This holds true for EU public actors and TPS. 
The theoretical considerations would hold true for other nations as third parties, too. However, I 
exclude them from my analysis, as this would increase the complexity disproportionally. I would 
need to assume supply safety and market access motives for them as well. Consequently, I would 
need to analyse any observed activity directed at influencing China’s food safety regulation to find 
out which goal it served. Even without considering the question whether EU actors rightly assess the 
objective of such activities themselves, the number of (potential) causal connections becomes too 
large for a targeted analysis. What furthermore supports this decision is the fact that third countries 
have hardly been mentioned as relevant by interviewees representing EU public actors or TPS. 
2.2.2.3.4 Interaction 
Like with third parties, the activities by EU public actors and TPS potentially influence the calculations 
of the respective other. Thus, the question here is: How do interactions between EU public actors on 
the one side and TPS on the other affect the behaviour of either side? As discussed in 2.1.3.3, within 
the transnational regulatory governance discourse, theoretically, all forms of relationships can result 
from interactions. They have been summarized as competition, coordination, co-optation and chaos – 
in other words it spans from mere awareness to forms of institutionalized cooperation (cf. Eberlein et 
al., 2014, pp. 11–12). Here, the degree of implicit or explicit cooperation is of interest. Again, for 
reasons of simplicity, I make an assumption for the following argument: the principal level of food 
safety with regard to the rules of TPS is equal to the level provided by the rules of the EU’s public food 
safety regulation. This assumption is reasonable, since TPS operating in the EU cannot require less than 
public law and in many cases actually go beyond (Meulen, 2011b, see also 3.5). This implies that for 
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the motive of supply safety EU public actors tend to reduce their efforts if TPS are actively influencing 
China’s food safety regulation, because “[...] private food schemes [meaning private food safety 
standards – the author] help to reduce the transaction costs by making information about European 
regulations on food safety systematically available and practically achievable” (Lee, 2006, p. 24). In 
short: the more the interaction implies burden sharing in tackling supply risks, the less the motivation 
to act. This is denoted in condition 5 in Table 3. For this condition, however, it is necessary to 
differentiate the interpretation for TPS. From a TPS perspective, the more public activities are seen as 
insufficient to positively influence supply safety, the more intense efforts are expected by TPS in 
China. From a purely theoretical perspective, the reverse does not hold true. EU public activities do 
not necessarily lead to little TPS involvement. After all, within EU, TPS also regulate the market 
despite the comparable powerful public regulation (see 3.1.3 and 3.5.1). As EU public actors and TPS 
pursue different market access objectives, this condition is not relevant for the MAH.42  
2.2.3 Summary and discussion 
The discussion above connected the theoretical reflections in section 2.1 with the case itself. I 
deduced two hypotheses and identified a set of conditions necessary for those hypotheses to come 
true. In sum, this provides a research heuristic for the analysis which is summarized in Figure 1. It 
rests on four statements: 
 EU Commission as well as TPS take action to achieve a change in China’s food safety 
regulation. 
 Actions taken to influence China’s food safety regulation can be based on two distinct 
motives – supply safety or market access – or combinations of both. 
 The actions taken depend on circumstances that intervene and affect actors’ behaviour and 
with this, whether the actions are based on supply safety or market access motivation. The 
circumstances are a combination of changes in China’s food safety regulation, trade flows, 
third party behaviour and interaction between EU public actors and TPS. 
 For each of the identified conditions, assumptions have been theoretically deduced how 
they may affect actors’ behaviour. This laid the basis for the operationalisation as 
summarized in Table 3 and Table 4. For each condition, every expectation is sufficient. 
This in turn means, that all expectations need to be absent for the condition to not being 
present (see also chapter 4). 
  
                                                          
42 Note the difference: If I were to include business interest representation in China – like for example the 
EUCCC – in the analysis, the expectations for the interaction would be different for the MAH. 
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Figure 1: Research heuristic 
 (Source: own) 
Table 3: Conditions and expectations for supply safety hypothesis 
Condition 
Expectations 
EU public actors TPS 
Condition 1:  
importance as trade 
partner 
 High or rising EU import 
volume from China (in kg) 
 High or rising EU import 
volume from China (in kg) 
Condition 2:  
state of China’s food 
safety regulation 
 Food safety standards do not 
fulfil international criteria 
 Food safety regulation is only 
partially implemented or 
enforced 
 Food safety standards do not 
fulfil international criteria 
 Food safety regulation is only 
partially implemented or 
enforced 
 China's food safety regulation 
allows or even supports TPS 
Condition 3:  
third parties 
 Non-existence of activities by 
IGOs to influence China’s food 
safety regulation 
 No or limited awareness of 
activities by IGOs to influence 
China’s food safety regulation by 
EU sources or activities by IGOs 
and other nations to influence 
China’s food safety regulation 
being portrayed as insufficient 
by EU public actors. 
 Non-existence of activities by 
IGOs to influence China’s 
food safety regulation 
 No or limited awareness of 
activities by IGOs to 
influence China’s food safety 
regulation by TPS or 
activities by IGOs to 
influence China’s food safety 
regulation being portrayed as 
insufficient by TPS. 
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Condition 4: 
motivation 
 Need formulated to protect 
European consumers 
 Need formulated to improve 
implementation and 
enforcement of food safety 
regulation in China 
 Need for action formulated with 
regard to specific imported 
products/product groups that are 
typical for import from China 
 Need formulated to protect 
European consumers 
 Need for action formulated 
with regard to specific 
imported products/product 
groups that are typical for 
import from China 
Condition 5:  
interaction 
 Activities by TPS in China being 
portrayed as insufficient by EU 
sources 
 No or limited awareness of 
activities by TPS in China by EU 
sources 
 Activities by EU public actors 
in China being portrayed as 
insufficient by TPS 
 No or limited awareness of 
activities by EU public actors 
in China by TPS 
(Source: own) 
Table 4: Conditions and expectations for alternative market access hypothesis 
Condition 
Expectations 
EU public actors TPS 
Condition 1: 
importance as 
trade partner 
 High or rising export volume (in Euro) 
 Search for export market to sell food 
products outside of the EU due to 
overproduction 
 No relevance for 
behaviour 
Condition 2: 
state of China’s 
food safety 
regulation 
 Food safety regulation not compatible 
(harmonized) with EU regulation, 
hindering export 
 China's food safety 
regulation allows or even 
supports TPS  
Condition 3:  
third parties 
 No relevance for behaviour  No relevance for 
behaviour 
Condition 4: 
motivation  
 Need/willingness to enter Chinese 
market formulated  
 Need formulated to especially change 
rules and standards in Chinese food 
safety regulation 
 Need for action formulated regarding 
specific products/product groups that 
are typical for export to China 
 Determination to 
establish TPS in China 
for domestic market 
formulated 
Condition 5: 
interaction 
 No relevance for behaviour  No relevance for 
behaviour 
(Source: own) 
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There is an important limitation in the theoretical deduction of the research heuristic: it does not 
provide a causal mechanism. Put in formal terms, I was able to identify a number of necessary 
conditions. What is open for research is, which conditions are sufficient to explain the outcome. 
The question mark in Figure 1 furthermore represents the uncertainty, whether I was able to ex-
ante identify all relevant causal components. As I cannot be certain about this, the research 
process should stay open to potential other elements for the causal mechanism. Therefore, it is 
important to proceed with the analysis in an explorative manner, as discussed more in detail in 
chapter 4. 
2.3 Conclusion 
The academic discussions about regulation and regulatory interdependence have brought about a 
society-centred understanding which leads to a transnational regulatory governance perspective. 
Thus, both EU public and private actors (narrowed down to TPS) potentially exert influence on 
China’s food safety regulation and need to be included in the analysis. This does not render state-
centred theories obsolete. To the contrary, theories from this school of thought provide important 
insights into potential causal mechanisms (or at least elements thereof). 
With a rationalist perspective in mind, two separate motives derive from the distinction of 
regulatory externalities and physical externalities. EU public actors and TPS may firstly be active 
in order to avoid unsafe supply of food from China (supply safety hypothesis). Alternatively, the 
interest in entering the Chinese market may motivate their attempts to influence China’s food 
safety regulation (market access hypothesis). Furthermore, differentiating between a rule and an 
enforcement dimension of regulation is key to analysing market access and supply safety motives. 
Lastly, rationalism tells us that, while preferences do not change, circumstances lead to changes of 
actors’ behaviour. Four necessary conditions – the state of China’s food safety regulation, trade 
flows, third parties and public-private interaction – have been identified to cater for this. A 
discussion of each condition provided an operationalisation of this research heuristic. The analysis 
of the case needs to validate these conditions. However, for a full causal mechanism I furthermore 
need to identify those parts which are sufficient to explain the outcome. These requirements 
derive from the outcome explaining variant of process tracing which I will discuss in chapter 4. 
Before, however, the following chapter makes an intermediate step by providing additional 
empirical information to sketch out the context of this case. 
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This chapter builds the bridge between the theory chapter and the analysis of the case. I introduce 
the general and partly historical background for the main aspects of the research heuristic – accept 
for the trade component, which does not need additional introduction before the analysis in 
chapter 5. Laying out the context serves two purposes: Firstly, this chapter specifies the 
dimensions of the research heuristic. This helps to understand the actor and interest-constellation 
when analysing the specific case. The first two sections introduce the specific public and private 
actors as well as their characteristics. Likewise, section 4 discusses the details of the 
intergovernmental dimension of global food safety regulation as a potential causal component. 
Secondly, I provide more detailed arguments for building my case by discussing the conditions of 
the SSH. In the third section of this chapter, I analyse in detail the supply safety-risk of China as a 
food exporter to provide detailed empirical evidence for the SSH. In doing so, I substantiate some 
of the statements made in the introductory chapter. In the last section I recap the interaction 
between public actors and TPS.  
3.1 The food safety regulatory system of the EU: experienced with import safety 
European food safety governance underwent a fundamental transition over three decades since 
the mid-1980s. A number of scholars have contributed to our better understanding of this 
transition (Marsden et al., 2010; Ansell and Vogel, 2006; Vos and Wendler, 2006; Alemanno, 2008; 
Dreyer and Renn, 2009; Abels and Kobusch, 2010; Alemanno and Gabbi, 2014). The chronological 
development of the transition has already sufficiently been described at length elsewhere 
(Millstone and van Zwanenberg, 2002; Alemanno, 2008; Marsden et al., 2010) and shall not be 
discussed in detail here. Here are rather those aspects of interest that affect the import safety 
approach of the EU.  
The EU acknowledges the external dimension of food safety and it has formulated its perspective 
and approach towards the related challenges. In the white paper on food safety, which was the 
basis for the GFL, the EU Commission underlined the international dimension of food safety and 
the responsibility for import safety as well as export safety: 
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„The Community is the world’s largest importer/exporter of food products, and trades 
with countries all over the world in an increasing diversity of food products. With this 
extensive trade in food products, food safety cannot be seen as solely an internal policy 
question. Exactly the same concerns as regards zoonoses, contaminants and other 
concerns apply to food products in international trade, whether these products are to be 
imported into the Community or exported from the Community.” (European 
Commission, 2000, 108). 
The same pattern can be observed for health policy in general, where two objectives play a role in 
the EU’s foreign policy: securing the safety of its own citizens and increasing the global safety 
(Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 249). The GFL further details these objectives in article 11 
and 12 (European Union, 2002). Both, import safety and export safety objective, point to the EU as 
a “normative power”, which is willing and able to extend its internal regulation beyond the 
internal market (Weimer and Vos, 2015, p. 3). This is obvious for the export safety, as the EU 
clearly formulates responsibility for food safety beyond its own borders: “[…] it is necessary to 
ensure that even where there is agreement of the importing country, food injurious to health or 
unsafe feed is not exported or re-exported” (European Union, 2002, p. 3). For import safety, the 
argument needs more deliberation. The GFL established the principle that imported food need to 
comply with or need to be equivalent to the requirements domestically produced food has to fulfil 
(European Union, 2002, 11). This position reflects the interest in protecting the internal market 
and consumers, which is in line with the focus on consumer protection-oriented approach. 
However, at the same time, this requirement exports EU regulation to third countries, because it 
requires exporting countries and businesses to implement EU regulation. In other words, the EU 
utilizes the attractiveness of its internal market for third countries to export its internal standards 
– not solely but also in the field of food safety (Weimer and Vos, 2015, p. 3). The effectiveness of 
this market power mechanism still depends on the attractiveness of the market for the third 
country and the stringency of the regulation (Weimer and Vos, 2015, p. 3). However, for food 
safety, this mechanism is not an unintended spill-over effect. It rather is an intentional part of the 
EU’s regulation, as will be shown in the next section detailing the Union’s import safety approach.  
The EU’s motivation to influence actively the state of food safety regulation outside of its borders 
furthermore is reflected in the objective to participate in the international institutions dealing 
with food safety issues. Article 13 of the GFL states that the EU as well as member states shall 
actively contribute to the development and improvement of international food safety standards 
(European Union, 2002, 13). The white paper explicitly refers to the WTO’s SPS committee and 
the ambition to become a member of the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) as well as of the 
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). The EU achieved both. Since 2003, the EU is a CAC 
member and since 2004 it has the observer status at the OIE.  
The food safety regulatory system of the EU: experienced with import safety 
 
59 
3.1.1 Import Safety approach 
Next to the GFL, the Official Food and Feed Controls Regulation (OFFC) sets the legal basis for the 
EU’s import safety approach (European Union, 2004b). The OFFC defines the general rules for the 
official inspections and control system of the EU. It clarifies the obligations and roles for Member 
States and the EU and describes how authorities have to conducted controls. In addition, it deals 
with the topic of food import safety. 
3.1.1.1 Import safety control system 
The vast majority of all food imports are not controlled at the point of entry into the EU and only 
need to fulfil general custom requirements. This means in practice that the respective national 
customs authority only conducts a document check (Alemanno, 2009, p. 184). The reason is the 
sheer amount of good imported into the EU, which makes comprehensive controls practically 
impossible.43 Two mechanisms tackle this problem. First, the OFFC introduced a risk-based 
approach to controls of foodstuff at the border. Foodstuff with higher safety risks is controlled 
more intensively compared to less risky products (Alemanno, 2009, pp. 177–178). For example, for 
food of animal origin, border controls are generally stricter than for food of non-animal origin 
(DG SANCO, 2006, pp. 11–13). Second, the EU has developed a system, which allows it to swiftly 
react to import safety incidents. In this system, the Rapid Alert System for Feed and Food (RASFF) 
plays a major role as the “internal market’s safety net vis-à-vis unsafe products” (Alemanno, 2009, 
p. 177). In essence, RASFF ensure the swift transmission of information about unsafe food on the 
EU market between the EU Commission and all Member States. Custom authorities also are 
connected to the RASFF system. This system ensures that regardless whether controls within a 
Member State or controls at the border detect a problem, the RASFF informs all other customs 
authorities, national inspection authorities and the EU Commission. It enables national authorities 
to take counter measures and, in case national solutions deem insufficient, it enables the EU to 
take action. The RASFF thus allows for a reactive approach to import safety controls by creating a 
system of shared allocation of responsibilities (Alemanno, 2009, p. 184). 
3.1.1.2 Active influence on third countries 
With regard to import safety, the OFFC defines: 
 that controls in third countries exporting to the EU are required to ensure compliance and 
how they are to be conducted;  
 what import conditions need to be fulfilled by countries exporting to the EU; 
 what constitutes equivalence for food safety regulation in third countries with EU 
regulation; 
                                                          
43 This is not a specific EU problem. In 2011, the USFDA inspected 2 per cent of all imported foods (Patoka, 
2013). 
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 and what type of support shall be provided to developing countries.44 
Before I will deal with the first aspect of controls in the next section, I will first briefly discuss 
how the other three aspects actively influence food safety regulation in third countries. Article 47 
of the OFFC about the general import conditions requires the EU Commission to seek information 
from countries exporting to the EU. In practice, this requires extensive interchanges of 
information between the EU Commission and a third country. Third countries need to provide 
information about food safety regulation, control and implementation procedures as well as risk 
assessment procedures and their implementation. Such information may need to be updated 
following a control, in case recommendations for adjustments had been provided by the EU. What 
is more, the OFFC requires exporting countries to have accredited laboratories that verify 
compliance with EU food standards (DG SANCO, 2006). As part of the compliance or equivalence 
requirement of the GFL, imported foodstuffs furthermore have to fulfil the general food hygiene 
requirements, which are laid down in the Regulation on the Hygiene of Foodstuffs (HOF) 
(European Union, 2004a). Among other specifications, HOF requires the application of the 
HACCP principles by food business operators regardless of the type of food. Lastly, the EU import 
regulation prescribes a strong role to competent authorities in third countries as it is “[t]he natural 
contact point for the Commission in third countries” (DG SANCO, 2006, p. 10)).45 The existence of 
a competent authority is not required by the OFFC, but more specific regulations make it a de 
facto requirement. For example, for food of animal origin, third country competent authorities 
need to guarantee that food exported to the EU is produced in compliance or equivalence with EU 
requirements (DG SANCO, 2006, p. 14). Likewise, competent authority is a key necessity for pre-
export checks, laid out in article 23 of the OFFC. In short, under a number of conditions the EU 
can accept pre-export checks of products exported to the EU. In this case, the frequency of import 
controls by the EU is reduced. A key condition is that the third country can name an organisation 
that fulfils the criteria of the EU to act as a competent authority. It should be noted, that as of 
2016, pre-export checks have only been granted to the USA and Canada for specific products 
(European Commission, 2017). However, article 23 again shows the strong potential influence, EU 
food import safety regulation takes on third countries regulation. An interviewed expert also 
confirmed the central role of competent authorities in third countries for the exchange between 
the EU Commission and a third country (interview 25). 
                                                          
44 The part is largely informed by the analysis provided by Weimer and Vos (2015). 
45 Regulation (EC) 882/2004 defines competent authority as “the central authority of a Member State 
competent for the organisation of official controls or any other authority to which that competence has 
been 
conferred; it shall also include, where appropriate, the corresponding authority of a third country” 
(European Union, 2004b, p. 20) 
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Requirements for food import safety beyond this vary – as part of a risk-based approach - between 
food of animal origin, food of non-animal origin and composite products, with the latter 
containing both products of plant origin and of processed products of animal origin (DG SANCO, 
2006, p. 13). As food animal origin generally poses higher risks, the import regulation is stricter. 
Only those third countries are allowed to export whom the EU Commission lists as eligible. 
Additionally, a company wishing to export live animals and products of animal origin needs to 
have a specific approval by the EU Commission to do so. The EU Commission publishes the list of 
approved establishments online (DG SANTE, 2016). To appear on the list of approved 
establishments, companies that wish to export need to request the competent authority of their 
country to submit an application. Regulation for food of non-animal origin is less strict. Third 
countries do not need to be listed with the EU Commission. Establishments also do not need to be 
approved by the EU (DG SANCO, 2006). Generally, food of non-animal origin can enter the EU 
market freely and is not subject to any import conditions. Exceptions to this rule have been 
imposed for specific food of non-animal origin considered posing higher risks (DG SANCO, 2006, 
p. 11). Such foodstuff can only enter through designated entry points and requires prior 
notification by the importing company to the authorities (DG SANCO, 2006, p. 12). For composite 
products, business operators have the responsibility to ensure that the components of animal 
origin of the product fulfil all requirements for food of animal origin. Certain composite products 
additionally are subject to import controls like prescribed for food of animal origin (DG SANCO, 
2006, p. 16). Lastly, in case of food safety emergency, the EU Commission has the possibility to 
restrict imports from specific countries (or take any other measures) – regardless of whether the 
product is of animal or non-animal origin (European Union, 2002, 53). 
The EU acknowledges that the requirements pose hurdles especially for developing countries. To 
accommodate for this, it obliges itself to support third countries. Article 50 OFFC determines that 
the EU Commission has to support developing countries in their efforts to build sufficient 
capacities to fulfil food safety requirements for importing to the EU. This includes “phased 
introduction of requirements” and extends to joint projects and active trainings of third countries 
staff (European Union, 2004b, 50). On the basis of article 51 OFFC – which is on official controls 
performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and 
animal welfare rules – the EU Commission established the Better Training for Safer Food 
programme (BTSF) in 2006. The BTSF programme has the purpose to train food safety authorities 
in EU member states and third countries in EU food safety regulation with a dedicated import 
safety objective, namely “[e]nsuring and maintaining a high level of consumer protection and of 
animal health, animal welfare and plant health” (CHAFEA, 2012). It is conducted by the 
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Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE/DG SANCO)46 training sector E and 
unit D3 and the Consumers, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive Agency (CHAFEA) 
(DG SANCO, 2009, p. 7). Trainings organised by BTSF are open to third countries. A more 
dedicated approach for a specific country are “specific training courses organised for third country 
participants on the spot” (CHAFEA, 2012). The planning for trainings is based on topics and not 
on which countries need to be addressed. Basis for the plans are RASFF statistics, outcomes of the 
previous year’s BTSF-programme and results from the audits conducted by the Food and 
Veterinary Office (FVO) (DG SANCO, 2009, p. 11). From 2006 until 2014, the EU Commission has 
spent about 110 million euro to conduct more than 1,100 trainings with more than 48,000 
participants. Approximately one third of the activities cover third countries (Le Goslès, 2015). 
3.1.2 Controls of third countries by the FVO 
As part of the overall reform of the EU food regulation at the turn of the millennium, the FVO, 
located in Grange, Ireland, was established as a body specifically dedicated to improving food 
safety inspections. It is a separate EU organisation, however, under the auspices of the European 
Commission, more specifically DG SANTE. According to its self-description, the “FVO’s primary 
role is to conduct audits or inspections to ensure the national authorities are fulfilling their legal 
obligations” (DG SANCO, 2017). The second part of the sentence refers to a special aspect. In 
contrast to what typically is considered to be the object of an audit – namely food production 
facilities – the FVO audits the work of national authorities. It assesses the respective national 
regulatory system as a whole and whether or not it is satisfactory from an EU’s perspective. This 
makes it a unique approach. The FVO conducts such audits to assess the compliance of EU 
member states as well as of third countries. Article 46 OFFC is the legal basis for the controls of 
third countries. Controls shall be comprehensive, considering virtually all criteria relevant for 
regulation to be effective – from rules over implementation to enforcement. Again, such controls 
conducted by the EU are based on an assessment of the risks associated with a particular country’s 
food exports (European Union, 2004b, p. 84).  
3.1.2.1 Process of auditing 
The auditing process consists of five steps (the rest of the paragraph is largely based on Weimer 
and Vos, 2015, pp. 63–65). First, the FVO publishes a working plan. It defines on which topics 
audits will be conducted and in which countries for a specific year. It is the result of a consultation 
process with the European Commission and member states (DG SANCO, 2017). The plan is 
revised and updated in the mid of each year. However, it remains tentative, as the FVO repeatedly 
points out in the plan’s introductions, as “[o]f necessity, [the working plan] must remain flexible to 
enable it to respond to emergencies and unforeseen circumstances” (DG SANCO, 2004, p. 3). 
                                                          
46 Until 2014, DG SANTE was DG SANCO. I use both names interchangeably and apply the old name DG 
SANCO when specifically referring to a point of time, when it was still called DG SANCO. 
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Adjustments thus are possible and frequent during a year. Second, before an audit actually starts, 
the FVO agrees with the national authorities of the respective country on the details of a planned 
audit. Once this is achieved, third, a team of FVO inspectors is sent to the audited country, where 
it closely collaborates with representatives from the national authorities. Both parties also jointly 
conduct field trips to production facilities to investigate whether or not the control system is 
effective. Fourth, the FVO auditors draft an audit report, which includes an assessment and 
recommendations to the audited country how improvements can be made. The report is sent for 
comment to the audited country. Disagreements between both sides, if any, are noted in the audit 
report. Additionally, the audited country is asked to present an action plan how to improve the 
situation. Fifth, the FVO together with the EU Commission monitors this action plan and follows 
up on its implementation. 
3.1.2.2 Relevance 
Through its task to audit third countries, the FVO thus is a corner stone of the EU’s food import 
safety system (Weimer and Vos, 2015, p. 61). About one third of all audits are targeted at countries 
outside of the EU (Weimer and Vos, 2015, p. 61). This also makes it an important channel through 
which the EU may influence third countries’ food safety regulation. Firstly, by providing an 
assessment of the situation for the EU Commission, the FVO potentially influences the priorities 
of the EU Commission to take action. Secondly, and more directly, FVO audit reports and their 
recommendation have proven to trigger change in the respective audited country. For example, in 
Thailand FVO’s audit results led to changes in Thailand’s food safety regulation (Weimer and Vos, 
2015, pp. 64–65). This is the case, although the FVO does not have any power to take actions in 
cases of non-compliance. What it provides, though is “important evidentiary basis for any actions 
taken by the Commission” (Weimer and Vos, 2015, p. 62). 
3.1.3 Responsibility distribution 
In the following paragraphs, I describe two dimensions of responsibility distribution within the 
EU. Firstly, I briefly review the multilevel food safety governance dimension of the EU and how 
member states and the EU Commission relate to each other when it comes to import safety. 
Secondly, I show that even within the EU Commission, several directorate-generals are involved 
in managing the external dimension of food safety. 
3.1.3.1 EU Commission vs. Member States 
The EU food safety governance is a “particularly illuminating example of an emerging system of 
multilevel regulation” (Vogel and Ansell, 2006, p. 6). This refers predominantly to the agenda 
setting part of food safety regulation, including the assessment of food risks. Indeed, 
understanding the linkages between national and European food safety governance is a topic of 
itself (Kobusch, 2010; Abels et al., 2014). What is more, the specific organisation of food safety 
regulation and risk assessment on member state level is diverse (Abels and Kobusch, 2015; 
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Bundesinstitut für Risikobewertung, 2011). For a number of aspects, the GFL applies the 
comitology procedure to specify regulation – for example with regard to the emergency clause 
(European Union, 2002, p. 53). The respective comitology committee is the Standing Committee 
on the Food Chain and Animal Health, installed by the GFL (European Union, 2002, p. 58). For 
the management of import safety, the relationship between the EU Commission and Member 
States is more straightforward. The EU Commission as guardian of the single market bears the 
prime responsibility for the import safety of food. While the national organisation of food safety 
regulation varies widely, all member states have to comply with EU food law (Bundesinstitut für 
Risikobewertung, 2011). The major legal instruments to this end, the GFL and OFFC apply 
directly in the member states. On behalf of the EU Commission, the FVO controls the 
implementation of EU food safety regulation and conducts audits. RASFF as a major tool for risk 
management also resides with the EU Commission. For import safety, the EU thus has a relatively 
high level of coordination with the EU Commission at its centre. Notably, when it comes to the 
export of food and the issues of market access to third countries, the responsibilities are less 
coordinated. Essentially, EU Commission and all member states act in parallel and on their own 
accord. 
3.1.3.2 External dimension of food safety within the EU Commission 
On all trade related matters, the EU Commission has the exclusive competence in EU-China 
relations, based on the initial 1985 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation (Snyder, 2009, 
p. 657). Within the EU, the EU Commission furthermore is responsible for import safety in its 
custom union (interview 3). It therefore is the major contact point for exporting countries for 
clarifying terms for import (such as being eligible for the export of food of animal origin into the 
EU, see 3.1.1).  
Within the EU Commission DG SANTE is responsible for food safety. DG SANTE’s directorate D 
“Food chain: stakeholder and international relations” contains a unit responsible for multilateral 
international relations (D2) and a unit dealing with bilateral international relations (D3). DG 
SANTE has established a number of agreements with 13 non-EU countries on the conditions for 
importing food. There is no such agreement with China.47 An informal expert group for sanitary 
and phytosanitary relations with non-EU countries supports DG SANTE in setting up such 
agreements. It is composed of experts from member state administrations (DG SANTE, 2012). DG 
SANTE also coordinates Thea RASFF system (Bundesinstitut für Risikobewertung, 2011, p. 9). 
While the core competency, and thus the internal lead, for food safety lies with DG SANTE, for 
food trade issues, the responsibility spreads across several DGs. DG SANTE needs to coordinate its 
actions with the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI), the 
                                                          
47 The EU Commission publishes a list of all agreements online, see European Commission (2016b). 
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Directorate-General for Trade (DG TRADE) and, depending on the product, with the Directorate-
General for the Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG ENTR) (interview 30). 
In this context, DG TRADE systematically involved in relevant working groups to address issues 
of market access, whenever requirements hinder EU exports (Kessler, 2008, p. 25). As a 
representative from DG AGRI explains, the contributions and aspects of international policies of 
food trade can hardly be differentiated between the different DGs: 
“Let’s say for, if we talk about food safety, because this is the issue, we are, […]in 
second role. We are not the first one leading the battle, because it’s not, normally it’s 
for SANTE. So, they would be the first one to talk with the, with all our partners. Then, 
of course, because it has an impact on trade […], DG TRADE comes in. And afterwards, 
[…] DG AGRI would step in for the agricultural products. But for us it is more to be 
sure that we have all the elements to assess how trade is going on between the 
countries, because we are also interested in trading agricultural products, of course. But 
for the food safety part, we can't do much. It’s DG SANTE, not us, so we don't cross 
each other. We would be more, as DG AGRI, will be more on what is agricultural 
policy, so the corporation maybe agriculture policy, but which now, everything is 
interconnected. You can't, differentiate it. Every time we have to work together with 
them. We can't be by ourselves anymore. DG SANTE is not working by itself 
anymore.” (interview 30) 
Analysis of the EU Commission actions towards China therefore needs to take into account that 
they potentially are the result of internal decision-making processes that include the viewpoints of 
several DGs.  
3.1.4 Summary and discussion 
Since the fundamental revision in 2002, the EU food safety regulation puts a stronger emphasis on 
protecting consumers. With regard to import safety, the EU has implemented a two-tier strategy. 
Firstly, it relies on risk-based controls at the borders combined with an internal safety net system 
provided by the RASFF. Secondly, it has put a number of requirements in place that actively 
influence third countries food safety regulation. The market power mechanism plays a central 
role, but the EU also actively pursues programmes to develop food safety regulation capacities in 
third countries. The control system of audits conducted by the FVO de facto treats third countries 
similar to Member States. While there is no hard proof for that, the second tier can be seen as a 
logical consequence of the first. The openness of the borders requires more preventive measures 
reaching out to third countries.48 For the second tier, the EU Commission plays a leading role and 
thus needs to be the focus of further analysis.  
                                                          
48 There are indications for this direction in the non-food product sector (Alemanno, 2009). 
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3.2 Transnational regulatory governance of food safety: private standards on the 
rise 
There is a widespread agreement that in addition to public regulation, private regulatory measures 
have started to considerably shape international food regulation and food trade (Hatanaka et al., 
2005; Havinga, 2006; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006; Meulen, 
2011a; Marx et al., 2012; Verbruggen and Havinga, 2017).49 In fact, some portrait food safety 
regulation as one of the frontrunners in the development of private forms of regulation (e.g. 
Wendler, 2008). Central to this development are private food safety standards (Henson and 
Reardon, 2005; Trienekens and Zuurbier, 2008; Fulponi, 2006, p. 4; Marsden et al., 2010, p. 116). 
Private food standards have been introduced by big retailing companies in the 1990-ies in Europe 
and have since proliferated across the globe (Havinga, 2015). The observation by Henson and 
Humphrey reflects the position of many scholars researching the field: “Private standards have 
evolved appreciably over time, and will continue to do so, for example in their institutional form, 
functions performed and attributes governed. It is important not to focus too much on the current 
standards ‘landscape’ but rather to see private standards as part of broader trends in value chain 
governance, in the context of changes in regulatory controls, consumer demand, etc.” (Henson 
and Humphrey, 2008, p. 1). I will briefly review this development and the dynamic behind it after 
having clarified the relevance of TPS in the following section.50 
3.2.1 Relevance of private standards 
The relevance of private standards derives from its usage by market actors. This has two aspects. 
First, the number of standard-adopters essentially drives the spread of private standards. Second, 
the position of standard-adopters within the supply chain and their share in the respective market 
segment contributes strongly to the relevance of private standards. Here, the differentiation 
between standard-adopter and standard-takers (see 2.2.2.1.2) reveals that though legally 
voluntary, for standard-taker, private standards may de facto be obligatory. This depends on the 
nature of global supply chains and the power of buyers. Global value chain analysis showed that 
private standards derive their relevance from the fact that western retailers and producers gained 
control over their supply chain and “dictated the way the chains are operated by requiring 
suppliers to meet certain standards” (Gereffi and Lee, 2012, p. 27). The power of retailers over 
their supply chain in turn is essentially based on high retail concentration in western highly 
developed countries, leading to a bottleneck in the supply chain between producers and 
consumers (Gereffi and Lee, 2012, pp. 27–28; Burger and Warner, 2012, p. 11, cf. Bernauer and 
                                                          
49 For a critical reflection on this development see Campbell (2005) as well as Fuchs and Kalfagianni (2010). 
50 Research on this issue also been driven by IGO that face the issue how to react to the emergence of 
private standards in food (e.g. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006; Mbengue, 
2011; Lee, 2006; Dankers, 2007; Henson and Humphrey, 2009b). 
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Caduff, 2006). This means, retailers and large food producers can impose private standards and 
their specific requirements on their suppliers because of their economic power (Havinga, 2012, p. 
7). Given the dominance of such companies in the supply chain, food suppliers, which are unable 
or unwilling to fulfil a required standard, are effectively excluded from the market (Fulponi, 2006, 
p. 11). Thus, private standards are de facto mandatory (Henson, 2008b, p. 65). For suppliers, the 
requirements of private standards may even be more relevant than any public regulation: “In a 
world where private standards predominate, the key issue for any exporter is to gain access to a 
given buyer's supply chain rather than a national market per se” (emphasis in the original) 
(Henson, 2008b, p. 76, see also Lin, 2014, p. 150). Empirical data confirm that private food 
standards exert a considerable impact on the market. According to a survey, 75 to 99 per cent of all 
suppliers are certified by at least one of the standards benchmarked against the Global Food Safety 
Initiative’s (GFSI) criteria (Fulponi, 2006, p. 6).  
3.2.2 Evolving characteristics of transnational private standards 
Two main reasons have been identified why food businesses established private standards (based 
on Fulponi, 2006; Henson and Humphrey, 2009b, pp. 8–14). Firstly, retailers use private standards 
to protect their reputation. The food scandals, especially in Europe, had led to heightened 
consumers’ anxiety, to new understandings of what constitutes food safety and food quality and to 
increased interest in how food is produced. Scholars widely agree that the occurrence of private 
regulation in Europe can be linked to growing consumer concerns over the effectiveness of public 
regulation following the 1980-ies (World Bank, 2005, p. 26; van Waarden, 2006, p. 56; Henson, 
2008b, p. 64; Marsden et al., 2010). At the core of the consumers’ concern lay the emerging new 
food risks of which the BSE-crisis is the dominant example. European governments failed to 
answer to these concerns and failed to contain the risks (Havinga, 2012, p. 6). At this point, 
retailers felt the need to manage the safety of their supply chain with establishing own standards 
for their suppliers being the dominant strategy. In a survey, retailers referred to the protection of 
their reputation as a major motivation to set up private standards, a view which was also reflected 
interviews with TPS-representatives (Fulponi, 2006, interview 4 and 26). This approach was 
possible because of a shift of relative power from producers to retailers in the market (although 
this varies depending on the member state market). The market was increasingly dominated by a 
small number of sizeable corporate retailers that thereby became able to influence and more 
strictly control their supply chains (Marsden et al., 2000; Bernauer and Caduff, 2006; Borraz et al., 
2006). Secondly, private standards serve the purpose of protecting especially retailers against food 
crises and liability claims (Fulponi, 2006). Responsibility for food safety in the EU had been passed 
from public to private actors by public regulation. The GFL holds them liable for placing unsafe 
food on the market (Alemanno, 2008, p. 151). Under these circumstances, it became more 
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important for food businesses to safeguard themselves against the increased risks and potentially 
new risks that derived from their globally spread supply chains. 
3.2.2.1 From first to third party certification 
Accordingly, the development of private standards can be recapped broadly in three phases. The 
first phase lies in the early 1990-ies, in which mainly European retailers started to include quality 
and safety requirements in their contracts with their suppliers. The control of the fulfilment of 
such requirements was either conducted by the supplier itself (first party certification) or by the 
buyer (second party certification) (see 2.2.2.1.2). This essentially was the creation of private 
standards specifying product and production requirements for food safety and quality in addition 
to existing public food safety standards. The second phase starts in the late 1990-ies with the 
establishment of third party certification. Especially retailers teamed up to formulate joint private 
standards and to establish private standard organisations as owners of such standards. As a result, 
private standards appeared on the market, which combined a private standard itself (that is a 
document describing the product and production requirements), a defined control and 
enforcement system, a private standard organisation (at least a secretariat) and a governance 
system (specifying the power relations between all parties participating in the standard 
organisation) (cf. Meulen, 2011b). For example, in 1997 the European Retailer Group (EUREP) set 
up EurepGAP, which later became GlobalGAP (cf. Campbell, 2005). Likewise, in 1998 the British 
Retail Consortium (BRC) Food Technical Standard was introduced by the British Retail 
Consortium. A major motivation for establishing such joint private standards was cost efficiency 
(interview 4). Such private standards reduced the wide number of company-own product 
specifications and with this the number of audits. In buyer-supplier contracts, a mere reference to 
the compliance with an existing private standard was necessary. Private standard organisations 
took care of the development of the standard’s requirements and compliance. From a supplier’s 
perspective, the number of controls and audits was considerably reduced. A certification for a 
specific private standard could be used for a theoretically endless number of buyers. Ironically, the 
need for consolidation created many such private standard schemes. Different national schemes 
emerged as well as industry specific schemes (Lee, 2006, p. 9). DG AGRI identified 441 private 
standard schemes (DG AGRI, 2016c).  
3.2.2.2 The Global Food Safety Initiative and the harmonisation of TPS 
It was exactly this development, which led to the third phase. Firstly, by the end of the 1990-ies 
consumers were ever more unsettled about the safety of food in western markets and lacked trust 
in market actors. Hence, “food safety was a top of mind issue for companies” (GFSI, 2014). 
Secondly, the several dispersed certification initiatives and private standards which were a first 
response to the increased pressure on retailers, however, acted in parallel and thereby raised the 
costs for retailers and producers due to duplications of certification processes (interview 29). As a 
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response, in October 1999, 20 leading retailers gathered in a hotel in Brussels to discuss measures 
how to address the high number of divergent private food standards (interview 26). They agreed 
on establishing an overarching organisation with the objective to harmonise the standard 
landscape (interview 26 and 29). Finally, in May 2000, the launch of the Global Food Safety 
Initiative under the umbrella of the International Committee of Food Chains (CIES) was 
announced (CIES, 2000, interview 26). The GFSI describes itself as a “business-driven initiative”. 
Its vision is to achieve “safe food for consumers everywhere” (GFSI, 2014; Kottenstede, 2017). 
According to a GFSI document “the need to enhance food safety, ensure consumer protection, 
strengthen consumer confidence, to set requirements for food safety schemes and to improve cost 
efficiency throughout the food supply chain” where the combined driving factors for its 
establishment (GFSI, 2003a). GFSI’s proclaimed mission is to “[p]rovide continuous improvement 
in food safety management systems to ensure confidence in the delivery of safe food to consumers 
worldwide” (GFSI, 2014, p. 1). From early on, it has been the declared approach to collaborate 
with governments around the world to this end (GFSI, 2003c; Kottenstede, 2017). 
The approach of the GFSI was new in that it did not create (yet another) new standard, but 
introduced the mechanism of benchmarking. Previously, EurepGAP already had used this 
mechanism, however limited to its specific realm of pre-farm gate production. The idea behind 
benchmarking is to make private food standards become comparable, eventually making double 
certification for suppliers unnecessary. GFSI put this in the formula and vision “Certified once, 
accepted everywhere” (interview 26, see for example GFSI newsletter from June 2008, GFSI, 
2013c). The benchmarking mechanism thus reduces the costs for auditing and controls for all 
parties (interview 26; Kottenstede, 2017). At the same time, this reduces a competitive logic 
between private standard schemes over certified businesses and between food businesses over food 
safety. Indeed, benchmarking considerably reduced the number of duplication in audits (SGS, 
2013, p. 3). By 2015, GFSI had recognised 13 private standards from 9 private standard 
organisations (GFSI, n.d.b; Kottenstede, 2017, p. 220). 
In a benchmarking process, the GFSI benchmarking committee with the support of the GFSI 
secretariat analyses whether an applying standard fulfils all the criteria laid down in the GFSI 
guidance document. The GFSI guidance document defines the requirements for benchmarked 
standards. It is updated regularly. The GFSI guidance document version 6.3 requires, for example, 
that all GFSI-certified standards have to cover the aspects of food safety management, good 
practice, HACCP, and certification of multi-site organisations (GFSI, 2013b). All GFSI stakeholders 
can comment on the preliminary proposal of the committee in an open consultation process. 
Subsequently, the GFSI board decides about the recognition (GFSI, n.d.c). In cases of positive 
benchmarking, the benchmarked scheme henceforth can be a substituted against any other scheme 
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recognized by GFSI. However, it is important to note that no GFSI member or any other market 
member is obliged to accept the equivalence. 
GFSI started to have effects after 2003. This year, the GFSI announced the successful benchmarking of 
the first four private standards (CIES, 2003). The initiative gained further momentum in 2007, when it 
was able to announce that seven major retailers officially declared to accept GFSI benchmarked food 
safety schemes.51 Yet another important milestone in GFSI’s development marked the entry of food 
manufacturers (interview 26 and 29). During the early years, GFSI was driven by retailers (GFSI, 
2008b, see also Kottenstede, 2017). Consequently, GFSI only had effects on retailer-owned brands. 
According to an expert involved in GFSI at the time, interest of manufacturers rose from 2005 
onwards, because GFSI proved to work (interview 26). A remaining hurdle was the fact that, thus far, 
GFSI had not benchmarked a food safety management standard based on ISO 22000, which food 
manufacturers needed and applied (GFSI, 2008a). In order to fill this gap, FSSC 22000 was created as 
standard fit for a GFSI benchmarking. Parallel to this development, manufacturers joined the GFSI’s 
board (interview 26, GFSI, 2008c). The FSSC 22000 standard was successfully benchmark by GFSI in 
2010, expanding the GFSI’s scope towards manufacturers (GFSI, 2010c). It paved the way for stronger 
manufacturers involvement in the GFSI. This was highlighted by GFSI representatives as a major step 
in the development of GFSI (interview 26 and 29, see also Kottenstede, 2017). It was so important to 
have ISO 22000 benchmarked, because it was one of GFI’s priorities to have as many companies as 
possible join the initiative (interview 29). In an additional step of its development, after three years of 
developing and piloting, in 2011, GFSI launched the Global Markets Programme (GFSI, 2011b). The 
programme resulted from the observation that small and less developed business struggled to fulfil the 
strict requirements of GFSI standards, especially with regard to HACCP. GFSI set up a technical 
working group that developed and reviewed voluntary food safety requirements which support small 
business developing their food safety systems stepwise until they reach a full GFSI level (GFSI, 2011b, 
p. 4). Two levels are available as what GFSI refers to as unaccredited entry points: basic (35 per cent of 
GFSI requirements) and intermediate (65 per cent of GFSI requirements). GFSI provides technical 
documents that define the two levels. GFSI conducts trainings to have small and medium sized 
suppliers achieve those levels (Kranghand, 2013; GFSI, 2015c). The actual trainings, however, are 
conducted by individual companies or partner organisation (for example in cooperation with the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization). GFSI does not provide resources itself for 
trainings. The Global Market Programme provides the framework and training material (GFSI, 2011b). 
Private standards, especially under the GFSI-umbrella, are primarily a European phenomenon. While 
GFSI is designed as an international initiative and has expanded its reach globally, it originates in 
Europe and for the period under investigation, companies from EU member states have played an 
important part in driving the initiative. An interviewee recalls how the idea itself was born within the 
                                                          
51 Those were Carrefour, Tesco, Metro, Migros, Ahold, Walmart and Delhaize. 
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Dutch retailer Royal Arnold (interview 26). The initial task force encompassed 20 companies, of which 
16 were from the EU.52 When the task force expanded to 53 members until 2003, EU companies still 
represented close to three quarters.53 Once set up, GFSI was facilitated by the Consumer Goods Forum, 
formerly named International Committee of Food Chains (CIES – the Food Business Forum), a Paris-
based international business organisation funded in 1953 in Rome with an enduring strong foothold in 
the EU.54 Certifications are gradually expanding from this geographical core to other regions (see 
Figure 2). After Europe, GFSI simultaneously planned the establishment of local groups in China and 
the USA (after Japan had already been set up in 2011) (cf. Havinga and Verbruggen, 2017). 
Figure 2: Global distribution of certificates issued against GFSI TPS in 2011 
 (Source: Rey, 2012) 
3.2.3 Summary and discussion 
Private standards have become a substantial element of the global food safety governance. They 
essentially represent businesses interest of developed countries in reputation and liability 
protection. Their development was highly dynamic and it therefore “is important not to focus too 
much on the current standards ‘landscape’ but rather to see private standards as part of broader 
trends in value chain governance, in the context of changes in regulatory controls, consumer 
demand, etc.” (Henson and Humphrey, 2008, p. 1). Given their dynamic development and the 
                                                          
52 Own calculation based on CIES (2000). 
53 Own calculation based on GFSI (2003b). 
54 44 per cent of its members are based in Europe and 40 per cent from EU member countries (own 
calculation based on membership directory of the Consumer Goods Forum, 2015). The GFSI itself does not 
disclose its membership structure. 
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powerful position of standard-adopters within global supply chains, they have become a de facto 
mandatory regulation for many food suppliers around the globe. At the same time, the emergence 
of GFSI indicates a dynamic within the sphere of private food safety standards towards 
consolidation via the mechanism of benchmarking. 
3.3 China’s food safety problems: a supply safety risk 
I already touched upon the severity of China’s food safety problems and mentioned food safety 
incidents (see chapter 0). However, as telling they are for the intensity of the food safety problems 
of China, those widely noticed cases cloud the understanding of the food safety problems in 
China. In fact, China faces a broad set food safety problems, which often reach deep into 
economic, political and cultural structures. The newsworthy stories of scary examples like glowing 
pork do not cover all facets of food safety problems and therefore a more structured and analytical 
discussion of China’s food safety problems is needed. The first part of this section is dedicated to 
this task. What is more and seemingly paradoxical, an increasingly strict and sophisticated food 
safety regulation by the Chinese government, which has developed since 2001, may have 
contributed to some of the food safety scandals reporting in national and international media. 
After all, some of the problems may have just been overlooked due to loose regulation and 
inspection in the past. At the same time, the development of China’s food safety regulation reveals 
further structural problems. In particular, while rules and organization improved substantially, 
authorities struggled with enforcing new regulation. This is the essential result of the second part 
of this section. 
3.3.1 Characteristics and sources of China’s food safety situation  
In order to achieve a deeper understanding of China’s food safety situation, I differentiate between 
types and sources of food safety issues. The former category sheds light on the different characters 
of food safety issues. The latter category draws attention to the reasons for food safety problems. 
Obviously, this distinction serves analytical purposes and in reality, both categories are connected. 
Insufficient infrastructure for sewage systems, for example, leads to microbiological 
contamination. 
3.3.1.1 Types 
The wide spectrum of food safety problems can broadly be categorized in three groups: 
microbiological contaminations, too high levels residues of substances as well as fake food and 
food adulteration (for similar categorizations see Yan, 2012; Becker, 2008; Bai et al., 2007a). 
Microbiological contaminations are mainly due to insufficient hygienic practises. Especially small-
scale food processors lack the professionalism and equipment to fulfil basic hygiene criteria (Yan, 
2012, p. 713, pre-interview 11). Human and animal waste spoils water used to irrigate fields, 
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because in rural areas sewage systems often do not exist. Likewise, waste from livestock and 
poultry, which wanders freely over fields, contaminates field crops. Inadequate handling and 
storage of food also increases the likeliness of microbiological problems. Functioning cold chains 
are not the standard in China, contributing to microbiological health risks (Gale and Buzby, 2009, 
pp. 2–4). In sum, hygiene issues make up a substantial, if not the largest, part of China’s food safety 
problems (Wu and Chen, 2013). Figures from the Ministry of Health (MoH) show that 
microbiological problems led to more victims than by farming chemicals (Yan, 2012, p. 714).  
In other cases, food contains toxicologically critical levels of substances. First, there are cases of 
high levels of pesticide and fertilizer residues on fruits and vegetables or veterinary drugs in meat 
due to misuse and overuse. China is the largest user of pesticides in the world (McBeath and 
McBeath, 2010a, p. 202). On average, Chinese farmers use 1.5 to 4 times more pesticides compared 
to the world’s average (Zhang et al., 2015a, p. 2).55 While usage varies strongly among different 
regions within China, overuse of pesticides is a substantial problem (FORHEAD, 2014, p. 32). For 
production of meat and aquaculture products, the massive usage of antibiotics poses major 
challenges to animal and human health. In 2013, China accounted for half of the global antibiotics 
consumption, 162,000 tons (Zhang et al., 2015c). Secondly, substances in soil and water lead to 
harmful levels of residues in food. For example, the arsenic contamination of water and soil led to 
arsenic contamination of rice in China (Howitt, 2013). Also, in some areas water and soil contain 
high concentration of pesticides and fertilizers (and their metabolites) due to previous excessive 
usage which enter the food chain this way (Sun et al., 2012). According to government figures 
from 2005, around seven percent of China’s arable land had been polluted with pesticides and 
fertilizers (as cited in Yang, 2007). In 2013, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations (FAO) expressed its concerns about food safety problems stemming from contaminated 
soil and water and Director-general Graziano da Silva urged China: “[T]here is much more to be 
done” (Xinhua, 2013b). Briefly before, food safety authorities discovered that 44 percent of rice 
and rice products in Guangzhou, a city of 8.5 million inhabitants in the south of China, contained 
“excessive amounts” of cadmium, a potentially carcinogenic heavy metal (Xinhua, 2013b). 
Residues of veterinary drugs especially in water likewise re-enter the food chain. Nearly a third of 
the national total consumption of antibiotics, namely 50,000 tons, end up in water and soil. This 
results in an average antibiotics emissions concentration in Chinese rivers of about 303 nanograms 
per litre, more than twice as much as in the USA (120 nanograms per litre) and 15 times as much 
as in Germany (20 nanograms) (Zhang et al., 2015c). Residues of harmful substances can also be 
due to illegal behaviour. Although the growth hormone clenbuterol was banned in China in the 
                                                          
55 For further details of Chinese pesticide production and usage, see Zhang et al. (2011) as well as Sun et al. 
(2012). 
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early years of the millennium’s first decade, cases of meat from animals treated with clenbuterol 
appeared again in 2009 and 2011 (Yan, 2012, p. 711). 
The third category, referred to as food adulteration or food fraud, includes all those cases in which 
farmers, food processors or food trades purposely faked food or added illegal substances. Many of 
the widely publicized cases of food safety incidents fall into this category. In such cases, actors 
somewhere during the supply chain add substances, toxic dyes, or fake ingredients. The 
motivation is mostly economic, that is to increase profits. They adulterate food to make expired 
food look fit for the market, replace ingredients by cheaper ones and stretch weight or volume. 
The illegal use of pesticides to preserve vegetables and other food – like the Jinhua ham incident 
cited above – falls into this category. Food adulteration not necessarily poses a health risk, as 
ingredients used to fake or adulterate foodstuff are not necessarily unsafe. An example for a less 
critical food fraud is the case of Wal-Mart China. In early 2014, testing showed that suppliers had 
sold fox meat labelled as donkey meat to Wal-Mart supermarkets (Reuters, 2014). However, in 
many cases adulterated food is potentially harmful. The melamine case is the best-known example 
for food fraud and a bitter showcase for the potential health risk posed by food fraud. A second 
major case is the seemingly widespread practice to recycle and fake cooking oil, often using actual 
waste – which is why it is often referred to as “gutter oil scandal”. This case also shows the 
persistency of some malpractices. First hitting the headlines in 2010, some oil processors dragged 
on to produce gutter oil. In 2015, a man who produced and sold 19,000 tons of tainted oil between 
2009 and 2013 was sentenced to death by the Anshun Intermediate People’s Court in southwest 
China (Whitehead, 2015). 
Virtually no country is a stranger to these types of food safety problems. What differentiates China 
from many other and especially western countries is the severity of many cases. For example, 
while overuse of pesticides occurs elsewhere, foodstuff is not soaked in pesticides as it has 
happened in China. Additionally, it is the extent to which the food system is struggling with safety 
problems, that is more extreme than in western countries. Figure 3 depicts the scope of food safety 
problems in China, namely that all product groups and all stages of the supply chain are troubled 
with deficiencies.  
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Figure 3: Food safety problems by product and stage of the supply chain 
 
(Source: FORHEAD, 2014) 
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3.3.1.2 Sources 
A number of structural factors contribute to the fundamental food safety crisis China is 
experiencing since the early 2000s. Firstly, China faces the challenge to nourish about 20 per cent 
of the world population with less than 10 per cent of the world’s cultivatable land (some figures go 
as low as 7 per cent). Even this limited space is under substantial pressure, as pollution results in 
land and water degradation (McBeath and McBeath, 2010b, pp. 52–60). This creates enormous 
pressure on productivity of the existing farmland, achieved to a large extend by the – initially state 
promoted – excessive use of fertilizers and pesticides with the above discussed negative 
consequences (Yang, 2007). Secondly, China’s rapid industrialization came at the cost of high 
collateral damages of the environment. This contributed strongly to the degradation of water and 
soil, which in turn affects the safety of food as laid out above. The development furthermore led to 
proximity of food production (be it farming of processing) and heavy industry in many areas in 
China (Gale and Buzby, 2009, pp. 2–4). In other words, part of China’s food safety problems are 
due to the rapid modernisation of its economy (Suttmeier, 2008; Li, 2009). Thirdly, China’s food 
sector features an immense fragmentation. The fragmentation of the Chinese food market is an 
obstacle on the road to safe food production. It implies that many businesses in the supply chain 
are very small. There are an estimated 200 million farms, which cultivate on average 0.6 hectare of 
land (FORHEAD, 2014, p. 23). The situation with food processors is similar. Official figures 
provided by the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the 
People’s Republic of China (AQSIQ) from 2007 counted 448,153 food processors of which 352,815 
have no more than ten employees (AQSIQ, 2007b). Figures vary widely with other sources 
counting 1 million food processors (Thompson and Hu, 2007, p. 5). The small size of the vast 
majority of businesses is a strong contributing factor to the low degree of professionalization, 
insufficient technical facilities, and poor knowledge and training (Yan, 2012, p. 713; Calvin et al., 
2006, p. 18, pre-interview 11). Fragmentation also is the root cause for overly lengthy supply 
chains with many distributors involved – which again complicates functioning food safety systems 
(Coglianese et al., 2009a, p. 8).  
China’s modernization was also accompanied by transformations of China’s society and economic 
structures. The share of the Chinese population living in an urban environment has increased 
from 20 per cent in 1980 to 55 per cent in 2015 (World Bank). The food business sector grew by 
13 per cent on average (Bai et al., 2007a). Because regulatory capacities did not keep up with these 
rapid transformations, food safety risks increased. Most notably, dietary behaviour changed 
fundamentally in China, partly because of increased income to spend on food, partly due to the 
massive urbanisation. Consumption of meat has soared and at the same time Chinese consume 
more processed food compared to pre-modernization times (Yan, 2012, p. 713). Such new diets 
mean that new ingredients and new foods are on the plate of Chinese consumers, which require 
regulation. A country discovering appetite for wine needs to establish new food safety regulation 
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for it (FORHEAD, 2014, p. 19). At the same time, urbanisation has transformed the food industry, 
including production techniques, transportation, retail and the structure and length of supply 
chains (FORHEAD, 2014, p. 21). Lastly, urbanisation with its vast construction of new 
commercial, industry and housing areas has additionally reduced the available land for agriculture 
which in turn increases the need for productivity. For example, Pudong, Shanghai’s new district 
with its commercial area, landmark buildings and 2.5 million inhabitants used to be a rural area 
supplying the city with food before the development started in the 1990-ies. 
What further complicates food safety regulation is the fact that China’s development is unevenly 
distributed across the country. While some parts of the country were elevated to much higher 
economic levels compared to the 1980-ies, others – especially rural areas – made much slower 
progress. The result is a nation, which presents a highly diversified picture in a number of aspects 
that affect food safety: “In terms of food safety, uneven development means that patterns of 
consumption, as well as the ways in which food is produced, transported and stored vary widely, 
as does the potential for upgrading the food supply chain” (FORHEAD, 2014, p. 19). Thus, 
governmental regulation has to address all these different situations within China. Yet again, this 
contributes to the complexity of the regulatory challenge.  
3.3.2 China’s food safety regulation and its reforms 
The Chinese government failed to keep up with the development of the challenges that arose from 
the fast changing market. Like other countries did before, China’s government struggled to 
develop an integrated food safety governance, that takes account of the complexity of the issue 
and the diversity of its challenges across the unevenly developed country. Conflicting policy 
objectives were part of the problem. China’s government pre-dominant aims for most of the time 
since the 1980-ies were to develop the economy and to ensure enough food for its population. 
These two objectives tend to conflict with the food safety, mainly because both put much pressure 
on the cultivable land (FORHEAD, 2014, p. 25). 
3.3.2.1 Developing gap between rules and implementation  
Most analyses point to the high fragmentation of the governmental oversight as a major source for 
the enduring food safety problems (FORHEAD, 2014; Chung and Wong, 2013; Calvin et al., 2006; 
Bian, 2004; Tam and Yang, 2005; Meador and Ma, 2013; Ellis and Turner, 2008). In his in-depth 
analysis, Zhou Guanqi, finds that regulatory segmentation was the proximate cause for regulatory 
failure in the field of food safety (Zhou, 2017). Before a major reform in 2013, as many as 13 
authorities on central level had responsibilities for food safety (Ellis and Turner, 2008). A decade 
earlier, the ADB even counted 17 government ministries and authorities with a say in China’s food 
safety regulation (Asian Development Bank, 2007, p. 3). Both occurred, overlapping 
responsibilities between central government ministries as well as gaps of regulation due to a 
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situation in which none of the organisation saw itself responsible (FORHEAD, 2014, pp. 40–41; 
Kahn, 2007). In addition to horizontal fragmentation at the central level, oversight is additionally 
stretched vertically from central level and province level to over 40,000 townships being the basic 
administrative level in China. 
The complexity of its highly fragmented government system furthermore multiplies with the 
diversity of the requirements for a food safety regulation that has to include the variety of the 
market (Yasuda, 2013). Food safety standards provide a concrete example for this argument: Many 
different levels of government set food safety standards as part of improving food safety regulation 
with industry and enterprises adding further standards resulting in an excess of partly overlapping, 
partly duplicated and even partly contradictory standards which nevertheless left some aspects 
unregulated and often were not strict enough (Wu and Zhu, 2014, p. 219). The government 
answered with a fundamental review and revision of standards only after 2010 (Wu and Zhu, 
2014, p. 222). 
A further central theme in the discussion of China’s food safety regulation is the gap between 
regulation on paper and its de facto implementation and enforcement (Yan, 2014, pp. 3–7; Liu, 
2010a; Ellis and Turner, 2008, pp. 11, 26; Gale and Buzby, 2009, p. 4). Despite all changes, this 
criticism has prevailed (Fu, 2016). Fragmentation of both governmental oversight and production 
contributes to this shortcoming (Yasuda, 2013, see also Bian, 2004, p. 11; United Nations, 2008, p. 
13; Ellis and Turner, 2008, p. 24). The sheer number of food suppliers makes it challenging to 
disseminate standards and to conduct inspections (Gale and Buzby, 2009, p. 3). The massive 
amount of contradictory food safety standards mentioned above represents the governmental 
fragmentation and complicates if not impedes sound implementation and enforcement (Dong and 
Jensen, 2007, pp. 20–21). Furthermore, enforcement pre-dominantly lies with the local 
government, which often lacks the resources to fulfil this task (Thompson and Hu, 2007, p. 5). 
There also is a tendency for local government authorities to act protectionist to safeguard 
businesses within their jurisdiction. Government authorities report that in order to avoid 
inspection, small food firms frequently re-locate their business (2010a, p. 298). Accordingly, 
breaches of food safety regulation often are without any consequences (Ellis and Turner, 2008, pp. 
11, 26; Broughton and Walker, 2010, p. 472; Yan, 2014, p. 290).  
Additionally, corruption bedevils the implementation of food safety regulation in China 
(Thompson and Hu, 2007, pp. 5–6; Huang, 2012; Kahn, 2007). Reportedly, this is often related to 
the practices of issuing licences by authorities, which can be obtained by paying bribes (Ellis and 
Turner, 2008, p. 26). The most prominent case for corruption is the case of Zheng Xiaoyu, former 
director of the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA). In 2007, he was convicted of bribery, 
sentenced to death and executed (cf. Yan, 2014, pp. 294–297). While this is a high-profile case, 
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corruption is widespread and present on the local level as well (Ellis and Turner, 2008, p. 26; Yan, 
2014, pp. 297–298).  
Food safety regulation reforms were on China’s government agenda for the full period.56 Chinese 
leaders repeatedly and openly stated their concern about food safety. In 2004, the State Council, 
presided by Premier Wen Jiabao, acknowledged food safety as a major concern and decided to 
strengthen regulation (China Daily, 2004a). In 2007, still before the melamine crisis, Wen Jiabao 
made a statement saying the food safety is a “top priority” urging that “[f]ull attention must be 
paid on the issue” during a cabinet meeting (Beijing Review, 2007). In 2010, vice premier Li 
Keqiang, said in front of officials from food safety authorities: “Food is essential, and safety should 
be a top priority. Food safety is closely related to people's lives and health and economic 
development and social harmony” (Xinhua, 2010). In 2013, during the press conference on his 
new position as premier, Li pledged to crack down on food safety problems with an ‘iron fist and 
firm resolution’" (Xinhua, 2013a). Later the same year, he again “vowed to enforce the toughest 
food safety regulations” (Lin, 2013). In 2015, he repeated the message towards food authorities in 
China and “called for full implementation of the revamped Food Safety Law and pledged ‘zero 
tolerance’ for food safety crime” (Xinhua, 2015b).  
In line with those rhetoric, the Chinese government has pursued numerous reforms of food safety 
regulation since 2000. The details of this process will be laid out in in chapter 5. Here, I want to 
draw attention to the number of changes, the depth of reorganisations undertaken and the 
resulting changing character of China’s food safety regime (CFSR). Two new laws were 
introduced, the Law on Agricultural Product Quality Safety and the Food Safety Law (FSL) of 
which the second underwent a substantial revision. The organisational structures were even less 
stable. Major reorganizations of the CFSR including redistributions of responsibilities occurred in 
2003/2004, 2009, 2010, and 2013. During all these reorganisations, the fragmentation of oversight 
was reduced and responsibility for food safety concentrated in fewer organisations. After 2013, all 
central tasks lie at the newly established China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA), the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and the National Health and Family Planning Commission 
(NHFPC) (see Table 5) (Kahn, 2007). 
 
                                                          
56 For a comprehensive description of China’s food safety regulation development see Liu (2010a). 
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Table 5: Major government's organisations and their food safety responsibilities 2000-2014 
 
 
(Source: own compilation based on Jia and Jukes, 2013, Meador and Ma, 2013, Chung and Wong, 2013, Bian, 2004, Bai et al., 2007a, Broughton and Walker, 2010) 
 
 
National Food Safety 
Co mmittee under 
t he State Council (NFSC)
2000
2004
2009
2013
• overall coordination 
and supervision of 
related authorities 
• development of food 
safety regulations and 
related policies
Ministry of Health (MoH)
• oversight  
(implementation of 
coordination delegated 
to CFDA)
• all aspects of domestic 
consumption of food, 
including licensing food 
businesses, monitoring, 
inspecting and giving 
technical assistance for food 
hygiene as well as 
investigating food 
contamination and food 
poisoning incidents
• coordination (within NFSC)
• risk assessment, risk 
surveillance, risk 
management, risk 
communication, food safety 
emergencies (with CFSA, 
CDC)
• standard setting 
• National Health and 
Family Planning 
Co mmission (NHFPC): newly 
formed ministry combining the 
former Ministry of Health and 
the Commission of Family 
Planning
• development, consolidation 
and promulgation of food 
safety standards 
• assessment of risks
Ministry of 
Agriculture (MoA)
• risk assessment, 
licensing, standard-
setting for edible 
agricultural products 
2003
• as above, additionally 
responsible for 
supervision of swine 
slaughter
Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine (AQSIQ)
• issuing food production licences; 
administration and supervision of 
food production (after 2002)
• supervision and administration of 
imported and exported food (with 
CIQ)
• accrediting agencies for food 
inspection and testing (with CNCA)
• as above with leading responsibility 
under the “five dragons-regime”
• as above, without leading role
• as above without responsibility for 
food production
St ate Administration for 
Industry and Commerce 
( SAIC)
• supervision of foods 
in circulation, 
including business 
licensing
State Food and 
Drug Administration (SFDA) / 
China Food and Drug 
Administration (CFDA)
• responsible for co-ordination and 
harmonization of the regulation of 
food (health and cosmetics) 
products, and for prosecuting food 
safety violations
Ministry of Commerce 
( MofCOM)
• responsible for chain 
stores, supermarkets, 
development of 
commercial circulation 
networks and swine 
slaughter 
• as above without swine 
slaughter
• Newly established leading ministry 
for food safety with comprehensive 
authority over the production, 
distribution and consumption of 
domestic food (and drugs)
• implementation of day-to-day 
coordinating of all other 
government organisations with food 
safety responsibility (from General 
Office of the Food Safety 
Committee), catering (from SFDA), 
domestic food processing and retail 
distribution (from AQSIQ and 
SAIC)
• responsible for food servicing and 
catering, including inspection of 
restaurants and similar businesses
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Figure 4: Organizational setup of China's Food Safety Regulation by 2014 
(Source: Chen et al., 2015, p. 2208) 
Despite of all the efforts by the Chinese government from 2000 until 2015, the series of food safety 
scandals did not end. In July 2014, a local Shanghai TV station – no government authority – 
revealed food safety violations at a local production site of the US-based meat producer OSI Group 
(Xinhua, 2014). Thus, the principal verdict that China’s government did not succeed in effectively 
manage food safety prevailed (The Lancet, 2014).  
3.3.2.2 Regulation of food destined for export 
China reacted to the occurring problems with food exports by establishing a “two-track food 
safety and inspection system” (Meador and Ma, 2013, p. 4). Supervision of exported food was given 
to a national-level inspection agency, while domestic production remained under local oversight 
(Meador and Ma, 2013, p. 4). AQSIQ with its provincial branches, the China Inspection and 
Quarantine offices (CIQ), is the responsible ministry. Any exporting company needs to be 
registered with a respective CIQ (Gale and Buzby, 2009, p. 19). Reportedly, food for the 
international market is tested much more often than food for the domestic market (FORHEAD, 
2014, p. 42). In their case study on aquaculture production, Broughton and Walker detect a “two-
track system” for the enforcement of food safety regulation. According to their observations, 
enforcement for exported produce is substantially stricter compared to enforcement of products 
destined for the Chinese domestic market (2010, p. 476). In addition to stricter enforcement, 
exporting companies in China have to comply with specific requirements (Calvin et al., 2006). For 
example, in 2002, AQSIQ issued a regulation making the application of HACCP mandatory for six 
kinds of food (canned food, aquatic products [excluding fresh, frozen, air-cured, and pickled/salted 
products], meat and meat products, frozen vegetables, fruit/vegetable juice, and frozen 
convenience food containing meat or aquatic products) (Dong and Jensen, 2007, p. 22). Also, they 
need to meet further requirements that go beyond regulation of domestic companies (cf. Gale and 
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Buzby, 2009, p. 20). An interviewee described the two tracks as a “vertical line”, dividing China’s 
food safety regulation. In 2007, AQSIQ claimed that over 99 per cent of all exported food was “up 
to standard” (AQSIQ, 2007a). However, this approach has strong limitations, because it is hard to 
keep export- and domestic-production supply chains strictly separated and ultimately it is the 
overall level of food safety that determines the safety of food exports (Dong and Jensen, 2007, p. 
20). By the same token, difficulties to monitor and enforce such stricter requirements have been 
reported (Gale and Buzby, 2009, pp. 20–21). Accordingly, the empirical problems with imports 
from China discussed in the introduction and the reactions by importing countries indicate the 
limitations of this approach.  
3.3.3 Summary and reflection 
By no means are import safety issues with Chinese food coincidences. In China, a fundamental 
problem with food safety exists, which roots deeply in the structure of its food market as well as 
the side effects of the economic growth. Most importantly for the question under investigation, 
China’s food safety suffered from an incapable regulatory system. There is widespread agreement 
that the status of China’s food safety and the challenges the country faces in this regard resemble 
those of developing countries. Hence, “lapses in the safe practises” as the root cause for supply 
safety problems were widespread and due to structural problems and policy failure (Coglianese et 
al., 2009a, p. 7).  
Developed countries in Europe and Northern America faced similar challenges during their phases 
of industrialization and urbanisation (Becker, 2008, p. 13; Dong and Jensen, 2007, p. 19). So, the 
food safety problems are not unique to China, but the intensity of scope and scale are: “Many of 
these problems were also encountered by developed nations during their periods of intense 
industrialization and urbanization, but because these processes have been more compressed in 
China, food safety problems are manifesting themselves in a more extreme form” (FORHEAD, 
2014, p. 3). While improvements of the CFSR have been made with regard to the organisational 
setup, standard-setting and rule-making, prevailing lack of implementation and enforcement 
problems appear to be deeper rooted problems. In short, China’s food safety regulation simply did 
not keep up with the speed of its economic development and its integration in the global food 
market. As Western industry representatives put it in a speech in 2014: China’s food safety 
regulation is “still playing catch-up” (Naville and Gibson, 2014).   
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3.4 Intergovernmental global food safety regulation: actors and institutions 
This section briefly discusses third parties as yet another potential component of the causal 
mechanism. I present those international organisations, which potentially affect the EU public 
actors’ and TPS’ behaviour. Numerous organisations are involved in shaping global regulation of 
food safety. In his review of the “fragmented international food safety regime” Alemanno lists all 
organisations on the global level mainly entrusted with food safety responsibility: the FAO, the 
World Health Organisation (WHO), CAC, OIE and furthermore those, which also address food 
safety among other topics, namely the WTO, the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 
International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN) (Alemanno, 2015, p. 10).57 This 
corresponds largely with Snyder’s list, in which he specifically analyses the transnational 
dimensions of Chinese food safety regulation (Snyder, 2015, pp. 242–243). Notably, I additionally 
include the World Bank in my discussion. The complex structure of international food safety 
governance complicates the structure of this section of the chapter. Presenting the organisations 
simply in a linear way, one after the other, would be an undue simplification. Due to the 
interconnectedness, repeatedly cross-references need to be made. This is the reason this chapter 
first presents main organisations dealing with food safety separately to then move on to discuss 
further organisations together as the core of an international food safety regime.  
However, the purpose of this section is not to provide an extensive presentation of global food 
safety governance.58 Rather, the aim is to identify those among the array of organisations, which 
potentially affect the activities of EU public actors and TPS in China. Here, it is helpful to already 
make analytical distinction between rule-making on the one side and 
implementation/enforcement on the other. I identify those organisations that themselves take 
measures to influence food safety regulation in specific countries. This is the content of the first 
part of this section. With regard to influence on rule-making, the regime character of 
international food safety governance needs to be taken into account as I argue in the second part.  
3.4.1 IGOs as actors in global food safety regulation 
In this part, I present those organisations of the list above, which are relevant to implementation 
and enforcement in China in the context of this research. I integrate INFOSAN in my presentation 
of the WHO since it is run by WHO and by its function does not have such an important role for 
the analysis here. 
                                                          
57 I exclude OECD from my discussion as it does not deal with China. 
58 This has been done extensively elsewhere and my presentation heavily draws on the respective body of 
literature, e.g. (Alemanno, 2015; Josling et al., 2004; Unnevehr, 2007; Alemanno, 2008). 
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3.4.1.1 WHO 
The WHO is a United Nations (UN) organisation established in 1948 to improve public health 
globally and which treats food safety as one aspect of this wider task. This understanding goes 
back to 2000, when the WHO has decided to give higher attention to food safety as a global issue 
and has been promoting an understanding of food safety as an issue of public health (Käferstein, 
2003, p. 102; Snyder, 2015, p. 250). According to its constitution, one of the WHO’s functions is 
“to develop establish and promote international standards with respect to food, biological, 
pharmaceutical and similar products” (World Health Organization, 1948 (2014), p. 3). Within the 
organisation, the Department of Food Safety and Zoonoses is foremost responsible for food safety. 
The WHO published a first Global Food Safety Strategy in 2002 on the request of the member 
states in 2000 (Snyder, 2015, p. 250, for details see INFOSAN, 2009). It was replaced by a strategic 
plan to advance food safety for the period 2013-2022, which goes back to decision by the member 
states in 2010 (World Health Organization, 2014a).  
With regard to specific activities, the WHO (based on World Health Organization, 2016a and 
Alemanno, 2015, p. 13): 
 assumes a coordinative role in the global network of food safety experts and organisations, 
for example by running the Global Foodborne Infections Network (GFN). Another 
example is the programme on managing zoonotic public health risks.59 In this regard 
INFOSAN stands out as a major programme. Established in 2004 by the WHO and in the 
meantime jointly managed by FAO and WHO, it connects food safety authorities in order 
to achieve a rapid flow of information about food safety incidents and to facilitate bilateral 
cooperation between states;60 
 is involved in setting food safety standards on the international level. As part of this, 
WHO provides scientific advice on questions of chemical food safety and micro-biological 
hazards for risk assessments. More crucially, the WHO and FAO jointly set up and run the 
Codex Alimentarius, which defines international food safety standards (see 3.4.2); 
 promotes and conducts and food safety research. For example, in 2006, the WHO initiated 
the research initiative to estimate the global burden of foodborne diseases; 
 has set up and runs monitoring activities and develops exposure assessments. Two 
programmes stand out in this regard, first the Global Environment Monitoring System - 
Food Contamination Monitoring and Assessment Programme and second the WHO 
Advisory Group on Integrated Surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance (AGISAR). 
                                                          
59 Zoonosis is a type of diseases which can move between animals and people (World Health Organization, 
2016b). 
60 For details about INFOSAN in China see Snyder (2015, p. 255). 
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Notably, the latter also includes capacity building measures in countries in order to 
increase the monitoring; 
 is active in communication and education, with the aim to raise food safety knowledge. 
Central element is the „five keys to safer food” campaign, which has been adopted by over 
100 countries around the world since 2001. It is targeted at consumers and workers in food 
producing establishments alike. 
 Lastly, and most relevant for the analysis, the WHO is involved in capacity building in 
member states, mainly through the GFN, which is “committed to enhancing the capacity 
of countries to detect, respond and prevent foodborne and other enteric infections and 
fostering collaboration between human health, veterinary, food and other relevant 
sectors.” To this end WHO and the partnering organisations FAO and OIE define strategic 
plans ever since the programme’s inception (i.e. strategic plans 2001-2005, 2006-2010 and 
strategic plan 2011-2015) (World Health Organization, 2011). Measures are training and 
mentoring, based on the country needs. 
The WHO runs its food safety programmes in all regions with a separate food safety strategy in 
each region. China belongs to the Western Pacific region, which published to strategy papers, one 
in 2003 and a second for the period 2011-2015 (World Health Organization, 2003; World Health 
Organization, 2012). 
3.4.1.2 Food and Agriculture Organisation 
The FAO, established in 1945, is yet another UN-organisation involved in global food matters. 
However, the FAO’s focus clearly lies on food security61, that is the provision of sufficient food to 
feed the global population. Via it’s decentral office structure, the FAO supports countries in 
developing strategies and capacities to increase food supply. It serves as a source of knowledge for 
its member countries. The FAO has a long history of cooperating with the WHO, with the CAC 
and the GFN being to primary examples. The FAO reflects the fact that objective of food security 
cannot be achieved independently of food safety. After all, only safe food can help to achieve 
sufficient nutrition. Thus, FAO does engage in food safety topics, however, rather strictly through 
the lens of food security (Alemanno, 2015, p. 12; Snyder, 2015, p. 244). Consequently, it treats 
food safety in conjunction with food quality and the responsible unit is called “Food Safety and 
Quality unit”. Within this approach, it conducts measures to provide scientific advice, supports 
the increase of institutional and individual capacities, supports the policy development, facilitates 
global access to information and networks (FAO, 2012b).  
                                                          
61 Food security describes the objective to ensure enough food for the population and thus is distinct from 
food safety, which describes the objective to ensure that food does not harm consumers. 
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3.4.1.3 World Bank 
The World Bank was established in 1944 and is part of the UN-system with the official aim to 
reduce global poverty.62 Alemanno and Snyder are right in excluding it from the discussion of the 
multilateral food safety governance as it is not involved in rule (soft or hard) food safety law 
making. However, my field work showed that the World Bank is active in improving de facto food 
safety in developing countries and in China specifically. This fits well with the overall task of the 
World Bank, to provide financial and technical assistance to developing countries (World Bank, 
2016). With my understanding of regulation as encompassing implementation and enforcement, 
the World Bank thus influences food safety regulation in China.  
Specifically, World Bank and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Food Safety Cooperation 
Forum (APEC FSCF) jointly initiated the Global Food Safety Partnership (GFSP) end of 2012. Set 
up as a Public-Private-Partnership project, it brings together public organisations, businesses, and 
academia and longs to increase the alignment of the different sectors food safety projects. It 
focusses on providing trainings and technical support to developing countries and claims to benefit 
actors across the whole food value chain, reaching from small farmers to regulatory agencies: “We 
combine food safety training and technical support so developing countries can improve their food 
safety systems and benefit from better compliance with food safety standards” (World Bank, 
2014b).  
3.4.1.4 UN Environment Programme 
UNEP, founded in 1972, is responsible for environmental issues. Its involvement in food safety 
reflects the overlap between food safety and environmental issues. As discussed above for the case 
of China, environmental contamination may negatively affect the safety of food (see 3.3.1). 
UNEP’s main task is to coordinate the development of environmental policy consensus on the 
global level. The organisation describes the broad fields of its work as follows: 
 “Assessing global, regional and national environmental conditions and trends  
 Developing international and national environmental instruments  
 Strengthening institutions for the wise management of the environment” (United Nations 
Environment Programme, 2016). 
As part of this, two major programmes are related to food safety. First, the Global Environmental 
Monitoring System (GEMS) and the International Programme on Chemical Safety in collaboration 
with the WHO (Alemanno, 2015, p. 17). Additionally, UNEP hosts the secretariat for the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and thus is also responsible for the Protocol on Biosafety. The 
                                                          
62 This is not the place to recap the highly controversial academic and political debate to what extent the 
World Bank does indeed serve the purpose of reducing global poverty and its role in implementing the 
principles of the “Washington Consensus” (Cavanagh et al., 1994). 
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protocol also relates to food safety in a wider sense as it deals with the trans-boundary movement 
of living modified organisms (Alemanno, 2015, p. 17). However, I exclude biosafety aspects of my 
analysis. 
3.4.2 The international food safety regime and global standard setting 
The core of the multilateral system which organizes and governs food safety topics internationally 
consists of a number of international institutions and their respective organisation bound together 
by the WTO. I henceforth refer to this assemblage as international food safety regime (IFSR) 
(Carruth, 2006, p. 29; Alemanno, 2015). These are the CAC, the World Organization for Animal 
Health (OIE) and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) (for details and overview 
see Josling et al., 2004; Alemanno, 2008; Epps, 2008). These three institutions bring together 
national experts of their respective member states to discuss and decide over food safety standards 
as recommendations – for example in the form of maximum residue levels for specific chemical 
compounds. The CAC is the most influential among them. Set up by the FAO and the WHO in 
1962, and supported by 185 member countries, it has become the organisation that negotiates and 
defines food safety standards and other guidelines and recommendations dealing with the safety of 
internationally traded food (Hüller and Maier, 2006; Boutrif, 2003). It has evolved into a powerful 
scientific advisory body and by 2015 has issued more than 240 standards on a wide range of 
specific issues (Alemanno, 2015, p. 14). The OIE, established in 1924, is another multilateral 
organisation setting food safety standards with specific focus on animal diseases (Carruth, 2006, p. 
31; Alemanno, 2015, p. 16). In addition to standard setting, it conducts scientific research informs 
its 178 member states about animal disease developments (Snyder, 2015, p. 274). It is an important 
part of the IFSR and frequently cooperates with FAO and WHO (Alemanno, 2015, p. 16). The 
IPPC is more a treaty than an IGO. It is signed by 181 parties and came into force in 1952 to 
regulate plant protection issues. IPPC bodies most importantly set plant protection standards 
(Snyder, 2015, p. 274). 
The WTO fundamentally increased the indirect influence of these three organisations (Joerges and 
Petersmann, 2006, p. 516; Hüller and Maier, 2006, p. 268; Boutrif, 2003). In fact, “[a]mong the 
several international organisations dealing with food-safety related activities, the WTO is the only 
one providing for a set of legally binding obligations for WTO Members when they adopt food 
regulations” (Alemanno, 2015, p. 19). Standards developed by Codex Alimentarius, OIE and IPPC 
became binding for WTO members through the SPS agreement and the TBT agreement of the 
WTO, which explicitly refer to Codex Alimentarius, OIE and IPPC. Without the WTO, all three 
for themselves only could issue recommendations and voluntary regulatory standards. In addition, 
the SPS-committee also refers to the expertise of WHO and FAO as official observer organisations 
(Roberts and Unnevehr, 2003, p. 37). The SPS-agreement clarifies under which conditions trade 
can be blocked or limited in order to safeguard humans, animals and plants. The TBT-agreement 
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likewise clarifies conditions surrounding the issues of food packaging, labelling and criteria for 
freshness.  
Neither of these organisations is actively supporting the implementation of international standards 
in member countries. Their relevance for the analysis stems from the fact that the core of the IFSR 
and its institutional power makes food safety regulation and standards developed by CAC, OIE and 
IPPC the reference for all actors involved in food trade (Boutrif, 2003, p. 84). 
3.4.3 Summary and discussion 
We can differentiate two ways how international organisations potentially intervene with EU 
public and private motivations for influencing China’s food safety regulation. First, in the sense of 
actively engaging with the Chinese government and other Chinese actors to improve food safety 
regulation in China. In this regard, the WHO stands out as an active driver of food safety in the 
period under observation. It was one of the first to advocate to take food safety seriously and also 
one which came up with a food safety strategy. Both show dedication to the topic. Snyder points 
out that “[i]n sum, the WHO has broad power to cooperate with other international, national, 
governmental and non-governmental organisations and has undertaken a wide variety of non-
legally-binding forms of cooperation” (2015, p. 252). 
There is a second perspective on how international organisations have an effect. As shown in the 
second part of this section, international institutions strongly shape the definition of food safety 
rules. Subsequently, virtually every actor refers to these internationally agreed food safety rules 
and standards: EU regulation is following widely international specifications and so do TPS and 
international organisations. For my analysis, I therefore can assume, that on a rule-making level, 
any of those actors promotes the same basic principles of food regulation and basic food safety 
standards. I consider this to be a static influence for the period under observation. While the 
content of international standards and rules have changed during that time, the character of 
influences has not. Especially from a supply safety perspective, therefore, activities can be treated 
as – in principle – advancing the same objective. From a market access perspective, this cannot be 
assumed. Thus, this second aspect needs to be kept in mind as a background condition when 
analysing the case, while for the first aspect it needs to be analysed how it materializes in detail. 
3.5 Public-private interaction: a history together 
I have identified interaction between EU public actors and TPS as another potential component of 
the causal mechanism and I already have narrowed down my understanding of what constitutes 
interaction in my analysis (see 2.2.2.3.4). The purpose of this section therefore is to put such 
interactions into wider perspective, that is the development of interaction between public actors 
Public-private interaction: a history together 
 
89 
and TPS in general. I discuss the interaction between TPS and EU food safety regulation and the 
interaction between TPS and the international food safety regime, two essential dimensions of 
interaction when analysing public-private interactions (cf. Lin, 2014). 
3.5.1 Responsibilities of private sector in EU regulation 
The post BSE-crisis EU food safety regulation, namely the above introduced GFL, established the 
principle of business responsibility, which is fundamental to the interaction between TPS and the 
EU’s food safety regulation. Article 17(1) of the GFL states, that “Food and feed business operators 
at all stages of production, processing and distribution within the businesses under their control 
shall ensure that foods or feeds satisfy the requirements of food law which are relevant to their 
activities and shall verify that such requirements are met” (European Union, 2002). In addition, 
article 14 of the GFL prohibits putting unsafe food on the market. In other words, the GFL 
established the legal grounds on which business operators can be held liable for putting 
consumers’ health at risk by placing unsafe food on the market. More specifically, the regulation 
includes the obligation to withdraw products from the market in case safety problems have been 
discovered and – in case the product has reached the consumer – the obligation to inform the 
public. Food and feed operators are likewise required by the GFL to inform authorities if they 
have information that unsafe food has been placed on the market and they have to inform about 
their actions taken to prevent risks for consumers (European Union, 2002, pp. 19, 20, 21).  
It has been argued that such legal provisions encouraged food businesses to engage in regulating 
their supply chain (Lee, 2006, p. 8; Meidinger, 2009, pp. 239–242; Marsden et al., 2010, pp. 19–22; 
Wendler, 2008, pp. 224–225). As Henson and Humphrey argue, “The development of private 
standards, rather than being seen as distinct from public regulation, is very much a response to the 
ways in which regulatory controls over food safety have evolved, most notably in Europe” 
(Henson and Humphrey, 2008, p. 1). In this regard, it is noteworthy, that the movement for 
private standards originates in the UK, where the legal logic of holding especially supermarkets 
liable for unsafe food products had already been introduced in 1990. The logic behind this is that 
for any food business operator the safety of the food it aims to put on the market does not only 
rely on the internal production processes and condition. Rather, the safety of the input it receives 
from suppliers is of equal importance to guarantee the safety of the outcome. Consequently, for 
the sake of safeguarding themselves from financial as well as reputational losses and even legal 
liability, food businesses started to establish mechanisms to control the safety of their supply. 
Thus, arguably, the GFL’s principle of holding businesses responsible for the safety of food put on 
the market contributed to the development of private food safety regulation and – further down 
the road – transnational food safety standards.63 
                                                          
63 I owe the stringency of this argument to the unpublished paper presented by Bernd van der Meulen at a 
workshop in Nijmwegen in May 2014. 
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Private standards de facto have become part a of the complex food safety regulatory governance in 
Europe latest by the end of the millennium’s first decade (Havinga, 2012).64 The EU Commission 
did take note of this development. For example, DG SANTE conducted a study to discuss private 
standards’ effects on developing countries that intend to export to the EU (Lee, 2006). In 2010, DG 
AGRI commissioned a research on voluntary certification schemes in the EU (DG AGRI, 2016c). 
In the same year, the EU Commission issued a Communication on best practice guidelines for 
private standards, referred to as voluntary certification schemes, for agricultural products and 
foodstuffs (European Commission, 2010).65 The Communication acknowledges the logic described 
above, that food businesses use certification schemes to ensure that they fulfil the responsibilities 
put on them by the GFL. It furthermore is “designed to describe the existing legal framework and 
to help improving the transparency, credibility and effectiveness of voluntary certification 
schemes and ensuring that they do not conflict with regulatory requirements” (European 
Commission, 2010). Directed primarily at scheme owners and operators, it reminds of the relevant 
EU regulation and provides a number of recommendations on the governance, processes and 
content of voluntary certification schemes. At the same time, the EU Commission declares in its 
Communication that legislative action to regulate private standards was not warranted (European 
Commission, 2010). 
3.5.2 International food safety regime and TPS 
The emergence of private food safety regulation added further complexity to an anyway complex 
system of multilateral food safety governance: “The net result of the evolution of public and 
private regulation of food safety has been the establishment of a broad range of overlapping and 
inter-related standards, and associated systems of conformity assessment and enforcement, 
originated from individual private firms, business organisations and regional, national and/or 
supra-national government” (Henson, 2008a, p. 19). In this part, I will discuss the major aspects of 
the relationship between the international food safety regime (representing public regulation) and 
TPS (representing private regulation). 
Given their purpose as baseline standards, most TPS refer back to public regulations that certified 
businesses have to comply with (Meulen, 2011b, p. 85). The Codex Alimentarius is a major 
reference point for TPS, when it comes to the definition of the standards content. The GFSI 
guidance document is a good example to illustrate the nature of this interaction with public 
regulation (GFSI, 2013b). In the introductory note, the GFSI states that, “[t]he key elements have 
been developed by members of the GFSI Technical Working Groups and other experts, who have 
                                                          
64 For a more detailed discussion of the changing role and increasing importance of private actors in EU 
regulatory food governance see Marsden et al. (2000), Marsden et al. (2010), van Waarden (2006), Bernauer 
and Caduff (2006), Havinga (2006), Havinga (2008), Garcia Martinez et al. (2007), Wendler (2008).  
65 The Communication’s definition of voluntary certification schemes requires third party certification. 
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advised upon sector specific requirements. These key elements can be directly related to the food 
safety principles laid down by Codex Alimentarius Standards and Guidance, as well as Codes of 
Practice, where appropriate” (GFSI, 2013b, p. 12, my emphasis). Differentiated for different types 
of businesses, the guidance document makes repeated reference for specific Codex Alimentarius 
regulation – like for example:  
“The standard shall require that procedures are in place to ensure that agricultural and 
veterinary inputs are of adequate quality for the intended use, that the application of 
agricultural and veterinary inputs is managed properly to minimise the potential for 
microbial or chemical contamination [as defined under the Codex Alimentarius 
Recommended International Code of Practice – General Principles of Food Hygiene 
CAC/RCP1-1969, Rev 4 -2003 and specifically Code of Hygienic Practice for Meat 
CAC/RCP 58-2005] at levels that may adversely affect the safety of Meat / Milk / Eggs / 
Honey and that the producer is required to take into consideration the WHO guidelines 
on the safe use of waste water and livestock excreta in agriculture, as appropriate.” 
(GFSI, 2013b, p. 119).  
Likewise, although to a much lesser extent, the guidance document mentions respective 
specifications developed by the WHO – for example:  
“The standard shall require that procedures be in place to ensure that agricultural 
inputs are of adequate quality for the intended use, that application of agricultural 
inputs is managed properly to minimise the potential for microbial or chemical 
contamination [as defined under the Codex Alimentarius Recommended International 
Code of Practice – General Principles of Food Hygiene CAC/RCP1-1969, Rev 4 -2003] 
at levels that may adversely affect the safety of fresh fruits and vegetables and that the 
producer is required to take into consideration the WHO guidelines on the safe use of 
waste water and excreta in agriculture as appropriate. (GFSI, 2013b, p. 128) 
Thus, from a content-perspective on TPS, they follow the rule-setting of public regulation. 
However, in some respects they do exceed public regulation in the requirements (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006). For example, some TPS require certified 
suppliers to do not exceed half or a third of the maximum residue levels for specific pesticides set 
by public regulation of the importing country (Stanton, 2012, p. 246). In a survey, 85 per cent of 
supermarkets in Europe said their standards are higher (Epps, 2010, p. 75). It was especially such 
circumstances, which created a conflicting relationship with public regulators.66 
In 2005, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines first raised the issue of private standards within the 
WTO’s SPS framework (DG SANCO, 2014). The central point of their complaint was that private 
standards could effectively act as trade barriers for developing countries. In this case, specific 
requirements by GlobalGAP (then EurepGAP) were under discussion. They are not subject to the 
                                                          
66 Stanton (2012) provides a detailed chronological description of the discussion within the IFSR about TPS, 
which will only be briefly summarized. The role of private standards in global food safety governance has 
furthermore been discussed extensively in Marx et al. (2012, part II and III). Also note that some see less of a 
conflict and more of a complementary relationship between public and private food safety regulation (e.g. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006). 
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scrutiny applied to public standards, which according to WTO rules cannot be unduly trade 
restrictive. The debate centred around three questions: First, whether or not private standards 
pose a barrier to trade (which was the key concern of the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines); 
second, the effects of private standards on the economic development of poorer countries; third, 
whether or not WTO provides a legal basis for regulating private food safety standards (Stanton, 
2012, p. 241). What followed was a “lively” debate within the WTO about how to deal with the 
emergence of private standard schemes in the area of food safety (Mbengue, 2011, p. 10). The issue 
gained even more weight, when in December 2008, a group of Latin American countries raised a 
number of concerns about private standards. Following this, private standards became an issue not 
only within the WTO but also for OIE, CAC, FAO, WHO, OECD, United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and World Bank. Many of these organisations mandated 
research on private standards and published analytical papers (e.g. Dankers, 2007; Henson and 
Humphrey, 2009b; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006; Henson and 
Humphrey, 2009a; World Bank, 2005; Washington and Ababouch, 2011). Likewise, the EU 
commission looked into the topic (Lee, 2006, for an overview see DG SANCO, 2014). The 
controversy over the question how to handle private standards has not been solved (Mbengue, 
2011). This lies in the nature of the conflict, which is goes back to opposing interests. While 
developed countries have no interest to weaken a mechanism, which provides higher import 
safety, poorer exporting countries have a strong interest to achieve market access for their 
products. By early 2014, the SPS committee had not succeeded in defining private standards 
(Manila Bulletin, 2014). Hence the conclusion that while TPS have a rather clear relation to public 
food safety regulation, public actors still struggle to define their position towards TPS. 
3.5.3 Summary and reflection 
When considering interactions between EU public actors and TPS in relation to China, existing 
structures of interaction matter. First, the post 2002 regulation in the EU delegates responsibility 
to the private sector. This contributed to the rise of private standards. This establishes a 
fundamental interaction between public and private level. However, the EU failed to prescribe a 
dedicated role to private standards in food safety governance, leaving uncertainty on both sides 
about the exact relationship (Havinga, 2012). If it exists at all, distribution of roles and more 
specific interactions thus are rather implicit than explicit. Hence, it seems more likely to find 
implicit instead of explicit interaction in the analysis of this specific case. 
Second, TPS adopt public international standards. They may go beyond public minimum 
requirements, but not below. This again supports the argument that it is the prime purpose of 
baseline standards to ensure a conformity with food safety standards of developed markets. Thus, 
TPS have the purpose to improve the conformity of food with public regulation for domestic 
produce and imported produce likewise. In other words, this supports the SSH. The fact that TPS 
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in some instances exceed international requirements in turn has hindering effects on trans-
boundary food trade, which complicates a consensus among public actors how to treat TPS. This 
raises doubts whether public actors perceive TPS as a positive contribution and thus are willing to 
actively engage in interactions. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter served the purpose to provide contextual information on the potential components of 
the causal mechanism. In doing so, it both clarified the background and narrowed down the focus 
for the analysis in the following chapters.  
As this chapter provides such a variety of information, I briefly recap the main findings relevant to 
the analysis in chapter 5. The first section analysed the EU’s food safety regulation with special 
focus on the import safety approach. The EU has a dedicated approach to import safety resting 
firstly on a passive pillar that uses the RASFF to quickly detect any non-conform product on the 
EU market. The second pillar represents a more active stance aiming at improving food safety 
regulation in exporting countries. The latter aspect establishes the ground on which I can search 
for activities by the EU that address supply safety issues. The second section discussed and 
disassembled transnational food safety governance. It showed that TPS are not to be neglected as 
part of transnational food safety governance. TPS need to be furthermore understood as a concept 
that involves several actors, namely a standard organisation, food businesses engaged in a private 
standard and certification bodies conducting conformity assessment. At the same time, the 
dynamic development of TPS in their relevance, characteristics and geographical outreach shows 
that a closer analysis with regard to China potentially holds interesting insights. The third section 
depicted the extent of China’s food safety problem as a necessary condition for the SSH. The key 
result is, that while the Chinese government made substantial improvements on the rule-level, 
implementation and enforcement remained insufficient. The importance of this finding derives 
from the previous discussion in chapter 2.2.2.2.1, which showed that especially public import 
safety regulation cannot effectively tackle lack of implementation and enforcement in exporting 
countries. The fourth section discussed third parties. I have outlined that among those 
international organisations that potentially conduct activities on the ground in China to actively 
change China’s food safety regulation, the focus of the analysis should lie on the WHO. Secondly, 
international organisations affect EU public actors’ and TPS behaviour through the establishment 
of international standards. Lastly, there is a background of interaction that affects the analysis of 
the case study. Firstly, because TPS are partly a result of delegated food safety responsibility from 
the EU public authorities to food business. Secondly, from a content perspective, TPS mirror the 
food safety concepts and standards defined by the international food safety regime. Critical issues 
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arise rather around potential trade-barrier effects of TPS. TPS thus support the implementation 
and enforcement of international food safety standards.  
Taken together, this chapter provided the necessary understanding of the context for the potential 
components of the causal mechanism. It thereby substantiated the statements and assumptions 
made in the two previous chapters. Before I turn to the analysis of the case itself, I first clarify the 
method applied. 
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Political science covers the middle ground between nomothetic sciences (with deterministic 
approaches) and idiographic sciences (with descriptive approaches) (Patzelt, 2007, p. 74). This is 
very much reflected in this study which aims identifying causal mechanisms by an as accurate as 
possible description of a social phenomenon. The invariant methodological approach I apply to 
this end contrasts with the prevalent research tradition in social sciences research that is variable-
centred and concerned with causal effects (King et al., 1994; Blatter et al., 2007, p. 124). Therefore, 
the first section discusses the approaches to single case studies and recaps my explorative research 
process. In section two, I detail the epistemological and ontological foundations of the mechanistic 
understanding of causality and explain the method of process tracing. In the fourth section, I 
present the sources for my data and how I analysed it. Finally, the limitations of the 
methodological approach will be discussed in the conclusion. 
4.1 Qualitative case study research 
Single case studies pose a challenge to the dominant variable-centred research tradition in social 
science. Every study of a specific political (or social) phenomenon has to address the fundamental 
methodological challenge, that “we cannot rerun history at the same time and the same place with 
different values of our explanatory variable each time – as a true solution to the fundamental 
problem of causal inference would require” (King et al., 1994, p. 91). Consequently, one has to deal 
with a situation in which potentially many variables could play an important role in explaining 
the outcomes but only very few cases exist – if not even only a single one (cf. George and Bennett, 
2005, p. 170). In the first part, I discuss these properties of qualitative research of single cases and 
how to gain most from it. In the second part of this section, I explain the selection of the case. In 
the third part I move on to make my actual research process transparent. 
4.1.1 Properties and advantages of qualitative research 
King, Keohane and Verba prominently argued that qualitative and quantitative research 
essentially do not differ in methodological terms and they showed in detail how, in their view, 
variable-centred methodology can be applied to qualitative research (1994). Their main claim is, 
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that qualitative research should be approached with the essential logics and assumptions of 
quantitative methodology. This variable-centred concept assumes that by observing changes in an 
identified set of independent variables that lead to changes in a dependent variable, causal effects 
can be determined. This probabilistic ontology additionally holds that the more cases one can find 
that show a correlation between changes in independent and dependent variables, the higher the 
confidence in the assumed causal relationship. In this logic, small numbers of cases (including n = 
1) bear the risk of a “selection bias”, that is the risk that the selection of the cases has a significant 
effect on the findings (King et al., 1994, p. 28). Single case studies by nature offer no variance. 
Researchers following the variable-centred approach therefore suggest breaking down single cases 
into numerous smaller cases (e.g. by separating different time periods from each other) (Gerring, 
2004, similarly Büthe, 2002, p. 488).  
However, searching for causal effects is just one way to look at causality. An alternative approach 
is to identify causal mechanisms instead of causal effects (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998). In 
contrast to variable-centred research, causal mechanisms represent a mechanismic and 
deterministic understanding of causality (for an extended discussion of the differences see Beach 
and Pedersen, 2013, chap 3). It has been suggested to consequently use different wordings: 
independent variables are thus termed conditions and dependent variables are referred to as 
outcomes (Beach and Pedersen, 2013; Blatter, 2012). This terminology captures the ontological 
assumptions and clearly demarcates the different concepts from each other. With the concept of 
causal mechanisms, there is no problem with invariance in single case studies. Causal mechanisms 
allow for within-case inferences. As will be discussed more in detail below, they can best be 
identified by the method of process tracing (Beach and Pedersen, 2013; George and Bennett, 2005, 
pp. chap. 8). 
The strength of invariant qualitative case study research is the depth of data it generates. While 
the possibilities for generalisation are limited, invariant research of cases enables the researcher to 
dig deeper into empirical material than large-n studies can possibly do. From this perspective, the 
requirement of variable-centred methodology to increase the number of observations within a 
case unnecessarily reduces the depth of data. Invariant approaches specifically allow to account 
much better for the context and case-specific circumstances in which causal linkages are 
observable (cf. Wilhelm, 2008, p. 247). Especially by focussing on mechanisms and processes, it is 
possible to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of a causal relationship than other methods 
can deliver (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 5). The qualitative analysis of case studies at the same 
time offers a wider theoretical angle that allows for identifying new causal factors by means of 
inductive reasoning. Consequently, Georg and Bennett argue that case studies allow to specify and 
combine existing theories and thereby contribute to a more thorough understanding of existing 
theories (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 80). With these properties, deterministic qualitative 
Qualitative case study research 
 
97 
research – which I will explain more in detail in 4.2.1 – can make essential contributions to 
researching policy interdependencies, because by unveiling processes and mechanisms it 
illuminates the exact way one policy affects the other – which is a deeper understanding of 
(interdependent) social phenomena than a mere quantitative study can find (Gilardi, 2014). To 
sum up this discussion bluntly: if one sets out to analyse a single case, testing existing theories 
based on variable-centred thinking seems to be a waste of opportunities which rather lie in the 
depth of data and the inductive production of theoretical explanations of the case. This, in turn, 
can best be done by a deterministic methodology. 
Inductive, explorative case study research typically does not set out with a theoretically deduced 
strict hypothesis (Wilhelm, 2008, p. 247). Nevertheless, I follow the argument of King et al. who 
doubt that strictly explorative approaches are possible and that “there are good reasons to believe 
that it is not useful, or may even be epistemologically impossible, to simply describe a case of 
interaction without an idea of its central aspects, because description always requires 
distinguishing between important properties (that are worth reporting) and other features (that 
may be ignored)” (King et al., 1994, pp. 42–43). Instead, two criteria for case studies are helpful to 
avoid this pitfall, which originally have been suggested for comparative case studies: case studies 
should be structured and focused (George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 66–72). Structured in the sense, 
that case studies should be guided by a set of questions that themselves are deduced from the 
central research question. Case studies shall be focused in the sense that the analysis should be 
concentrated on specific empirical aspects of the case (Blatter et al., 2007, pp. 140–141). Accepting 
this argument, it rather becomes important to be explicit about the theoretical assumptions and to 
make use of the guiding character of theories in empirical research. The heuristic model developed 
above as the result of the theoretical discussion is instrumental to this end and helps to exclude 
information not central to the argument and thereby structures and focusses the research (on the 
need for such models see Büthe, 2002, p. 487).  
4.1.2 Crucial case design 
According to George and Bennett, it is the “relevance to the research objective”, which is of 
foremost importance for the case selection (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 83). As the research 
objective is to understand better, to what extent import safety is (or can be) a driver for 
influencing China’s food safety regulation and what role TPS have in this, all cases are of interest, 
in which…  
 …a country A which is member of the WTO,67 
                                                          
67 The SSH is based on the assumption that country A and B are WTO members. As discussed in 2.2.2.2.1, 
membership in the WTO affects the possibilities for import safety measures for the respective country.  
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 …with a sizeable market (because otherwise an exporting country is not dependent 
enough on this export market), 
 …and a high level of food safety relevance (because otherwise it does not care much about 
other food safety regulation), 
 … and in which private food safety standards have been established and have a 
considerable role in regulating food supply chains, 
 …imports large amounts of food (because the amount of imports raises the risk and 
thereby the problem pressure) 
 …from a country B which is also a member of the WTO and a strong contributor to global 
food supply, 
 …which additionally has food safety regulation considerably less strict compared to 
country A (because the difference of regulatory strictness creates the need of country A to 
have country B adapt to the importing standards) and 
 …which does not depend on the export of food (as this would trigger a “California Effect” 
which in turn would decrease the necessity of activities by country A, see 2.1.2.2). 
As regards the criteria for country A, a high level of food safety relevance is composed of two 
factors. First, a food safety regulation that matches and in certain areas drives the standards set by 
the IFSR. Second, food safety relevance consists of high public sensitivity towards food safety as a 
health risk. Both holds true for the EU, for which food safety has even been described as 
“contested governance” (Ansell and Vogel, 2006). In addition to this, among the largest importing 
economies, USA and EU, the EU has the more mature system of private standards (Garcia 
Martinez et al., 2007, pp. 304–305). The EU was the “main engine” (Meidinger, 2009, p. 239) of 
private food safety regulation and to date has the most matured private food safety and quality 
standards (Marsden et al., 2010), (Henson, 2008a, pp. 17–18); (Havinga, 2008)).  
With regard to country B, the potential candidate shall briefly be discussed. First, countries in the 
group of least developed countries tend to have – from a European perspective – insufficient food 
safety systems but they are highly dependent on their food exports while at the same time they are 
not individually important to world supply. A second group, China would at first sight fit into, are 
the big transition countries Brazil, Russia and India. However, while Brazil does play an important 
role in global food supply (ranking third with 5.7 percent share of the global food export), India 
and Russia do so to a much lesser extent (India ranking 10th with 2 percent and Russia ranking 15th 
with 1.3 percent, World Trade Organization, 2012, p. 74). The difference between Brazil and 
China then again is the higher dependency of Brazil on food exports compared to China. Brazil 
had a GDP between roughly 650.421 billion USD in 2000 and 2.615 trillion USD in 2014 (World 
Qualitative case study research 
 
99 
Bank, n.d.). This compares export volume of food products of 12,808 million USD in 2000 and 
77,389 million in 2011 (World Trade Organization, 2012, p. 75). Export of food made up 23 (in 
2000) and 35 (in 2011) per cent of all merchandise exports. For the same years, China’s GDP 
accounted for 1,205 and 7,492 trillion USD (World Bank, n.d.). The volume of food exports added 
up to 13,559 million USD (in 2000) and 54,168 million USD (in 2011), equalling a share of 5.43 
and 2.7 per cent of all merchandise exports (World Trade Organization, 2012; World Bank, n.d.). 
This latter point is relevant for the SSH (see 2.2.2.2.1). 
Table 6: Selection of country B 
 Less strict food  
safety regulation 
Economy not 
dependent on agri-
food exports 
Top contributor to 
global food supply 
Least devel. countries + - - 
Brazil +/- - + 
Russia +/- +/- - 
India + +/- - 
China + + + 
Legend: + = criteria fulfilled, - = criteria not fulfilled, +/- = criteria partly fulfilled 
(Source: own) 
Thus, the chosen case represents a crucial case or at least a most likely case – meaning that if the 
import safety hypothesis is true, for this case the implied effects are very likely to occur, because it 
“closely fits” the theory (cf. Eckstein, 1975, p. 118; Gerring, 2007, for the discussion of crucial and 
most likely cases see Blatter et al., 2007, pp. 149–150). If import safety as a motivation for the 
activities conducted to influence Chinas food safety regulation cannot be found, it is unlikely, that 
in other cases with less import safety challenges and risk to consumers, import safety measures are 
taken. In summary, the EU is selected because of the importance of private standards in its food 
safety system. China is of interest, because it is a country which fulfils the conditions so that both 
SSH and MAH are potentially possible explanations. 
4.1.3 Iterative research process 
Qualitative research assumes a reciprocal relationship between theory and empirical observation 
(Blatter et al., 2007, p. 138). In practical research, this leads to an iterative process. Indeed, 
collected data may inspire new and more relevant research questions (King et al., 1994, p. 23). The 
study thus was a process in which empirical findings led to the revision and fine-tuning of the 
research question as well as the heuristic model which then was applied to further, adjusted, 
empirical research. Thus, the approach chosen here lies somewhere between the inductive and 
deductive qualitative research traditions (cf. Blatter et al., 2007, pp. 28–29). Such an iterative 
approach to explorative research is reflected in Beach and Pedersen’s distinct variant of process 
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tracing termed explaining-outcome process tracing, which allows alternating between inductive 
and deductive steps in the research process and “involving multiple stages of analysis of evidence 
and theoretical reformulation” – in contrast to theory-centred variants of process tracing (Beach 
and Pedersen, 2013, p. 46 and Beach and Pedersen, 2013, chapt. 2 more generally). However, 
while it has been argued that qualitative research has advantages in its own right, these advantages 
also depend on a transparent ex-post description of the iterative process (cf. Blatter et al., 2007, pp. 
138–139). 
For this study, the research process itself can be separated into two phases, an explorative and 
an analytical phase. This broad distinction conflates the more step-wise iterative process in 
order to focus on the most important revisions. The first phase of case-centred explorative 
research serves the purpose of approaching the case and deepen the understanding of its 
characteristics (Blatter et al., 2007, p. 170). In this phase, the starting research question was to 
understand the relationship between China as a country with fundamental food safety 
problems and the global food safety governance regime – or simplified: How does China fit 
into the global food system given the countries food safety problems? The aim was to pre-test 
assumptions, to assess the availability of data and ultimately – built on the derived 
information – to develop a more focused research model. To this end, 11 explorative, non-
structured interviews were conducted with persons that have professional knowledge in the 
area of (international) food safety regulation (see appendix 8.1). For matters of clarity, I 
henceforth refer to them as pre-interview. Among the interviewed were representatives of 
German and European public authorities, European and Chinese researchers and 
representatives of European companies in China. Six of the persons have been interviewed as 
part of the expert interviews at a later stage. The review of theoretical literature on global 
food safety governance, regulatory interdependence and processes of policy transfer revealed 
that there is little theoretical work which includes a push perspective of policy transfer and a 
regulatory governance perspective of regulation (i.e. the inclusion of transnational regulatory 
regimes). Resulting from the in itself iterative first phase, I refined the research question and 
research heuristic. The former towards a focus on explaining European public as well as 
private activities that aim to influence China’s food safety regulation as measures to primarily 
ensure food import safety – as opposed to analysing only public activities, albeit within a 
global framework. The latter was refined by taking the perspective of regulatory 
interdependencies between the EU and China rather than applying the less specific concept of 
policy transfer. 
The refinement as the result of the first phase informed the empirical research during the second 
phase. Two rounds of semi-structured expert interviews were conducted. After the first round, yet 
again an iterative step was necessary to refine the research approach. The first round essentially 
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drew attention to the dependence of all activities on the status of the Chinese regulatory system 
and secondly to the fact that for European actors China’s regulation is also relevant with regard to 
market access. Additionally, interviews during the first round revealed none or only very limited 
exchange between public level activities and its actors and private activities and its actors. Thus, 
the first round led to a specification of the heuristic model. The factors behind the motivation to 
influence China’s food safety regulation from a European perspective could be specified and 
narrowed down. This served as a first approximation of causal mechanisms to be specified more in 
detail by the second round of interviews and the then following additional analysis of empirical 
data (i.e. documents). 
4.2 Causal mechanisms and process tracing 
In the following paragraphs, the epistemological and ontological foundations of causal 
mechanisms will be discussed. Following this, process tracing will be introduced as the central 
method to identify causal mechanisms. 
4.2.1 Understanding of causality and causal mechanisms 
The focus of the analysis lies on identifying causal mechanisms. As it is often the case with 
concepts in social science, the understanding of causal mechanisms varies. Mahoney undertook 
the effort to analyse competing understandings and hence summarized causal mechanisms as 
„unobserved entities, processes, or structures that generate outcomes and that do not themselves 
require explanation. Causal mechanisms are hypothetical ‘ultimate causes’” (Mahoney, 2003, p. 
1). However, he puts much emphasis on the elsewhere disputed non-observability of the entities 
(Mahoney, 2003, p. 4, for a different view see Beach and Pedersen, 2013, pp. 43–44). Hernes 
puts a different emphasis, namely on the dynamic element – by defining a mechanism as “a set 
of interacting parts – an assembly of elements producing an effect not inherent in any one of 
them. A mechanism is not so much about ‘nuts and bolts’ as about ‘cogs and wheels’ – the 
wheelwork or agency by which an effect is produced” (1998, p. 74). 
The concept of causal mechanisms implies a different ontological and epistemological 
perspective in comparison to variable-centred approaches. Epistemologically, proponents of 
causal mechanisms argue that “[c]ovariations have important limitations as sources of causal 
inference” (Bennett and George, 1997, p. 1). Variable-centred research is based on identifying 
the probability of a causal relationship to occur. However, finding statistical evidence for an 
independent variable correlating with a dependent variable does not necessarily mean that a 
causal link was found (Popper, 2005 (1934)). Proponents of causal mechanisms argue that – in 
contrast to Karl Popper’s popular statement that theories cannot be verified – we indeed can 
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find confirmation of causal linkages by tracing the causal mechanism from it root cause(s) to the 
outcome.  
This methodology is based on an ontology that starts with acknowledging the contingency of 
causal relations. The sociological concept of contingency holds that causal connections themselves 
depend on specific starting and context conditions (Mayntz, 2002b, p. 22). In other words, this 
thinking rejects the ceteris paribus-concept which demands to design research in a way that 
context variables are kept constant. Closely connected to this concept is the conviction of causal 
heterogeneity – that is the observation that in reality multiple different factors may lead to the 
same social phenomenon. This is another fundamental weakness of variable-centred research 
(George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 161–162). It assumes that there is only one causal relationship that 
explains changes in the dependent variable. In this regard finding statistical evidence for an 
independent variable correlating with a dependent variable does not necessarily mean this is the 
only factor that may cause such an effect. Variable-centred research thus has no answer to the 
problem of equifinality, that is “[t]he fact that different causal patterns can lead to similar 
outcomes” (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 161, emphasis in the original). As it has been discussed in 
chapter 2, this exactly is the argument for the case presented here. Both, even the combination of 
both, the import safety and the MAH may contribute to Europe’s motivation to influence China’s 
food safety regulation. The concept of causal mechanisms, in contrast, is open to more than one 
explanation for observed outcomes. Linearity of the causal process thus should not be expected ex-
ante and independent variables might also interact with each other (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 
212).  
The concept of causal mechanisms thus is different from causal effects in two regards – firstly its 
mechanismic and, secondly, its deterministic understanding of causality. Regarding the former, 
causal effect approaches remain utterly silent about how an independent variable causes changes 
in the dependent variable – the process remains in the dark. In contrast, the mechanismic 
understanding opens up the black box of causality between independent variable(s) and the 
dependent variable (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 39, see also Brady and Collier, 2004). It aims 
to describe the concrete empirical mechanism that relates both sides with each other rather than 
stopping with an abstract theoretic connection which deductive approaches merely deliver 
(Blatter et al., 2007, p. 133). The mechanismic understanding of causality focusses on “the 
dynamic, interactive influence of causes on outcomes and in particular how causal forces are 
transmitted through the series of interlocking parts of a causal mechanism to contribute to 
producing an outcome” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 25). The deterministic ontology implies 
an understanding of causal factors as conditions (Blatter, 2012, p. 12; Beach and Pedersen, 2013, 
p. 27). Such conditions can either be necessary, sufficient or both, meaning “a condition is 
necessary if the absence of it prevents an outcome, regardless of the values of other variables, 
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whereas if a sufficient condition is present, the outcome will always take place” (Beach and 
Pedersen, 2013, p. 27). Furthermore, it is assumed that a “plurality of causal conditions is 
necessary to be jointly sufficient to produce the outcome”, with this plurality forming what is 
usually called a causal process (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 12). 
A mechanism consists of parts which themselves are composed of two elements. Firstly, entities 
which are units that are capable of undertaking activities. The second element of each part are 
the activities undertaken by the entities which actually “transmit causal forces" (Beach and 
Pedersen, 2013, p. 49). Beach and Pedersen suggest applying the distinction between necessary 
and sufficient conditions to specify the logical relationship between the different parts of a 
mechanism. Causal mechanisms consist of parts which all are necessary but insufficient, that is 
only if all of them are present the causal mechanism takes effect (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, pp. 
30–31). 
4.2.2 Identifying causal mechanisms by means of process tracing 
Identifying causal mechanisms is closely associated with the method of process tracing 
(George and Bennett, 2005, pp. chap 10). The following specifications build on advanced 
concepts of process tracing as a research method developed by researches who contributed 
strongly to demarcating this method from other qualitative methods (Beach and Pedersen, 
2013). Their work in turn heavily builds on the seminal book by George and Bennett on case 
study research (2005) as well as the influential book edited by Brady and Collier on 
“rethinking social inquiry” (2004). 
A basic definition of process tracing was provided by George and Bennett, according to which 
process tracing can be understood as “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the 
causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the 
outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 206–207).68 The focus on 
making within-case inferences about the (non-)existence of causal mechanisms furthermore 
distinguishes process tracing from other methods, i.e. the congruence method for within-case 
inference and small-n methods that are based on comparative approaches (Beach and 
Pedersen, 2013, p. 4). While there is a widespread agreement that process tracing is the 
appropriate method to trace causal mechanisms, there are variations in the definition of the 
concept and the underlying assumptions. 
The concept of causal mechanisms does not relate to any theoretical school per se. Based on 
the fundamental differentiation of theoretical traditions in social sciences structural, 
institutional, ideational, and psychological causal mechanisms can be distinguished (Beach and 
                                                          
68 In contrast to later work, which builds on their publication, George and Bennett apply the terminology of 
“variable” to process tracing. 
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Pedersen, 2013, p. 53). Since the theoretical argument introduced in chapter 2 is based on the 
role of “exogenous constraints and opportunities for political action created by the material 
surroundings of actors” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 52), this study is looking for structural 
causal mechanisms. Rational choice and process tracing have indeed been combined in various 
research already (Risse, 2003, p. 7, see also George and Bennett, 2005, p. 208; Silzer, 2014). 
Process tracing has often been applied as a comparatively “thin” technique as a useful addition 
to deductive research designs. It has been combined with congruence analysis or comparative 
analysis (Blatter, 2012, pp. 9, 25; Blatter et al., 2007, p. 156). In contrast, and partly as an 
answer to critical reflections, a distinct and “thicker” understanding of process tracing has 
been developed which takes into account the specific ontological and epistemological 
assumptions laid out above. It is such a more intense and rigorous understanding of process 
tracing which allows for inductive causal inferences – and thus helps to use the full potential 
of process tracing (Blatter, 2012, p. 25). Beach and Pedersen provided much clarification by 
pointing out that three different types had previously been summarized under the umbrella of 
process tracing. They differentiate between two forms of theory-centred process tracing 
(theory-testing process tracing and theory-building process tracing) and case-centred process 
tracing, namely explaining-outcome process tracing (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, pp. 2–4, for a 
very similar categorization see Mahoney, 2003). A wide array of different types of process 
tracing had already been acknowledged before (George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 210–212). The 
substantial difference is that Beach and Pedersen provide a structured and theoretically guided 
differentiation and are able to show the consequences of the different approaches for the 
research. For example, while George and Bennett hold that process tracing delivers 
explanations for “a given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical 
context” (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 176, my emphasis), Beach and Pedersen associate this 
specification to explaining-outcome process tracing only (cf. Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 3). 
Beach and Pedersen’s theoretically guided separation of three distinct types of process tracing 
greatly facilitates the challenge of using process tracing, which is “to choose a variant of it that 
fits the nature of the causal process embedded in the phenomenon being investigated” (George 
and Bennett, 2005, p. 213). Table 7 summarizes the characteristics of explaining-outcome 
process tracing and compares them to theory-centred variants of process tracing. 
  
Causal mechanisms and process tracing 
 
105 
Table 7: Types of process tracing 
 Theory-testing Theory-building Explaining-Outcome 
Purpose of analysis – 
research situation 
Situation one 
Correlation has been 
found between X and 
Y, but is there 
evidence that there 
exists a causal 
mechanism linking X 
and Y? 
Situation two 
Build a plausible 
causal mechanism 
linking X and Y based 
on evidence in case 
Situation three 
Explain particularly 
puzzling historical 
outcome by building 
minimally sufficient 
explanation in case 
study 
Ambitions of study Theory-centric Theory-centric Case-centric 
Understanding of 
causal mechanisms 
Systematic 
(generalizable within 
context) 
Systematic 
(generalizable within 
context) 
Systematic, 
nonsystematic (case-
specific) mechanisms 
and case-specific 
conglomerates 
What are we actually 
tracing? 
Singe, generalizable 
mechanism 
Single, generalizable 
mechanism 
Case-specific, 
composite, 
mechanism that 
explains the case 
Types of inferences 
made 
(1) Parts of causal 
mechanism 
present/absent 
(2) Causal mechanism 
is present/absent in 
case 
Observable 
manifestations reflect 
underlying 
mechanism 
Minimal sufficiency 
of explanation 
(Source: Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 21) 
This study represents an example of explaining-outcome process tracing. As Beach and Pedersen 
point out, such an approach implies ontological assumptions different from theory-centred process 
tracing and thus a different treatment of theories:  
“[C]ase centric researchers agree that the social world is very complex, multifactored, 
and extremely context-specific. This complexity makes the ambition of producing 
knowledge that can be generalized across many cases difficult, if not impossible. 
Instead, the ambition is to account for particularly puzzling outcomes. Theories are 
used here in a much more pragmatic fashion – that is, as heuristic instruments that have 
analytical utility in providing the best possible explanation of a given phenomenon. 
[…] The ambition is not to prove that a theory is correct but instead to prove that it has 
utility in providing the best possible explanation.” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, pp. 12–
13) 
Method: 
Research design and methodology 
 
106 
As they indicate, this is the most common form of process tracing (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 11). 
(Blatter et al; 2012) support this point by portraying the concern with the outcome as a core 
characteristic of process tracing studies and argue that such inductive process tracing is the most 
valuable. The outcome that bears explanation in the case presented here is the specific EU (public and 
private) activities to influence China’s food safety regulation.  
A basic feature of process tracing is what Blatter names “configurational thinking” (2012, p. 12). Such 
configuration can possess additive effects or interaction effects – based on the distinction of necessary 
and sufficient conditions. In the former case, the force of conditions can be added, regardless whether 
every single one of them contributes to the joint force. All conditions are sufficient but not necessary. 
The additive causal force of the conditions is what causes a specific outcome (Blatter, 2012, p. 12). In 
contrast, a configuration can also possess interaction effects. In this situation, conditions depend on the 
existence of each other for a causal force to materialize. Hence, all conditions are necessary (Blatter, 
2012, p. 12). In Beach and Pedersen’s conception, configurational thinking is reflected in the step-by-
step analysis of single entities which in conjunction form a causal mechanism. The combination of 
entities and their respective sufficiency and necessity define the causal mechanism (Beach and 
Pedersen, 2013, pp. 29–32). Here, Beach and Pedersen’s concept is more fine-grained compared to the 
suggestions from Blatter et al., however, ending up with the same result. 
Among those authors, who deserve credit for specifying and developing further the method of 
process tracing, there are different suggestions about the way causal linkages can and should be 
presented. Process tracing is often presented in form of narratives – chronological descriptions of 
(series of) events. Such approaches resemble historical research (e.g. Silzer, 2014, pp. 130–131). For 
process tracing to be a distinct method and for it to deliver theoretical value, Beach and Pedersen 
argue, causal mechanisms are more than just a chain of empirical events and more than just 
intervening variables. The difference is that causal mechanisms include theory based explanation of 
how and why exactly the events or causal components led to a specific outcome (Beach and 
Pedersen, 2013, pp. 32–40, similar: Blatter, 2012, pp. 11–15). The distinctive understanding of 
process tracing purposely distinguishes itself from historical methodology. Causal mechanisms, the 
point is, may not only present themselves as temporal sequences but also as other variations of 
evidence (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 5). Therefore, each part of a causal mechanism has to be 
conceptualized as an entity plus an activity (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 49). Thus, process tracing 
should be conducted as a step-by-step analysis and (especially in explorative research) as a process of 
identifying the mechanism’s parts. Temporal sequences and events may be part of the presentation, 
but the focus should lie on the identification and separation of the parts of the causal mechanism (cf. 
Beach and Pedersen, 2013, pp. chapter 5). Blatter, in contrast, explicitly advocates an understanding 
in which it is a basic feature of causal process tracing that it “takes advantage of the fact that 
causality plays out in time and space” (Blatter, 2012, p. 10, my emphasis). Accordingly, extracting 
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storylines from the data is a central technique of identifying and denoting causal linkages (Blatter, 
2012, pp. 16–19). In fact, both perspectives do not contradict each other as much as it seems at first 
sight. Beach and Pedersen argue that temporal narratives alone are not sufficient. This is a point 
which does not contradict Blatter’s understanding. Both thus agree that storylines are one possible 
way to portray casual mechanisms and which, however, should be complemented. The main 
difference is that Blatter puts emphasis on the temporal aspect and demands a more rigorous analysis 
of it. He has a valid point in arguing that process tracing has to take the term “process” seriously and 
that processes indeed develop over time. It seems, the objective of both is the same, namely to 
prevent too descriptive, under-conceptualized forms of process tracing. Blatter therefore further 
specifies the temporal aspect of process tracing by distinguishing between “causal conjunction[s]”, 
that is “causal conditions work together in a specific situation”, and “causal chain[s]”, that is “causal 
conditions work together in a specific sequence” (Blatter, 2012, p. 13).  
Three elements are useful to identify and describe causal processes (Blatter, 2012, pp. 16–21). First, 
narratives or story lines, which reproduce the sequence of causal conditions that led to an 
outcome as a development over time. Here, temporal and spatial proximity are important elements 
for this analysis. Additionally, turning points and decisive moments can and should be identified. 
With narratives, we “focus on the temporal contiguity and temporal order of ‘turning points’ and 
‘phases of transition’ in the development of […] conditions” (Blatter, 2012, p. 18). Secondly, 
smoking guns help to further verify causal processes as observations that serve as “central pieces of 
evidence” (Blatter, 2012, p. 19; on the research concept of smoking guns see also van Evera, 1997). 
Thirdly, confessions complement the first two elements (Blatter, 2012, p. 20). They are important 
to include motivations of actors which are revealed by explicit statements. As discussed above, a 
narrative itself is seen as unsatisfying: “Ideally, a full-fledged explanation based on CPT should 
include all three kinds of empirical evidence […]” (Blatter, 2012, p. 21). 
4.3 Data sources and analysis 
The data, which I understand as “systematically collected elements of information about the 
world” (King et al., 1994, p. 23), is based on three separate groups of sources:  
 Semi-structured expert interviews form the basis of the analysis. Primary data derived 
from interviews has the advantage of potentially delivering more relevant and otherwise 
un-retrievable information. 
 Secondly, a set of documents has been systematically retrieved in order cross-validate 
information derived from interviews. Part of this are existing studies and publicly 
financed reports and other sources, which provide further insights. Here, sources from 
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China, international organisations and third countries as well as researchers from various 
countries have been used in order to avoid the pitfalls of one-sided perspectives.  
 The third group of sources derives from non-systematically “cloud” of publications. Part of 
this is also academic literature with empirical data and media reports, from Western as well 
as Chinese media.  
With this setup of different groups of sources, I aim to avoid a selection bias by means of 
triangulation. While academic literature was used as source especially in the first phase of the 
research process, for instance to gain background information on the state of China’s food safety 
regulation, the focus of the study lies on analysing information from the first two groups of sources. 
I am interested in understanding the relationship between the public and private activities towards 
China and to what extent co-regulation or hybridity plays a role in this context. In order to keep this 
focus, I reduce the number of actors for each side. Thus, the analysis concentrates on the European 
Commission for the public sector. Given its pivotal role in the politics of extra-EU trade, it is the 
most relevant actor. More specifically, the EU-commissioned EU-China Trade Project (EUCTP) is a 
core subject of the analysis. However, as part of the explorative approach, information from member 
states is included in the analysis. Here, especially German experts were interviewed because the 
Sino-German Food Safety Project (SGFSP) represents the EU member states’ largest and longest 
running food safety cooperation project in China which had multiple ties with the EUCTP. For 
private standards, the analysis concentrates on the GFSI. Here, in addition, information from GFSI-
benchmarked TPS is included in the analysis to further validate the findings. Again, with 
GlobalGAP, the focus lies on an especially large and relevant example. While the SGFSP and 
GlobalGAP were systematically analysed, additional information discovered about other member 
states and other GFSI-benchmarked private standards is included in the analysis where it is of 
relevance (see Table 8).  
Table 8: Focus and sources  
 Focus Data sources 
pu
bl
ic
 EU Commission EU delegation interviews, EU Commission interviews, EU 
Commission reports, EUCTP reports, EUCTP interviews, 
interviews with member state representatives, documents 
from member states, media reports 
pr
iv
at
e 
Global Food Safety Initiative GFSI-interviews, interviews with certification bodies, 
interviews with accreditation authorities, GFSI publications 
(newsletters, conference reports, etc.), interviews with 
representatives from GFSI-benchmarked standards, 
publications by GFSI-benchmarked standards 
(Source: own) 
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4.3.1 Expert interviews 
Expert interviews were introduced as a method of retrieving information about decision processes 
that otherwise are hard to reconstruct, given the fact that much information is never put in 
writing. Experts can be defined as persons who  
 either were or are involved in decisions  
 or who have or had access to information, circles of decision makers, or decision-making 
processes  
which are potentially relevant to the subject under inquiry (cf. Lauth et al., 2009, p. 169, for an in-
depth discussion of concept of experts see Meuser and Nagel, 2009, pp. 467–470). Experts often are 
persons with limited time resources, which has to be acknowledged when conducting interviews.  
Expert interviews are a variation of semi-structured interviews, which are based on guiding 
questions (see appendix 8.2). Such guiding questions are developed based on theoretical 
considerations and already obtained information (Blatter et al., 2007, p. 62). Initially, the 
questions were based on the widely-used research heuristic to analyse policy transfer 
developed by Dolowitz and Marsh (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, p. 9). As discussed above, 
although I do not apply this terminology, activities to influence China’s food safety regulation 
can also be understood as a variation of policy transfer (see 2.1.2.2). Their criteria provided a 
wide angle to start with. After the first round of interviews, the set of questions was reduced 
and refined to cater for the developed research focus and the restricted time for interviews. 
During interviews, the order of the guiding questions must not be followed strictly. In semi-
structured interviews, the list of questions rather is a checklist of aspects the interviewer 
wants to raise. At the same time, it guarantees a basic comparability of different interviews. 
The nature of the conversation during the expert interviews varies between phases of 
relatively frequent exchange of rather specific questions and phases of long narratives by the 
interviewee (Blatter et al., 2007, p. 62).  
Experts can provide insights into their behaviour, decisions and the applied rules. They may 
also provide information and assessments about the context under which others act. Both 
aspects are of relevance and were addressed during the interviews (cf. Meuser and Nagel, 
2009, p. 471). However, the experts who have been interviewed are not the unit of analysis 
but used as carrier of information which otherwise would not or hardly be accessible (Lauth et 
al., 2009, p. 169). It lies in the nature of the social relationship that interviewer and 
interviewee enter into, that the quality of the interview and the information shared depends 
on interviewee’s perception of the interviewer (Littig, 2008). Experts are generally more 
willing to share information if they perceive the interviewer as having a sound understanding 
of the topic – an observation which could be re-confirmed during the interviews for this study 
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(Meuser and Nagel, 2009, p. 473). In addition, in China, it is important to build a network of 
relationships with potential experts for interviews. In a culture, in which the Chinese concept 
of 关系 (guanxi) – roughly translated as social relationships or social network – are essential 
for conducting any sort of business. The concept of guanxi is often portrayed as an essential 
aspect of Chinese culture (Gold et al., 2002b). The intensive research of social scientists on 
guanxi stresses its importance (Chen et al., 2013). For Westerners, its logic and depth is often 
hard to grasp, but its relevance for achieving anything in China is obvious. Crucial for 
conducting interviews in China, it also relies on “reciprocal obligation and indebtedness” and 
is the “basis for a gift economy that exists in China” (Gold et al., 2002a, p. 7). Giving an 
interview itself is not a reciprocal act. This makes it harder to convince Chinese experts to act 
as an interviewee. As far as possible, I brought with me information and insights from my 
network. Especially knowledge about the BfR proved helpful. Also, establishing contacts to 
potential experts was important before requesting interviews. Consequently, I met all Chinese 
interviewees more than just once. To these two ends – building up a network and being 
perceived as knowledgeable about the various aspects of food safety regulation and food trade 
– I participated in food safety conferences, gave presentations based on my previous working 
experience in European and German food safety regulation and food risk communication, co-
organized and moderated food safety expert meetings and published about food safety topics 
in China (see Table 9). My participation in twelve conferences and workshops on food safety 
in China and Malaysia also served the purpose to gain additional information from speeches 
and to identify and approach potential interviewees. 
In principle, the sum of all interviewees should cover all sides and all types of identified actors. 
In addition to the above-mentioned 11 pre-interviews (see 4.1.3), I conducted 41 semi-
structured interviews (7 EU Commission, 6 EU member state, 5 Chinese government, 3 Chinese 
academics, 7 TPS, 6 foreign and Chinese companies, 5 certification professionals, 2 IGO 
representatives). One of these interviews is the sum of a series of four separate short talks with 
the same interviewee (interview 37). In addition to the 41 interviews, one presentation of an EU 
Commission representative has been summarized as a text based on notes taken during his 
speech and following question and answers session, because he was not available for an 
interview. The length of the interview therefore was adapted to the availability of the 
interviewee. The shortest interview lasted 30, the longest just over 90 minutes. Where possible, 
interviews were recorded digitally and henceforth transcribed. In cases, in which respondents 
refused recording, extensive notes where taken. While this was a matter of pragmatism, some 
scholars stress the advantages of handwritten notes as they may reduce the bias in interviewees’ 
answers (Burnham, 2008, p. 239). 
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Table 9: Networking activities and participation 
Type of activity Instances 
Participation in food safety 
conferences 
 International Conference on Food Safety Risk 
Communication, Beijing, 2011 
 Deutsch-chinesisches Symposium zu 
Krisenmanagement und Gesetzgebung in der 
Lebensmittelsicherheit, Beijing, 2012 
 International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) 
International Conference, Workshop on Food 
Safety Governance, Beijing, 2013 
 China Food Safety and Sustainability 
Conference, Shanghai 2013 
 M Food Talks, Shanghai, 2013 
 China International Food Safety and Quality 
Conference (CIFSQC), Beijing, 2013 
 China Food Safety and Sustainability 
Conference, Shanghai 2014 
 European Chamber of Commerce in China 
seminar on food safety, Shanghai, 2014 
 Panel discussion organized by Asia America 
Multitechnology Association on food safety, 
Shanghai 2014 
 CIFSQC, Shanghai, 2014 
 GFSI Focus Day, Beijing, 2014 
 GFSI Global Food Safety Conference, Kuala 
Lumpur, 2015 
 Global Forum for Food and Agriculture, Berlin, 
January 2016 
Presentation of own expertise in food 
safety-related areas 
 Presentation about food risk communication 
measures and concepts of the Federal Institute 
for Risk Assessment (BfR), International 
Conference on Food Safety Risk 
Communication, Beijing, 2011 
 Presentation about European food safety risk 
governance, annual conference of the IRGC, 
Beijing, 2013 
 Presentation about food risk communication, 
Center for Food Safety Risk Assessment (CFSA), 
Beijing, 2013 
 Presentation about German food safety 
inspection system, Shanghai Government Law 
Office, Shanghai, 2014 
 Presentation about food risk communication 
measures and concepts of the BfR, CIFSQC, 
Method: 
Research design and methodology 
 
112 
Shanghai, 2014 
 Presentation about China’s food safety 
challenges, Danish Innovation Centre, 
Shanghai, 2014 
 Presentation about linkages between risk 
communication and food safety regulation, 
Food and Beverage Innovation Forum, Shanghai 
2015 
Co-organization and co-moderation 
of food safety expert meetings 
 Session about risk communication and food 
safety of the annual conference of the 
International Risk Governance Council, Beijing, 
2013 
 Workshop “Envisioning food safety solutions 
2020” by swissnex Shanghai, an organization of 
the Swiss Consulate, Shanghai, 2013  
Publications  Regular posting and commenting information 
about food safety in China that had relevance to 
industry representatives and government 
officials via the social media platform LinkedIn, 
from August 2013 until July 2015.  
 Publication of 5 articles in non-scientific 
articles in Chinese media (Oriental Outlook 
Weekly, and Social Sciences Today), from 
October 2014 until June May 2015 
 Publication of chapter about German food 
safety risk management in book published by 
the Chinese Law Society which is planned to be 
used as a guidance book for the CFDA 
(Source: own) 
4.3.2 Other sources and triangulation 
Given their highly subjective nature, expert interviews should be complemented by the 
analysis of additional sources to achieve triangulation (Abels and Behrens, 2002). Therefore, as 
indicated in the right column of Table 8, I used additional sources to generate data. They can 
be further separated in systematically and non-systematically derived sources. Generally, I 
focussed on documents for the period from 2001 until the end of 2014. 
The focus of the systematically derived sources is on official documents have which have 
mainly been collected online. I have systematically scanned the EU Commission’s website and 
other websites for relevant information (for details see appendix 8.3). The list of documents 
was cross-checked against a compilation of official and unofficial documents of EU-China 
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cooperation published by Snyder (2009). Likewise, all GFSI newsletters and GFSI Focus Day 
documents were collected systematically (for the period of January 2008 till December 2013). 
Especially these documents were used as the basis to reconstruct the historical development. 
In addition to this, additional documents were included in the analysis which I discovered 
during the research process. I found most of these documents based on a snowball effect: 
retrieved information led me to search for further information. In addition, I retrieved 
documents and information by constantly monitoring a set of sources from January 2012 
onwards (see appendix 8.3). Also, speeches at conferences provided another source of 
information. Furthermore, participant observation during conferences and workshops enabled 
me to cross check findings derived from the other sources (see the list of participation in 
conferences, Table 9). For example, at conferences I could observe that speakers from both 
sides – EU and China – rarely mentioned import safety as a reason for cooperation. In the 
same manner, I could observe that sessions with representatives of public institutions and 
private standards were mostly separated and neither side joined the other’s session.  
4.3.3 Data analysis 
In order to transfer observations into useable data, all sources haven been processed in the same 
manner. In total 479 documents were analysed, including the interview transcripts. The analysis 
was conducted in two steps. First, all texts were coded using a pre-defined set of codes to identify 
relevant information in the text – regardless of the nature of the source. The categories were 
deduced from the theoretical discussion and resembled set of questions posed in the expert 
interviews. Secondly, during the coding-process, additional new codes were added. After coding 
all texts, the codes were reviewed, revised and grouped into categories. In some cases, codes were 
conflated in order to reduce the total number of codes. In addition to that the connection between 
the codes was defined using Atlas.ti, a software tool for qualitative data analysis. For example, the 
code “import safety is a challenge for EU” was marked as “is cause of” the code “supply safety”. By 
defining the connections between codes, code-networks covering all aspects of the analysis were 
created. By doing this, the large number of codes and connected quotes in the documents became 
manageable. Some codes were added not for interpretative purpose, but for marking instances in 
which potentially relevant information was given – e.g. about the actors involved or the time 
when something happened. The process of coding and organizing the codes again reflects the 
explorative nature of the research. 
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Table 10: Networks of codes 
Aspects covered by network Number of codes Number of quotes 
Content & Motivation 39 932 
How – public (processes and content) 75 730 
Why – public (motivation) 67 1047 
How and why – private 72 731 
Public-private interaction 19 100 
(Source: own) 
The analysis proceeded with integrating every code (or group of codes) into the full picture, 
network by network. To qualify the meaning of a code, the quotes in documents linked to the 
specific code were consulted. In addition, the query function of Atlas.ti was used to dig deeper 
into specific aspects in order to validate findings (e.g. in order to identify whether specific codes 
rather appeared in specific types of sources). 
Two sets of documents were analysed separately. Reports by the FVO about audits of China’s food 
safety regulation system have been coded with a special set of codes in order to extract the FVO’s 
judgement (for details see 5.4.2.1). Secondly, all activities conducted by the EUCTP were coded 
and analysed separately. Each activity was allocated to one of the categories, depending on what 
motive it represents (for details see 5.4.2.3). 
4.4 Conclusion 
The design of this research is based on a single case study. The case itself is chosen, because it is a 
crucial case for the SSH. To fully harness the single case analysis, I follow those who propose to 
identify causal mechanisms instead of searching for causal effects. This enables an explorative, 
more in-depth research which in turn leads to a better – in the sense of a more nuanced – 
understanding of the researched phenomenon and what has led to this outcome. In doing so, I 
develop a specific explanation of the case which does not claim to be generalizable beyond the 
case itself but adds to the theoretical discussion of regulatory interdependence nevertheless. 
Regardless of the explanatory width of the study, it still has to adhere to fundamental criteria of 
sound research: validity and reliability. Both aspects shall be critically discussed in the following 
paragraphs.  
It lies in its nature, that invariant case-centred qualitative research only provides low external 
validity for its causal inferences. Causal inferences cannot easily be generalized beyond the case. 
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Instead, case-centred study designs offer the potential of high internal validity (Blatter et al., 2007, p. 
137). Blatter et al. list two aspects of internal validity: First, single case studies provide more stable 
context and constant scope conditions. Thus, changes in Y are less likely to be due to changes in the 
context. If changes in context appear, single case studies enable the researcher, due to the depth of 
the analysis, to account for changes in the context and control the effects. This leads to the second 
aspect. For internal validity, high confidence is needed that changes in X are the cause for changes in 
Y. The researcher should be able to exclude other potential factors that could have contributed to 
changes in Y. Generally, process tracing methodology is especially suitable to avoid this mistake 
(Blatter et al., 2007, p. 130). However, it is important to fully identify a causal chain to develop the 
explanatory power of process tracing (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 222).  
Of course, compromises must be made. The pre-development of a research heuristic does bear the 
risk of ex-ante concentration on specific elements of the observed processes. There is a tension 
between depth of analysis with the consideration of case-specific aspects on the one hand and 
theoretical insights on the other hand. As George and Bennett rightly point out, reduction of 
complexity is the price for a more analytical approach and theorising (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 
225). Still, it is important to be conscious of the fact that there may be more than just one causal 
chain that could be described with the existing evidence (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 207). Process 
tracing analyses are thus vulnerable to not being able to identify the full causal chain (George and 
Bennett, 2005, p. 222). These challenges can only be answered by interpretative rigor, a critical 
reflection of the findings and transparency regarding doubts. 
As regards reliability, qualitative research designs suffer from the impossibility to standardize the 
data generation process. Many factors contribute to the differences of interview situations. After all, 
interviews are inter-personal communication with all of its facets. On top of that, qualitative 
research requires the interpretation of text, which again can only partially be standardized. These 
circumstances necessarily reduce the intersubjectivity of qualitative research designs. King et al. 
argue that therefore one should collect as much data as possible and record as well as report the 
process of data collection to achieve as much intersubjectivity as possible (1994, pp. 23–27). As 
discussed in section 4.3, my data collection is based on three pillars. Two, interviews and 
systematically collected documents, can be replicated based on the description of the procedure 
provided in the annex. While the third pillar, in its principle, can also be replicated, it most likely 
will generate a partly different set of documents and sources. However, this serves the objective of 
triangulation in order to avoid the risk of a biased collection of material in pillar one and two. In 
order to gather a sufficient yet not unnecessary high amount of data, I stopped collecting when new 
sources provided only for little additional information.  
However, there are limitations with regard to the availability of data. Especially interview data is 
more detailed for the more recent years. Interview information for the time prior to 2011 is rather 
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scarce as experts were not available any more. Furthermore, I encountered substantial difficulties in 
finding interviewees from the Chinese government that are involved in drafting and executing 
regulation. As one interviewee confirmed in a private discussion, those government representatives 
are more open to outsiders, who do not consider their work as being political. Thus, my interviewees 
from CFSA and CFDA understand their work as being scientific. One interviewee answered 
accordingly by saying that he is just a scientist and he therefore cannot answer questions that touch 
upon political questions. Other western researchers also experienced similar constraints when 
researching food safety topics in China (e.g. Ferraro; Broughton and Walker, 2010). This also implies 
that triangulating information received from interviews with Chinese experts is hard to achieve. 
This seems the more problematic, as one cannot readily assume that all information obtained from 
interviews are true.69 While all these data limitations need to be reflected when discussing the 
validity of my conclusions, it should not prevent oneself from studying the case: “An important topic 
is worth studying even if very little information is available. The result of applying any research 
design in this situation will be relatively uncertain conclusions, but so long as we honestly report our 
uncertainty, this kind of study can be very useful. Limited information is often a necessary feature of 
social inquiry” (King et al., 1994, p. 6). 
The reliability of the data heavily depends on the type of source. Official publications from 
governments or other organisations are the easiest case. They can be interpreted as the public 
position, without further questioning. Chinese media reports play a special role in this category of 
sources. I interpret Chinese media reports from state-owned media as statements representing the 
official government’s interpretation. However, given that the topic is highly specific, only few 
reports could be found. Reports from the media and other sources which report about others, needed 
to be interpreted more critically and checked against other sources. Likewise, judgements and 
positions in interviews should be treated carefully as interviewees may have an interest to present 
certain information in a specific light. Here again, theoretical validation and triangulation help to 
avoid misinterpretation. 
Each research design has its built-in limitations. What is important is to consciously discuss and 
respond to the specific limitations. For single case studies, the answer lies in a more extensive 
theoretical reflexion of the findings (Blatter et al., 2007, p. 172). This will be done in chapter 7, but 
before that, chapter 5 and 6 present the analysis. 
                                                          
69 In one instance, a western expert reported in a side talk on 6 November 2014 during the CIFSQC that to 
his knowledge what he had just heard from a Shanghai government official about the food safety measures 
and achievements during the Shanghai Expo 2010 were not only an exaggeration but simply not true. 
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With a research heuristic, a clarification of the context and a definition of my approach, I can 
proceed to analyse the case itself. The purpose of this chapter is to detect evidence for the SSH and 
the MAH. To this end, I trace the development of each of the conditions of the model in detail. 
For each condition in turn, I first present the empirical evidence to then summarize the findings 
and discuss the results with regard to the respective pre-defined expectations (as defined in 2.2.3). 
In doing so, I provide a comprehensive overview of the development of China’s food safety 
regulation and the EU Commission’s and GFSI involvement from 2001 until the end of 2014. It is 
comprehensive in the sense that I also include observations that do not strictly fall under my 
heuristic model. 
5.1 The increasing importance of China as an EU trade partner in food products 
In this section, I analyse whether the trade conditions for the SSH and the MAH can be 
determined. The first part deals with China’s growing food export to the EU, its development and 
characteristics, showing that the trade-condition for supply safety is fulfilled. The second part 
qualifies the trade condition for the MAH. I show that there is a point to be made for market 
access interest in China. I do so by briefly discussing the general food export orientation of the EU, 
the need for foreign markets due to overproduction and finally the rise of food exports to China.  
5.1.1 China’s growing food export 
China has become the fourth biggest food supplier of the EU by 2016 with 4.5 per cent of all agri-
food imports originating in China (compared to 11.6 per cent from Brazil, the EU’s largest 
supplier) (DG AGRI, 2016b, p. 2). China's exports to the EU has risen by 7 per cent on average 
between 2005 and 2015 (DG AGRI, 2016b, p. 2). Year-on-year, China’s export of food to the EU 
market steadily rose with two notable exception. In 2009, one year after the melamine crisis, the 
export amount measured in kilograms decreased. In a similar temporal proximity, in 2012, shortly 
after a norovirus outbreak in Germany caused by strawberries from China, exports to the EU 
decreased. There has been an especially sharp increase by 25 per cent in 2007 to over 2.5 billion 
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kilograms where it roughly stayed until 2013, with 2010 and 2011 above and 2009, 2012 and 2013 
under this level (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5: EU food imports from China 2002-2013 (in 100 kg) 
 
(Source: Eurostat, based on SITC 0 and SITC 1) 
However, these figures still lead to an incomplete picture as they aggregate all types of food in one 
category. In fact, China's world market share is much bigger for specific product groups. Out of all 
36 3-digit SITC product groups70, China is the leading exporter in four SITC groups and among the 
top three in another eleven groups. What is more, in ten categories China experienced a growth 
rate of at least 25 per cent (see Table 11). 
  
                                                          
70 Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) is a classification system for all kinds of traded goods 
which has been developed by the United Nations. Here I refer to the 3rd revision of the SITC (United 
Nations Statistics Division, 2017). 
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Table 11: China’s food export by SITC food categories 
SITC 
Group 
Description Export rank 
China 
value in 
million 
USD** 
avg. growth 
2007-11 in % 
growth 
2010-11 in % 
world 
share in % 
001 Live animals other than animals of 
division 03 
10 570.8 11,1 25,7 2,7 
011 Meat of bovine animals, fresh, chilled 
or frozen 
China not among top 15 
012 Other meat, meat offal, fresh, chilled, 
frozen (for human) 
China not among top 15 
016 Meat, edible offal, salted, in brine, 
dried, etc; flours, meals 
China not among top 15 
017 Meat and edible meat offal, prepared 
or preserved 
3 1877.8 8,8 28,5 9,8 
022 Milk and cream and milk products 
other than butter or cheese China not among top 15 
023 Butter and other fats and oils derived 
from milk 
China not among top 15 
024 Cheese and curd China not among top 15 
025 Eggs, birds', egg yolks, fresh, dried or 
preserved; egg albumin 
8 174.5 16,7 22,1 3,6 
034 Fish, fresh (live or dead), chilled or 
frozen 
2 7172.8 19,4 24,9 12,2 
035 Fish, dried, salted or in brine; smoked 
fish; flours, meals, etc 
3 393.6 13,3 11,7 7 
036 Crustaceans, molluscs, aquatic 
invertebrates; flours and pellets 
1 3419.1 36,9 26,7 10,8 
037 Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, aquatic 
invertebrates, prepared 
1 5983.6 7,4 35,9 23,7 
041 Wheat (including spelt) and meslin, 
unmilled 
China not among top 15 
042 Rice 9 427.0 -2,8 2,6 1,8 
043 Barley, unmilled China not among top 15 
044 Maize (not including sweet corn), 
unmilled 
China not among top 15 
045 Cereals, unmilled (other than wheat, 
rice, barley and maize) 
5 115.5 2,1 34,2 3,4 
046 Meal and flour of wheat and flour of 
meslin 
11 143.4 -9,2 21,8 2,4 
047 Other cereal meals and flours China not among top 15 
048 Cereal, flour or starch preparations of 
fruits or vegetables 
14 898.2 15,4 34,6 2 
054 Vegetables, fresh, chilled, frozen, 
simply preserved; roots 
2 6518.7 17,8 8,1 10,9 
056 Vegetables, roots and tubers, 
prepared or preserved, nes 
1 5726.2 14,6 27,9 19,9 
057 Fruit and nuts (not including oil 
nuts), fresh or dried 
8 2838.7 19,8 17,7 3,4 
058 Fruits, preserved, and fruit 
preparations (excluding fruit juices) 
1 2825.0 11,7 27,7 15,1 
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059 Fruit and vegetable juices, 
unfermented and without added 
spirit 
5 1226.0 -2,4 41,9 7 
061 Sugars, molasses and honey 9 879.0 24,7 20,1 1,9 
062 Sugar confectionery 2 820.6 15,1 20,5 7,8 
071 Coffee and coffee substitutes China not among top 15 
072 Cocoa China not among top 15 
073 Chocolate and other food 
preparations containing cocoa 
China not among top 15 
074 Tea and mate 3 1017.6 12,5 23,3 12,4 
075 Spices 2 875.8 19,2 13,6 11,1 
081 Feeding stuff for animals (not 
including unmilled cereals) 
9 2085.4 19,4 5,4 3,1 
091 Margarine and shortening China not among top 15 
098 Edible products and preparations 5 2695.6 14,4 25,7 4,4 
* boxed marked indicates strong position/development 
** at current prices 
(Source: own calculation based on UN Comtrade data 2011, United Nations, 2011) 
The EU’s food imports from China resemble this global picture. According to an EU Commission 
report from 2008, fish and aquaculture represented the largest proportion of EU imports from China 
and thus were relevant from a supply safety perspective (Fischer et al., 2008, p. 10). From a more 
recent perspective, the top food product groups imported by the EU are vegetables (fresh, chilled and 
dried); offal, animal fats and other meats (fresh, chilled and frozen); preparations of vegetables, fruit or 
nuts; tropical fruit, fresh or dried, nuts and spices; oilseeds, other than soybeans; gums, resins and plant 
extracts; pasta, pastry, biscuits and bread; eggs and honey; unroasted coffee, tea in bulk and mate; 
miscellaneous seeds and hop cones (DG AGRI, 2016b, p. 6). Even this specification disguises the de 
facto dominance of single products: fruit and vegetables pre-dominantly were canned mushrooms and 
garlic. Food preparations and apple juice dominated the import of processed food from China (DG 
TRADE, 2006a, p. 2). Examples from specific member states indicate the relevance of imports from 
China. For instance, 90,000 out of 130,000 metric tons of pollack imported by Germany come from 
China (Dowideit, 2014). An interviewee reported that 60 per cent of Germany’s apple juice 
concentrate originates in China (interview 8) – a figure in line with the general dominance of Chinese 
apples in juices (Zamiska, 2007; Dowideit, 2014). The amount of dough for bread rolls imported to 
Germany from China in 2011 equalled the amount of 282 million bread rolls (Lee et al., 2012). 
5.1.2 China as a market for EU agri-food business 
China has developed into a relevant export market for EU agri-food businesses. To identify this 
development, I firstly review the general export orientation of the EU agri-food sector. Secondly, I 
show that China’s importance as an export market has grown strongly over time. 
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5.1.2.1 The export orientation of the EU agri-food sector 
The EU has a history of actively managing its food trade balance. Initially, food self-sufficiency was 
one of the central goals behind the EU’s predecessor, the European Economic Union (EEC), when the 
participating nations depended on food imports. Accordingly, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
agreed among the then EEC member states in 1962, had been installed to protect farmers and 
agricultural production by guaranteeing minimum prices for agricultural products. This policy 
eventually led to an overproduction of food in the EU. Excess production of food was exported with 
the support of EU-financed export subsidies. Since the 1980s, numerous reforms of the CAP 
successfully reduced the overproduction and export subsidies. In the period of interest here, the EU 
experienced both, periods of net-import and net-export of food (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Structure of EU Agri-food Trade with extra EU 28, 2005-2015 
(Source: DG AGRI, 2016a, p. 3) 
The history of the CAP has left the EU with a highly efficient, widely industrialized and 
concentrated production system (cf. Bernauer and Caduff, 2006). Consequently, the EU exports 
mostly processed, finalized products (DG AGRI, 2011). Foodstuffs, especially beverages, wine and 
vinegar, account for the biggest share (see Figure 7). For specific sectors or products, the EU still 
produces more than it needs. This implies that there is no strict trade-off between food imports 
and exports. Imports of commodities partly are used to produce finalized products. For example, 
imported soy beans are used as feed for raising pork which then are exported. The EU is one of the 
largest producers of pork meat in the world, second only to China. Overproduction reached 111 
per cent of what it needs for its own populations consumption (DG AGRI, 2016d). This is reflected 
in row “02 – Meat and edible meat offal” in Figure 6. Similarly, I assume that overproduction and 
hence a need to sell abroad exists for all strong export categories denoted by Figure 6. This is 
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supported by the general observation that the European food market is highly saturated, leaving 
growth opportunities mainly in the export sector (Bernauer and Caduff, 2006, p. 84).  
Figure 7: Extra-EU 28 exports of agricultural products, by product categories, 2013 
 
Legend: red = animal products, light blue = vegetables, dark blue = foodstuffs 
(Source: Eurostat, 2015) 
China has repeatedly been discussed as an opportunity market for agri-food exports. In an official 
memo, the European Commission argued in 2008 that the future of European agriculture lies – at least 
partly – in expanding exports: “We see huge opportunities to increase our exports of high quality foods 
to expanding markets such as China and India” (European Commission, 2008d, p. 4). An EU 
commissioned report concludes in 2008 that EU-China trade relations in the agriculture sector have 
strong growth potential for EU businesses (Fischer et al., 2008). The report identifies product areas that 
were of special relevance to EU-China-relations. For meat, dairy, wine and spirits the report assessed 
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that products “hold great potential for European food producers as a means of boosting investment in 
the Chinese food market” (Fischer et al., 2008, p. 10). The overall working plan of the EUCTP (OWP, 
for details see 5.4.2.3) critically notes with regard to the trade of agri-food that “China exports to EU 
still outweighs [sic!] EU’s exports by close to 1 billion euros” (EUCTP, 2010, p. 176). Yet another source 
to validate specific interests in exporting to China lies on the private side. The European industry 
association FoodDrinkEurope publishes a yearly report on trends of the European food and drink 
industry. In these reports, which are available for the period 2008-2014, China constantly plays a role 
as export market with increasing importance, basically due to the growth rate denoted in Figure 8 
(FoodDrinkEurope, 2009; FoodDrinkEurope, 2010; FoodDrinkEurope, 2011; FoodDrinkEurope, 2012; 
FoodDrinkEurope, 2013; FoodDrinkEurope, 2014). The importance of China as a market for the 
European food and drink industry, however, becomes more visible in the fact that China at least partly 
compensates for losses on other export markets (like the USA). This has especially been noted for 2012 
(FoodDrinkEurope, 2013). It furthermore is reflected in the fact that China is the only major export 
market for EU food and drink products in which the share of European products follows a positive 
trend (see Figure 9). 
Figure 8: EU 28 export of food to China (in EUR) 
(Source: Eurostat, based on SITC 0 and SITC 1) 
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Figure 9: EU shares in food and drink imports of key markets, 2007-2012 
(Source: FoodDrinkEurope, 2013) 
5.1.2.2 The EU food export development to China 
The development of food exports from the EU to China, measured in Euro, can be summarized 
easily in one clear trend: food exports constantly rose since 2002. Notably, the curve is much 
steeper following the year 2009 (see Figure 8).  
The comparison with the export of food from the EU to all trading partners furthermore shows 
the rising importance of China as destination. The total food export of the EU has grown 
considerably less over the same period (see Figure 10). Figure 11 illustrates the difference by 
comparing directly the year-on-year change measured in percentage of the previous year. While 
exports to China steadily grew above 10 per cent, with four years even above 30 per cent, growth 
of exports to the whole world remained around 10 per cent or less with only two years exceeding 
15 per cent. Furthermore, the figure illustrates that both trends are largely decoupled and follow 
different patterns, which suggests that China was a market compensating for sales problems in 
other markets. Consequently, an analysis by DG AGRI from May 2011 states that “China and 
Hong Kong are now among the top growth markets for EU exports” (DG AGRI, 2011, p. 9).  
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Figure 10: EU 28 SITC 0+1 global export (in EUR) 
 
(Source: Eurostat) 
Figure 11: Year-on-year change of EU 28 SITC 0+1 export to China and the globe in per cent  
 
(Source: Eurostat) 
In the same manner, the relevance of food exports to China compared to the sum of all exported 
commodities to China rose (both measured in Euro). While from 2002 until 2010, food exports 
contributed less than 2 per cent of the total export, this figure steadily rose to 4.7 per cent by 2015. 
Again, this development is decoupled from the global trend. Exports of the EU 28 to the rest of the 
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world did not rise steadily and overall only climbed from 5.7 in 2002 to 6.3 per cent in 2015 (see 
Figure 12). 
Figure 12: Share (in %) of EU's agri-food exports in all exported commodities (in EUR) 
 
(Source: Eurostat) 
5.1.3 Summary and discussion 
The expectation for the SSH – for public actors as well as TPS – is a high or rising EU import 
volume from China. For the MAH, a high or rising export volume and the search for an export 
market to sell food products outside of the EU due to overproduction were the two expectations 
identified for EU public actors. For TPS, this condition is irrelevant for the MAH.  
With these expectations in mind, the evidence provides an ambiguous message. On the one hand, 
China is an important provider for European food consumption. Import has grown over time and 
China has become an important source for EU’s agri-food imports. Specific product groups even 
play an especially dominant role on the EU market. Hence, from a pure trade perspective, the 
condition for the SSH is fulfilled. On the other hand, China has become increasingly important as 
an export market for EU food products, also in direct comparison with the rest of the world. 
Likewise, export of food has become more important in EU exports to China. This indicates a 
strong interest in China as a market. However, it does not inform us about the specific need for 
discussing food safety regulation with the Chinese government in order to achieve market access. I 
assume that a general rise in exports raises the probability of the need to discuss market access, but 
whether or not changes in China’s food safety regulation were necessary can only be found out by 
the more detailed analysis in the next section. Furthermore, the relevance of market access varies 
for specific products. For example, a large share of the EU’s pork overproduction goes to China 
(DG AGRI, 2016d). Then again, for most of the time during the observed period, China de facto 
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was a minor destination for EU food exports. China rather was a market which provided strong 
opportunities for export growth, a growth which – according to the figures – could at least partly 
be achieved. To conclude, the trade figures confirm that the SSH and MAH both are possible. 
Besides, the analysis of the trade factor revealed that for both directions, import and export, 
specific product groups are especially relevant.  
5.2 Development and changes of China’s Food Safety Regulation 
This section extends the presentation of China’s food safety regulation of chapter 3.3. While the 
initial discussion served the purpose of clarifying the intensity and severity of China’s food safety 
problems and the government’s enduring struggle to tackle the problem, I now will retrace in 
detail how China’s food safety regulation developed and what have been the issues at the time. As 
the FSL of China, introduced in 2009, marks a major change, I divide this discussion in two parts. 
In the third part of this section, I collect information qualifying the impact of China’s food safety 
regulation on supply safety and market access. Taken together, the information later allows 
connecting these pieces of information with the development of the other conditions.  
5.2.1 CFSR before the Food Safety Law 
As already sketched out in chapter 3.3, the Chinese government struggled to keep regulation up 
with the development of the market. In the following paragraphs, I show which steps were 
undertaken to tackle food safety problems and which fundamental limitations remained. In effect, 
the reforms did not solve the problems. 
5.2.1.1 Outdated food safety regulation 
China entered the WTO with a severely outdated regulatory framework for food safety. Laws, 
organisational setup, and standards have been described as insufficient at this point of time (Bian, 
2004). It did not meet the requirements of the WTO. At the end of the accession process WTO 
member states were concerned that China’s food safety regulation may violate the SPS agreement 
and pose trade barriers (World Trade Organization, 2001, p. 40). Nor did it fulfil the necessities 
from a public health perspective that arose through the rapidly changing and expanding food 
production sector (Shen, 2013; van der Meer, Cornelius, 2005, p. 1). 
China’s food safety regulation had a narrow scope and it especially failed to come close to a farm-
to-fork-perspective (Broughton and Walker, 2010, p. 472; Shen, 2013). The Food Hygiene Law 
(FHL) from 1995 primarily covered hygiene issues of industrial production of food with the MoH 
as the responsible authority (Chung and Wong, 2013). Regulation of food safety in the agricultural 
section, like pesticide usage, was left to the MoA (Tam and Yang, 2005, pp. 10–11). Likewise, the 
regulation of aquaculture, food additives, feeds and feed additives were not covered by the FHL 
(Shen, 2013, p. 156). As a result, the regulator did not see – let alone regulated – sources of food 
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safety problems at the different steps of the supply chain in conjunction. The regulatory situation 
was further complicated by an increasing number of additional rules. In response to new 
problems, authorities were able to issue new regulations71 in accordance with the FHL, often done 
without prior evaluation of existing regulation of that specific issue (Bian, 2004, p. 4). What is 
more, the framework of risk analysis, central to the international understanding of food safety 
regulation since the mid-1990s, was widely unknown to Chinese regulators. As one interviewee 
involved in developing China’s food safety since the 1980s recalled, China only got to know the 
risk analysis framework in 1999 (interview 21). Likewise, the HACCP was only introduced in 
2002 by China’s State Commission on Supervision of Certification. In practice, the concept was 
only gradually implemented in China in the following years (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2005, p. 219, interview 24). The laws at the beginning of the 
millennium thus document that no modern understanding existed of what constitutes food safety 
and the regulation thereof. Another indication for the developing understanding of food safety as 
a concept is the terminology used. Initially, the Chinese term 食品安全 (shipin anquan) was used 
for both food safety and food security and only with the evolving Western influences, a 
differentiation between the two issues developed (Löhr and Trappel, 2011, pp. 19–20). As a 
Chinese expert put it, Chinese food safety regulation lacked a “theoretical basis” and was rather 
done by “feeling” what was right (interview 20). 
Until the introduction of the FSL, fragmentation of governmental oversight was the severest (see 
Table 5).72 In addition to MoH and MoA, further ministries and respective laws regulated food 
safety. The Product Quality Law from 1993 entrusted AQSIQ with the responsibility to regulate 
the quality of foodstuff (among other products). It oversaw food processers and producers and 
regulated manufacturing, packaging and labelling. The State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC), in turn, was responsible for regulating food safety in the market – thus, when 
food came into circulation. Both ministries were entitled to issue and withdraw licences and 
impose fines. The Ministry of Commerce (MofCom) was entitled to set up and change standards 
for the processing, packaging, storage, transportation and sales of food. Additional ministries 
partly had a say in food safety related matters, too (Tam and Yang, 2005, pp. 11–12). 
Consequently, overlapping responsibilities, lack of coordination and lack of transparency are 
mentioned as major problems of the regulatory system during this period by interviewees 
(interview 1, 3, 8 and 9). The harmful result of this situation has been pinpointed by Roger 
Skinner in 2007, a British expert working for the WHO project on China’s food safety reform 
between 2004 and 2007: “You get buck-passing, frankly, between ministries[.] […] One ministry 
says, ‘It wasn’t my job to do that, it was this other ministry’” (Kahn, 2007).  
                                                          
71 For clarification: the Chinese term used was 规章 (guizhang). 
72 For the structural and historical reasons behind the fragmented regulatory system see Ellis and Turner 
(2008), Liu (2010b). 
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In addition to the disadvantageous organisational setup, for many areas and products in the food 
sector, there simply were no or insufficient numbers of technical standards. Existing standards 
furthermore often did comply with international standards. For pesticide residues, by 2007, China 
had 484 maximum residue levels defined of which less than 20 per cent conformed to standards 
defined in the Codex Alimentarius. To put this figure into perspective, the Codex Alimentarius 
listed over 2,500 maximum residues levels, while the EU had over 22,000, the USA over 8,600 and 
Japan over 9,000 (Dong and Jensen, 2007, p. 20).  
5.2.1.2 Attempts for improvement 
Within the Chinese government, the necessity to adjust food safety regulation to international 
expectations and the rapidly changing industry was acknowledged and indeed, responsible 
ministries were working on programs to improve regulation and oversight.73 Major food safety 
incidents pointing at the deficient food safety situation in China seem to have spurred this 
development (Ellis and Turner, 2008, p. 162). Tam and Yang argue in their case study that the 
Fuyang milk powder scandal in 2004 introduced in chapter 1 had “highlighted major weaknesses 
in China’s food safety regulatory regime” (2005, p. 8). Notably, 2004 also marked the start of 
substantial efforts by the Chinese government. In July 2004, then prime minister Wen Jiabao 
addressed the problem of food safety at a conference of the State Council, appealing to all 
provinces and responsible organisations for making food safety one of their top priorities (Löhr 
and Trappel, 2011, p. 19). As a further indication for the increased political importance of the 
topic, under the 11th Five-Year-Plan for the period 2006-2011 the Chinese government initiated a 
National Food and Drug Safety Plan (Ellis and Turner, 2008, p. 29). It “clearly recognized that 
improving food safety is a critical national task” (United Nations, 2008, p. 4). 
The reform process starting in 2004 was to a substantial extent informed and influenced by a 
project for political advisory that had been initiated by the Chinese government which was 
financed by the ADB and strongly supported by the WHO. The WHO’s specific contribution will 
be discussed below in part 5.3.1. With this project, the Chinese government openly sought 
international expertise to ameliorate the food safety situation (Chuan, 2004, interview 3 and 20). 
As a Chinese interviewee pointed out, when food safety become a major topic, China was eager to 
learn from other states (interview 20). As part of this, in November 2004, a high level “Global 
Food Safety Forum” was held in Beijing with 400 participants from China and abroad. At the 
forum, the Development and Research Centre of the State Council (DRC) presented a study titled 
“Study on China’s National Food Safety Strategy” (Chen, 2004, cf. Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2005, pp. 216–225, interview 3). The study addressed the need for 
better coordination of governmental authorities as a key point (Chuan, 2004). At the forum, 
                                                          
73 See, for example, comment by then Vice-Premier of the State Council of China, Wu Yi (AQSIQ, 2007c) 
and the 2004 paper prepared by MoA for the WHO/FAO Global Forum of Food Safety Regulators (FAO, 
2004). 
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Chinese high governmental representatives openly acknowledged the problems stressing 
specifically the need for organisational reform. Vice-Premier Wu Yi is quoted in the state-owned 
China Daily saying that “the supervision and management system for food safety in China will be 
perfected. Different government departments will be given clear duties” (Chuan, 2004). To 
conclude the reform project, a further major international conference on food safety was held in 
2007. The High Level International Food Safety Forum in Beijing was initiated and financed by 
China and jointly hosted by the AQSIQ, the MoH and the WHO. The conference concluded with 
a “Beijing Declaration on Food Safety”. In addition, the advisory project issued a report with key 
recommendations (interview 3 and 41). 
The central government focused on structural adjustments and reorganisation to address the 
obvious problem of regulatory fragmentation. Already in March 2003, the SFDA was established 
with the aim “to improve the efficiency and coordination among different state departments” as 
formulated by the MoA in a report for a FAO/WHO conference in 2004 (FAO, 2004, see also Bai 
et al., 2007a, p. 482). In 2004, the State Council issued the “Decision on Strengthening Food Safety 
Control” which re-distributed food safety responsibility between national level authorities. It led 
to the strengthening of the AQSIQ, especially vis-à-vis the MoH. As for the SFDA, it stipulated 
coordinating on the national level. The result was what has been termed the “five dragons regime” 
consisting of MoA, AQSIQ, SAIC, MoH and SFDA (Liu, 2010b, p. 253; Bai et al., 2007a, p. 482). 
However, it proved to be a half-hearted reform. The aim to overcome fragmented organisation of 
food safety regulation was not achieved. SFDA, established as the central organisation to 
coordinate and implement food safety regulation, was only granted a vice-ministry-level – making 
it the lowest ranking organisation among the five. For this reason and the enduring separation, it 
could not fulfil its coordinating task (Burns et al., 2010, pp. 14–15; Bian, 2004, p. 8; Asian 
Development Bank, 2007, p. 3, interview 41). Oddly, the SFDA did not have own capacities but 
even depended on other ministries to carry out investigations or to enforce regulation (Burns et 
al., 2010, p. 15). Furthermore, the system divided oversight along the production process, still 
preventing a holistic approach (Meador and Ma, 2013, p. 4). This situation endured until August 
2008, when the coordinating responsibility was shifted from SFDA to MoH. While MoH was 
ministry-rank organisation, this change did little to tackle the fundamental fragmentation. 
From a rule perspective, the introduction of the Law on Agricultural Product Quality Safety under 
the responsibility of the MoA in 2006 was a first attempt to improve food safety regulation. It was 
designed as a supplement to the FHL (Calvin et al., 2006, p. 5). However, international observers 
perceived it as insufficient and disappointing (interview 3). In any case, it extrapolated the 
separation of food safety regulation between agricultural production and food industry. It thus was 
a distinct draft for a new food safety law issued by the Legal Office of the State Council in 2004 
that eventually became the nucleus for the reform process leading to the FSL (Liu, 2010b, p. 253). 
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However, in the view of several interviewees, the reform process quickly slowed down. It was the 
event of the melamine crisis that finally created the pressure for a more fundamental change 
(interview 1, 3, 8, 15 and 31; see also Pei et al., 2011, p. 412; Xiu and Klein, 2010).74 The melamine 
scandal, however, was the tipping point. It hit China amidst the Beijing Olympic in 2008 and 
made headlines around the world. It seems that the incident created a relevant window of 
opportunity for changes in food safety regulation, at least on paper. In this sense, 2008 resembles 
the situation in 2004 – in a more extreme shape.  
5.2.1.3 Introduction of voluntary standards as part of the solutions 
On a different track, the Chinese government introduced and promoted voluntary standards and 
the logic of certifications to improve food safety regulation. Voluntary standards and third party 
certification industry started to develop in China in the 1990s. It rooted in the development of 
organic production and included the establishment of Chinese certifications as well as certification 
bodies (Sheng et al., 2009). The organic certification, introduced in 1994, was an answer to 
requirements resulting from exports and an adoption of the Western organic concept (Scott et al., 
2014, p. 161). However, the Chinese government, specifically MoA, introduced further certificates 
which also addressed domestic needs – among which are the so-called green food certification 
established in 1990 and the hazard-free certification established in 2001 (Scott et al., 2014, p. 160).  
In 2001, with the creation of the Certification and Accreditation Administration of the People’s 
Republic of China (CNCA) out of a previously internal department of AQSIQ an important step 
was made to further establish, promote and regulate the third party regulation sector. This change 
addressed the food sector as one among several market segments. Pointing to the same direction, 
in 2003, a new regulation on certification and accreditation was adopted replacing a regulation 
from 1990 (Shen, 2013, p. 180). Domestic voluntary certifications were furthermore extended to 
include system certifications, which extend the certificate beyond products to production 
processes. Most prominent examples for such certificates are HACCP and ISO22000 (Zhang et al., 
2015b, p. 2180). By 2013, domestic voluntary standards and certificates had become a well-
established instrument of food safety regulation in China (Zhang et al., 2015b). However, the 
Chinese third party certification suffered from decreasing trust as it proved to be prone to failures 
and corruption (Zhang et al., 2015b; Battaglia, 2013). 
5.2.1.4 Major insufficiencies of the reform 
Overall, despite the reform process, the assessment of China’s food safety regulation for the period 
until 2009 remains bleak. The MoH claims that according to collected data, the number of samples 
taken that conformed with Chinese standards rose from 60 per cent to nearly 90 per cent already 
by 2004 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005, p. 223). However, 
these figures disguise the fact that Chinese food safety standards neither met international 
                                                          
74 Of course, other food safety scandals preceding the melamine scandal already had increased the pressure 
(Shen, 2013, pp. 163–164), see also Table 1).  
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standards in quality nor quantity. According to the 2004 DRC study, only by the end of 2005 the 
Chinese government planned that 50 per cent of China’s agricultural product standards and 55 per 
cent of standards for processed food products were in line with international standards 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005, pp. 216–217, referring to the 
DRC-study).  
The changes of organisational setup and rules aside, for the whole period, the implementation and 
enforcement of existing regulation remained partial at best (Shen, 2013). Most of the problems of 
enforcement noted in 3.3.2 relate to the time prior the FSL. The inspection system was 
underfunded with too few and poorly trained personnel (Shen, 2013, p. 157), (United Nations, 
2008, p. 17)). Furthermore, corruption and the “willingness of some local authorities to prioritize 
growth over health and safety” reduced the effectiveness of any improvement on paper (Ramzy, 
2009, see also Ellis and Turner, 2008, p. 25; Yan, 2012, p. 713). For example, pesticides and other 
agricultural chemicals forbidden, were still available on the black market (Gale and Buzby, 2009, 
p. 3). Burns et al. report that local officials simply did not have the technical means to enforce the 
national law (2010, p. 11). Implementation even starts to fail with proper registration of 
businesses. Figures from the early 2000s show that in Hunan province, a mere 20 per cent of small 
food producers had the necessary permits and licences (Chung and Wong, 2013, p. 476). An 
investigation conducted by the SFDA published in 2007 revealed the extend of non-compliance. 
According to these official figures, 29% of the surveyed 450,000 food companies did not 
implement any food production standard. Almost half of them failed to have sanitation certificates 
or production licenses (Liu, 2010a, p. 298). Another assessment comes from the analyses 
conducted as part of the joint project by the Chinese government, ADB and WHO, which states 
that “the PRC [People’s Republic of China] still has not achieved high-level comprehensive 
coordination or many other earlier envisaged targets” (Asian Development Bank, 2007, p. 1). It 
goes on to stipulate the need for a fundamentally new food safety law (Asian Development Bank, 
2007, p. 1). Ellis in Turner summarized the situation prior to 2008 pointedly: “China’s capacity to 
effectively protect food quality is hampered by a weak legal, political, and regulatory 
infrastructure that has not forced food producers and processors to be accountable.” (Ellis and 
Turner, 2008, p. 3) 
5.2.2 CFSR after the Food Safety Law 
In the following paragraphs, I show that while the FSL was a major step, it still had a number of 
shortcomings. As a result, the Chinese government undertook further adaptions of its food safety 
regulation. 
5.2.2.1 Improvement of rules and organisation by Food Safety Law  
In February 2009, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passed the FSL 
which came into effect in June the same year. It was complemented by implementing rules issued 
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by the State Council and further implementing regulations issued by other ministries (Shen, 2013, 
p. 167). With this, the year 2009 marks a substantial change in China’s food safety regulation. The 
FSL was widely considered to be a major step towards modernizing China’s food safety regulation, 
bringing it in line with international standards and improving its effectiveness (Lam et al., 2013, 
pp. 2049–2050; Collins and Gottwald, 2011, p. 151; Shen, 2013; Chung and Wong, 2013; Jia and 
Jukes, 2013; Meador and Ma, 2013, interview 1, 2, 8, 21 and 31). The WHO described China’s food 
safety regulation post 2009 as “modern” (World Health Organization). 
Compared to the FHL, the central step forward was the fact that with the FSL China for the first 
time had a comprehensive law covering a wide array of food safety aspects. This is already obvious 
in the amount of provisions. While the FHL had a mere 57, the FSL comprises over 100 provisions 
(Shen, 2013). The FSL brought improvements in the following areas (Jia and Jukes, 2013, p. 238, 
for details see Shen, 2013, pp. 168–173): 
 It clarified the organisational framework and distribution of principal responsibilities 
between the different authorities, including the integration of an inspection system. 
 It introduced a risk surveillance and risk assessment system. 
 It required the establishment of a unified food safety standard system. 
 It stipulated the prime responsibility of food business operators to ensure the safety of 
food. 
 It enhanced legal sanctions and clarified legal liability for food producers and law 
enforcement personnel. 
The inter-ministerial cooperation was not only enhanced by the definition of responsibilities, but 
also by introducing the State Council-level national Food Safety Commission (FSC) as the prime 
coordinator, which was set up in 2010 (Poms et al., 2011, p. 11). Then vice-premier Li Keqiang 
was appointed head of the commission, further stressing the importance the central government 
attached to food safety. Placed between the FSC and the four other main ministries MoA, AQSIQ, 
SAIC and SFDA, the MoH regained weight and became the ministry with an overall coordinating 
role (Chen et al., 2015, p. 2206, see also Table 5). In addition, it was charged with the 
responsibility to unify the system of food safety and quality standards. In 2011, a new authority, 
the CFSA, was founded in order to improve risk assessment and risk surveillance (Meador and Ma, 
2013). Food safety monitoring capabilities were expanded across the country (China Daily, 2010). 
However, despite all the nationally and internationally welcomed improvements, the FSL fell 
short of changing the situation in a number of areas as I will discuss in the following paragraphs.  
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5.2.2.2 Enduring segmentation 
Most importantly, at its core, the fundamental problem of fragmentation remained (Collins and 
Gottwald, 2011, p. 149; United Nations, 2008, p. 12). The attempt by the government to turn the 
fragmentation into a clearly defined segmentation of oversight, proved to be insufficient (Jia and 
Jukes, 2013, p. 243). The continuous problem of fragmentation and insufficient clarity in the 
distribution of responsibilities has also been raised in interviews with Chinese experts (interview 
15, 20 and 33). Chen Junshi, a high ranking Chinese government scientist involved in the reform 
process from its beginning, likewise commented on the organisational reforms during his speech 
at a conference of the American Chamber of Commerce in 2013 in Shanghai (American Chamber 
of Commerce China, 2013, p. 3). Despite the redistribution of responsibilities, in early 2013 as 
many as 14 authorities were still involved in food safety matters in China on the national level 
(Wu and Chen, 2013). A report commissioned by the EU described the resulting situation during 
that time as follows: “Some departments are linked vertically under the direct auspices of a higher 
level authority, whilst others are linked latterly at the same level of government, and commonly with 
each department being responsible for certain parts of whole food safety chain which makes 
coordination more difficult” (Norse et al., 2013, p. 48). The main weakness, however, was, that the 
FSL still did not break with the tradition of splitting food safety regulation in the agricultural 
sector and the industrial sector (Liu, 2010b, p. 253).  
Jia and Jukes (2013) provide an example, how, after the FSL, fragmentation of oversight led to 
regulatory failure. In April 2011, police discovered 40 tonnes of tainted bean sprouts in Shenyang, 
Liaoning province. The vegetables had been illegally treated with various chemicals to improve 
their appearance (Foster, 2011). Jia and Jukes describe the following buck-passing between 
Chinese authorities: 
“The AQSIQ declared that its responsibility focused on production processing and that 
the IAC [SAIC – the author] should take the responsibility for the sprouts because the 
problem occurred in the market. However [sic!] the IAC declared that the Agriculture 
Department should take the responsibility, because the sprouts were a primary 
agricultural product. The Agriculture Department declared that the illegal producers 
and traders ran away before the analytical evidence of contamination was available and 
that in any case the department did not have the right to detain people. The SFDA 
declared that it just supervised the food in restaurant and catering. Overall it appears 
that in this case, no department was willing to take responsibility for tackling the 
problem.” (2013, p. 241) 
Further clarification also was needed in the relationship between the central and local 
government levels. Especially, the supervision of local governments remained insufficient (Jia and 
Jukes, 2013, p. 243).  
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5.2.2.3 Enduring lack of implementation and enforcement 
The improvement of regulation with respect to rules contrasted with an enduring lack of 
implementation and enforcement of food safety regulation in China (FORHEAD, 2014, pp. 42–43, 
for details see Lam et al., 2013). Observers have argued that the lack of implementation of laws 
and regulations explain why China has continued to be shaken by food safety scandals (The 
Lancet, 2014, pre-interview 3). In 2012, the FAO put much emphasis on implementation and 
enforcement aspects, when listing the reasons for China’s food safety problems: “incomplete and 
unscientific safety and quality standards for agricultural and fishery products and processes, poor 
or disjointed legal framework, under-developed and under-resourced institutions, weak 
enforcement of law and regulations, lack of consumer protection measures, lack of quality control 
and quality management infrastructures, and insufficient trained human resources” (FAO, 2012a). 
Implementation of China’s food safety regulation remained uneven across provinces and types of 
food (Yasuda, 2013). Consequently, enforcement remained uneven, too (Collins and Gottwald, 
2011, p. 149). The FSL did not fundamentally change the situation when it comes to putting rules 
into business practice. There remained “an obvious need to improve monitoring, inspection and 
law enforcement” (Chung and Wong, 2013, p. 477). GFSI cites Chen Junshi, a Chinese high-
ranking government scientist, in 2010 saying that small scale producers are not adequately 
controlled by the Chinese government: “In the [official] documents they may say that they are 
exporting bicycles, but really it is food, or pet food” (GFSI, 2010a, p. 4). Reports about the food 
safety situation point to misuse and overuse of chemicals in food production as a fundamental 
problem, despite the fact that pesticide regulation became stricter and GAP-concepts were 
introduced (FORHEAD, 2014, pp. 32–35; Lam et al., 2013, p. 2048). 
A major scandal in July 2014 involving the Shanghai branch of the US meat producer OSI 
indicates the depth of the implementation problem. A local TV station discovered that at this 
specific production site, fresh meat and expired meat were mixed and sold (Xinhua, 2015a). 
Although Shanghai has been described as one of the most developed provinces in China when it 
comes to the implementation of food safety regulation, seven inspections of the Shanghai OSI 
production site during the three years before the scandal did not detect or report any 
abnormalities (The Lancet, 2014, interview 3 and 7).  
Official data from testing food which would provide information of actual compliance with food 
safety regulation is patchy if available at all (FORHEAD, 2014, pp. 80–82). However, the issue of 
implementation and enforcement deficits is reflected in the monitoring data provided by private 
standard schemes in China. In its 2014 report, BRC disclosed that in China only 25.5 per cent of all 
inspected sites achieved the A grade, which is the “lowest percentage across all regions and 
countries” (BRC, 2014, p. 35). China accounted for 32 per cent of all major nonconformities 
worldwide and in two criteria it represents the vast majority (30 out of 33 and 18 out of 26) of 
cases of major nonconformity with BRC requirements (BRC, 2014, p. 35). A China-based private 
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food quality control company released figures for 2011, claiming that “51% of all food facility 
check-ups conducted in the country failed, with ‘major’ defects […] accounting for around 10%” 
(Astley, 2012).75 These figures illustrate a substantial gap between standard requirements and 
actual implementation even for food producers who applied for a private certificate. There is little 
reason to believe that companies, which did not even apply for a certification do better than that. 
These findings are supported by numerous anecdotal evidence about the non-implementation of 
existing rules. For example, in a side talk during the CIFSGC 2013 in Beijing, a representative of a 
US food producer, who was responsible for sourcing in China reported about the lack of 
conformity of Chinese farmers with basic food safety rules, concluding “in reality, in China, we 
have to go out and train the farmer”.76 
The continued fragmentation of the market combined with the sheer size of the Chinese food 
market remained a major obstacle on the road to safe food production (Lam et al., 2013, p. 2050, 
cf. Yasuda, 2013). According to a statistic issued by the MoA, by the end of 2012, the number of 
small scale farms was still as high as 877,000 across the country, mainly run by families (China 
Financial and Economic News, 2013). The high number of food producers brings along high costs 
for monitoring, increasing the barrier to implement enforcement (Chung and Wong, 2013, p. 
476).77 In relation to the high number of food businesses to be regulated, governmental authorities 
struggled with insufficient funding (Liu, 2010b, p. 256).78 As a Chinese official publicly stated, 
following the FSL, process control, inspection capacities and stronger technical support for 
improving risk management in China were still lacking (Chen, 2014b).  
In sum, in China implementation and enforcement kept lagging behind the development of its 
food safety rules. Improving the practice of regulation seemed to be a more pressing task compared 
to improving the rules-side of China’s food safety regulation (Collins and Gottwald, 2011, p. 151). 
Still in 2016, an industry initiative complained that implementation on the ground remained 
vague, varied widely among regions and often contradicted each other (Jiang, 2016). 
5.2.2.4 Need to improve standard system 
With regard to rule-making, despite the FSL demand for a unified food safety standard system, 
inconsistencies and contradictions between numerous standards regulating the same topic 
prevailed. Furthermore, public food safety standards for specific substances still often did not meet 
the levels of safety set by Codex Alimentarius (Jia and Jukes, 2013, p. 243). In 2010, the MoH, 
                                                          
75 According to the company, major defects include “mould, strong odours showing spoiled food, any sort of 
living specimen, mud or dust traces, feathers in chicken meat, bones in a fish filet, etc” (Astley, 2012). 
76 Personal notes of a side talk with a representative of a US food producer on 7 November 2013 at the 
CIFSQC in Beijing. 
77 In the dairy sector, for example, the Chinese government responded to this problem by pushing for higher 
market concentration (Dendler et al., n.d.). 
78 This topic also was brought up with reference to the CNCA in a background talk with an official 
representative of an EU member state on 16 November 2013 in Shanghai. 
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responsible for food standard unification, had created a National Food Safety Standard Review 
Committee, which had the daunting task to streamline the standard system and reduce the total 
number by 2015 (Xu, 2014).79 In addition, the task was to identify areas which needed standards 
and to develop such standards (Meador and Ma, 2013, p. 5). This topic was dealt with in the 12th 
Five Year Plan of National Food Safety Standards (Meador and Ma, 2013, p. 5). However, the 
plan seemed to be too ambitious. By 2011, still the vast number of food safety standards did not 
meet international standards set by the Codex Alimentarius and other international standard 
setting organisations. According to an analysis by Mangelsdorf et al., a mere 14 per cent of all 
standards were based on international requirements – 70 per cent of which only partially fulfilled 
international standards (2012, pp. 512–513). In 2012, China daily quotes Su Zhi, a senior 
supervision official of the MoH pointing out the need to improve the food safety standards: 
„[P]roblems still exist in the present standards of food safety” (China Daily, 2012). In 2013, the 
ministry came up with a survey indicating the extent of the problem. The analysis found 4,934 
food safety standards with 1,492 contradicting others or being redundant (Xu, 2014). Hence, the 
development, unification and revision of public food safety standards turned out to be a lengthy 
process, remaining high on the political agenda at the time (Meador and Ma, 2013; Jia and Jukes, 
2013, p. 244). The revision process of the National Food Safety Standard Review Committee, 
scheduled to end in 2015, had not been officially accomplished by the beginning of 2016 (Balzano, 
2016). Interviewees confirm the struggle with the Chinese food safety standards in practice. In 
many cases, China still did not have detailed standards to regulate products new to the Chinese 
market (interview 7). Thus, for example, toast with raisins was regulated like toast without raisins. 
Likewise, shredded lettuce was regulated as ice cream in lack of any better matching food safety 
standard (interview 40). 
5.2.2.5 First amendments of Food Safety Law 
There was a widespread dissatisfaction with the FSL. In the section about food safety, the 
American Chamber of Commerce in China stated in its 2012 White Paper: “Still, inconsistency 
and lack of clarity remain in regulations, and coordination of efforts between different authorities 
needs improvement” (American Chamber of Commerce China, 2012, p. 102). The Chinese 
government was aware of the shortcomings of the FSL, not least because food safety scandals kept 
occurring. Government experts publicly acknowledged that the regulatory reform had not been 
finished (American Chamber of Commerce China, 2013, p. 3). The State Council’s Food Safety 
Supervision System plan for 2012-2017 came to similar conclusions and recognised the challenges 
with regard to coordination of food safety supervision, insufficient capabilities, lack of 
implementing regulations and a consistent system of food safety standards, inadequate risk 
surveillance assessment and too low food safety awareness (Meador and Ma, 2013, pp. 10–11).  
                                                          
79 Information additionally derived from Chen (2014b). Notably, the task that was not completed by 2016 
(Balzano, 2016). 
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As yet another step to improve food safety regulation, in March 2013, an additional administrative 
reform considerably reduced the number of authorities responsible for regulating food safety. It 
also upgraded the SFDA to become the CFDA with ministerial status and a comprehensive, 
vertical authority over the production process including the power to set food safety standards 
(the latter obtained from MoH). Respective supervision responsibilities of AQSIQ and SAIC were 
integrated in the CFDA (Chen et al., 2015, p. 2207). Set up as the new coordinating ministry, it 
took over the coordinating role from the MoH and furthermore was tasked to perform the 
functions of the FSC (FORHEAD, 2014, p. 41). At the same time, the MoH became the NHFPC 
while keeping the responsibility for risk assessment and risk surveillance. MoA kept its 
responsible for primary production, supplemented with responsibility for pig slaughter (formerly 
under belonging to MofCom) and AQSIQ retained responsibility for import and export (Chen et 
al., 2015, p. 2207). In addition to the organisational re-shuffle, the same year, the revision process 
for the 2009 FSL was started that proceeded throughout 2014 (see Table 5).  
5.2.3 Implication of CFSR development for supply safety and market access 
This part retraces the effects of China’s changing food safety regulation on supply safety and 
market access issues. As I show separately for both perspectives, there is no clear tendency. 
Neither did supply safety nor market access issues become considerably less or more intense. 
5.2.3.1 Development of supply safety 
RASFF notifications are a problematic indicator for assessing the status of an exporting country’s 
food safety regulation (interview 17 and 25, Battaglia, 2013). Statistically, they are not valid, 
especially because the intensity of border controls may change over time or is not the same for 
two different countries.80 What RASFF does show, however, is a mixture of the extent of import 
safety problems the EU has with a specific country combined with the risk of unsafe imports as 
anticipated by the EU Commission. Rising numbers of notification are the result of a combination 
of both factors. Thus, in any case, RASFF notifications roughly indicate the extent to which the 
EU has a problem with import safety with a specific country. The fact that the picture drawn by 
RASFF reports for China is rather plain and clearly different from other countries additionally 
justifies their usage in this specific context. 
In the first years of China’s accession to the WTO, the number of RASFF notifications from China 
remained relatively stable and this is also the period in which China was not the number one 
country for notifications. This situation only changed in 2005, when the number of notifications 
from China increased sharply. This was followed by a steady increase until 2008, which marked a 
                                                          
80 Additionally, effects from stricter EU regulation lower the value of RASFF figures for interpretations. 
Theoretically, stricter regulation leads to an increase in RASFF notifications although the exporting country 
has kept its level of food safety. However, as in the context considered here, the relative distance between 
EU and third party food safety regulation is what matters, this does not pose a problem. 
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second sharp increase. At the same time, from 2006 onwards, China was the number one country 
for RASFF notifications (Figure 13). Since 2009, RASFF notifications originating from China 
remained stable on a high level around 500 per year and with China being the number one origin 
of notifications throughout the period. 
(Source: own compilation based on RASFF annual reports 2002-2012) 
RASFF notifications in fact often represent the prevention of food import safety problems. 
However, unsafe food from China also de facto led to massive food safety incidents in the EU. In 
September 2012, over 11,000 students in Eastern Germany suffered from diarrhoea which was 
caused by a norovirus on strawberries. The product was imported from Shandong province, China, 
as frozen fruits and was served in school canteens (Spiegel Online, 2012). 
5.2.3.2 Market access issues deriving from China’s food safety regulation 
China’s food safety regulation also indirectly and directly affects the access of foreign products on 
the market. As Prévost points out, the regulatory updates in China’s food safety regulation 
following 2009 pose the risk of additional market access issues for the EU (Prévost). Indirectly, the 
fast establishment of new regulation potentially posed problems for EU exporters to catch up with 
these developments, an issue raised by the EU within the WTO (Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, 2010, 15–16). The EU Commission provides a database of ongoing SPS 
topics with all trading partners which tracks market access issues directly resulting from China’s 
food safety regulation. The SPS issues with China still open by the end of 2014 are listed in Figure 
14. Since the data has been retrieved in 2015, it remains unclear whether the database also 
includes older resolved SPS issues. A comparison with the WTO database of Specific Trade 
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Figure 13: Number of RASFF notifications by country of origin 
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Concerns shows three additional SPS issues all of which had been resolved rather quickly: (1) 
import ban on products of Dutch origin (raised 2002, resolved 2003), (2) Quarantine measures for 
the entry and exit of aquatic products (raised 2003, resolved 2003), (3) import restrictions on 
products of animal origin due to dioxin (raised 2007, resolved 2007) (World Trade Organization). 
Figure 14: SPS issues raised by the EU by end of 2014 
No Reported date Title Remark 
1 01 Jan 2005 Burdensome application process for approval of meat 
establishments for exports to China 
 
2 07 Mar 2006 Non recognition of EUs regionalisation due to avian 
influenza 
Raised as Specific 
Trade Concern 
within WTO on 16 
Mar 2016 
3 01 Apr 2012 Unjustified Chinese import ban imposed on 
bovine/ovine genetic material due to Schmallenberg 
virus 
Trade restrictive 
measures since 2002 
4 26 Aug 2014 Non-recognition of EUs regionalisation measures 
strictly implemented due to African swine fever 
Ban started February 
2014 
5 12 Dec 2014 Import conditions related to milk and dairy product  
6 07 Jan 2015 Unjustified barrier for alcoholic beverages due to 
phthalate (plasticizers) levels. 
Trade restrictive 
measures started in 
February 2013; 
resolved in May2016 
7 27 Jan 2016 Longstanding and unjustified import ban on EU 
Bovine/Ovine and products thereof due to BSE. 
Topic since 2005 
(Source: own, based on DG TRADE, 2017) 
5.2.4 Summary and discussion 
For the SSH, I formulated two expectations which are the same for EU public actors and TPS 
actors: First, food safety standards do not fulfil international criteria and secondly, food safety 
regulation is only partially implemented or enforced. The expectations for the MAH differ for EU 
public actors and TPS. For the former, food safety regulation which is not compatible (in other 
words harmonized) with EU regulation and thus hinders EU export would potentially indicate 
market access motivation. For TPS the expectation is that China's food safety regulation allows or 
even supports TPS. 
The discussion above clearly shows that prior to the FSL, the state of China’s food safety 
regulation gave sufficient reason to become active to influence China’s respective regulation to 
increase supply safety. China’s food safety regulation was far behind international criteria with 
existing regulation loosely enforced. Reoccurring food safety incidents furthermore diminished 
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national and international trust in the capability of China to ensure safe food. At the same time, 
given the lack of harmonisation with international standards, there were also sufficient reasons for 
market access motivated activities by EU public actors. 
After the introduction of the FSL in 2009, the situation changed and became less clear. The overall 
perception is that with the FSL and subsequent changes, China’s food safety regulation improved 
(Meador and Ma, 2013, interviews 6, 7 and 8). EU representatives especially see it more in line 
with international standards, praise the increased transparency and clearer responsibilities 
(interview 1, 2, 8, 21, 31). Especially, the structural changes in 2013 have been commented on 
positively (interview 1 and 2). At the same time, China’s food safety regulation is clearly still work 
in progress (Chung and Wong, 2013). The comparable high speed of regulatory change in 2009 
and the following years happened mainly on paper and were not reflected to the same extent in 
improvements in market practice. Implementation and enforcement were still lagging behind the 
regulators’ requirements. China’s government itself stressed the need of capacity building to 
achieve its own goals (interview 13, 18, 21). So, until 2014, the state of China’s food safety 
remained a “continuing global problem” (The Lancet, 2014). This leaves sufficient reason for 
supply safety-motivated activities by the EU Commission and the GFSI. The RASFF figures bear 
witness to that. At the same time, specific standard (re-)definition bear the potential for market 
access activities, especially when targeted at important European export products. The EU’s list of 
SPS issues with China indicates that updates of China’s food safety regulation did not lead to a 
situation in which market access barriers vanished. As for the TPS’ market access expectations, I 
found a similar situation. The gradual extension of China’s food safety regulation towards 
voluntary standards and certification systems laid the regulatory basis for TPS in China.  
To conclude, the evidence found for the condition “Sate of China’s food safety regulation” allows 
for both hypotheses and for both types of actors, EU public and TPS. 
5.3 IGOs supporting China’s food safety reforms 
In this section, I trace the activities of those IGOs, which potentially affected EU Commission’s 
and GFSI’ behaviour. The analysis concentrates on the WHO, as this is the organisation featuring 
most prominently in the interviews. Often it is mentioned in conjunction with the FAO which I 
dedicate the second part to. Lastly, I summarize further organisations which were active in China, 
most importantly the World Bank.  
5.3.1 WHO 
The WHO played a decisive role in the changes of China’s food safety regulation, especially during 
the development of the FSL. The basis for this was laid early before. The office of the WHO 
Representative in China was already set up in 1981 (World Health Organization, 2013, p. 19). 
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Accordingly, WHO was already involved in supporting China’s food safety before 2001. For 
example, in the mid-1990s, WHO sponsored a project, which aimed at improving street food 
safety by introducing HACCP principles (FAO, 2002). Such kind of training programmes also 
continued after China’s WTO accession and contributed strongly to establishing the concept of 
risk analysis and risk assessment in China (Liu, 2002). For example, WHO sponsored, in 
collaboration with FAO and other organisations a training programme on risk assessment for 
microbiological risks in China in 2002 (Liu, 2002, interview 8). These activities were intended to 
support the establishment of a Western-style food safety monitoring system in China continued 
over several years and have been acknowledged as a relevant contribution by several interviewees 
outside of the WHO (interview 3, 8 and 23). 
In 2004, WHO and MoH signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to strengthen 
cooperation in the health area in general. Among the five key areas for cooperation identified in 
the MoU, one is about non-communicable diseases, including inter alia food safety as a sub aspect. 
Commencing with the MoU, both partners regularly agreed on a country cooperation strategy 
(CCS). The first CCS covered the period 2004–2008 and was based on the MoU. For the following 
CCS (2008-2013) food safety has ex post been described as one of the successful collaboration 
projects (World Health Organization, 2013, pp. 19–20). The 2013-2015 CCS addressed food safety 
again as part of a main focus area which reads: “Support the Government in the preparedness, 
surveillance, early warning, assessment, risk communications, epidemiological investigation and 
response for risks to health security and food safety.” Specifically, the WHO’s approach is to 
“provide technical and policy support” (World Health Organization, 2013, p. 24). The review of 
the CCS indicates that, overall, food safety remains one aspect of a broader objective (that being 
improving public health) – a perspective confirmed by an interviewee (interview 41).  
The major importance of WHO for China’s food safety regulation, however, stems from its 
involvement in the reform process from 2004 until 2007. The roots can be traced back to 2002, 
when WHO China made food safety a priority. However, at the time, this did not meet any 
interest from the Chinese side (interview 41). This however changed shortly afterwards, when 
China asked the ADB for support on setting up the newly created SFDA (interview 41, likewise 
reported in Ellis and Turner, 2008, pp. 37–38). ADB initially planned to focus the project on avian 
influenza81. It turned to WHO in China as a partner for such a project with expertise in the field. 
According to an interviewee, the WHO office in China seized this opportunity to push forward its 
more general food safety agenda for China and agreed to join the project under the condition that 
it deals with food safety regulation in general instead of focussing on avian influenza only 
                                                          
81 Avian influenza is a zoonotic disease prevalent and reoccurring in China since the mid-1990s, but also 
occurring in other parts of the world, including Europe. 
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(interview 41). As a result, a joint project was set up with ADB as the financing organisation, 
WHO providing technical support and SFDA as the Chinese governmental partner.  
The main result of the project was the “Study on China’s National Food Safety Strategy” already 
mentioned in section 5.2.1.2. It was led by an international and a domestic expert, who both have 
been portrayed by interviewees as crucial for the high impact of the report (interview 3 and 41). 
The international expert, Roger Skinner, a retired public servant of the British Food Standards 
Agency, was appointed by the WHO (Kahn, 2007, interview 3 and 41). The Chinese expert, Han 
Jun, was an expert from the influential DRC.82 Both explicitly advocated for change (interview 3 
and 41). The report included detailed recommendations for reform on about 1,000 pages, for 
example providing suggestions for the capacities needed (interview 41). It was handed over to the 
Chinese government in 2004 (interview 3). While the report itself remained confidential, a short 
version was made public entitled “Focused Synopsis of Consultant’s Findings and 
Recommendations on a Regulatory and Strategic Framework for Food Safety in the People’s 
Republic of China” (interview 3 and 41). The synopsis presents the two key recommendations of 
the project: First, the project advocated a new overarching food safety law covering all aspects of 
food safety. Second, the report included recommendations for a new organisational arrangement 
of food safety regulation in China. Specifically, it proposed to install a coordinating body with a 
hierarchical status above the ministries involved in food safety regulation. This could be done by 
either upgrading SFDA’s status or creating a new commission (interview 41, see also Asian 
Development Bank, 2007). These suggestions were made public during the Global Forum on Food 
Safety in 2004 by Han Jun (Chuan, 2004).83 
Following the presentation, the WHO engaged in advocating the implementation of the report’s 
recommendations. The project itself was extended until 2007 (interview 41). Likewise, ADB and 
SFDA contributed to the widespread dissemination of the report among the Chinese government 
(interview 41). An interviewee described the activities as straight forward lobbying (interview 41). 
To this end, the WHO engaged in organizing several consultations with “neutral” Chinese 
governmental bodies to convince them of the necessity of reform (interview 41). Arguably, the 
FSL and the following organisational reform in 2013 strongly reflected the report’s 
recommendations. Thus, interviewees ascribed the direction of the reform to a strong degree to 
the WHO/ADB/SFDA study (interview 3, 41 and pre-interview 4). Consequently, a WHO 
representative expressed “a sense of achievement” when reflecting on the WHO’s support of 
China’s food safety regulation (interview 41). 
                                                          
82 The DRC is an advisory body conducting research and developing policy recommendations to the State 
Council and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, thus two of the highest bodies of China’s 
political system. 
83 The report and conference have also been portrayed as a crucial moment in the development of China’s 
food safety regulation by a former EU representative in Beijing, who was working in Beijing during that 
time (pre-interview 4). 
Analysis:  
Supply safety and market access as motivation for EU’s activities 
 
144 
WHO kept supporting China in the development of food safety regulation beyond this specific 
project. It provided comments on drafts of the original FSL in 2009 and its revision in 2014 to the 
Chinese government (interview 35 and 41). The contacts established during the period 2004-2007 
are still used for mutual projects (interview 41). For example, a technical workshop on chemical 
risk analysis in the food chain organized jointly with FAO and CFSA in 2013 in Beijing was 
targeted at a wider Asian audience as part of the WHO regional food safety strategy (World 
Health Organization, 2014b, p. 40). WHO also supported projects on microbiological resistance 
and provided training on monitoring microbiological risks (interview 8 and 35). In addition, WHO 
sent an expert to the CFSA’s international advisory committee (interview 19 and 35). In July 2014, 
WHO and CFDA agreed on capacity building measures for staff of Chinese authorities. In general, 
however, technical trainings have become of lesser importance. Instead, issues of risk 
communication play a larger role, as an interviewee described the approach in 2014 (interview 
35). In addition to its active involvement, the WHO also is an important source of knowledge on 
food safety topics. For example, it tracks closely the progress of food safety in Asian countries like 
China (World Health Organization, 2014b). Likewise, China participated in WHO conferences, 
like the Global Forum of Food Safety Regulators in 2002 and 2004 (FAO, 2002; FAO, 2004). 
However, the relevance of the WHO’s work for the EU’s activities in China derives from the 
health organisations deep involvement in developing the FSL. The WHO enabled China to 
establish food safety regulation which in its basic concepts followed internationally agreed 
principles (interview 41). With this step forward, the WHO contributed – in theory – to 
increasing supply safety. Accordingly, WHO activities have been acknowledged by the EU 
Commission (interview 1, 2 and 3). In the case of EUCTP I, the WHO/ADB/SFDA-project was 
seen as a major milestone and used as an opportunity to engage stronger with China on food safety 
topics (interview 3). After the introduction of the FSL, also, coordination with WHO was stressed 
as important. However, it is noteworthy that beyond the WHO/ADB/SFDA-project, interviewees 
made no specific reference to any WHO project (interview 2). As for TPS, WHO’s activities have 
no direct effect. Occasionally, WHO is portrayed as a potential partner for cooperation (GFSI, 
2012c, p. 3). In a global context, WHO representatives were speakers at GFSI conferences (GFSI, 
2013d; GFSI, 2011a). However, neither documents nor interviewees made any specific references 
to WHO’s work in China.  
5.3.2 FAO 
By 2011, the FAO was already active in China for three decades with over 400 field projects 
implemented (FAO, 2011, p. 1). Overall, the activities of the FAO in China reflect the 
organisation’s main purpose to reduce hunger. After all, ensuring food security was a major 
objective for China over decades (Ghose, 2014; Ash, 2012). Food safety thus is a subordinated 
topic, but nevertheless part of the FAO’s programme in China. Accordingly, its Chinese partners 
IGOs supporting China’s food safety reforms 
 
145 
are government organisations dealing with agricultural issues. The FAO does not list CFDA or 
other food-related organisations as partners (FAO, 2017). The achievement report covering FAO’s 
activities until 2011 lists food safety as one of nine sub-categories (FAO, 2011, p. 3). In accordance 
with that, food safety projects played a minor role in China. For the period from 1978 until 2012, 
an official report lists 227 selected projects in China of which 15 are related to food safety (FAO, 
2011, pp. 11–18). Likewise, out of the five success stories, FAO presents on its website about 
China, three foci on food security and two on the special issue of avian influenza (FAO, 2016a). 
Likewise, in FAO’s country programming framework (CPF) 2012-2015 for China, agreed as part of 
a memorandum of understanding between the FAO and the MoA, “Strengthening capacities for 
quality and safety management of agricultural product” was one of the five priority areas (FAO, 
2016b; FAO, 2012a). 
Three topics are most relevant when looking at FAO’s work in China with respect to food safety. 
Firstly, the FAO has a history of fighting avian influenza (Ellis and Turner, 2008, p. 36). Here, 
FAO’s capacity building programs supported the Chinese management of the zoonotic disease. 
One interviewee reported that especially in the case of avian influenza, coordination with the 
FAO and other international actors in China was strong (interview 1). Since the first outbreak in 
2004, the FAO continuously supported China, notably mostly financed by US funds (FAO, 2011, 
pp. 6–7).84 In 2013, the long-term cooperation between the FAO and China on avian influenza 
yielded the official recognition of the Harbin Veterinary Research Institute (which belongs to the 
Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences) as an FAO Animal Influenza Collaboration Centre 
(FAO, 2016b). Secondly, another food safety-related focus of the FAO’s activities also lies on 
animal health, but goes beyond avian influenza. It encompassed a series of events starting in 2012 
which focused on increasing surveillance capacities in China by supporting the China Field 
Epidemiology Programme for Veterinarians (FAO, 2012c). It was jointly organized with EUCTP II 
(for details on the series, see 5.4.2.3.6). According to the 2012 MoU and CPF, Integrated Pest 
Management forms a third focus of the FAO in China with regard to food safety with a project in 
Yunnan (Ellis and Turner, 2008, pp. 36–37). Furthermore, like discussed for the WHO, the FAO 
also exerted indirect influence on China through its authority as the global expert organisation in 
the field. For example, a Chinese expert reported that he translated the FAO Paper 76 
“Strengthening national food control systems - A quick guide to assess capacity-building needs” 
into Chinese to make it accessible for Chinese policy makers (interview 20, FAO, 2003). FAO’s 
activities played a role for EUCTP. The EU Commission used the momentum generated by FAO’s 
engagement to cooperate on the topic of animal diseases (interview 1 and 2, see also 5.4.2.3.6). As 
for the GFSI, the FAO had an even lesser importance compared to the WHO. No single 
interviewee mentioned the FAO, nor features it specifically in TPS-related documents. 
                                                          
84 According to a paper published in 2013, the support is ongoing (FAO, 2013). 
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5.3.3 Others 
The World Bank started looking into supporting food safety regulation in China only in 2006, 
when it conducted a first study on China’s compliance with food safety requirements for fruit and 
vegetables (van der Meer, Cornelius, 2005), followed by a policy note on food safety in general in 
2008 (World Health Organization, 2010). The result of both studies was the World Bank’s first 
(and until the end of 2014 only) food safety project in China effectively providing technical 
support. Having started in 2010 in the northeast province Jilin, it set out to improve safety of 
agricultural products. It was the World Bank’s largest food safety project with a loan of 100 
million USD loan to China (World Health Organization, 2010). A more long-term involvement 
with China’s food safety developed with the GFSP (see 3.4.1.3). From 2012 until 2014, World 
Bank’s GFSP was still in its built-up phase. However, it already showed a focus on China with first 
HACCP-trainings conducted in Shanghai (GFSI, 2015d). Part of the GFSP work is supporting the 
CFDA with advice and research since its establishment in 2013 (Hakobyan and Eliste, 2015). Part 
of this is an assessment of China’s capacity building needs in food safety to identify priority areas 
for action (Batmanian, 2014). GFSP also brings together different actors engaged in supporting 
China’s food safety. During the third GFSP conference in 2014, a session was dedicated to China 
where IGO representatives as well as several country and industry representatives presented their 
activities (World Bank, 2014c). Likewise, in 2014, a joint CFDA/CFSA/FAO/WHO/World Bank 
Food Safety Symposium was held in Beijing (World Bank, 2014a, see also Godefroy, 2014). The 
World Bank’s efforts have a development aid focus that is to improve China’s domestic food safety 
regulation. The focus on China was re-confirmed in a GFSP meeting in 2015.85 Arguably, the 
World Bank’s efforts contribute to strengthening China’s safety regulation, thereby indirectly 
improving supply safety. The EU Commission acknowledged the World Bank’s increased efforts 
after 2012 (interview 1). However, details of those activities were unknown to EU public 
representatives and the World Bank’s work in general did not affect the EU Commission’s 
behaviour – which is indicated by the fact that none of the respective interviewees referred to the 
World Bank. In contrast, TPS showed greater interest the World Bank’s food safety activities. 
GlobalGAP and GFSI joined the GFSP (interview 5, GFSI, 2012a). In both cases this was part of a 
global approach and not specifically directed at China. However, GFSI planned to cooperate with 
GFSP for capacity building measures in China (Kranghand, 2013). 
Although listed in section 3.4, UNEP and its food safety-related programmes did not appear during 
my case-specific research, neither in interviews nor in any of the documents. However, in a larger 
context, the UN involved in China’s food safety situation. It published a “Occasional Paper” on 
China’s food safety in 2008 (United Nations, 2008). However, the implication of this paper – and 
any more intensive involvement of the UN office in China with this topic – remains unclear. 
                                                          
85 For example, GFSP presented itself during the CIFSQC 2014 in Shanghai; see also World Bank (2015). 
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Indeed, one interviewee dismissed the report as irrelevant as it only served the purpose that the 
UN wanted to say something about the then hot topic, too (pre-interview 9). The UN itself has not 
been mentioned in any of the other interviews.  
Lastly, a short reflection on the role of the ADB is in order as I have not discussed it separately in 
this section although this IGO re-appears as part of the historical development. While the ADB 
played an important role by enabling the WHO/ADB/SFDA-project, its function was limited to a 
coordinating role. It initiated the project on request by the Chinese government. However, the 
WHO was the partner with the necessary technical expertise (Ellis and Turner, 2008, pp. 37–38). 
What is more, the ADB did not involve in any other substantial project on food safety in China. 
5.3.4 Summary and discussion 
I defined two expectations for this condition: first, the non-existence of activities by IGOs to 
influence China’s food safety regulation; second, no or limited awareness of activities by IGOs to 
influence China’s food safety regulation by EU sources or awareness but perception as being 
insufficient. These conditions are the same for EU public actors as well as TPS.  
Among the IGOs being active in China on food safety topics, WHO stands out. While FAO and 
World Bank – being the two other important IGOs – mainly engaged in capacity building and 
trainings, WHO had substantial influence on shaping China’s food safety regulation with regard to 
its rules and organisational setup. However, a closer look shows that a clear-cut distinction of the 
effects of these activities between supply safety and market access is hardly possible. The WHO 
contributed strongly – at least in theory - to an improved implementation and enforcement, 
because with the FSL the basis was laid for progress in these areas, which – according to virtually 
all observers – would not have been possible otherwise. At the same time, the reform process 
kicked off with the FSL and especially the standard revision process opened the possibility for 
extensive involvement by the EU Commission to influence rules and standards so that market 
access barriers were to be reduced (interview 1). In a similar manner, FAO’s engagement in China 
affects both SSH and MAH. Capacity-building measures for surveillance contribute to supply 
safety as they reduce the spread of food risks. Establishing a reference laboratory for avian 
influenza in China at the same time establishes international approaches for dealing with this risk 
in China. This in turn connects with the SPS issues the EU had with China. A Chinese reference 
laboratory86 potentially is helpful for the EU because it follows and promotes internationally 
accepted risk assessments. In EU perception, trade barriers based on avian influenza are not 
justified if one accepts international risk assessment standards (see Figure 14). Lastly, the World 
                                                          
86 According to the OIE, reference laboratories “are designated to pursue all the scientific and technical 
problems relating to a named disease.” They should furthermore “provide scientific and technical training 
for personnel from Member Countries, and coordinate scientific and technical studies in collaboration with 
other laboratories or organisations […]” (OIE, 2017). Laboratories need to fulfil a number of criteria and 
have to apply for the status as reference laboratory, in this case at the OIE.  
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Bank and GFSP rather clearly contribute to supply safety by focussing on the built-up of 
implementation and enforcement capacities. There is yet another aspect to be noted. IGO 
activities rely on cooperation with the Chinese government – an official request or at least 
agreement. The major WHO/ADB/SFDA-project was possible because the Chinese government 
initially requested support from ADB.  
With regard to the awareness and judgement of IGO activities in China, data provides a mixed 
picture. To start with, the EU Commission was aware of IGO activities, however not constantly 
informed about detailed activities. GFSI was much less aware of IGO activities and concentrated 
on GFSP, since the project specifically invites the cooperation between public and private actors. 
IGO activities have not been portrayed as contributing to one’s objectives and thus creating less 
need to become active. A critical remark about the high number of organisations running projects 
on improving food safety indicates that from the EU Commission’s perspective, IGO activities 
could not substitute for own activities (interview 25). However, IGO initiatives have partly been 
utilized as a helpful basis for own activities – as it was the case for EUCTP I with WHO, EUCTP II 
with FAO and GFSI with GFSP.  
Aside from actively involving in China’s food safety regulation, IGOs exert influence in a passive 
manner. Especially WHO and FAO as organisations with substantial expertise provide knowledge 
resources which have been used by Chinese authorities in the process of improving China’s food 
safety regulation. The participation in international conferences and the translation of a FAO 
paper are two instances of presumably larger phenomena. 
5.4 The EU’s public engagement with China’s food safety regulation 
The EU activities are presented in two steps. Firstly, an overview is given about the intensity of 
the diplomatic exchange between the EU Commission and the Chinese government on food safety 
related issues. Secondly, I denote specific activities conducted by the EU Commission that aimed 
at influencing China’s food safety regulation. 
5.4.1 Food safety and agricultural as topics in the EU-China dialogue  
Among the many trade issues, food safety, SPS measures specifically, played a role early on. The 
EU supported China’s entry into WTO due to its rising importance as a trade partner (Tondl, 
2006). As part of a trade agreement between both, which contributed to paving the way to China’s 
WTO accession, China committed itself to phytosanitary measures as demanded by the EU (Tondl, 
2006, p. 158). However, food safety, SPS and agricultural topics generally have not been the 
highest on the EU’s agenda in dealing with China. Thus, the picture painted in the following 
paragraphs reflects the EU-China exchange within this specific sectoral dialogue. Nevertheless, 
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agriculture, food safety and SPS topics do occasionally reappear in high level documents outlining 
the overall strategy of the EU towards China. The following part reconstructs when these issues 
have been brought up and with which motivation behind – supply safety or market access. 
5.4.1.1 Food safety within the architecture of EU-China relations  
By the beginning of the new millennium, the EU and China had built a complex architecture for 
organising their political relations, with bilateral relationships between EU member states and the 
People’s Republic not even included in the consideration. The basis for this was laid in 1985 with 
the Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement between the then European Economic 
Community and the People’s Republic of China.87 In the new millennium, bilateral political 
relations include a long list of institutionalized meetings on a wide range of political levels ranging 
from an annual summit at the highest level to a regular working group level between experts on 
both sides. The long list of separate dialogues reflects the depth of the relations EU and China have 
reached. The External Action Service counts over 60 high-level and senior official dialogues 
between the EU and China (European External Action Service, 2015). They are organized in three 
pillars, the High-Level Strategic Dialogue (HSD), the High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue 
(HETD), and the High-Level People-to-People Dialogue (HPPD). This structure originates in a 
long established approach by both sides to distinguish between the political dialogue (now HSD) 
and sectoral dialogues (now HETD). Only recently, in 2012, the HPPD, dealing with topics around 
“education & training, culture, multilingualism and youth” has been added (European 
Commission, 2012a). The political dialogue addresses topics which are deemed to be inherently 
political in nature (e.g. security, human rights, migration, arms exports). The sectoral dialogue 
deals with issues related to economic relations, including development and trade (Snyder, 2009, 
pp. 656–657). The number of sectoral dialogues keeps changing and information provided by the 
External Action Service of the EU varies by source. In 2015 there were as many as 24 to 27 
sectoral dialogues, up from 23 in 2005.88 The new HPPD pillar aside, the functional separation 
between political and economic relations is hard to uphold in practice. The main function is to cut 
out controversial political issues between EU and China (like human rights, Tibet, Taiwan) from 
more technical and less controversial topics around economic development and trade (Snyder, 
2009, p. 657). Results of most of the institutions for collaboration between the EU and China are 
in most instances not legally binding for either side. Influence on behaviour of both sides thus is 
rather indirect (Snyder, 2009, p. 657).  
Issues of food safety are discussed between both parties under the HETD pillar. The 
institutionalisation of the communication developed over time, eventually establishing a specific 
                                                          
87 It provided for an annual EC-China Joint Committee meeting, which included several sectoral Working 
Groups and enabled the political dialogue, including annual EU-China Summits and the human rights 
dialogue (European Commission, 2002a, p. 6). 
88 Numbers based on Snyder (2009, p. 656), European External Action Service (2015), European External 
Action Service (2012). 
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sectoral Dialogue on Food Safety and Sanitary/Phytosanitary (SPS, for details see 5.4.1.4 further 
below). According to the EU perspective, it aims “at considerably enhancing co-operation on these 
issues and at establishing better communication and collaboration between the responsible 
authorities on food safety and SPS issues” (European External Action Service, 2012). Issues of food 
safety regulation in China potentially are topics within the Agricultural Dialogue and the Trade 
Policy Dialogue.89 In the regular meetings of the Agricultural Dialogue “[f]rom the beginning, food 
security and related issues – for example, food safety and the environmental implications of 
changing dynamics of food demand and supply - were identified as core issues” (Ash, 2012, p. 22, 
highlighted by me). The Trade Policy Dialogue covers a yet wider scope of topics. It supplements 
other institutionalized forums for exchange on, inter alia, trade issues – namely the Economic and 
Trade Working Group and the Joint Committee (European External Action Service, 2012). 
Naturally, issues of import and export are related to trade and with this issues of restrictions for 
food trade due to regulatory barriers are potential topics for the trade policy dialogue. Lastly, all 
issues of sectoral dialogues may be discussed on a higher level as part of the High-Level Economic 
& Trade Dialogue, the highest level dialogue of the HETP pillar or even in the annual leaders’ 
summit. 
The sectoral dialogue is not the realm of classical foreign policy diplomats, who on neither side 
play an important role in these dialogues. Rather, on the European side, DG TRADE and the 
respective DGs responsible for a specific topic are involved. Likewise, from the Chinese side, a 
number of ministries, like MofCom and further ministries with special responsibilities are 
involved (Snyder, 2009, p. 658). The DGs involved in food safety related sectoral dialogues, DG 
SANTE and DG AGRI, each have a representative present at the Delegation of the EU in Beijing. 
They coordinate between their EU Commission colleagues in Europe and Chinese partners. An 
interviewee explained:  
“I am the link between the headquarters in Brussels and the Chinese authorities in both 
ways. So, I report regularly to my head of hierarchy in Brussels […]. I receive 
instructions from my office in Brussels but I am in close contact with them. […] So, 
from a more formal point of view let’s say that every letter which is sent from the 
headquarters to the Chinese authorities has to go through the delegation. So, it has to 
go through me basically. Normally, I’m not supposed to modify very much the content 
of the letter. Because normally I have been associated with the drafting of this letter 
before, but if there is a case where a letter would be sent which I have seen, because I 
have specific information that it is not appropriate or that it would generate problems, 
or that we could avoid to create problems, then I can report back to Brussels and say – 
look we should not do this, we should do that. And modify the content and so forth.” 
(Interview 2) 
                                                          
89 The sectoral dialogue on fisheries is concerned with all issues around fishing rights and sustainable fishing. 
It does not address matters of food safety.  
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The same logic links the high-level meetings and sectoral meetings on the EU side, resulting in a 
circular logic. The results of high-level meetings set the frame for the more technical exchanges 
on the working level, coordinated in China by the EU Delegation representatives and vice versa. 
The EU Delegation representative feeds information into the preparation of each high-level 
meeting (interview 2). 
5.4.1.2 Food safety in EU’s strategy papers 
The 2002-2006 China Country Strategy Paper, approved by the EU Commission on 25th February 
2002, mentions food safety very briefly as part of supporting China on its way to become a market 
economy. It is part of the objective to develop China’s status as a market economy and “to support 
future policies and integration into China of EU technical standards” (European Commission, 
2002a, p. 26). Food safety problems in China are not noted.90 The National Indicative Programme 
2002-2004 for China (NIP), the implementing plan of the country strategy, furthermore 
determines the establishment of the EUCTP with a funding of 15 million Euro as a specific action. 
It explicitly includes SPS topics: “Particular consideration will also be given to the inclusion of the 
area of sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards and inspection, with a view to bringing Chinese 
standards and inspection procedures in line with the WTO SPS Agreement and relevant 
international practice” (European Commission, 2002a, p. 7).91 Given the emphasis on market 
economy status and WTO-alignment, the NIP rather points to a market access motivation. Food 
safety as consumer safety or import safety is not discussed. During the preparation of the 2005-
2006 NIP, Chinese representatives agreed with the suggestion made by the EU side and in 
particular to the suggestion to focus activities on assistance with SPS standards and food safety 
(European Commission, 2004, p. 45). The NIP 2005-2006 itself refers on a side note to supporting 
better enforcement of inter alia food quality and SPS standards as part of the governance capacity 
building priority (European Commission, 2004, p. 18).  
The 2007-2013 China Country Strategy Paper focused on continuity. The EUCTP project was 
highlighted as the project to implement trade cooperation. Notably, the relevant areas of activity 
are termed “agriculture and agro-food” and “technical barriers to trade/sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures”. Hence, the EU Commission expresses a clear market access focus for the EUCTP. In a 
similar vein, the dialogue established between DG SANCO and AQSIQ is reduced to product 
safety only, ignoring its food safety dimension. Accordingly, the 2007-2010 NIP makes no remark 
on food safety or SPS topics, but stressed the importance of EUCTP for opening China’s market for 
imports in general (European Commission, p. 12). 
This strong market access focus is reflected in the Commission’s Communication on China. SPS 
issues appear explicitly in the update on the EU Commission’s Communication on China in 2003, 
                                                          
90 For example, the problem of water pollution is mentioned but no reference to food safety implications is 
made (European Commission, 2002a, p. 16). 
91 On an assessment of NID see Snyder (2009, p. 512). 
Analysis:  
Supply safety and market access as motivation for EU’s activities 
 
152 
where disputes on food safety issues are mentioned that pose market access barriers (European 
Commission, 2003). This is in contrast to the original Communication from 2001, where no such 
reference is made (European Commission, 2001). The 2006 Communication on China followed 
this trend. It first stressed the strong will to solve “trade irritants” with China to achieve market 
access. Import safety is portrayed as a beneficial result of such efforts: “This will also help to 
ensure compliance of Chinese imports with EU standards for food and non-food products” 
(European Commission, 2006a, pp. 7–8). 
5.4.1.3 Market access as initially dominant focus 
The joint statement of the 5h EU-China Summit in 2002 refers to “recent food and consumer 
safety problems” which both sides wish to resolve “to open the way for more fruitful co-operation 
on sanitary and phytosanitary issues” (European Council, 2002). While the document does not 
disclose the specific food safety issues, the historic circumstances suggest that the document refers 
to the EU’s BSE crisis. This, in turn, suggests a market access motivation as BSE caused export 
problems for the EU. A document listing the “Highlights of the EU-China Agreement on WTO” 
from 2003 point into a similar direction as it stresses the envisaged market access for specific EU 
food products (namely rape-seed oil, dairy products, pasta, wine and olives) (DG TRADE, 2003). 
While the 2003 Summit statement makes no reference to food topics at all, the 2004 joint 
statement of the EU-China summit addresses the issue again. It stresses that consultations between 
the two had helped to mitigate trade restrictions in the area of SPS measures (European Council, 
2004). It remains unclear, to which trade direction this statement refers precisely. In 2005, food 
safety again was raised on the summit conclusion as a market access topic. Also in July 2005, EU 
Agricultural Commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel discussed matters of agricultural trade 
facilitation with Chinese ministers of the MoA and MofCom. Additionally, a Joint Declaration was 
signed between DG AGRI and MoA to start an annual EU-China dialogue on Agriculture in 2005 
(European External Action Service, 2012; European Commission, 2005b). It established exchanges 
on agriculture policies and laws, agricultural production and trade, agricultural technologies, and 
quality policies (including geographical indicators and organic production) (Snyder, 2009, pp. 795–
796).92 It was a major step, as exchanges on food safety topics had been complicated during this 
period (pre-interview 4). Geographical indicators93 mark a clear market access motivation, since 
the concept is about protecting products associated with a specific region against competition from 
other geographical origins. The fact that an expert representing the EU Commission in China at 
the time recalls geographical indicators as a major topic, additionally highlights the dominance of 
                                                          
92 See also EUCTP (2011c). These topics prevailed over time, see respective comment in EUCTP (2011d). 
93 DG Trade defines geographical indicators as “a distinctive sign used to identify a product as originating in 
the territory of a particular country, region or locality where its quality, reputation or other characteristic is 
linked to its geographical origin” (DG TRADE, 2013). They have been established to protect products, 
traditionally deriving from specific locations (e.g. parma ham, champagner). 
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market access topics (pre-interview 4). The first meeting of the dialogue was in November 2006 
(European Commission, 2007b).  
Meetings of the EU-China Economic and Trade Joint Committee provide a similar picture with 
occasional discussion of food safety, agriculture and SPS issues with a market access connotation.94 
During the 17th Joint Committee in January 2002, during the discussion between EU Trade 
Commissioner Pascal Lamy and China’s Minister for Trade and Co-operation Shi Guangsheng, 
food and agriculture were not a topic (European Commission, 2002b). On the 20th Meeting of the 
China-EU Mixed Committee on Trade and Economic Cooperation in November 2005 held in 
Brussel, agricultural and SPS-issues were on the agenda (Ministry of Commerce, 2008). The 
European Commission’s press release dominant focus on market access issues in general suggests 
that both topics also have been discussed under this overarching theme (European Commission, 
2005d).  
The market access aspect gained further momentum in 2006 and 2007. During a speech in Beijing 
in June 2006, Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson specifically criticized “unjustified sanitary 
barriers in agricultural trade” (Mandelson, 2006). A comprehensive study conducted on behalf of 
the EU Commission in 2006 and published in 2007 which assessed market opportunities for EU 
businesses in China backed his claim. For agriculture specifically, the study argues that SPS issues 
with China hinder trade (DG TRADE, 2007b). In total, the authors calculated a loss of 20 billion 
Euro in trade opportunities every year for the EU in EU-China trade because of market access 
barriers.  
Internally, the EU Commission started a process of coordinating a strategy on the problem of SPS 
market barriers for EU food and agricultural exports to China. In July 2006, DG TRADE, DG AGRI 
and DG SANCO organized an SPS export China workshop. A documentation of the workshops 
conclusions details the approach how to achieve the reduction of SPS-based trade barriers. The 
paper lists priority actions to achieve better market access, which shows the EU’s issues with 
China’s food safety regulation from a market access perspective at the time. Firstly, the paper 
proposes regulatory cooperation and technical assistance: change to risk-based SPS measures, 
adhere to international standards, engage in independent risk assessment, and provide technical 
assistance. Notably, the list includes the aim to improve coordination of food safety controls in 
China and information sharing between responsible Chinese ministries. The documented 
justification for this points to supply safety interests. Secondly, it was envisaged to negotiate SPS 
protocols, export certificates and to lift import bans. Lastly, business operators shall be supported 
with promotional support and export advice (DG TRADE, 2006b). Following the workshop, the 
EU Commission asked for member state contribution to this topic. It suggested setting up three 
working groups – indicating the main market access issues: fruit and vegetables, bovine meat and 
                                                          
94 Not all Joint Committee Statements were available for the full period. 
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other animal products, and dairy (DG TRADE, 2006e). Finally, as a result of the communication 
between EU Commission and member states, technical working groups under the framework of 
Market Access Advisory Committee were established in 2007. They covered two areas: (a) 
horizontal issues, affecting all types of EU food exports, explicitly including the “bans related to 
BSE”; and (b) specific phytosanitary issue, especially dealing with member states interest to export 
kiwi fruit, apples and pears to China. The consultations furthermore revealed that member states 
were competing over market access of pork products to China, which is why this field was taken 
out of joint activities. The technical working groups prepared arguments for the EU delegation in 
Beijing (DG TRADE, 2006c).  
The establishment of these technical working group for improved market access of food products 
was inspired by a large conference on trade with China, held in July 2006 and organised by DG 
TRADE which made market access to China a strategic priority (DG TRADE, 2006b). Notably, the 
conference puts the relevance of food and agricultural exports to China for the EU into 
perspective. While the conference highlighted EU’s overall interest in improving access to the 
Chinese market for a wide array of business sectors, none of the 10 working groups dealt with 
food or agricultural topics (DG TRADE, 2006d). Nevertheless, a comprehensive study into the 
“Future Opportunities and Challenges in EU-China Trade and Investment Relations 2006-2010” 
which followed the conference, includes a detailed section on agriculture exports. According to 
the report, the loss due to market access barriers for agri-products accounts for 750,602,000 US 
dollars per year (based on figures from 2004) – 2,75 per cent of the total estimated loss calculated 
across all sectors.95 The report states SPS-regulations by China as a major factor preventing 
agriculture exports (Fischer et al., 2007, p. 29). It details the specific hindering SPS measures as 
(Fischer et al., 2007, p. 29)  
 zero tolerance for pathogens, 
 tightened import policy with regard to BSE, 
 non-application of risk analysis to import restrictions, 
 standard on the upper limit on higher alcohols in spirits (so-called fusel oils), 
 overly restrictive food additive standards, 
 and arbitrary maximum residue land certificate regulation for cereals. 
Accordingly, the authors recommend to “[n]egotiate timely removal of SPS measures and provide 
better access to information on SPS measures […]” (DG TRADE, 2007c, p. 21).  
                                                          
95 The total sum was estimated to be 25,645,993,000 USD (DG TRADE, 2007b, p. 13). 
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The 22nd Joint Committee held in June 2007 brought up China’s interest that the ban on Chinese 
poultry meat to the EU shall be lifted (European Commission, 2007a). During the same meeting, 
the EU brought up its substantial overall trade deficit with China (DG TRADE, 2007a). During the 
23rd EU-China Joint Committee on 25 September 2008 in Beijing, SPS issues were discussed more 
specifically. The two sides agreed to improve mutual information about SPS problems and increase 
discussion to conclude SPS protocols for kiwi fruits, pear, citrus, apples and pork – reflecting a 
strong market access agenda, as these products were destined to be exported to China (see above 
mentioned internal discussion of these products) (European Commission, 2008a). China 
additionally welcomed that the EU lifted the ban on Chinese poultry meat exports. This 
information indicates that both sides perceived SPS issues through their export interest lenses 
(European Commission, 2008b). 
5.4.1.4 Increasing importance of supply safety considerations 
In 2002, a Joint Technical Group was already established between the EU Commission and the 
Chinese government to deal with regulatory questions with regard to food safety and SPS issues 
(European External Action Service, 2012). While no further information is available on the 
specific activities, the upgrading to the sectoral dialogue with the 2006 MoU covering product and 
food safety, signed between DG SANCO and AQSIQ in January 2006, indicates that the working 
group was considered insufficient and intensified exchange was needed (DG SANTE, 2008; 
European Commission, 2005a). It initiated an annual dialogue (under the name of “EU-China Food 
and Consumer Goods Safety Joint Committee”) on food safety – explicitly mentioned as part of 
product safety –, which “specifically seeks to support Chinese authorities in their efforts to ensure 
product safety, particularly for consumer goods exported to the EU” (Delegation of the European 
Union to China, n.d.). Thus, there was a change towards a supply safety focus. The text of the 
MoU stresses the establishment of communication mechanisms for timely notification, which 
furthermore underscores a motivation which is more driven by a supply safety issue rather than a 
market access interest, since the latter is a mid- to long-term issue that does not require urgent 
action. In a memo issued on the occasion of the signature, the EU Commission describes the MoU 
“[as] a voluntary agreement between legislators on food and non-food product safety, which aims 
to promote common interests and enhance the safety of products traded between the regions. It 
provides the basis for the establishment of a consultation and cooperation mechanism, which will 
help in reaching solutions to any trade problems and in forging a common view on safety 
standards” (European Commission, 2005a). With respect to the food safety part, the memo 
specifies: “The aim of the Memorandum of Understanding is to generate reciprocal confidence and 
trust when it comes to trade in these products, through improved contact between the EU and 
Chinese authorities. Among the measures foreseen in the agreement are the timely notification of 
relevant information concerning agricultural or food products (particularly when there are 
problems), the establishment of SPS communication and consultation channels, the exchange of 
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information on SPS issues, and regular meetings between EU health and consumer protection 
officials and those of AQSIQ when necessary” (European Commission, 2005a). The External 
Action Service of the EU Commission describes this double-purpose and task of the food safety 
dialogue as follows: “Co-operation between China and the EC in this field can bring benefits to 
consumers both in the EU and China, and facilitate trade in agricultural goods” (emphasis in the 
original) (European External Action Service, 2012).  
The dialogue on agriculture, the EU-China Trade Dialogue96 and the exchange in the EU-China 
Food and Consumer Goods Safety Joint Committee were separate but often linked with each other 
(Snyder, 2009, p. 795). Thus, ever since 2006, regular annual dialogues have been held between 
DG SANCO/SANTE, AQSIQ, MoA, MoH/NHFPC on agriculture, food safety and SPS issues 
(EUCTP, 2012f). 
Overall, more emphasis was put on supply safety after the MoU in 2006. The joint statement of the 
9th EU-China Summit in 2006 still interprets the newly established EU-China food safety dialogue 
as a tool serving the objective to facilitate bilateral trade (European Council, 2006). This clearly 
formulated market access motivation, however, becomes less clear in the following developments. 
To start with, the Joint Statement of the 9th EU-China Summit in 2006 additionally mentions a hot 
safety issue that features strongly in this phase, namely avian influenza. Clearly, the issue is raised 
from a consumer safety and thus supply safety perspective. This is supported by the fact that 3 out 
of the 14 FVO audits in this phase dealt with avian influenza (see Table 12 and the discussion in 
5.4.2.1). Likewise, in January 2006, the EU, China and World Bank jointly hosted an international 
pledging conference on avian influence in Beijing (European Commission, 2006b). 
The joint press statement of the 2007 summit furthermore underscores that both partners were to 
“enhance cooperation and exchanges in areas of food sanitation and safety, and health personnel 
training.” As this point is made within the paragraph on health issues and avian influenza, it 
indicates a stronger safety motivation. Whether it is China’s intrinsic interest or an EU’s supply 
safety interest, cannot be determined. Generally, the document suggests an increasing sense for 
supply safety. Cooperation in the agricultural sector is stressed to ensure safety of agricultural 
products and the dialogue on product safety is explicitly mentioned with reference to trade 
(European Council, 2007). 
The High-level International Food Safety Forum in November 2007 (see 5.2.1.2) marks a 
noteworthy moment in EU-China relations on food safety, as it sheds a light on the underlying 
tensions and dissatisfaction with unsafe imports from China.97 On the forum, DG TRADE 
                                                          
96 The annual Trade Policy Dialogue (now Trade and Investment Policy Dialogue) had been initiated by DG 
TRADE and MofCom in May 2004 (Snyder, 2009, p. 787). 
97 I received this hint during a conversation with the organiser of the CIFSQC at the 2015 Global Food 
Safety Forum in Kuala Lumpur. 
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commissioner Peter Mandelson held a speech in which he – for the first time – stressed the issue 
of import safety of food and consumer products prominently: “During the summer some Chinese 
officials pointed out that less than 1% of China's exports to Europe had alleged health risks. But 
Europe imports half a billion Euro worth of goods from China every day - so even 1% is not 
acceptable.” Reportedly, this remark was seen as a provocation by the participating Chinese Vice 
Minister Wu Yi, who left the conference as a response. She later told reporters “I am very 
dissatisfied with Peter Mandelson's speech” (Spiegel Online, 2007).  
An incident reported by an interviewee further underlines the increased tensions on supply safety 
topics between the EU and China around that time. He reports about a meeting of the FVO with 
the Chinese in 2007, which “was [on] avian influenza and a lot of things on the agenda” (interview 
25). The meeting was a follow-up to the 2006 FVO poultry meat and avian influenza audit. At the 
end of the meeting, the Chinese side did not accept the FVO conclusions. In the view of the head 
of the EU’s delegation in this meeting, the Chinese “totally destroyed what we did for two days” 
(interview 25). Generally, to his experience, the discussions of FVO with Chinese were “always 
very, very tough” (interview 25). 
This observed tendency towards more supply safety sensitivity, is put into context by the 
reflection of an interviewee who was responsible staff from the EU side during that period and 
who qualifies the EU’s perception in those years. He stated that while the EU was aware that 
“there were enough problems” with Chinese food safety, but the EU felt relatively safe due to the 
RASFF: “The rapid alert system allows DG SANCO to have a very good idea where food safety 
issues are. So, focussing on food safety issues in China at that juncture was very much in response 
to the number of rapid alerts there were” (interview 3). As Figure 13 shows, there were three 
years of sharp increase of RASFF notifications from China, namely 2005 (plus 53 per cent), 2007 
(plus 34 per cent) and 2008 (plus 42 per cent). The 2007 RASFF report included a special country 
report on China (European Commission, 2008c). This unusual focus on a specific country in the 
annual report indicates the extent to which EU officials were alerted by (potential) unsafe food 
imports from China. From 2002 until 2012, never before or after, a country had been specifically 
highlighted in the RASFF annual reporting. The “country report” sets out by pointing out the 
exceptional amount of RASFF notifications for China. It goes on by listing in detail the different 
types of problems with food imports from China: residues of veterinary medicinal products, illegal 
imports, mycotoxins, food contact material, food additives and other problems (including the 
detection of melamine in rice) (European Commission, 2008c, pp. 41–42). Therefore, if the 
interviewee’s judgement is correct, the rising number of RASFF notifications after 2005 support 
the analysis and explain why supply safety issues gained importance. 
The increasing relevance of supply safety does not imply a reduced importance of trade and 
market access, quite to the contrary. The same year, the EU Commission and the Chinese 
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Government gave exchanges on trade topics another boost by establishing an additional channel 
for communication. The High Level Economic and Trade Mechanism (HLM) was proposed by the 
Chinese and it deals with short as well as long-term issues in EU-China trade, investment and 
economic cooperation (DG TRADE, 2008b). Still, the HLM included consumer protection topics. 
The Commissioner for Consumer Protection was one out of the eight participating EU 
commissioners participating in the inaugural meeting. Accordingly, an official EU document on 
this meeting includes as section on improving consumer product safety (DG TRADE, 2008a). 
5.4.1.5 Implications of the melamine crisis 
In September 2008, the EU Commission became aware of the melamine crisis unfolding since July 
in China and discussed counter measures internally. Since milk and milk product imports from 
China had never been allowed, the EU was safeguarded against the worst possible consequences. 
Additional measures, like increased border controls were set up as an immediate reaction. 
However, the discussion between the EU Commission and member states showed that bans could 
not ensure, that melamine-tainted remained absent from the EU market (DG SANCO, 2008c).98 
Shortly afterwards, in November 2008, the MoU between DG SANCO and AQSIQ was reaffirmed 
and extended (DG SANTE, 2008). In comparison to the 2006 MoU it specifies the organisation of 
the collaboration (e.g. frequency of meetings to be held). In addition, the renewed MoU adds 
“cooperation instruments” on two topics: First, the “Arrangement for the cooperation on joint 
prevention of illegal action in the import and export of food”. Secondly, the “Cooperation 
Mechanism between both sides to improve the means of information concerning notifications of 
the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed” (DG SANCO, 2008a). In a statement addressed to 
AQSIQ, DG SANCO commits itself to provide AQSIQ with an access to the RASFF online portal. 
Through this portal, the EU provides the Chinese side with all available information on cases of 
RASFF notifications that affect Chinese food products (DG SANCO, 2008b). Both additional 
aspects of the 2008 MoU imply an EU motivation of import safety. The first, tackling illegal 
exports and imports, can be seen as more relevant for the EU as illegal exports and imports were 
more a phenomenon in China (with illegal exports being an import safety issue). The reference to 
the RASFF of the second aspect, more directly points to the EU’s wish to tackle unsafe food 
imports from China. The plan was to extend RASFF to China (Alemanno, 2009, p. 184). However, 
the implementation never went beyond China’s access to EU’s notification. It seems reasonable to 
assume that these amendments in the cooperation with China were at least partly triggered by the 
melamine crisis. As a further indication to support this assessment, a media article about the 
updated MoU as of November 2008 may reflect the situation at the time well. It points to the need 
to increase efforts, because “[a] previous memorandum of understanding was signed in 2006; 
however, safety has been a recurring topic, notably recently in the contamination of milk with the 
industrial chemical melamine” (anonymous, 2008). 
                                                          
98 Thereby reaffirming the general argument, that bans alone are an insufficient protection.  
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In November 2008 as well, a High-Level Consumer Product Safety Trilateral Summit was held in 
Brussels summoning EU, US and China representatives to discuss safety of traded products. The 
three trading partners signed a revised MoU on product and food safety. The joint press statement 
laid out general agreements, especially with regard to improving traceability. No explicit reference 
to food safety is made (European Commission, 2008e). On the second EU-China HETD meeting in 
May 2009, EU Commissioner for Consumer Protection, Meglena Kuneva, and EU Commissioner 
for Agriculture and Rural Development, Mariann Fischer Boel, both participated. The topic of 
product safety was discussed from a supply safety and a market access perspective. A supply safety 
perspective is indicated by the announcement that both sides see the responsibility for safety 
primarily with the businesses involved and furthermore that the initial statement stresses “the 
importance of enhancing consumer product safety through close collaboration” (DG TRADE, 
2009). The paragraph in the EU’s official memo on the meeting ends with mentioning that “the 
close collaboration also helps the two sides act more focused and diminishes the risk of hindering 
access to markets” (DG TRADE, 2009). Both remarks have been made with reference to product 
safety in general, indicating that food safety was not a specifically important topic during the 
meeting. This two-sided formulation of the issue has been replicated in the joint statement of the 
12th EU-China Summit half a year later, in November 2009, which stresses the need to “further 
strengthen” cooperation in SPS matters in order to improve consumer protection and facilitate 
trade (European Council, 2009). 
5.4.1.6 Effects of Food Safety Law on EU Commission’s motivation 
In the meantime, in February 2009, the FSL had been issued and changed the state of China’s food 
safety regulation considerably (see 3.3.2). Besides the general improvements on the rule level, the 
FSL also particularly integrated EU approaches to food safety regulation. Pei et al. portraits the 
Chinese food safety regulatory reforms as modelled on the EU regulatory framework (2011). As 
one interviewee stressed, the FSL is “full of European language” and introduced principles of 
European legislation, notably the responsibility of the private sector to ensure the safety of food 
(interview 3). Another interviewee seconds this judgement on the FSL by saying: “[…] the rules 
were quite good and quite close to the European rules” (interview 1). Other interviewees, from EU 
as well as Chinese side, have confirmed the impression that in general the Chinese government 
had a tendency to follow EU food safety approaches (interview 1, 2, 19 and 20). It fits into this 
picture that the EUCTP was involved in supporting China in implementing the FSL (as will be 
discussed in more detail below).99  
The FSL fulfilled the EU Commission’s wishes with regard to increased food safety and with this 
market access returned as the prime motivation for action. Until the end of 2014, food safety or 
agricultural topics only appeared three times again in high level consultations – that is Summits, 
HETD or Joint Committee meetings. Firstly, the joint declaration of the 15th EU-China Summit in 
                                                          
99 There also are US influences in the FSL, as other experts pointed out (interview 15 and Dionisi, 2015) 
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September 2012 made a reference to further strengthen geographical indicators. This seems to be 
related to the fact that the “10plus10” programme, which promoted the joint acceptance of 
geographical indicators, ended the same year (for details on the programme see 5.4.2.3.3). 
Likewise, market access oriented, the joint statement of this summit stresses the need to fight 
counterfeiting of alcoholic beverages. Secondly, the 16th EU-China Summit in 2013 led to the 
conclusion of the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, a milestone in EU-China’s 
bilateral cooperation. Food safety appears in the document agreed upon between both countries. It 
states: “With regard to food safety, intensify cooperation with the objective to protect consumer 
health, recognising the importance of food safety as a key element for consumer health, sound 
food markets, economic development and social welfare, highlighting the continuous and already 
fruitful cooperation between the EU and China on food safety, and underlining that risk analysis 
should form the foundation of any food safety policy, laws and regulations” (European 
Commission, 2013a, p. 8). Furthermore, the agenda envisaged food and agriculture as one of the 
foci of joint research (European Commission, 2013a, p. 8, interview 30). An interviewee pointed 
out that the specific mentioning of “risk analysis” in the joint strategy had been an important 
success of the EU and DG SANTE especially (interview 2). Thirdly, in 2012, DG AGRI and MoA 
signed a new cooperation plan on agriculture and rural development, extending the agricultural 
dialogue of 2005. The EU press release on this occasion makes a short reference to food safety 
without further explanation (European Commission, 2012b). However, both the strategic agenda 
and the new cooperation plan on agriculture and development point to a new mutual 
understanding. Explicitly, both formulate the plan to joint research, indicating cooperation on a 
playing level field. Specifically, the EU and China started the Research Innovation Cooperation in 
Food, Agriculture and Biotechnology (FAB) (DG AGRI, 2013a). The letter of intent was signed 
during the 16th Summit, on 21 November 2013, in Brussels between the four European 
Commissioners responsible for Agriculture and Rural Development, Research, Innovation and 
Science, Health, and the Environment and the president of the Chinese Academy for Agricultural 
Sciences (CAAS). FAB is financed from the EU side under the Framework Programme for 
Research and Innovation, HORIZON 2020 and goes back to an agreement of both parties in 2011 
(European Commission, 2013b). Agriculture and food had been defined as two out of five priority 
areas for cooperation in research and development (Geoghegan-Quinn, 2011, p. 11).  
The objective of FAB is to conduct joint research in “an ambitious strategic long-term partnership” 
(DG AGRI, 2013b). Food safety is one of the topics of the programme, which however puts more 
emphasis on agriculture techniques and topics like “green economy” (European Commission, 
2013c). FAB marks a development in EU-China relations in the food safety area, as it operates on a 
level-playing field. It is not about knowledge provided by the EU for China’s development but 
rather finding areas for joint research which are beneficial for both sides. The Joint Report of EU 
and Chinese Experts which put forward the FAB’s framework, decisively mentions both 
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objectives: protecting EU consumers from Chinese unsafe food imports and improving trade of 
food products for both sides (European Commission, 2013c, p. 34). FAB reflects a changing 
relationship between EU and China in food topics. Interviewees stressed specifically that by 2014 
experts from both sides have met each other more on eye level than they did previously 
(interview 17, 18, 19 and 21). 
The EU kept the issue of market access for food products on the agenda. The continued interest in 
market access for European food products is reflected in two promotional trips of agricultural EU 
Commissioners, of Mariann Fischer Boel with her “Tasty Europe Tour” in 2009 and Dacial Cioloș 
visit in 2011 (European Commission, 2009; European Commission, 2011). The same year, the EU 
Commission put additional market access pressure on China by issuing a communication within 
the WTO Committee on SPS measures. In the document, it reminded China of several areas in 
which the country was not yet compliant with WTO rules. Those areas were food additives and 
aids, beef and BSE, and live pigs (Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 2011).  
Internally, the EU Commission defined expanding export of bovine products as a priority. Already 
mentioned in 2006 it remained high on the agenda (DG TRADE, 2006b, interview 1, 2 and 31). 
Accordingly, in 2010, the EU pushed the issue of meat exports to China by making an agreement 
with AQSIQ and MoA to promote the understanding of BSE among Chinese food safety 
regulators. China kept blocking imports of bovine products from the EU on the grounds of the BSE 
outbreak in the 1990s and was little willing to change this stance (interview 2). The EU had to 
convince the Chinese side to work on this topic. An EU expert recalls that Chinese authorities 
were “less enthusiastic to participate, to be part of training or cooperation activities because there 
was clearly a political dimension in this ban” (interview 2). Another EU expert reflects that 
specifically in 2011 and 2013 there was a strong pressure from the EU side to make progress on 
this market access topic: “We had a huge pressure from the EU who wanted more. To make every 
possible action to move in the direction that China will lift the ban for beef products from the EU” 
(interview 1). The prevailing focus on market access is furthermore reflected in statements made 
by a DG SANCO representative in 2015, who argued that that the EU should continue to 
cooperate with China on food safety related matters because this would bring the Chinese 
regulation more in line with the EU system which is necessary to facilitate trade. He explicitly 
argued that, if the EU would not involve with China and ensure that China follows EU’s 
suggestions, other nations would do so. China’s food safety regulation would deviate more strongly 
from EU’s approach which would hinder trade (Dionisi, 2015). 
5.4.2 Activities to influence China’s food safety regulation 
Next to the dialogue between the EU Commission and the Chinese government, the actual 
activities conducted by the EU Commission in or in relationship with China reveal the 
motivations behind. As introduced in section 3.1, EU Commission’s activities take different forms 
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when it comes to import safety. I analyse each in turn. First, I review FVO activities. Secondly, I 
address the BTSF programme. Lastly, and most importantly I discuss the EUCTP as a China-
specific large scale and long-term project.  
5.4.2.1 FVO audits 
In the period from 2004 until 2014, the FVO had planned 96 audits for China. Of all so called 
“other third countries”, excluding countries of the European Free Trade Association and EU 
applicant countries, China is the country for which the most audits had been planned. In 11 of the 
21 working plans issued during this period, China was the country with the most planned for 
audits with a total of 96 (see Table 12). The number of actually conducted audits is lower. Over 
the 11 years, the FVO implemented 46 audits. However, one has to take into account that some of 
the 96 planned audits were repetitions due to the fact that previously planned audits had not been 
conducted. The gap between these two figures thus looks bigger than it is de facto. While the data 
is not conclusive on this question, nevertheless, the number of planned audits remains higher than 
the number of conducted audits. If a repetition is understood as a situation in which the same 
topic is mentioned in two successive plans and in the meantime no audit on this topic has been 
conducted, 39 repetitions can be counted. 
14 FVO audits were conducted until the release of the FSL, unevenly distributed with four each in 
2001 and 2006. Until 2005, only one of the audits concluded that China was (partly) compliant 
with EU requirements. From 2006 until the end of 2008, in contrast, five audits only required 
minor changes by the Chinese side and two declared the situation unsatisfactory (see Table 12). 
The number of audits increased strongly for the time after the FSL to a total of 31. Most of them 
were conducted in two years, namely 2009 (9) and 2013 (11). While overall the results of the FVO 
audits improved, still 8 ended with the assessment that China had failed to meet the criteria and 
another 6 were still not seen fully in line with EU requirements. In 16 cases, minor changes were 
requested and in one case no further amendments were needed. Furthermore, there is no clear 
tendency that the assessments became more positive from 2009 until 2014. 
The FVO reports which conclude with a need for improvement of China’s food safety regulation 
mainly criticize insufficient implementation and a lack of enforcement. In four cases, FVO also 
found inadequate rules (see Table 12).  
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Table 12: Overview and assessment FVO audits 2001-2014 
No Year Month Topic Result* Reason** 
1 2001 May Aflatoxin in peanuts -1 i 
2 2001 June Pine Wood Nematode 1  
3 2001 October-November Avian influenza -1 
i/e 
4 2001 November Residues in live animals and animal products -2 e 
5 2003 September Control of residues in live animals and animal products -2 
r/i 
6 2004 October-November Avian Influenza, Poultry & Rabbit Meat -2 
r/i 
7 2005 February-March Fishery and Aquaculture products -1 
e 
8 2006 February Poultry meat and avian influenza -1 i 
9 2006 March 
Control of residues and contaminants in live animals 
and animal products, including controls on 
veterinary medicinal products 
-1 
i 
10 2006 October Poultry meat products 1  
11 2006 November Aflatoxin in peanuts 1  
12 2007 April Food Contact Materials  1  
13 2007 November-December Feed hygiene in additives and premixtures 1 
 
14 2008 November-December GMO - Controls 1 
 
15 2009 February Plant Health - Anoplophora chinensis -1 i/e 
   and EU requirements for wood packaging material 1 
 
16 2009 February-March Food irradiation facilities -2 
i 
17 2009 March Pet food of animal origin 1  
18 2009 May Fishery Products -2 i/e 
19 2009 September Bivalve molluscs -2 i/e 
20 2009 September Food Contact Materials -2 i/e 
21 2009 October-November 
Control of residues and contaminants in live animals 
and animal products, including controls on 
veterinary medicinal products 
1 
 
22 2009 October-November Public Health - Rabbit Meat 1 
 
23 2010 January-February Animal health - equidae for export to EU 1 
 
24 2010 September Plant Health - Anoplophora chinensis -2 r/i 
25 2011 March-April 
Genetically modified organisms in respect of seed, 
food and feed intended for export to the EU 1 
 
26 2011 September aflatoxin contamination in peanuts 1  
27 2011 October-November Poultry meat products -1 
i/e 
28 2011 October-November 
Animal health - poultry meat products for export to 
EU - controls -2 
i/e 
29 2012 February-March export controls - anoplophora chinensis 1 
 
30 2012 September Pesticides 1  
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31 2012 October Animal health - aquaculture animals for export to EU -2 r/i 
32 2013 June Wood packaging material -1 i 
33 2013 October organic production standards and control measures applied by a recognised Control Body in China 1 
 
34 2013 October organic production standards and control measures applied by a recognised Control Body in China 1 
 
35 2013 October microbiological contamination in seeds for human consumption -2 
i/e 
36 2013 October organic production standards and control measures applied by a recognised Control Body in China 1 
 
37 2013 October Pesticides -1 i/e 
38 2013 October Microbiological contamination in soft fruit intended for export to the European Union -1 
i 
39 2013 November Fishery products 1  
40 2013 November 
evaluate the control of residues and contaminants in 
live animals and animal products including controls 
on veterinary medicinal products 
1 
 
41 2013 November Public Health - Casings and Rabbit Meat 1  
42 2013 November Bivalve molluscs intended for export to the European Union -1 
i/e 
43 2014 June evaluate the implementation of requirements for feed additives and premixtures 1 
 
44 2014 September Microbiological contamination in seeds for human consumption 2 
 
*The FVO reports conclusion has been transferred in to an ordinal scale, with -2 being the most negative and 2 being the 
most positive audit result. In detail, -2 was given, when China has failed to pass the audit; -1 was given, when China 
passed but fundamental improvements were requested; 1 was given when minor improvements were requested and 2 
was given, when no further requests were stated in the audit conclusions. 
** This column specifies which dimension of regulation is seen as insufficient by the FVO and let to the overall 
assessment – with r=rules (incl. organisational setup), i=implementation (incl. coordination), e=enforcement. The term 
implementation refers to a situation in which not even the procedures for controls are in place (or laboratories are 
criticized by the FVO for not having an implementation plan). Enforcement refers to a situation in which the 
implementation is not executed thoroughly. 
(Source: own, based on FVO audit reports) 
5.4.2.2 BTSF  
Chinese delegates participated in BTSF workshops throughout the whole period (see Table 13). In 
addition, China hosted six BTSF workshops or missions. Hosting a workshop indicates a stronger 
interest in the specific topic, as more participants from the hosting country can participate. 
Participant figures for 2013 and 2014 confirm this. Out of a total of 65 Chinese participants in 
BTSF workshops 55 alone participated in the BTSF World workshop on Food safety and Plant 
Health held in China.100 Taking this factor into account, there is a considerable difference in 
participation before and after the FSL. In 2011 and 2012 Chinese participation in BTSF is 
especially high. Delegates joined five workshops in 2011 and 2012. Furthermore, China hosted 
three BTSF workshops in 2011 and in total three BTSF missions were conducted in China in 2009 
                                                          
100 Information provided on request by the Consumers, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive Agency of 
the EU Commission (CHAFEA) via email on 12.11.2016. 
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and 2011.101 The first BTSF workshop held in China corresponds with the following decision to 
open RASFF to Chinese authorities and the Chinese plan to develop a similar system (Alemanno, 
2009, p. 184). As DG SANTE claims, it had been a direct result of the MoU with AQSIQ and was a 
measure to increase import safety from China (European Commission, 2007d). 
An interviewee mentioned one BTSF project with China as specifically relevant (interviewee 25). 
Partly as an answer to the complicated discussions with Chinese officials about FVO audit results, 
DG SANCO initiated the Sino-European Food Safety Cooperation Forum in the EU pavilion of the 
Shanghai Expo in 2010 (interview 25, AQSIQ, 2010). The Forum was financed with BTSF funds 
and is listed under the EU food standards section in the BTSF’s 2010 annual report. The Forum 
primarily served supply safety purposes, by showing and explaining EU food safety regulation 
(DG SANCO, 2011). One of the experts involved in developing the programme explained: “The 
core element right there and the idea was to explain our rules and to explain them how to have a 
better understanding of our legislation and to export in a better condition and maybe for some 
commodities that they don’t export until now” (interview 25). 
  
                                                          
101 Figures based on examination of all Better Training for Safety Food annual reports 2006-2013. 
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Table 13: China participation in BTSF 2006-2014 
Year Chinese delegates Workshop hosted by China 
2006  Welfare standards concerning the stunning and 
killing of animals in slaughterhouse and disease 
control situations 
 
2007  Welfare standards concerning the stunning and 
killing of animals in slaughterhouse and disease 
control situations  
 EU food standards (for fishery and aquaculture 
products; residues and contaminants in fruit, 
vegetables, nuts, herbs and spices; food contact 
material) 
 Training on the EU RASFF 
and the possible 
introduction of a similar 
system in other regions of 
the world 
2008  EU food standards 
 Highly pathogenic avian influenza control 
 
2009   2009: Avian Influenza 
mission to China with 
Chinese participants 
2010  Prevention, control and eradication of 
transmissible spongiform encephalopathies 
 Sino-European Food Safety 
Cooperation Forum 
2011  Quality schemes: organic farming and 
geographical indications  
 Food testing  
 Analysis of genetically modiﬁed organisms 
 Mission: Animal disease 
control (food mouth disease) 
 EU food rules (irradiation) 
2012  Food hygiene and controls 
 Feed Law 
 Quality schemes: organic farming and 
geographical indications 
 Food testing  
 Feed rules and import requirements 
 (RASFF and other EU information technology 
systems)* 
 
2013  Animal welfare 
 Feed 
 Food composition and information 
 Food hygiene 
 
2014  Audit 
 Feed 
 Food composition and information 
 Quality schemes 
 BTSF World Food safety 
and Plant Health 
* Chinese participation not made transparent, but likely since 575 participants “from all over the world” with roughly one 
quarter from Asia. 
(Source: own, based on BTSF annual reports 2006-2014 and additional information received by email from CHAFEA on 
12.11.2016) 
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5.4.2.3 EUCTP 
5.4.2.3.1 Background and setup 
The by far most intensive involvement of the EU Commission with China’s food safety regulation 
stems from the EUCTP which ran in two phases from 2004 until the end of 2015. It had been built 
on the Framework Programme for EU Support to China’s Accession to the WTO (also named 
WTO1), which ran from 1999 until 2003 and had the prime purpose to support China’s accession 
to the WTO (European Commission, 2007c, pp. 16–17). Results of WTO1 were meagre and in 
hindsight the project essentially seemed to have been the mutual preparation for a more 
sustainable succeeding project, namely EUCTP. Also, while information is not available on the 
thematic or sectoral foci, it is documented that the programme introduced the main instruments 
also applied by EUCTP (namely “research studies, seminars, study tours, internships, and 
qualification courses for specialised personnel”) (European Commission, 2007c, p. 17).  
The EUCTP is jointly financed by the European Commission and the Chinese government 
(EUCTP, 2009, p. 1). Its overall direction, its project plans and budget, is determined by a Project 
Steering Committee which meets once per year. It is jointly chaired by the Chinese Ministry of 
Commercial Affairs and the European Delegation, the two organisations formally responsible for 
the EUCTP. Each activity of the EUCTP is a result of an agreement between the EU and Chinese 
side of the project (interview 3 and 32). This procedure makes the list of all activities a consensus 
between both sides. Projects are designed, managed and implemented by a technical assistance 
team which is based in Beijing. A non-permanent Project Support Team assists with the 
implementation. It consists of experts outside of the EUCTP, e.g. representatives of stakeholders, 
academics, etc. The Technical Assistance Team reports to a Project Task Force which consists of 
MofCom staff (see Figure 15).  
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Figure 15: EUCTP structure, consultation and approval pathway 
 
(Source: EUCTP, 2013a, p. 12) 
EUCTP I ran a total of six years, from 2004 until 2009 with a budget of 20.6 million Euro for 
EUCTP I (2009; EUCTP, 2009, p. 1). It consisted of six components: Customs & Import/Export 
Regulations, Agriculture, Agri-Food & SPS, Technical Barriers to Trade and Standardisation, Trade 
in Services, Legislative and Legal Aspects of Domestic Implementation, Transparency, Co-
operation & Policy Develop (EUCTP, 2009). Starting in the end of 2010, a second EUCTP project 
(EUCTP II) was set up for the period 2010 to 2015.102 The budget increased to 25 million Euro. For 
this period, information is available on the cost sharing between both partners. The European 
Commission contributed the bulk of the total budget (20 million Euro). The Chinese government 
provided the remaining 5 million Euro (EUCTP, 2013a, p. 9). EUCTP II comprised of five 
components: Services, Quality Infrastructure & Technical Barriers to Trade, Agriculture & Food 
Safety, Customs, and Cross-cutting Trade Issues. For component 3 “Agriculture & Food Safety” 
EUCTP II distinguished five technical files: animal health and welfare, biotechnology and GMO, 
food safety, geographical indications, organic agriculture and plant health (EUCTP, 2014a).  
EUCTP conducts what it calls “technical assistance activities”, mostly via studies, training 
seminars, conferences, workshops, internships and study tours to the EU for Chinese 
participants.103 The purpose of the EUCTP project was to continue and intensify the WTO1’s 
work, to “support China’s integration into the world trading system” – as the project wrote on its 
webpage (EUCTP, 2006a) – and “to assist the Chinese government with the implementation of its 
                                                          
102 Initially to be ended February 2015, then extended until December 2015. 
103 This list names the activities commonly mentioned by documents and interviewees (interview 1 and 3, 
EUCTP, 2013a, p. 11; EUCTP, 2006b). Some official documents list further activities (e.g. field trips). 
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WTO obligations, and to increase China’s capacity in the process of wider economic, regulatory, 
legal and administrative reform necessary for further trade liberalisation” – as defined by the NIP 
(European Commission, 2004). An interviewee confirms that this also was the dominant 
perspective in practice, characterizing the EUCTP as “the EU’s largest trade facilitation project” 
and stressing that although it was financed by funds designated for development aid, EUCTP was 
“not really an aid project” and was rather driven by trade interests. Interviewees likewise describe 
the initial purpose to foster EU’s connections to the Chinese government to improve market access 
to overcome trade barriers. Food safety, in fact, was not a component when the project started 
(interview 3 and – in a more general sense – interview 1). As one interviewee put it: “[W]hen I 
came into the EUCTP job, my brief was really to work on agriculture, to some extent, SPS as part 
of agricultural access but certainly there wasn’t a food safety component to the position at the 
time” (interview 3). According to this interviewee, agriculture and SPS became a topic within the 
EUCTP, because the EU was lagging behind other major agricultural trading partners in 
supporting its own exports to China. However, the EUCTP in its achievement report for the first 
phase claims to have “contributed significantly to Chinese efforts in response to the recent food 
safety crises, to enhance Food Safety and SPS measures, drawing strongly from European best 
practices” (EUCTP, 2009, p. 7). As the report was written from the perspective of the situation in 
2009, it seems to reflect the general change in perception towards supply safety outlined above in 
the review of EU-China official exchanges (see 5.4.1). Thus, a shift of focus occurred during the 
EUCTP I period. 
In the same vein, EUCTP II has been characterized as a duality of market access and supply safety 
themes with market access being the more dominant aspect. An EU expert involved with EUCTP 
II stresses this balance: “I have a direction that is more EU to China. I have more issues with a 
bigger flow of commodities or products from the EU to China. We want to get milk here, we want 
to get beef, we want to get lots of wines, from animal production systems, get them here.” He 
argues that much less food products are imported by the EU from China (interview 1). Likewise, 
the OWP, laying out the plan for the whole project period, mentions market access as the first 
focus for component 3. However, in contrast to EUCTP I, supply safety is explicitly included in 
the projects objectives: “The harmonisation of the application of SPS and the creation of SPS 
compatible domestic policies in China will increase EU food exports to China, enhance domestic, 
EU and international consumer protection and global health. In practical terms; improved trading” 
(EUCTP, 2010, p. 178). More specifically, the project states as the first strategic initiative to 
“[d]ecrease the share of Chinese non-compliant food products imported into the EU” (EUCTP, 
2010, p. 178). Representatives from DG AGRI and DG TRADE pre-dominantly expressed EU 
Commission’s interest in market access, when talking about EU-China exchanges on food safety 
regulation (interview 30 and 31). In this context, one interviewee also stressed the technical 
exchanges implemented by EUCTP as especially helpful to reduce trade barriers for the EU 
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(interview 31). According to a DG SANCO representative, the majority of his work is related to 
supply safety aspects, as it includes FVO inspection missions and RASFF notifications. However, 
when discussing EUCTP activities specifically, he mostly referred to market access topics 
(interview 2).  
5.4.2.3.2 Analysis of EUCTP activities 
In addition to the experts’ judgements, the individual assessment of the EUCTP activities provides 
additional clarity about the purpose and direction of the EUCTP food safety-related component. 
Until 2009, when the first phase of EUCTP ended, 56 activities had been conducted for 
component agriculture, agro-food & SPS (EUCTP, 2009). EUCTP II conducted 88 activities for 
component three. This represents an increase of nearly 100 per cent of the number of activities per 
year compared to EUCTP I.104 Initially, even 132 activities had been planned for EUCTP II (see 
Table 14).  
Table 14: EUCTP II agriculture and food safety related activities 
Year Working plan Planned activities Conducted activities 
2010 IPA 2 2 
2011 AWP 1 33 11 
2012 AWP 2 27 15 
2013 AWP 3 34 23 
2014 AWP 4 36 35105 
Total  132 86 
(Source: own, based on EUCTP annual working plans, AWP, 2011-2014 and EUCTP Brief Activity Reports) 
In order to include this large number of activities in my analysis, I proceeded as follows: Based on 
the activity descriptions provided in the achievement report for EUCTP I, the annual working 
plans (AWP) and the brief activity reports for EUCTP II, I assessed each activity alongside the 
distinction between market access and supply safety. In the process of this assessment, it became 
obvious that an additional distinction was necessary. The activities also need to be separated 
between those which are clearly based on the EU’s initiative and those for which this is less clear 
and we also need to assume of have specific evidence that the activity was requested by the 
Chinese side. For the latter, I use the term “pull”. Thus, I distinguish four types: market access, 
supply safety, market access pull, supply safety pull. 
                                                          
104 Statistically, EUCTP I conducted an average of 8.5 activities per year and EUCTP II conducted 17.6 
activities per year. 
105 Including activities in 2015 and 2016. 
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Following this procedure, EUCTP I conducted 26 market access activities of which 14 are clearly 
indicated as such and 22 supply safety activities of which only five are clearly indicated as such 
(eight activities could not be specified). During the course of the EUCTP I the two types of 
activities are not evenly distributed. Starting in 2007, the share of supply safety-oriented activities 
increased. The changes in the content of activities thus reflect the shift from market access to 
supply safety already discussed above. Of the 88 total activities, the majority is associated with 
supply safety. This, however, is largely based on pulled supply safety activities (37) and only nine 
supply safety activities which were clearly driven by the EU. For market access, 28 have a strong 
indication and another 11 activities rather seem to have been requested from the Chinese side. For 
three activities, the direction could not be specified (for details see appendix 8.4). I will discuss 
examples for all four types of activities to explain better the details which provide further hints to 
causal mechanisms.  
5.4.2.3.3 Activities due to EU market access interest 
A good example for a market access motivated activity with the aim to influence China’s food 
safety regulation is the study on fusel oils conducted in September 2004 (EUCTP, 2007). As an 
interviewee involved in the project explains:  
[T]here was a problem with the standard used to measure fusel oil in liquor. In spirits, 
so in European brandies and other distilled spirits there’s a component called fusel oil. 
And fusel oil actually is what all the smell and the aroma is about. But it’s a product of 
secondary fermentation and Chinese liquors don’t go through a secondary fermentation 
process so therefore they don’t have fusel oil. So, China can’t measure it or didn’t want 
to measure it and they said that it was too volatile and that it was used as a non-tariff 
barrier. So, we agreed to do a study on fusel oil and the Chinese side understood the 
problems or understood what the issues of fusel oil were. What role it played in the 
fermentation or how it was derived in the fermentation of spirits. And then we 
managed to overcome that trade barrier. (Interview 3) 
Hence, the EU side identified a specific regulatory topic which hindered EU exports to China and 
used EUCTP to address this topic with the Chinese side. The implicit assumption behind is that a 
clarification of the scientific assessment convinces the Chinese side to change their regulation in 
EU’s favour. 
Following the same logic, a whole set of EUCTP activities aimed at educating Chinese officials on 
animal diseases which occurred in the EU and led to import stops by China. Next to BSE, those are 
African swine fever106 and the Schmallenberg107 disease (see brief activity reports A458-C3, A336-
C3, A371-C3, A457-C3 at EUCTP, 2015c). In 2011, an EUCTP activity specifically taught Chinese 
                                                          
106 African swine fever is a usually fatal infectious disease of pigs for which no vaccine has existed by 2016. It 
does not affect humans (for more details see European Commission, 2016a). 
107 The Schmallenberg virus affects cattle, sheep and goats. It potentially leads to defects of unborn animals 
and may cause stillbirths. As of March 2014, no negative effects for humans had been detected (for more 
details, see Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, 2014). 
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government experts how the EU manages to contain any BSE-related problems (EUCTP, 2011e). 
BSE related activities have been still held in 2015, showing the long-term approach of the EU on 
this issue. As for African Swine Fever, although the outbreak occurred in Poland in February 2014 
in domestic pigs, China decided to block pork imports from the whole EU. Consequently, part of 
the efforts by the EU were trainings organised via EUCTP about a risk-approach, basing market 
access restrictions on separate risk assessments for different regions within the EU (interviews 1, 2 
and 31). Similarly, due to temporary trade restrictions enacted by China in 2011 because of 
Schmallenberg disease, EUCTP conducted activities to “to increase the capacity of the Chinese 
authorities in the area of risk analysis, diagnosis and surveillance of Schmallenberg disease” 
(EUCTP, 2014c, see also EUCTP, 2015b). 
Likewise, EUCTP conducted a series of activities to facilitate exports of alcoholic beverages from 
EU to China. In this context, EU experts engaged with their Chinese counterparts in discussions 
about food additive standards, especially related to phthalates (see brief activity reports A013-C3, 
A114-C3, A053-C3, A150-C3, A239-C3, A297-C3, A332-C3 and A318-C3 at EUCTP, 2015c). This 
topic was triggered by an import stop of spirits from the EU due to phthalate (interview 1, 2 and 
31). Other activities of this series addressed issues how to detect and prevent counterfeit alcohol 
products as result of a high-level agreement between DG AGRI and AQSIQ (European 
Commission, 2013d). In another instance, a regulation for dairy products newly introduced in 
2014 was effectively threatening EU exports to China (interview 2, Dionisi, 2015). An EU 
Commission expert described dairy trade as “the biggest current issue for the EU with China” 
(Dionisi, 2015). Accordingly, in 2015, EUCTP conducted an activity on “EU-China roundtable on 
the global integration of the Chinese dairy industry” (EUCTP, 2015a). Even before this specific 
regulation, EUCTP activities showcased the quality and safety of EU’s dairy production (EUCTP, 
2012b). Cases like phthalates and the dairy regulation notably also led to direct meetings between 
EU delegation in China, EU member states and Chinese authorities in which EU and member 
states raised their concerns (interview 2). 
5.4.2.3.4 Activities with market access character pulled by China 
Other activities are less clearly associated with an EU interest in market access. For example, 
EUCTP sent Chinese government officials to the EU for internship programs. The purpose was to 
improve communication between the two sides, and to increase “mutual understanding of 
agricultural issues”. Exchanges on agricultural trade specifically were part of the activity. A better 
understanding of EU food safety on the Chinese side and improved channels for communication 
increase the opportunities to successfully discuss market access barriers in the long run. However, 
such activities are designed with a broad spectrum of aspects and are not clearly dedicated to a 
specific market access topic. What is more, they likewise improve China’s export opportunities in 
the long run. 
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In 2009, the EUCTP I project conducted four seminars to support the implementation of the FSL, a 
fact which also had been stressed by China Daily in its report about the EUCTP I (EUCTP, 2009; 
anonymous, 2009). As the brief descriptions for each of the seminars reveal, supporting the 
implementation of the FSL served both aims from a long-term perspective – supply safety and 
market access. EU input on topics, such as “human health food and feed risk assessment, essential 
areas of potential food/feed risks, surveillance approaches and methodology” supports China in 
increasing the effectiveness of its food safety regulation by better implementation, effectively 
increasing the safety of food products. Thus, these measures rather improved supply safety. On the 
other hand, discussions about the development of food safety standards based on risk assessment 
and the installation and organisation of scientific committees to this end served the EU’s interest 
formulated by an interviewee: “We want the Chinese to have as far as possible rules and laws of 
food safety based on science. So, we want them to apply the principle of risk analysis, risk 
assessment, risk management and risk communication” (interview 2). 
The case of geographical indicators follows a different logic, as it does not deal with food safety 
risks. The purpose rather is to protect brand value of specific types of products. The agreement 
between DG AGRI and MoA introduced above initiated a pilot under the term “10plus10” in 
which EU and China agreed to mutually recognize and protect geographical indicators for 10 
products from both countries respectively (EUCTP, 2011c).108 It was facilitated by a previous 
workshop organized by the EUCTP in December 2006 as well as further support in 2007 to 
implement the project (EUCTP, 2009). This was the starting point for the pilot project on 
geographical indicators which ended in 2012 (EUCTP, 2011b). However, GI do not have a direct 
effect on food safety regulation. 
5.4.2.3.5 Activities due to EU supply safety interest 
EUCTP activities which clearly go back to the EU’s import safety interests often can directly be 
linked to respective RASFF notifications. For example, high numbers of RASFF notifications from 
China regarding food contact materials led to “a comprehensive training programme with AQSIQ 
on the handling of food contact materials”, according to the achievement report (EUCTP, 2009). 
The direct linkage between RASFF notifications and these specific activities was also reported by 
an interviewee (interview 3). These activities thus directly addressed supply safety concerns of the 
EU. However, while the first two activities have been portrayed as being initiated due to EU 
interest, the last one on this topic specifically was implemented because of an AQSIQ request. This 
reflects the reciprocity of supply safety. Problems with supply safety also concern the Chinese 
side, as they may lead to decreased export opportunities for Chinese food businesses. Notably, two 
experts involved in the Food Contact Material projects expressed their frustration about the fact 
                                                          
108 The implementation of this project took nearly 10 years. 
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that an online training platform which had been developed in this context by EUCTP was not 
sustained.109 The EU Commission was not willing to keep financing this activity (interview 3). 
Just like for the case with food contact material during EUCTP I, RASFF notifications in 
conjunction with a FVO audit in 2011 brought up the topic of mycotoxins especially in nuts 
imported from China (FVO, 2011; European Commission, 2014). Notably, the FVO-report states 
the volume of imports as a reason for the audit. Starting 2012, three activities were conducted to 
tackle this issue.110 Interviewees stressed this topic as an example for supply safety-oriented 
activities of EUCTP II (interview 1 and 2). Notably, respective activities were planned for 2011, 
2012 as well as for 2014 but only conducted in 2014. Food contact material also remained on the 
EU’s supply safety agenda as well due to RASFF notifications and respective capacity building 
measures were initiated by the EU and conducted by EUCTP (interview 1, EUCTP, 2014b). 
Furthermore, the EUCTP implemented measures to train Chinese food inspectors by conducting 
internships in EU member states and informing about the functioning of RASFF (Broughton and 
Walker, 2010, p. 473). The RASFF 2007 report notes that the EU financed a workshop in 
November 2007 attended by representatives of Chinese authorities to explain the functioning of 
the RASFF. The report explicitly states that the aim was to promote the establishment of a similar 
Chinese rapid alert system (European Commission, 2008c, p. 43). Such measures have specifically 
been referred to as a measure to increase import safety by DG SANCO (European Commission, 
2007d, p. 19). Furthermore, EUCTP conducted three activities on the topic of antimicrobial 
resistance resulting from the overuse of antibiotics in feed (EUCTP, 2013f; EUCTP, 2013c; EUCTP, 
2013b). The latter has been portrayed as an especially challenging topic for the Chinese side and 
they had to be convinced to accept this topic for EUCTP II (interview1). 
5.4.2.3.6 Activities with supply safety character pulled by China 
EUCTP conducted a large number of activities that contribute to supply safety for which there is 
no indication that they have been requested by the EU side. At the same time, the content of the 
activity does not allow for an interpretation as being directed at market access. The supply safety 
character rather stems from a long-term perspective. Examples for such topics are traceability and 
pesticide controls. Clearly, both is not relevant to market access for the EU and rather increases 
the safety of Chinese food and with this, supply safety. However, it remains unclear whether 
activities on these topics had been requested by the EU. An interviewee gave the impression that 
it was rather the Chinese side actively seeking for support on these topics (interview 3).  
Another instance for this logic is a series of activities on feed safety (EUCTP, 2012d; EUCTP, 
2013d; EUCTP, 2013g). The conferences specifically dealt with a new regulation issued by the 
                                                          
109 Interview 3 and presentation given by an expert from the EU reference laboratory for food reference 
materials during the internal EU Commission workshop on 23 March 2015 in Brussels listed in Table 9. 
110 Namely activities A385-C3, A122-C3 and A275-C3 (EUCTP, 2015c). 
The EU’s public engagement with China’s food safety regulation 
 
175 
State Council in 2011 on feed and feed additives. The purpose of the EUCTP activities was “to 
create awareness about the newly implemented Chinese feed and feed additive regulation, and 
support its enforcement” (EUCTP, 2013g). While this partly overlapped with critical findings for 
aquaculture animals in 2009 and 2012 (see Table 11), these measures explicitly had been requested 
by China. 
A long series of activities in EUCTP II also falls into this category. In fact, it makes up 19 out of 
the 38 pulled supply safety activities in this period (see appendix 8.4). The focus was on supporting 
China to establish a reference laboratory for animal disease and building up animal disease 
surveillance capabilities. This was induced by an agricultural dialogue meeting in March 2012, in 
which EU and China agreed to cooperate in order to improve the quality of Chinese laboratories 
with the specific objective to of “twining European and Chinese animal health reference 
laboratories” (EUCTP, 2012e). The 19 EUCTP activities dedicated to this topic stretched from 2012 
until the end of 2015. However, it was based on a MoA activity already initiated and conducted in 
collaboration with FAO (interview 1 and 2, EUCTP, 2010). There are numerous indications for 
supply safety effects of this series. First, for several activities within this series, the EUCTP 
explicitly stresses the aim of enforcing the FSL (e.g. EUCTP, 2012c). Second, and more critically, 
the series to large extent is justified with supporting China in its fight against brucellosis, “a 
disease which currently poses a food safety hazard in China” (EUCTP, 2013e). Third, interviews 
with EU experts support a differentiated assessment of this series. An interviewee mentions the 
objective to establish a reference laboratory in China as an example for cases, in which he had to 
convince the EU Commission to approve the idea, because “[i]t's something that initially benefits 
only the domestic situation [in China]. But in the medium term it will benefit the international 
compliance of China” (interview 1). This firstly indicates that the series rather supported the 
improvement of food safety in China and thereby indirectly improved supply safety but which, 
secondly, was not seen as a priority by the EU Commission. A second interviewee confirms the 
EU’s hesitation. The Chinese side was especially pulling for activities that support laboratory 
capabilities and knowledge detection methods also for animal diseases and the EU side answered 
to this to “accommodate the Chinese” (interview 2). Overall, this intensive series of activities in 
the long run should yield supply safety affects by improving food safety implementation and 
enforcement in China domestically.  
5.4.3 Summary and discussion 
When considering the SSH, three expectations are relevant for this condition: first, the need 
formulated to protect European consumers; second, the need formulated to improve 
implementation and enforcement of food safety regulation in China; third, the need for action 
formulated with regard to specific imported products/product groups that are typical for import 
from China. For the MAH, I also defined three expectations: first, need/willingness to enter 
Analysis:  
Supply safety and market access as motivation for EU’s activities 
 
176 
Chinese market formulated; second, the need formulated to especially change rules and standards 
in Chinese food safety regulation; third, the need for action formulated regarding specific 
products/product groups that are typical for export to China.  
The EU Commission was continuously involved in discussions about food safety-related topics. 
Especially via EUCTP, it likewise continuously conducted activities which contributed to shaping 
China’s food safety regulation. Thus, over the whole period, there has been a sustained effort been 
made by the EU Commission to influence China’s food safety regulation. In fact, the intensity 
increased after the FSL with regard to quantity. The quality also changed towards cooperation 
increasingly at eye level, as exemplified by the FAB. Discussion and activities focused on technical 
details of food safety regulation. This contrasts with the project conducted by WHO, ADB and 
SFDA which involved in organisational setup and fundamental agenda setting and law making. 
There is ample evidence that the EU Commission justified its activities to influence China’s food 
safety regulation with the need to protect European consumers. This argument does appear in 
interviews as well as in documents of the EU-China dialogue on food safety-related matters. 
Likewise, this argument was mentioned as an explanation of EUCTP’s SPS respective components. 
The relatively high number of FVO-audits furthermore indicates that the EU Commission was 
indeed concerned about the safety of food imports from China. As the retracing especially of the 
high-level dialogues shows, the protection of EU consumers is not a constant topic in EU-China 
discussions about food safety, though. It rather re-appears every other instance. It gained 
prominence especially between 2006 and 2009, when the dialogue on food safety was started. 
Also, BTSF – normally an instrument which merely serves as an offer – was actively used by the 
EU Commission to train Chinese authorities on RASFF. There are also concrete instances in which 
the need for improving implementation and enforcement is mentioned. This is most prominent in 
the FVO audit reports, which show that from an EU perspective, especially implementation and 
enforcement needed improvement. This seemingly is reflected in remarks about the need for 
implementation and enforcement in official documents, especially from EUCTP. However, a 
closer look reveals that stressing the need for implementation and enforcement in these instances 
does not necessarily imply a supply safety motivation. This point has been made for EUCTP II. 
“The times for policy development and regulatory tools of the government has already passed in 
China”, as one interviewee involved in EUCTP II explained (interview 1). By this he explicitly 
referred to the implementation of food safety standards, naming both market access topics (wine) 
as well as supply safety topics (food contact materials, pesticides) (interview 1). 
There is less evidence for the third expectation. Specific products or products groups are discussed 
with regard to food safety, but rarely. The prime example is the case of food contact materials. 
While it rather refers to a specific food risk rather than to a product, it was an issue discussed 
between the EU and China as a supply safety issue. This case also illustrates how the EU 
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Commission’s import safety system works and that it indeed is responsive to occurring food risks: a 
high level of RASFF notifications led to FVO audits on the same topic to substantiate the problems 
behind the notifications. In order to ameliorate the import safety situation, the EU Commission 
than decided to conduct EUCTP-activities to build up Chinese capacities on this topic. In the same 
vein, the EU Commission was active to influence China’s food safety regulation on the topic of 
aflatoxins in peanuts (interview 1, 2 and 3). The strawberry-incident reported in 5.2.3.1 likewise 
led to a quick response by the EU Commission, which sent FVO to China to address the issue by 
assessing the controls systems in place to control microbiological contamination in soft fruit 
intended for export to the EU in October 2013 (FVO, 2009). In general, the high number of 
planned FVO audits for China furthermore indicate a specific awareness on the EU Commission’s 
side that it was necessary to improve supply safety from China. FVO data also shows some 
reluctance on the Chinese side to accept critical comments on supply safety problems and to agree 
to related measures. The gap between planned and conducted measures is one indicator for this. In 
addition, an interviewee provided anecdotal evidence supporting this assessment (interview 25). 
This, however, is not to say that China’s behaviour in this regard was significantly different from 
other countries, as another interviewee pointed out (interview 39). 
I also found evidence for all three MAH-expectations. The difference is that the evidence for the 
MAH is more – more frequent, more continuous over time, and more specific. The need to achieve 
market access is mentioned more often in high level exchange between the EU commission and 
China compared to the need to protect EU consumers. In fact, it is a continuous theme in the 
dialogue. While there are several instances in the document in which market access is mentioned 
but consumer protection is not, there is virtually no instance in which the reverse is true. 
Likewise, when talking about specific activities, interviewees pre-dominantly talked about market 
access issues. Consumer protection was only mentioned, when it had specifically been addressed 
in the question. As for the second expectation, especially the need to shape standards and to 
harmonise food safety regulation rules is formulated regularly – both in high level exchanges as 
well as in EUCTP documents. Again, this need is formulated continuously over the whole period. 
The EU Commission also discussed which specific product groups should have priority in 
achieving market access. The evidence shows a stringent process from internal coordination 
within the EU until the implementation of respective EUCTP-activities. In this regard, the 
strategic decision to push for bovine exports and the related EUCTP-activities on BSE may serve as 
an example. Likewise, the EU first decided to make the export of fruit and vegetables an issue in 
2006. An according EUCTP activity (EU-China Roundtable on Prospects for Fruit and Vegetable 
Trade) followed swiftly in 2007. The discussion about African swine fever, Schmallenberg disease, 
phthalates follows similar patterns. According to a Chinese expert, the dominance of market 
access topics is part of a more general trend. He argued that with the increasing role as a food 
importer, interest of other countries in access to the Chinese market grew and accordingly, China 
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increasingly found itself in discussions about market access-restrictions with the EU and other 
countries (interview 32). 
Thus, the analysis of the motivation of EU public actors provides evidence for both hypothesis. 
The EU Commission itself presents the sectoral dialogue on food safety as serving both objectives: 
“Co-operation between China and the EC in this field can bring benefits to consumers both in the 
EU and China, and facilitate trade in agricultural goods” (European External Action Service, 2012). 
This duality is reflected in both the dialogue on food safety topics and the specific activities. 
Supply safety and market access are portrayed as objectives not contradicting each other. The 
distribution of supply safety and market access topics in bilateral discussions and actions between 
EU and China follows a general pattern: market access sustained and was the main driver for EU 
Commissions continuous interest in exchange. It features more prominent in the dialogues as well 
as in the EUCTP activities. Instances, in which the EU Commission pushes for supply safety issues 
reoccur more irregularly. This dominance of market access motivation is reflected both in the 
analysis of documents as well as expert interviews. 
The explorative analysis revealed another, not anticipated aspect: a large number of those 
activities, which contribute to supply safety rather than market access, have effectively been asked 
for by the Chinese side. Regarding measures directed at market access, it is important to note that 
often such activities were designed so that the Chinese side benefitted as well. For example, on the 
market access issue of phthalates in alcoholic beverages, EUCTP held activities to convince China 
of its approach. Such activities at the same time were capacity building measures to increase 
China’s food safety experts’ knowledge in risk assessment procedures. As a Chinese expert stressed, 
Chinese authorities were especially interested in learning more about risk assessment (interview 
32). Thus, the activities by the EU Commission were strongly influenced by the need to find 
consensus with the Chinese side. 
5.5 TPS drive for a stronger role in China  
The emergence of TPS in China occurred in parallel to the engagement of the EU Commission in 
China. I retrace the development of TPS’ influence on China’s food safety regulation as part of the 
outcome I aim to explain in two steps. First, I show that there was a passive development of TPS in 
China, the effect of which remained limited. Driven by demand, this development occurred partly 
in a legal grey zone. Second, with some delay, GFSI started to actively push TPS in China. 111 
                                                          
111 This section is largely based on Kottenstede (2017). 
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5.5.1 Passive development of TPS in China 
TPS specifically gained importance after China joined the WTO (Kottenstede, 2017, pp. 219-224). 
Experts recall that, in 2003, GlobalGAP and IFS were the first to have issued certificates in China 
with BRC following shortly afterwards in 2005 (interview 4 and 24, Battaglia, 2013). The growing 
relevance of TPS is also reflected in the CB’s behaviour. Around that time, no foreign CB were 
present in China (interview 11). With increasing demand for food safety certifications from 
Chinese suppliers, foreign certification bodies also discovered China as a potential market. For 
example, TÜV financed a study clarifying the legal requirements for certification bodies to operate 
in China (interview 18, Kottenstede, 2017).  
The number of food production facilities in China, which are certified against TPS has remained 
low until 2014. This becomes obvious when comparing figures for China with global figures. 
About 2,800 certifications had been issued in China as of 2014. This contrasts with 195,000 
certifications globally (see Table 15). In other words, 1.4 per cent of all private standard 
certificates have been issued in the People’s Republic. What is more, the relation to the especially 
large number food producers of all sorts in China shows a very limited penetration of the market. 
These figures in turn show a limited impact of TPS on China’s food safety regulation that is also 
reflected widely by interviewees (interview 4, 5, 7, 24, 26, 27, 33 and 34; Kottenstede, 2017 p. 
222). 
Table 15: Number of GFSI recognized certifications worldwide and in China, 2014 
Transnational 
private standard 
geographical origin global number 
of certifications 
geographical 
outreach 
number of 
certifications 
in P.R. China  
FS22000 The Netherlands/ 
Europe 
10915 109 countries 852 
GlobalGAP Germany/Europe 130000 113 countries 300 
IFS Food Standard Germany 14000 96 countries 272 
BRC UK 17289 113 countries 1329 
primusGFS USA 12947 North America 0 
GRMS Denmark 27 Europe 0 
Global 
Aquaculture 
Alliance 
USA No information 
available  
No 
information 
available 
No 
information 
available 
CanadaGAP Canada 954 Canada 0 
SQF USA (Australia) 6910 30 countries 6 
For comparison112     
ChinaGAP China 2000 P.R. China 2000 
(Source: Kottenstede, 2017) 
 
                                                          
112 ChinaGAP is indirectly recognized by GFSI through benchmarking against GlobalGAP. 
Analysis:  
Supply safety and market access as motivation for EU’s activities 
 
180 
As interviewees pointed out, as a general rule, the motivation for TPS to engage in a country is 
driven by the demand for certification(s) of their standard(s) (interview 10 and 26). Indeed, this is 
a straight forward mechanism: buyers request a specific certification from their supplier in China, 
which leads them to apply for this certification. This requires CB to conduct audits in this country. 
Given a sufficient number of requests for certification, there is a demand for TPS to actively 
engage in a certain country (interview 26 and 27). Thus, TPS certifications can be found, where 
buyers demand the respective TPS certification from their suppliers (Kottenstede, 2017, pp. 220-
222). The sources of information for private standard organisations to learn about a growing 
demand in a specific market are threefold: the companies using the standard, the board of the TPS 
organisation and CBs. This mechanism is also confirmed by an official document in which GFSI 
explains the need for its engagement with China: “As GFSI is an industry-driven initiative and as 
more and more buying companies begin to request that their supply chain partners achieve 
certification against a GFSI recognised scheme, there is need for communication on exactly what 
this means for a business” (GFSI, 2013a).113 It is important noting, however, that this is not a 
China-specific phenomena but a logic that theoretically applies to any sourcing market 
(Kottenstede, 2017). 
The demand for private standard certifications in China mainly is the result of Western companies 
sourcing in China. Interviewees reflected this when they argued that the reason the GFSI is so 
active in China lies in the fact that international companies source in China (interview 24, 26, 28 
and 29). Chinese companies hardly request TPS-certifications if they do not need it due to their 
commitments towards their western customers (interview 33 and 34; Kottenstede, 2017, p. 222). 
In accordance with this assessment by two interviewees, clients of international CB are “either an 
international company working in China, sourcing in China or exporting from China and we have 
as well Chinese customers, but those are mainly prescribed by our customer abroad that is a 
customer, for instance, in the US or in France who asks them to work with us” (interview 9). In 
order to understand the motivation behind TPS activities in China, we have to differentiate 
between companies sourcing in China for overseas markets (effectively importing from China) and 
companies sourcing in China for the Chinese domestic market (interview 5 and 27). According to 
the experts interviewed both is relevant: international companies source in China for the Chinese 
                                                          
113 Likewise, this logic is reflected in an announcement of the private standard SQF in 2011 to move to 
China: „The SQF Institute is planning to move into China to address the global retailer and supplier need 
brought on by the 30 percent rise in Chinese agricultural exports in the first eight months of 2010. Due to 
increasing interest in the SQF Programme in China, the SQF Institute has been marketing there since early 
last year, primarily at conferences like the fifth annual China International Food Safety & Quality (CIFSQ) 
Conference & Expo, held in Beijing last November. Currently, the SQF Institute is conducting 
implementation and auditor training classes, with an overall objective of developing synergy between 
qualified auditors and sites awaiting certification. Plans are also under way for formal meetings with specific 
manufacturers in China to begin the certification process, as well as meetings with key retailers and the 
establishment of a regional office in Shanghai” (SQF, 2011). 
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market and many international companies source from China for export markets (interview 26 
and 29; Kottenstede, 2017). Which phenomena is more relevant cannot clearly be determined 
from the data.  
Clearly, for Chinese exporting food businesses, private standards do have a strong impact. This is 
not only the assessment of experts interviewed (interview 10 and 40), but also suggested by earlier 
research, which showed that those food companies in China having adopted HACCP principles 
were mainly export-oriented companies (Bai et al., 2007b; Zhang et al., 2015b, p. 2182, interview 
40). Other sources go further and suggest that export causes the largest share of TPS certification 
in China. For example, an expert stated during a presentation that “[m]ost factories in Asia 
exporting to Europe have introduced BRC and/or IFS” (Battaglia, 2013, p. 16). According to BRC, 
“Chinese sample site assessments were generally in response to overseas customer requirements” 
(BRC, 2014, p. 35). SQF announced in 2011 that it will increase its presence in China because of 
the rising demand for certifications driven by exports (SQF, 2011). Likewise, it is mainly export 
oriented companies in China, that apply for GlobalGAP certification (interview 10; Kottenstede, 
2017, p. 222). Statements made by Chinese experts second the assessment that export-induced 
certifications make for the larger share (interview 24 and 34). According to a presentation by a co-
founder of the GFSI, export was the initial reason that has led to the certification of private 
standards in China: “After a carefree period of exporting to Europe until 2000, resulting in many 
quality complaints, the European retailers demanded the implementation of the standards from 
their Chinese suppliers[.] The industry was initially unaware of the problems and therefore 
reluctant to introduce the standards, but was forced to” (Battaglia, 2013, p. 15).  
The dominant role of export as the reason for TPS certification in China seems to wane. A Chinese 
CB expert portrays western companies sourcing for their domestic business in China as an 
increasingly relevant factor (interview 33). A CB representative even reports that clients sourcing 
in China for the Chinese market are a much bigger part of the business compared to clients 
sourcing in China for export (interview 9). A representative of a western food manufacturer 
explained his company’s interest (and priorities) in supporting GFSI’s expansion to China: “[W]e 
cannot export to China, because our products shelf life is too short. We must produce in China for 
the Chinese market. However, we want to maintain our high quality in the Chinese market as 
well. This is why we have an interest in safe food supply in China. On top of that comes food 
supply from China to other parts of the world” (interview 29). Although not specifically related to 
China, the 2008 GFSI newsletter indicates that exports indeed may play a secondary role. The 
newsletter reports that a GFSI working group had been set up “to support auditors in emerging 
markets”, which “has been concentrating on local sourcing and selling rather than exporting” 
(GFSI, 2008a). 
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Partly, TPS certifications spread in China outside of the regulatory frame for certification business 
set by the Chinese government. During interviews, it was frequently pointed out that Chinese 
regulation, in international comparison, sets unusual strict boundaries for the implementation of 
TPS in China (interview 9, 11, 14, 27 and 28). For a TPS to acquire a legal status in China, it has to 
be licensed by the CNCA, because the CNCA is responsible for 3rd party certification in China 
(interview 36). This implies that CBs in China are only able to certify standards which previously 
have been accepted the CNCA (interview 33). CBs operating in China in turn require an 
accreditation from the China National Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessment (CNAS), a 
government organization authorized by the CNCA (interview 33, CNAS, 2015). Only those 
certification bodies are allowed to issue certifications, which are accredited by CNAS. This specific 
Chinese approach to certification deviates from international practice. Many governments do not 
require the accreditation of CBs (IAF, 2011, p. 2). Instead, the requirement for an accreditation is 
organized within the private realm. For example, the GFSI benchmarking requirements make it 
mandatory for CB to be accredited.114 China’s regulation also deviates from the principle to 
mutually accept accreditation across countries established by the International Accreditations 
Forum (see for example DAKKS, n.d.; cf. Kottenstede, 2017, p. 230). For a European business 
expert based in China, this strict regulation had a purpose as “it was clear that China wants to 
control extremely carefully the company to do certification, to do testing, to do everything” 
(interview 9). Consequently, attempts by the European industry to lobby the Chinese government 
for a freer system in which certification for TPS could have been done without specific allowance 
by the Chinese government had not been successful. “There was nothing else but no”, the 
interviewee described the Chinese government’s response (interview 9; Kottenstede, 2017). 
Most GFSI standards did not apply for a registration with the CNCA (with BRC being a notable 
exception) (interview 33). However, Chinese companies, which want to export to Western 
markets need a TPS certification, simply because their buyers make it a precondition. Also, 
Western companies producing in China require their suppliers to be certified for TPS officially not 
licensed in China (interview 33). Consequently, market actors ignore the Chinese regulation of 
TPS and quickly business practices deviated from the official requirements. Chinese companies 
obtain certifications of TPS, including those accepted by the GFSI, from international CBs not 
licensed by the CNCA. Such CBs send an auditor to the facility to be certified, often even from 
outside of China (interview 24). The certificate is provided officially by an office of the CB outside 
of China. This way, Chinese companies are able to get TPS certifications needed for their business 
with Western buyers, although the specific TPS has not been approved by the CNCA. The CNCA 
is aware of this frequent bypassing of the legal rules and disapproves of the situation (interview 28 
and 33). However, the Chinese government faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it is not in control 
                                                          
114 “Scheme owners shall ensure that all Certification Bodies with which they have contractual arrangements 
are accredited” (GFSI 2013b, p. 66). 
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of something it obviously had the intention to be in control of. On the other hand, a strict 
enforcement of TPS regulation would potentially have too negative effects on Chinas food export 
businesses (interview 28). Besides, enforcing the regulation would require resources and capacities 
the CNCA does not have (interview 33). In the view of one interviewee, by 2014 the Chinese 
government had considerably lost influence on the development of voluntary standards, because 
of the increasing activities of international CBs on the Chinese market (interview 11, Kottenstede, 
2017, pp. 230-231). 
5.5.2 GFSI’s push for stronger establishment of TPS in China 
It was primarily the GFSI, that pushed TPS in China (cf. Kottenstede, 2017). Individual TPS 
organisations did not make China their focus country, as numerous TPS experts pointed out 
(interview 5, 10, 11, 26, 27 and 29). While there is little record of GFSI’s relationship towards 
China prior to 2008, a statement by Wenyi Che, Deputy Chief Administrator of CNCA, suggests 
that relations have been built early on. He is quoted in a GFSI publication of 2011 expressing his 
positive experience in working with GFSI since 2004 (GFSI, 2011a). In June 2007, the CIES held 
its Annual World Food Business Summit in Shanghai with GFSI participation (CIES, 2007). 
According to an official statement by the GFSI, the commitment of seven major retailers to accept 
GFSI-benchmarked standards on this occasion, allowed to redirect the resources at enhancing 
collaboration with developing countries (GFSI, n.d.a). Consequently, GFSI’s engagement with 
China became more substantial from 2008 onwards. This year in April, GFSI conducted its first 
road show to Shanghai and Tokyo – a fact so relevant for GFSI that still in 2016 it marked it as a 
milestone in GFSI history (GFSI, n.d.a). From this point onwards, GFSI continued to actively build 
its presence in China (see Table 16). The activities from 2008 until 2014 can be traced based on the 
official GFSI newsletters (Kottenstede, 2017). 
The activities conducted by GFSI reveal two objectives. First, GFSI aimed at local Chinese food 
business to raise awareness for the initiative and eventually increase TPS usage in China. 
Accordingly, GFSI organized the GFSI China Focus Days annually since 2012. It advocated the 
event by claiming that it provided answers to the following questions: “What are the benefits of 
GFSI? What are the GFSI recognized schemes? What is the process to comply with GFSI’s 
guidelines? Is it accessible to small producers and manufacturers? How can we achieve: ‘Once 
certified, accepted everywhere’? What does it mean? How can GFSI help me boost my business? 
Are there any case studies showcasing the benefits of GFSI?” (GFSI, 2013a). The fact that 
individual GFSI-benchmarked private standards had the opportunity to present themselves on 
these conferences furthermore supported this objective (GFSI, 2012a).115 An interviewee stressed 
GFSI’s interest in pushing for wider usage of the benchmarked schemes globally: “[T]he aim was 
to have as many companies as possible becoming certified against one of the GFSI benchmarked 
                                                          
115 Also based on the authors observation at the GFSI China Focus Day 2014 in Beijing. 
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schemes. This was mainly a task of communication in order to inform food businesses around the 
world to know about it and to make use of the GFSI’s approach” (interview 29). The GFSI Spring 
2012 newsletter shows that China plays a key role in this objective. Increasing the number of 
businesses using GFSI recognized standards is presented as a strategic focus, adding that “China 
and India will be [sic!] top of our list” (GFSI, 2012c). 
In China, like in developing countries, especially small and medium-sized food companies had 
(and still have) substantial problems fulfilling all criteria of GFSI-benchmarked TPS (interview 
24). For GlobalGAP, one interviewee reported that his suppliers would comply with “something 
like 8 per cent” of the full set of requirements (interview 7). Chinese companies therefore needed 
training and education to eventually be able to fulfil GFSI-criteria (interview 24 and 29). GFSI was 
well aware that a further spread of GFSI-benchmarked certifications in China depended on 
capacity building.116 At the China International Food Safety and Quality Conference (CIFSQC) 
2013 in Beijing, a GFSI official said, “you need to give training” for a success of GFSI in China 
(Kranghand, 2013). In this context, GFSI also claims to have been active in conducting capacity 
building measures. Reported instances of capacity building were: 
 Coca-Cola conducted a pilot training project in 2009 (GFSI, 2009), that was acknowledged 
as helpful by CFSA-representative (interview 21); 
 Carrefour uses an own programme to train suppliers to eventually achieve a full 
GlobalGAP certification (interview 7); 
 In 2012, during a Sino-France CEO Forum 2012, GFSI held a food safety session that 
served training purposes (Kranghand, 2013); 
 A pilot project conducted in Shanghai in cooperation with Jiaotong University and 
SSAFE117 in 2013 marked the start of the Global Markets Programme in China (Yao, 
2013). It included six sessions with about 500 trained persons and lasted until 2015118; 
 Metro conducted a capacity building workshop in 2014 in Shanghai in which GMP tools 
were discussed with the Shanghai FDA.119 
                                                          
116 This problem also became visible during Q&A session at the CIFSQC 2013 in Beijing, the CIFSQC 2014 in 
Shanghai and the GFSI China Focus Day 2014 in Beijing, during which Chinese participants complained 
that GFSI certifications were too hard to achieve. 
117 SSAFE is a non-profit organisation founded in 2006 by globally operating food companies with the 
mission to promulgate “internationally recognized food protection systems and standards” through public-
private-partnership projects. It collaborates with OIE and FAO. Four of its ten member companies are also 
active members of GFSI (Cargill, Coca-Cola, Danone and McDonald’s) (SSAFE, 2014). 
118 Presentation by Yue Jin from Bor S. Luh Food Safety Research Center of Shanghai Jiao Tong University 
on 28 August 2014 at the GFSI China Focus Day in Beijing, personal notes of the author. 
119 Presentation by Jiang Xin from Metro China on 28 August 2014 at the GFSI China Focus Day in Beijing, 
personal notes of the author. 
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Another GFSI expert said during an interview: “The […] objective of GFSI was to make the 
processes of becoming certified easier. We want to lower the hurdle of becoming certified. To this 
end, GFSI is offering training programs which are essentially capacity building measures. 
Increased food safety competency for food producers increases their likelihood to be certified 
against GFSI benchmarked schemes” (interview 29). To overcome this barrier, GFSI advocated the 
Global Markets Programme and the according low-level unaccredited status as intermediate steps 
to full certification in China. GlobalGAP and CNCA had introduced a similar approach with 
ChinaGAP in 2006 which allows for two grades of certification, a partial and full certificate 
(interview 4). A problem for conducting capacity building measures was financial resources, as a 
GFSI official explained in a short encounter at the GFSI China Focus Day in 2014. Accordingly, 
GFSI sought strategic alliances with other institutions such as the World Bank” (GFSI, 2012b). 
Part of this is the GFSI’s discussion with World Bank’s GFSP.120  
With regard to the second objective, GFSI engaged intensively with the Chinese government in 
order to achieve an officially accepted status in China. A partnership with a Chinese authority was 
the declared aim, which was stated in GFSI’s conference presentations (Kranghand, 2013). To both 
ends, GFSI participated in and organized own conferences and held several meetings with Chinese 
officials (see Table 16). Often, Chinese government representatives also participated as speakers in 
GFSI events, for example in all GFSI China Focus Days (Groenveld, 2013; GFSI, 2012b).121 The 
engagement with the Chinese government yielded several Memorandums of Understanding. The 
first one signed in 2011 between GFSI and CNCA was a major milestone in GFSI’s China-strategy 
as it established the grounds on which GFSI was able to build its localization strategy in China (see 
discussion further below in this part). 
As for the motivation behind this active programme of GFSI in China, one of its leading 
representative explained: “We must produce in China for the Chinese market. However, we want 
to maintain our high quality in the Chinese market as well. This is why we have an interest in safe 
food supply in China. On top of that comes food supply from China to other parts of the world” 
(interview 29). This clear hierarchy of motives – supply safety for the Chinese market first, then 
for export – is the same for retailers. Retailers source few products in China (interview 6). Hence, 
their most important concern is sourcing safe food in China for the Chinese market (interview 6 
and 7). As other interviewees stressed, if companies in China take food safety seriously, companies 
                                                          
120 No formal partnership had been set up by the end of 2014, but GFSI took steps to establish closer contact 
with GFSP. For example, it was mentioned as an envisaged partner in a GFSI speech in 2013 (Kranghand, 
2013). In 2015, the official report about GFSI’s Global Food Safety Conference featured GFSP as a topic 
(GFSI, 2015d). 
121 Also based on the authors observation. 
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had to take it into their own hands (interview 14 and 40). Making use of TPS was a major element 
in their strategy to his end. 122  
Table 16: GFSI activities in China 2008-2014 
Year Activities 
2007 GFSI representatives participate in CIES Annual World Food Summit in Shanghai 
2008 April: first Asia road show with event in Shanghai (220 participants) 
Start of partnership with China Chain Story & Franchise Association (CCFA) 
2009 April: 2nd Asia road show with Beijing event 
2010 April: GFSI delegation spends a week in China for meetings, including with members 
of the Chinese government administration “to establish links there” 
Meetings include discussion with CNCA about mutual recognition 
April: co-branded conference with CCFA in Shenzhen 
November: Participation of GFSI in CIFSQC 
GFSI team has China coordinator 
2011 April: 7th GFSI-session at CCFA China Food Safety Annual Conference in Hangzhou  
April: GFSI workshop with Chinese food company Cofco (Beijing), meeting with 
CNCA (Beijing) 
April: participation in International Forum on Food Safety Beijing 
April: participation in the fourth International Food Safety Peak Forum in Beijing 
April: meeting with CNCA to discuss collaboration, incl. China HACCP benchmarking 
November: GFSI official partner of CIFSQC with half-day GFSI session 
November: memorandum of understanding between GFSI and CNCA  
2012 March: GFSI Food Safety workshop at the 18th Franco-Chinese economic forum, 
Beijing 
March: memorandum of understanding between GFSI and the CNCA Certification and 
Accreditation Institute of Technology (CCAI)  
July: 1st GFSI China Focus Day (422 delegates) with speakers from AQSIQ, CNCA, 
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
March: official announcement of GFSI China Local Group 
November: GFSI partner of CIFSQC 
                                                          
122 I take this impression from visiting conferences in China in which companies as various as Metro, 
Chiquita, Element Fresh, Carrefour, Hormel, Kerchin, Danone, Coca-Cola and Cargill presented their 
approach 
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2013 April: GFSI session at International Forum on Food Safety, Beijing 
June: 2nd GFSI China Focus Day (332 delegates), Beijing, with speakers from CFDA, 
CNCA, CDC, CIQ 
June: official launch of China Food Safety Initiative (CFSI) 
July: GFSI presentation at International dairy development Forum, Hohhot, Inner 
Mongolia 
July: GFSI presentations at 9th CCFA Food Safety Annual Conference 
November: 4th meeting of GFSI China local group 
November: GFSI partner of CIFSQC 
2014 3rd GFSI China Focus Day GFSI (359 delegates), Beijing, with speakers from CFDA, 
CNCA, CFSA (former CDC)  
GFSI China local group office set up in Shanghai 
2015 GFSI announces technical equivalence of China HACCP  
(Source: own, based on Kottenstede, 2017; GFSI, 2010b; GFSI, 2011b; CNCA, 2011) 
The story of GFSI in China took a turn at this point of the development. The relationship between 
the GFSI and the Chinese government changed towards institutionalized cooperation which 
included a substantial adaption of GFSI to Chinese political conditions. This development 
unfolded along two separate but related paths (Kottenstede, 2017).  
Firstly, GFSI pushed for the establishment of a local GFSI group (Kottenstede, 2017, p. 224). This 
idea was first publicly presented during the 2012 GFSI China Focus Day combined with a “call for 
action” to establish a China Food Safety Initiative (CFSI) (GFSI, 2012b, p. 13; GFSI, 2012d, p. 12). 
A GFSI representative explained the reasoning behind the establishment as follows: “For making 
the implementation of GFSI in China easier and in order to bridge the global-local gap, GFSI has 
set up a local team in China. […] The CFSI also takes care of the communication between the 
GFSI and the Chinese government” (interview 29). During the 2013 China Focus Day, GFSI 
officially launched the local group and announced that it had 20 members on board which already 
had met three times (GFSI, 2013c, p. 12; Kranghand, 2013). In 2013, GFSI also announced first 
activities of the local group. It had established a working group on the GFSI’s Global Markets 
Programme and a working group on communication and implementation (GFSI, 2013c, p. 12). In 
2014, the number of members had expanded to 30 Chinese and Western companies and seed 
funding as well as a secretariat office in Shanghai were in place (interview 29 and 37). However, 
an official inception only was declared end of 2015 (GFSI, 2015e; GFSI, 2015a). The reason for this 
delay was that GFSI aimed for the support from a Chinese governmental partner for a successful 
official registration of the CFSI. Initially, GFSI planned to set up CFSI as an independent NGO in 
China. However, regulation for foreign non-profit organisation issued by the Ministry of Security 
changed the situation and made an official partner necessary (interview 37). Initially, CNCA was 
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supposed to become the partner (interview 37, Kranghand, 2013). However, when GFSI gained 
the impression in 2014 that CNCA behaved too engrossing, it turned to the by then established 
CFDA as a potential partner (interview 37). Eventually, CFSI was set up as a part of partnership 
with the China Nutrition and Health Food Association (CNHFA), “an independent, national and 
non-profit social organisation, co-initiated by the Chinese leading food production and operation 
entities, scientific research institutes and inspection institutions, with the approval from the State 
Council and the Ministry of Civil Affairs and endorsed by China Food and Drug Administration” 
(GFSI, 2015a). 
Secondly, GFSI engaged with the Chinese government to benchmark a Chinese public standard 
(Kottenstede, 2017, p. 231). Notably, this was not the first time, a TPS benchmarked a 
governmental voluntary food safety standard in China. Previously, GlobalGAP had already 
accepted ChinaGAP as benchmarked on request of the standard owner CNCA (interview 11). In 
March 2012, an additional memorandum between GFSI and CCAI, a CNCA body, was signed to 
facilitate this process, which already had started before (CNCA, 2016a). Specifically, the CNCA 
and the GFSI agreed to subject China HACCP, a voluntary national standard owned by the CNCA, 
to the benchmarking procedure. CNCA had developed this new standard based on the ISO 22000 
standard.123 The CNCA purposely designed China HACCP so that it would be suitable for 
benchmarking against GFSI requirements. To this end, Western GFSI member companies and 
Western certification bodies consulted and supported the CNCA in the development and 
benchmarking of China HACCP (interview 24 and 33). However, the lead of the CNCA working 
group for the China HACCP benchmarking was mainly organized by the Chinese CB CQM, which 
also became a member of the CFSI (interview 33). It proved to be a lengthy and complicated 
process (interview 26). Discussion about this can be traced back to 2010 according to the CNCA 
website (CNCA, 2016b). Results initially were expected by the end of 2013 (GFSI, 2013c, p. 7; 
Groenveld, 2013). However, even at a late stage, the successful benchmarking had to be postponed 
and had not been completed by the end of 2014.124 This view is shared by the Chinese side. By 
characterizing the establishment of China HACCP as an “intensive process”, a Chinese expert 
insinuates that the discussion between both sides was complicated (interview 36).  
Reportedly, the technical equivalence of China HACCP with the GFSI guidance document was 
achieved without problems (Kottenstede, 2017, p. 231). The reason for the prolonged 
benchmarking process was the governance structure of China HACCP (interview 26, 29 and 37). 
The guidance document requires scheme owner, certification body and accreditation body to be 
                                                          
123 ISO 22000 is a food safety management standard published by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) in 2005. It is especially suitable for food manufacturers. The Western FSSC 22000 TPS 
likewise is based on ISO 22000. 
124 It was announced publicly by GFSI representatives at the CIFSQC in 2013 to be completed in February 
2014 (Kranghand, 2013). 
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separate organizations (GFSI, 2013b, p. 17). In the case of China HACCP, however, this was not 
guaranteed: CNCA was the standard owner and CNAS was the authority responsible for 
accreditation. However, CNAS was authorized by CNCA. The discrepancy between the China 
HACCP governance structure and the GFSI requirements resulted in a deadlock of the 
benchmarking process within GFSI, as participants struggled to find a solution (interview 26 and 
37). Eventually, in 2015, GFSI made a solomonian decision. It explicitly created a new category of 
benchmarking, the so called “technical equivalence”. This category, GFSI claims, was deliberately 
established for public standards. It “is an acknowledgement of the equivalence of the content of 
the certification scheme to the relevant scope of GFSI requirements (Part III)” and thereby 
confirmed the equivalence of the technical aspects (GFSI, 2015b). It thus is less than a full 
benchmarking, which would also confirm the equivalence of the standard’s governance system 
(Kottenstede, 2017, pp. 235-236). 
CFSI and the China HACCP-benchmarking bound both sides closer together: With China 
HACCP, GFSI has a standard in its portfolio, which connects the initiative to the Chinese market. 
This was seen as helpful as many GFSI members run businesses in China (interview 37). However, 
it seems GFSI had little other choice if it wanted to establish itself better in China. When asked by 
an attendee during the GFSI session of the 2013 CIFSQC, why GFSI opted for China HACCP as 
the standard in China rather than applying existing Western TPS, then GFSI chairman Yvey Rey 
answered publicly that this was a government decision of China and that GFSI cannot make China 
accept any other private standard.125 The fact that GFSI went so far to change its own rules in 
order to create a second type of benchmarking for China HACCP furthermore shows the extent to 
which GFSI depended on the Chinese governments conditions. The Chinese government, in turn, 
received business support to improve food safety through capacity building and increased export 
opportunities for its food sector. The former point is supported by a GFSI representative, who 
argued that it was the problem pressure in the area of food safety, that created the Chinese 
government’s interest in the GFSI and drove China’s interest in benchmarking China HACCP 
(interview 29). A Chinese government official involved in the matter put the emphasis on the 
latter point. He stressed that once China HACCP is benchmarked against GFSI, it will be much 
easier for Chinese food producers to export their products” (interview 36). Likewise, Liu Weijun, a 
CNCA official stated during his presentation at the 2014 GFSI China Focus Day: “GFSI standards 
have an impact on China and the Focus Day is an important platform for Chinese companies to 
learn about best practices and to be able to expand to overseas markets” (Liu, 2014). This stance on 
GFSI is mirrored in statements of several Chinese companies during their presentations at the 
2014 GFSI China Focus Day in Beijing. For example, Chen Chunhua, Co-Chairwoman and CEO of 
New Hope Liuhe, a Chinese food producer, said: “We are expanding to the international market 
and with GFSI, we can shoulder food safety responsibilities in different markets” (Chen, 2014a). In 
                                                          
125 Personal observation by the author. 
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the same vein, Gu Shaoping, a CNCA representative stressed that in order to increase the number 
of HACCP-certified exporting Chinese food businesses, China needed the “GFSI-mechanism” (Gu, 
2013). At the same time, with the benchmarking of China HACCP, the Chinese authorities 
created the opportunity to reduce the number of unlicensed TPS in China and to regain control 
over the certification sector in China (Kottenstede, 2017). With a China HACCP being equivalent 
with GFSI, Chinese market actors have little incentive to request for certificates of Western TPS 
(Kottenstede, 2017, p. 235). As for the CFSI, the deal is similar. GFSI received an official status and 
governmental recognition while the Chinese government profits from the impetus of the GFSI 
that activated Chinese food companies to take responsibility for food safety while at the same time 
staying in control over this development. Both parts of the cooperation, however, were not 
officially connected with each other, as a GFSI representative stressed: “Of course it 
[benchmarking China HACCP – the author] well helped the establishment of CFSI, but that was 
not the reason in this case” (interview 37). 
5.5.3 Summary and discussion 
Two expectations are relevant for the SSH: first, the need formulated to protect European 
consumers; second, the need for action formulated with regard to specific imported 
products/product groups that are typical for import from China. When analysing TPS in China 
with respect to the MAH, I concentrate on the following expectation: determination to establish 
TPS in China for domestic market formulated. 
GFSI standards in China at first predominantly occurred in China in the export part of China’s 
food sector, because customers outside of China requested respective certifications. As TPS play an 
important role within the Chinese export sector, there is a clear supply safety dimension. This 
however, is not the result of TPS pursuing a more active role in China. It rather is the result of the 
very core mechanism built-in in supply chains: if Chinese companies want to become a supplier, 
they need to provide the requested TPS certificates. Likewise, interviewees do mention the need 
to protect European consumers rather more on a side note. As regards the second expectation, it 
follows the same pattern. There is no specific drive to improve China’s implementation of specific 
product groups because of export. Again, TPS involvement is driven by demand. The BRC report 
cited above serves as a good example: it shows which product groups had been certified on request 
by the respective Chinese companies (which in turn thereby fulfil requests from their buyers). In 
comparison to the overall engagement of TPS with China, this supply safety-driven presence of 
TPS in China makes for the much smaller share. 
The more active and intense involvement of TPS in China rose when GFSI started pushing for 
wider usage of TPS in China. While the motivation for this drive has not been made fully 
transparent, interviewees’ statements and additional facts indicate that this drive primarily derived 
from the need to have TPS in China for sourcing and selling within China. Ensuring safe imports 
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from China plays a secondary role. One of the additional facts is the observation that the leading 
actors for GFSI in China represent retailers (Metro) and food service companies (Coca-Cola, 
McDonald’s), thus companies which heavily rely on sourcing in China for their China business. 
What is more, GFSI showed a strong will to establish itself in China, indicated by its persistence 
over the years and willingness to establish a new benchmarking status for China HACCP. Given 
that businesses are behind the GFSI, such an enormous investment needs to be reflected in 
according business opportunities which the growing Chinese domestic market offers more 
strongly than then increased sourcing from China. This is reflected in an interviewee’s statement: 
“It [the benchmarking of China HACCP – the author] was more or less a move from GFSI to have 
China as a country on board since a lot of members are having [or] doing business in China” 
(interview 37). Thus, for Western companies behind GFSI, the prime motivation is the same 
motivation for which TPS have been setup in general: safeguarding their reputation against food 
scandals while keeping costs at bay by means of harmonisation of standards (interview 26 and 29). 
After all, their reputation is an important distinction from Chinese competition. Chinese 
consumers trust Western brands and especially imported products more with regard to their safety 
(Wang, 2012). The cooperation of GFSI with the Chinese government, the CFSI as well as the 
benchmarking, arguably are measures that respond to the stricter regulation of third party 
regulation in China (Kottenstede, 2017). 
The GFSI’s support of China HACCP also indicates a focus on supporting the local Chinese food 
safety regulation, because this standard will foremost be used and accepted by Chinese market 
actors. As China HACCP has not been fully benchmarked, it is very unlikely that China HACCP 
will be accepted by companies sourcing in China for Western markets. Thus, in sum, while a 
stronger establishment of TPS in China in theory contribute to both supply safety and market 
access and this dual objective is reflected in interviewees statements, the GFSI’s investment into 
China seems to rather stem from market access interests. Thus, TPS occurred in China because of 
both reasons, ensuring import safety as well as to ensure safety of supply chains within China 
(interview 8). The notable difference is that the latter motivation was combined with an active 
push, especially by the GFSI. Regardless of the specific motivation, TPS exert influence on China’s 
food safety relation, as stressed by an interviewee: „GFSI brings new ideas, new concepts and a 
new system” (interview 24). 
The development of TPS in China to a large extent is also shaped by the interest of the Chinese 
government to establish a certification system based on private responsibility for food safety. The 
strong interest occurred twice, in the case of GlobalGAP and GFSI. China seems to see 
advantageous in using TPS to improve implementation and enforcement of food safety regulation 
in China. However, the Chinese government at the same time kept control over the certification 
system. Establishing own respective government owned standards which were then benchmarked 
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against GlobalGAP and GFSI together with strict regulation for CB and foreign TPS were means to 
secure governmental oversight of the certification sector in China. 
5.6 Limited interaction between EU public actors and TPS 
The theoretical discussion suggested that interaction between the EU Commission and TPS may 
be another potential component of the causal mechanism explaining both actors’ behaviour. I 
understand interaction broadly, covering a continuum ranging from mere awareness to close 
cooperation (see chapter 2.2.2.3.4). The analysis is rather short as the main finding is that 
interaction is very limited. I discuss the finding for both the EU public and TPS perspective, 
starting with the former. 
5.6.1 Interaction from EU public perspective 
The EU Commission has a principal awareness of TPS and – to a varying degree – interviewees 
reflected the role TPS play in influencing China’s food safety regulation. However, there is no 
cooperation between the EU Commission and TPS in China. One EU Commission representative 
interviewed was not aware at all of GFSI (interview 30). DG SANCO and DG TRADE 
representatives were aware of TPS and GFSI but were decidedly reserved about any cooperation. 
They portrayed TPS as problematic. Firstly, because they potentially interfere with the work of 
DG SANCO in ensuring import safety (interview 2 and 25). Secondly, because they potentially 
distort trade due to their stricter requirements compared to public food safety standards (interview 
31). In this the DGs followed the EU’s position within the Codex Alimentarius, as one interviewee 
pointed out (interview 2). 
The negligence of TPS is reflected in EUCTP as well. During EUCTP I and EUCTP II there were 
no exchanges with private standard organisations (interview 1 and 3). One expert argued that 
interaction or cooperating with TPS was a too sensitive area, as the Chinese government would 
not accept it (interview 1): “And if I had a chance, and if I had a budget, I would very much get 
involved with them [private standards – the author] and invite them to every one of our activities. 
But I can assure you that I might run into a conflict of interest with the government of China. I 
might run into a conflict with them saying that we are the ones that...Even though the future is 
promising, for that, I think the status quo now in China doesn't allow us as a project... not to step 
our nose into that direction” (interview 1). EUCTP, interviewees argued, by its definition was a 
government-to-government project, not allowing for public-private cooperation (interview 1 and 
3). What happened in EUCTP more frequently is the invitation of specific business representatives 
as experts (interview 1 and 3). This indirectly established links for TPS as the examples mentioned 
in the interviews are experts representing companies that are active within GFSI – notably Metro 
and Carrefour (interview 1 and 3). What the interviewees did not refer to, was the fact that, 
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during EUCTP II, TPS were addressed as a topic in EUCTP activities. The Original Working Plan 
for EUCTP II specifically contains the objective C3e “Awareness raised on private standards and 
their impacts on food producing and international trade” (EUCTP, 2010, p. 294). In the same vein, 
a number of measures specified in the annual planning documents supposedly contributed to this 
goal (EUCTP, 2011a; EUCTP, 2012a; EUCTP, 2013a; EUCTP, 2014a). Thus, it seems that TPS have 
been discussed with some notable distance, not as a means to achieve food safety regulation, but as 
phenomena to be aware of. 
The EU Commission’s ignorance towards TPS occurred despite the fact that TPS contribute to 
supply safety by supporting implementation of international food safety approaches (and enforcing 
them). This happens via two already described ways. Firstly, the logic of TPS with the required 
certification puts an additional layer of enforcement on Chinese companies that supply to Western 
companies. Secondly, TPS show a strong will to conduct capacity building in China. Although for 
GFSI within the period under observation there are only limited capacity building measures 
implemented in China, with the view from 2016, it is possible to see that GFSI was working on 
establishing such projects (although not exclusively for China) (anonymous, 2015b, see 5.5.2). 
Accordingly, many sources re-confirm that TPS contribute to the implementation and 
enforcement of food safety regulation and thereby complementing public regulation or even 
filling a void left by insufficient public controls: 
 A representative of GFSI confirmed in a side talk during the 2015 GFSI Global Food Safety 
Conference in Kuala Lumpur that industry perceives implementation of food safety 
regulation as the strength of private standards and it “would not use certification systems, 
if state inspection and implementation would be sufficient to protect the own brand”.126 
 Likewise, Chen Junshi, representing CFSA, said that “GFSI standard guarantee 
implementation of government regulation” and “GFSI can significantly enhance food 
safety in China, if it plays it role like in other countries” (Chen, 2014c). 
 A representative of a Chinese food producer said “Especially in the beginning, Chinese law 
often provided unclear rules or specific rules for products were not established. In cases, in 
which the Chinese law was unclear, my company followed a number of regulations and 
international standards. One example for such standards is the GlobalGAP standard” 
(interview 40). 
 Even EU Commission officials reflect this view. One speculated that TPS are used to “to 
compensate for the abandoned public services” (interview 25). Another acknowledged that 
TPS are training suppliers. This was seen as helpful for exporting countries, so that they 
                                                          
126 Personal notes of a side talk with a GFSI representative on 4 March 2015 at the GFSI Global Food Safety 
Conference in Kuala Lumpur. 
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could meet EU requirements and were able to export more easily. The interviewee 
portrayed public and private influence on third countries as complementary in this regard 
(interview 31). 
The EU’s negligence of TPS seemed to root in the EU’s primary motivation for market access. A 
statement from one expert directly points in this direction: “if it was my project, I would interact 
with the private standard developer, straightforward. Because I think that it is the game that is 
going to prevail in the future. But because this project is come under government, I have to play 
these games. I have to play these games, because the medium term of this project is to harmonise 
the Chinese standards, you know. The official Chinese standards, you know, the ones that the gate 
opener is going to use to open the gate for international products. So, this is the game” (interview 
1). A further indication is that, in contrast to cooperating with TPS, cooperation with the private 
sector in general was seen as highly positive. An EU delegation representative stressed how well 
the European Chamber of Commerce in China (EUCCC) supports his work (interview 2). Similar, 
an EU Commission representative stresses the exchange with business associations (interview 30). 
EUCTP II Original Working Plan mentions coordination with Chambers of Commerce, but makes 
no reference to TPS (EUCTP, 2010). 
5.6.2 Interaction from TPS perspective 
The TPS perspective mirrors the negligence by the EU Commission. In principal, there have been 
several meetings and exchanges between GFSI and the EU Commission in Brussels, as reported by 
GFSI (GFSI, 2008b, p. 3; GFSI, 2009, p. 4). A GFSI interviewee claims that GFSI also has a 
partnership with DG SANCO and EFSA on food fraud (interview 29). However, specifically for 
China no such connection exists. For instance, EU officials did not participate in any of the GFSI 
activities in China (e.g. GFSI China Focus Days). Nor did GFSI representatives or GFSI documents 
suggest that involvement with EU officials in or about China as an objective.  
However, activities by EUCTP I interacted in an indirect manner with TPS. Several CB 
approached EUCTP I to discuss problems in setting up their business in China. This did not result 
in any further cooperation with EUCTP I (interview 3). What is more, EUCTP I was in close 
contact to the co-founder of Sino Analytica, the first privately run food testing laboratory which 
fulfilled western companies’ requirements and which developed into a CB (interview 3). EUCTP I 
also organized a study and a workshop on co-regulation between public authorities and food 
industry and possible lessons China could learn from the EU. This was part of the EUCTP support 
to implement the FSL (interview 32). Thus, EUCTP I activities indirectly supported TPS and their 
establishment in China. 
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5.6.3 Summary and discussion 
The interaction condition is only relevant for the SSH. For the interaction condition to be present 
in the case of EU public actors, one of two expectations must hold true: first, activities by TPS in 
China being portrayed as insufficient by EU sources; second, no or limited awareness of activities 
by TPS in China by EU sources. The expectations for TPS mirror those expectations with EU 
public actors instead of TPS. 
The above discussion, however, leads to the conclusion that the level of interaction is very low – 
no matter the type of interaction (see 2.1.3.3). From the EU Commission’s side, statements suggest 
that this is partly due to the generally critical judgement of TPS. The positive attitude towards 
collaboration with chambers of commerce and business associations is striking in this regard as it 
contrasts with the refusal to interact with TPS. Thus, the EU Commission is aware of TPS but 
rather ignores it, which – in effect – is similar to portraying their contribution to supply safety as 
irrelevant. This is despite the fact that numerous experts confirmed a supply safety void left by 
public regulation (see the discussion of the void in chapter 2.2.2.2.1). GFSI likewise shows no 
interest in interaction from their side. Even the awareness of EU public activities is low. This 
suggests that TPS do not expect any advantages in interacting with EU public actors on China. For 
the objective, GFSI is after, the EU Commission cannot be of any help. This in turn supports the 
observation that the drive for GFSI in China especially comes from a market access motivation. 
Ironically, a market access motivated expansion of TPS in China – as discussed in section 5.5 – 
may well indirectly contribute to improved overall supply safety. Efforts to improve food safety 
knowledge and practices in the Chinese market at least theoretically improve overall food safety 
and thus mitigate supply safety risks in the long run. To conclude, there is no evidence that 
interaction between both sides substantially influences their respective behaviour. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to verify whether the conditions for supply safety and market 
access hypothesis can be found. To this end, for each condition I briefly discussed the evidence 
supporting the expectations as defined in chapter 2.2.3.  
In a nutshell, the conditions support both hypotheses. The results for the condition trade and 
condition state of China’s food safety regulation as well as the findings for third parties allow for 
both hypotheses. A more decisive result derives from the detailed discussion of EU Commission’s 
and GFSI’s activities. It showed an emphasis on market access as a motivation in both cases. For 
the EU Commission, market access continuously sustained EU-China relation – on the negotiation 
level as well as on the level of EUCTP activities. This is where the EU pushed the hardest. In 
contrast, supply safety-motivated discussions appeared more irregularly. It is noteworthy and at 
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first sight in contradiction to the theoretical considerations in section 2.2.2 that the state of the 
CFSR as well as the perception of the deficiencies of the CFSR by the EU Commission did not lead 
to a bigger push for supply safety measures. At the same time, the analysis of the CFSR showed 
that – despite all reforms – fundamental food safety problems remained throughout the full 
period, especially with regard to implementation and enforcement. For GFSI and TPS in general, 
they fulfil their supply safety-function to the extent requested by market actors sourcing in China 
for other countries. However, this appears to be more of a passive development. An active 
involvement with decisive interest to push for TPS-development in China rather derives from the 
interest of Western companies to establish business within China.  
IGO activities contributed to the development of China’s food safety regulation, thereby 
increasing de facto food safety. In this context, especially WHO stands out as it contributed 
decisively to the development of the FSL, which (unintendedly) was in EU supply safety interests. 
Thus, IGOs’ engagement may have contributed to a reduced need for conducting supply safety-
oriented activities, especially in the view of the EU Commission.  
Notably, the focus on market access seems constitutive for the meagre interaction between the EU 
Commission and TPS. Market access for both follows separate specific needs and interests, leaving 
little areas of overlapping interest and potentially mutually supportive actions. Thus, the finding 
of hardly any interaction is another indication which supports the MAH. 
An additional major finding, however, brings in yet another explanatory element. China’s 
government plays a crucial role for both public and private actors. Activities conducted by EU 
public and private actors to influence China’s food safety regulation to a strong degree depend on 
whether the Chinese government is willing to let it happen. This is less surprising for the EU’s 
public involvement as this is the natural limitation of bilateral relations, as discussed at the outset 
of this analysis (see 2.2.2). What is more noteworthy is the Chinese government’s deliberate 
involvement in the development of TPS in China. Contrary to the argument that TPS are a 
market-mechanism, China’s government has brought itself in this regulatory realm by its specific 
regulation of CB and creating state-owned “private” standards. 
The retracing in this chapter analysed all causal components identified as potentially necessary in 
the research heuristic. However, the analysis so far is not sufficient to describe the causal 
mechanisms that explain EU’s activities to influence China’s food safety regulation. In other 
words, I have not yet identified the causal components sufficient to explain the outcome. I will 
now turn to this task in the following chapter. 
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The analysis in chapter 5 leaves us with an ambiguous result. Expectations for both hypotheses 
have been fulfilled. While I was able to show, that the MAH proved to be more relevant compared 
to the SSH, overall the analysis of chapter 5 only provides a partial answer to my question. It asks 
for the specific causal mechanisms that explain the outcome. With my research question, I have 
defined the outcome as the activities conducted by EU Commission and GFSI that aim to influence 
China’s food safety regulation. By answering this question in this chapter, I will complete my 
analysis. Building on the results of chapter 5, I discuss EU Commission and GFSI as well as supply 
safety and market access separately. This shall clarify, which components of the research heuristic 
are actually sufficient for the causal mechanism. Those observations with causal relevance that I 
derived from my analysis in chapter 5, but which have not been part of the research heuristic, 
play an important role. As it becomes clear in the following discussion, such observations were 
missing pieces in the re-tracing of the causal mechanisms. I first discuss the causal mechanisms for 
the European Commission and then turn to the causal mechanisms of the GFSI. This separation is 
a direct result of the finding in chapter 5, that interaction between both is very limited. 
6.1 The outcome-explaining mechanisms for the EU Commission 
As discussed in section 5.4, market access was the initial and sustained motivation of the EU 
Commission to influence Chinese food safety regulation. However, I also found supply safety-
motivated activities. The difference in timing and frequency of market access and supply safety 
access suggest that different processes and mechanisms were at work. In this section, I firstly 
introduce three factors, which I extract from the analysis in chapter 5. In the second section, I use 
these factors as missing parts to develop two causal mechanisms. The last section summarizes this 
section and combines both causal mechanisms to define one causal mechanism explaining the 
outcome for the EU Commission. 
6.1.1 Additional causal components 
I first show that supply safety motivated activities each needed a triggering event. I then proceed 
to discuss a second causal component that was necessary and sufficient to explain the EU 
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Commission’s activities that address supply safety problems. China, I argue, forestalls the EU in 
that it pulls for capacity building and training activities which support supply safety. It does so 
because of intrinsic motivation to improve food safety regulation in China. Lastly, I turn to the 
MAH. China’s reform process with regard to food safety regulation opened up an initially closed 
and opaque governance structure to outside influence. This was an essential factor leading to 
increased EU activities, thus providing windows of opportunities. 
6.1.1.1 Triggering events 
The EU-China dialogue and likewise the EUCTP activities shifted towards food supply safety 
objectives after the first series of major food safety incidents had occurred between 2003 and 2005. 
Especially the “Fuyang baby formula” incident and the “sudan red dye” incident stirred attention 
(see Table 1). During the same period, avian influenza reappeared as a topic in China, because in 
2006 a first human victim of H5N1 was confirmed retrospectively for 2003 (World Health 
Organization, 2017). In addition, during the same period, unsafe non-food imports from China 
became a topic, especially toys. Consequently, unsafe imports of consumer goods from China in 
general rose on the political agenda in the following years: 
Since early 2007, a crisis of confidence has developed around the world regarding 
products made in China. A series of product quality scandals involving items such as 
toys, toothpaste, pet food, and milk powder has resulted in a dramatic decline of 
confidence in Chinese products among global consumers. Of the concerns, food safety 
is the most serious. (Liu, 2010b, p. 244) 
It was with this development that food import safety gained more attention. This becomes 
especially obvious in the EU Commission’s stocktaking report of consumer protection (European 
Commission, 2007d). Notably, the MoU between DG SANCO and AQSIQ, which strengthened 
supply safety as a topic in EU-China relations, was signed in 2006. It was directed at product safety 
in general, including food safety (European Commission, 2007d, p. 19). How “hot” the topic was in 
this period is furthermore indicated by the sharp comment by trade commissioner Peter 
Mandelsohn at the 2007 Beijing Forum and the resulting éclat (see 5.4.1.5). As a further 
indication, EUCTP-activities with a supply safety-character became more frequent after 2007. 
This connection between specific supply safety problem and supply safety measures is also 
embodied in the EU Commissions procedure already described at length in section 5.4.3, which 
connects RASFF notifications, FVO audits with EUCTP-activities. Again, it needs a specific event, 
a trigger, for the EU Commission to engage in supply safety motivated activities. 
This trigger-effect seems not to be limited to EU public actors. As one interviewee explained, 
when food safety incidents occur, international actors tend to coordinate better: “Most of the 
activities that I see where people get together, like, FAO or WHO, the World Bank, are when we 
had a crisis. You know, like the avian flu crisis. You have an immediate crisis so everybody gets 
together” (interview 1). What is more, a similar process can be found for Germany, which 
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redirected the aim of its long-running SGFSP in 2012 towards supply safety, after the Chinese 
strawberries sickened German pupils (interview 23). Crucially, the connection between a 
triggering event and supply safety-motivated activities also explains the erratic appearance of such 
activities throughout the whole period of observation. 
The observation of a trigger-effect fits well with another observation. In this line of thinking, 
triggering events were necessary, because the Chinese government was rather reluctant to agree to 
activities which directly addressed supply safety issues when the EU pushed (interview 2 and 25, 
see also 5.4.1.4 and 5.4.3). In fact, it seemed to have been seen rather critical by the Chinese side, 
when supply safety-induced topics had been brought by the EU side: “No matter how much DG 
SANCO told them that any domestic crisis would affect their international market. They believed 
that they could quarantine all of their companies and farms that were exporting. And they could 
make sure that export criteria, export standards were very high. But they couldn’t of course do it 
across the board so they didn’t want to include the domestic market” (interview 3). Actual cases of 
food safety incidents put the necessary additional pressure on the Chinese side to agree to 
measures improving supply safety. The reported reluctance furthermore is notable as it contrasts 
with the logic discussed in the next part, where China pulled for support. Thus, we need to 
distinguish activities pushed for by the EU and which were motivated by supply safety interests 
from activities with supply safety characteristics sought after by the Chinese side.  
6.1.1.2 The pull factor 
The above described steadiness of market access motivation and un-steadiness of supply safety 
motivation (see 5.4) especially can be observed in high level dialogue and strategy papers. On the 
level of concrete activities, especially within EUCTP, the picture becomes less clear. The reason, I 
suggest, is that the trigger-logic does not explain all instances of supply safety activities. Especially 
the list of EUCTP I and EUCPT II activities leaves a large number of activities, which rather 
contribute to supply safety than to market access but for which I could not find or assume any 
specific EU interest in this activity. The answer to this phenomenon lies in the motivation of 
China’s government to request for capacity building measures. In other words, the Chinese side 
actively pulled for support from the EU to conduct measures with supply safety effects.  
The pressure on the Chinese government to improve food safety was immense (interview 23 and 
pre-interview 10) and – as I recap in detail in section 3.3 and 5.2 – it was active in stepwise 
reforming regulation at latest since 2003 when having created the SFDA. Chinese academics and 
government representatives stressed the country’s need and strong will to learn from Western 
approaches especially during that time (interview 15, 19, 20, 21 and 32). This corresponds with the 
perception of European and Chinese interviewees alike that a substantial part of the EU’s activities 
to support China’s food safety regulation go back to requests from Chinese authorities (interview 
1, 2, 32 and 34). As one EU expert said: “When China started to look at the implementation of the 
law [FSL – the author], it realized that it created a monster. Officials of Chinese institutions were 
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overwhelmed because there were too many things which had to be installed and set up. Officials 
signalled that it is too much work (pre-interview 5). Other interviewees confirm this tendency by 
pointing out that China generally strongly pulled for knowledge in food safety matters (interview 
12, 13, 20, 30 and 38). In addition, China’s early and sustained participation in BTSF further 
substantiates this assessment (see 5.4.2.2). The reform process leading to and implementing the 
2009 FSL was an important driver for this pull from China. It created a substantial demand for 
capacity building to put the new law into practice (interview 1). In this sense, the trigger-effect 
reappears in an indirect manner, as the Chinese reforms, especially the 2009 FSL, themselves had 
been the result of China’s food safety crises (interview 18, see also 5.2.1).  
There is an obvious overlap between EU’s interest in supply safety and China’s interest in 
domestic food safety improvements: “So, I would say, the intentions, the basic principles that are 
motivating, are the same in both countries. It has to do with the food safety for the population, 
which has such strong implications in the political business, the political management of a 
country. I mean, in Europe, when something happens with food safety it shakes the country, the 
continent – the horse meat, E.coli. And a minimum of incidents come forward. What is going on 
in this country [China – the author], and around this country is a mess […]. So, I think the 
objectives are the same” (interview 1). Ge Zhirong, former Vice Minister of AQSIQ, confirmed 
this Chinese position when addressing Chinese and international participants at the 2014 CIFSQC. 
He pointed out, that there was still a gap of food safety in China, especially compared to the first 
world. He proposed to enhance cooperation and exchange of opinions and expertise through 
international cooperation to resolve this situation. In this context, he specifically demanded that 
advanced economies “need to give more support to poor countries”, especially with regard to 
technical assistance (Ge, 2014). Teng Jiacai, Vice Minister of CFDA, argued similarly at the 2014 
GFSI Focus Day in Beijing (Teng, 2014). 
It is not only the internal pressure for better domestic food safety that drives this logic. Likewise, 
China’s own interest in food export motivates China to request for capacity building, because the 
better Chinese regulation matches with EU requirements, the better the export opportunities for 
China (interview 28 and pre-interview 10). As an EU Commission representative said: “If you see 
that China has also some problems, from an SPS point of view, with bringing goods in safety to 
other markets like the EU, there are plenty of opportunities that they are begging for a better 
understanding why we block certain products and what would be our motivation and justification 
behind. And it's one of the first things in a bi-lateral discussion that I say there is. The question is, 
why do you block it, what is your legislation behind, what is your motivation behind? You have 
detected problems, what are the analytical matters that you use, can you share your knowledge 
with us because we have a different approach because we don't find anything and when we bring 
it to your market you find products or substances which we were looking for but did not find” 
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(interview 31). Another interviewee confirmed that the Chinese are highly interested in help 
from the EU to solve problems of exporting to the EU due to too many notifications (interview 1). 
In 2008, an EU study found that Chinese agri-food exports to the EU had been much below the 
expectations by the Chinese due to rejections based on SPS-issues (Fischer et al., 2008, p. 25). The 
strong interest by the Chinese government to improve food safety regulation because of pertaining 
problems with unsafe export is furthermore stressed by an expert from the East Asian Institute in 
Singapore, who argued in 2007 that “They [the Chinese government – the author] will not let a 
tiny percentage of bad exports damage their reputation.” (Kahn, 2007). This topic prevailed. An 
AQSIQ speaker at the 2014 CIFSQC in Shanghai also pointed out that China had to step up its 
capacities to meet export market requirements. In 2016, rejections of Chinese food at EU borders 
endured, indicating the remaining need of alignment (Whitworth, 2016). 
There are indeed numerous instances in which the Chinese interest in a specific activity 
conducted by the EU Commission is stressed. For example, Yu Jun, Deputy Director General of 
Bureau of Food Safety Integrated Coordination and Health Supervision, MoH is quoted in the 
EUCTP I achievement report, saying: “The EUCTP activities highlighted EU practices and 
approaches for food safety risk assessment and risk surveillance which is relevant to China’s own 
challenges to develop a strong food safety system” (EUCTP, 2009, p. 7). In accordance with this 
general statement, China’s specific interest is presented as the reason for a number of EUCTP II 
activities. For example, a large part of the series of activities directed at increasing China’s 
capacities for animal diseases, especially the nine activities supporting the China Field 
Epidemiology Training Programme for Veterinarians are a response to a request by MoA (EUCTP, 
2012c). 
The discussion showed, that there are several reasons why the Chinese government has interest in 
support from the EU. This is relevant for the bigger picture: Regardless of where the specific 
motivation lies with the Chinese government, the more it has an intrinsic interest in stepping up 
on food safety regulation, the less the incentive for the EU to actively push for supply safety-
measures. 
6.1.1.3 Windows of opportunities 
A third finding is that it were specific situations in restricted periods of times which made actions 
possible, a phenomenon often referred to as window of opportunities. The extent to which the EU 
Commission was able to conduct measures to influence China’s food safety regulation was highly 
dependent on the Chinese side. This firstly is due to the fundamental logic of diplomatic relations, 
that a consent needs to be achieved for cooperation between two state actors (as already discussed 
in chapter 2). However, there is a second, China-specific factor that increased this dependency. 
The complex organisational setup and fragmentation of China’s regulatory competencies (as 
described in 3.3.2 and 5.2) prevented effective action. EU interviewees complained that unclear 
responsibilities hindered them in taking action (interview 1, 3, 30 and 38). This was also a specific 
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problem for the EUCTP. In this regard, a reoccurring theme in the interviews are the unclear 
distribution of responsibilities for food safety regulation between Chinese ministries, the related 
unwillingness of these Chinese ministries to collaborate and the negative impact on effectivity of 
cooperation (interview 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). Two quotations from interviewees from the EU side 
referring to different points in time illustrate the degree to which the fragmentation affected 
cooperation with the Chinese side. For the years of EUCTP I (2004-2009), an interviewee said: 
“The main problem I had in dealing with the ministries was that the Ministry of Agriculture was 
always the major stumbling block. In that the Ministry of Agriculture considered itself the most 
important policy ministry and so therefore it had great difficulty discussing issues with AQSIQ. 
[…] We could not possibly organise a meeting which had representatives of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and AQSIQ” (interview 3). Another interviewee, referring to discussing specific 
market access topics with Chinese governmental organisations in a later period stated: “So, first 
you have to clearly understand the steps, then to see who is doing what, and this, for me, it’s one 
of the difficult situations in China, to know to whom to speak” (interview 4). 
Crucially, when China started its reform process, this situation improved with subsequent changes 
in the organisational structure of food safety regulation in China (interview 1, 8 and 38). As an 
EU-expert with view on the time after 2013 argues: “I think that through the last year we've seen 
a light of reform, that is basically giving us a better picture of who is in charge of what. Maybe 
we'll be in a better position to act with respect to certain issues. Because I think that previously 
there was a lot of effort put in the wrong institutions. And the institutions were just taking 
advantage of that, of those wrong efforts” (interview 1). What is more, China’s extensive request 
for capacity building and training that came with the reform process and which has been 
described already above created the opportunity for the EU to engage with the Chinese on food 
safety related matters. This thus provided an entry point for starting discussions, potentially also 
on EU’s interests. An EU Commission representative refers to this as windows of opportunities 
which the EU needed to use, in order to exert influence on China’s food safety regulation: “But we 
have to invest our cooperation now because we have a window of opportunity to promote our 
own rules so that the Chinese when they adopt new rules they would in the best case replicate 
those rules which are totally identical to ours. Or at least not too far. […] So, they admire very 
much our system and they request us to help them. That’s why as I told you before I believe that 
we have a window of opportunity now to influence the review of the new rules on food safety by 
the Chinese authorities” (interview 2). An EU expert directly involved in negotiating, planning 
and implementing EU Commission’s food safety-related activities in China describes this logic in a 
similar manner: “And when you're trying to do something here you have to be able to sense where 
the [Chinese] government wants to go. And in order to do that you just got to educate yourself 
really, the programmes and all these things, and if that makes sense according to the rest of the 
world. […] So, if you see that the government of China is going into a plan, a programme that 
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makes sense in comparison. The best thing that you can do is, just join the mainstream, you 
mainstream your programme” (interview 1). Likewise, for the EU, the Chinese early reform 
process starting in 2004 with the research project conducted by WHO, ADB and SFDA opened up 
a window of opportunity. An EU representative at the time referred to it as “just a useful 
serendipitous time” (interview 3). For instance, EUCTP supported the 2004 DRC conference in 
Beijing (EUCTP, 2009). The project also organized European input to and comments on the 
Chinese Food Safety Law, which was drafted at that time (interview 3). EUCTP also provided 
input to the WHO/SFDA-2007-report which was a major building block of the 2009 FSL by 
sending a DRC delegation to the EU for them to “to learn about food safety developments, 
including the process of food safety system reform and food safety policies issues” (EUCTP, 2009, 
p. 33). Likewise, the EUCTP organised a meeting with the “chief drafter” of the 
WHO/ADB/SFDA-report for EU and Chinese officials to learn about and discuss the main 
suggestions for food safety regulatory reform (EUCTP, 2009). The FSL draft was translated and 
distributed to European stakeholders by the EUCTP to enable the European side to comment on 
the draft. EUCTP itself did provide input and comments to the FSL during the public consultation 
period (interview 3). Notably, a German representative involved in a national project with China 
gives exactly the same view when asked what facilitated her project: “It was just at the right time 
and it were the right topics. MoH, CDC and AQSIQ (at a later stage) were highly motivated to 
participate and to learn” (interview 23). The important point is that the Chinese reform process 
not only led to a pull for EU expertise. It thereby also created the (window of) opportunity for the 
EU Commission to bring her interests and topics in.  
6.1.1.4 Summary 
Beyond the pre-defined elements discussed in chapter 5, the analysis revealed three additional 
components relevant for the causal mechanism explaining EU Commission’s activities to influence 
China’s food safety regulation. Firstly, instances, which clearly demark EU interest in supply 
safety were reactions to triggering food safety incidents. Secondly, a larger number of activities, 
which in effect contributed to supply safety, were sought after by the Chinese side. Thirdly, 
China’s regulatory reform process was crucial in providing the EU Commission with windows of 
opportunity to influence China’s regulation. The Chinese government was looking for ways to 
effectively improve food safety regulation. Therefore, it was open to outside approaches and 
suggestions. These three additional factors need be considered when depicting the full causal 
mechanism in the following part. 
6.1.2 Causal mechanisms 
I now turn to the question, how all the causal components connect with each other to form a 
causal mechanisms which establish a causal link between the interest of the EU in safe food supply 
on the one hand side and market access on the other with the outcome of EU Commissions 
influence on China’s food safety regulation. From the wealth of historical data and experts’ 
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information, I can distract two causal mechanisms. First, the trigger-mechanism is only concerned 
with supply safety and presents the exception to the rule. Second, the deal-mechanism describes 
the mechanism which sustains the EU-China relationship over the whole period. In this deal, the 
EU Commission trades with China the provision of know-how and training with the opportunity 
to engage with China on specific issues. I proceed by presenting each of the mechanism and how 
its parts interact with each other in a causal manner. 
6.1.2.1 The trigger mechanism 
The central part of the trigger mechanism has already been described above (see 6.1.1.1). Here, I 
integrate this causal link into the full process. Starting point is the EU Commission’s interest in 
supply safety (causal part 1, see Figure 16), which I could confirm in principle in my analysis (see 
chapter 5). This interest in itself is not sufficient to explain any activity by the EU Commission to 
influence China’s food safety regulation. Arguably, for the mechanism to take effect, also Chinese 
exports to the EU needed to exist (causal part 2). Yet another necessary part of the causal 
mechanism is the state of China’s food safety regulation – as identified ex ante in section 2.2.2 
(causal part 3). I can now specify this part. The general observation of food safety problems in 
China is necessary but itself not sufficient. What leads to further steps by the EU Commission, are 
especially critical incidents – i.e. food safety scandals. Initially, such critical incidents have been 
domestic food safety scandals in China which drew the attention to the severity of the problems in 
China. This came in conjunction with increasing import safety problems in non-food consumer 
products, fuelling the overall fear of unsafe imports from China. Admittedly, no document or 
statement clearly stated this connection between triggering event and actions. However, the 
timely proximity is striking between the occurrence of first incident in China and the sudden 
appearance of supply safety in EU-China relations. In addition, further findings support my 
interpretation. I was able to show the same causal mechanism for specific products and food 
safety-problems. For example, rising RASFF notifications (being the trigger) for food contact 
materials or aflatoxins in peanuts led to activities by the EU Commission. The important point is: 
without a trigger, the EU Commission would not have pushed for measures to influence China’s 
food safety regulation which especially increase supply safety (causal part 4). The EU Commission 
pushed for specific activities, like FVO missions and EUCTP activities, to influence China’s food 
safety regulation with the objective to mitigate the import safety problems. 
It is important to note, that in cases like dairy products, such exports did not exist, because the EU 
already had issued an import ban based on SPS grounds. The possibility of blocking Chinese 
imports is the last part of this mechanism. It explains, why China agreed to engage in the specific 
activities pushed for by the EU side, although it initially often was less interested. The interest of 
keeping access to the EU market motivated Chinese authorities to consent to EU suggestions 
(causal part 5). This in turn means that the trigger-mechanism explains activities for which the 
interests of the Chinese side in exporting food to the EU overlap with the interest of the EU side in 
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safety food imports. Again, the activities on aflatoxins are a case in point. An interviewee argued 
that the interests of the EU and China on the topic of aflatoxins in peanuts “match perfectly” and 
according activities by the EU created a “win-win situation” (interview 1). 
6.1.2.2 The deal-mechanism 
The second mechanism describes the more fundamental process. It connects especially China’s 
pull for support with the EU Commission’s interest in market access in one causal chain. It 
answers the questions, why the EU reacted positively to a pull by the Chinese side and why the 
Chinese side reacted positively to EU’s market access motivated activities. In contrast to the 
trigger-mechanism, the Chinese specific interest and the EU Commission’s interest did not 
converge, because here I am not looking at instances in which China asked for specific support in 
export-related matters. This mechanism describes and explains how both sides reached agreement 
on activities which initially were not in both sides interest (see Figure 17).  
The initial causal component is the EU Commission’s market access interest, which I discussed at 
length in 2.2.2.2.2 and which continuously appears as a topic in the EU-China food safety-related 
exchanges in 5.4. The second part of the causal mechanism establishes an actual market access 
problem. Only when China hinders EU exports to China, the EU Commission initiated market 
access motivated activities. From EU side, this appears as a lack of harmonisation with 
international or more specifically EU state of food safety regulation. As the analysis showed, this 
problem appears with regard to specific product or product groups. Here, a sufficient interest in 
trading this product with China is needed within the EU to identify it as a priority topic for 
discussions with the Chinese side (causal part 3). The following parts of the causal mechanism are 
based on the above discussion of the window of opportunity (6.1.1.3) and establishes the deal-
character: China experienced massive problems with its food safety regulation and therefore 
conducted a fundamental reform process (causal part 4). The reform process was possible, because 
WHO and ADB provided substantial support (causal part 5). However, China’s government 
needed additional support and the depth and width of the reform process led China’s government 
pull for further expertise and support from outside, including from the EU (causal part 6). 
Importantly, activities deriving from this pull also supported supply safety issues. In other words, 
this mechanism explains the list of pulled supply safety measures identified in Table 19. At the 
same time, the EU Commission approached the Chinese government with suggestions for 
activities to support China’s food safety regulation, however directed at improved market access 
(causal part 7). 
At this point an additional part 8 needs to be added to the mechanism which relates to the IFSR. 
As discussed in part see 3.4.2, the international food safety regime is the reference point for 
internationally accepted rules and approaches for food safety regulation. With the WTO requiring 
China to harmonize with these concepts, especially the risk analysis approach, China pulled 
strongly for expertise and support in this regard during the reform process. In other words, the 
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international food safety regime indirectly defined, what China pulled for (causal part 8). As 
discussed further below, this is a necessary causal part of the mechanism as it provided the basis 
for technical exchanges between the EU and China.  
The EU used the pull by China for expertise and support during the reform process to bring in its 
own market access-related topics in measures which still served the Chinese interest. This resulted 
in an exchange, which can be characterized as a deal (causal part 9). This deal was implicit but also 
explicit at times. As one interviewee stated: “[…] most of the time we are dealing with two topics 
at the same time more or less because you know the Chinese it’s always ‘I give you this, but you 
give me that’” (interview 2). Another EU expert explicitly describes how this mechanism had been 
established: “The EU at that stage when I started working with them in 2004 was just so many 
light years behind the other major agricultural trading countries - the South Americans, 
Americans, Australia – that I had to look for something which was a, to use a Chinese term, a win-
win for both sides and that would allow us to talk about agricultural issues and allow us to work 
on them. And [something] that in terms of the aid programme would look as if it was really being 
of assistance to China and also issues that China was very interested in working on itself” 
(interview 3). What is traded in this deal is the EU’s technical knowledge, regulatory expertise and 
experience in implementing international food safety standards against the opportunity to 
influence China’s food safety regulation so that existing trade barriers vanish – a logic, one EU 
Commission representatives has described as a “long term investment” (interview 31). The deal 
becomes apparent in specific EUCTP activities. For example, in a study visit on the topic of “EU 
regulations, standards, production practices and safety of medical specialties derived from milk” in 
May 2012 Chinese government officials from MoH and AQSIQ received information that helped 
the implementation of a new Chinese standard. At the same time, it supported the Chinese 
understanding of EU regulation in this field and “increased their awareness of the rigorous EU 
regulatory and technical systems in place to produce safe milk for general and FSMP use”. Also 
“European public and private institutions became better acquainted with the standard 
development and enforcement procedures in China” (EUCTP, 2012b). With this the EU could 
hope for lowering export problems of infant formula and related products to China. Likewise, 
EUCTP conducted a number of workshops on the implementation of food safety standards. This 
supported the MoH in its task to revise food safety standards after the introduction of the FSL. At 
the same time, it provided the EU Commission with the opportunity to raise specific market access 
related issues. For example, in a workshop in November 2011 on food additives also included the 
sub-topic of wine standards formulation. As described in part 5.4.1, wine and alcoholic beverages 
were a market access issue for the EU Commission and here especially the Chinese assessment of 
additives was an issue.127 The deal logic also extends beyond single activities. For each year, the 
                                                          
127 Specifically, for the EU, the Chinese zero-tolerance of phthalates was a problem (interview 1 and 2, see 
also 5.4.2). 
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Chinese and EU partners in the EUCTP agreed on a set of activities, which represent a mix of 
activities representing Chinese and EU interests (see appendix 8.4).128 Thus, the window of 
opportunity deriving from China’s reform process was a window of opportunity for striking give-
and-take-deals. 
Importantly, the concept of risk analysis and more specifically the methods of risk assessment 
provided a basis on which both sides could agree. The EU Commission clearly has a strong interest 
in pushing China’s food safety regulation into the direction of higher convergence with the risk 
analysis-approach. This is exemplified by a statement of an EU Commission representative who 
pointed out that integrating the objective of increased risk analysis-based regulation in China in 
the joint 2020 strategy paper was a major success (interview 2). A more risk analysis based 
approach by China would reduce market entry barriers as interviewees argued for the cases of beef 
(BSE) and pork (swine fever) (interview 1 and 2).129 At the same time, China generally has a strong 
interest in building up capacities in risk assessment since this helps fulfilling international 
requirements (interview 19, 21 and 32). The transfer of knowledge on how to apply, conduct and 
implement the risk analysis concept seems to be an essential link between the motivations of both 
countries to cooperation on food safety regulation in a long term. Thus, the concepts developed by 
the IFSR facilitate the cooperation between both sides as they provided the basis for the deal. 
6.1.3 Summary and discussion 
In this section, I first discussed three additional causal components to then integrate them in two 
causal mechanisms which explain the EU Commission’s influence on China’s food safety 
regulation. The trigger-mechanism explains supply safety-motivated influence. It shows that 
incidents which raised the EU Commission’s attention to supply safety risks led it push for 
activities addressing this problem. There are in fact several instances in which this mechanism 
occurred during the observation period. The deal-mechanism explains additional activities with 
supply safety character and activities with market access character. It shows that the reform of 
China’s food safety regulation led the Chinese government pull for support to harmonize 
regulation with international approaches, leading to activities with facto supply safety 
characteristics. This also created the opportunity for the EU Commission to include their market 
access topics in their specific support activities. The distinction of two mechanism is analytical. In 
reality, both causal mechanisms were connected. This point has been made by an EU official: 
“China they self – for some of the difficult long-standing issues we have – see it also as one of the 
steps necessary for them to lift the ban […]. It's these technical changes and they are quite used to 
say, let's create a working group, bring the experts around the table and discuss one day or a half 
day on this particular topic. So, it's an argument which is used on both sides, both for offensive 
                                                          
128 As discussed in 6.1.1.2, EUCTP activities marked as supply safety also reflect Chinese interests. 
129 Which is also reflected in the EUCTP activities on these two topics. 
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[meaning “market access” – the author] and defensive [meaning “reduction of trade barriers on 
one’s own side” – the author] issues, so. And it does not work if there is no interest by one of the 
parties to sit around the table” (interview 31). What this means is, that in exchanges between the 
EU Commission and the Chinese government, the supply safety and market access issues were 
dealt with in conjunction. A second connection of both causal mechanisms is depicted in Figure 
16. For both mechanisms, the deficient state of China’s food safety regulation was a necessary part 
of the causal mechanism. This confirms my initial thoughts that the state of China’s food safety 
regulation was of major relevance for EU-China food trade. 
The heuristic model introduced in section 2.2.3 suggests that the state in China’s food safety 
regulation, trade and third parties play a role in the causal mechanism.130 Indeed, all three 
reappear in the two causal mechanisms. As for trade, it remains a necessary condition. The EU 
Commission’s activities to influence China’s food safety – regardless whether motivated by supply 
safety or market access – are connected with trade between both markets. More specifically, I was 
able to show that product-specific trade and is relevant for specific activities. However, the 
analysis does not reveal a more general causal connection between changes in trade volume and 
intensity in activities by the EU Commission. While higher trade export and import volumes co-
occur with more EUCTP activities, interviews and documents did not suggest a causal connection 
between both. As for the state of China’s food safety regulation, a clear causal connection could be 
identified. For the SSH, the trigger-mechanism ascertains that the (deficient) state of food safety 
regulation in China is a necessary condition for EU public actors’ supply safety-directed activities. 
The mechanism furthermore specifies the causal connection. It is not the overall and broad 
situation of insufficient food safety regulation in China, but the occurrence of specific incidents 
and/or specific cases which were necessary. With regard to the MAH, the state of China’s food 
safety regulation likewise is part of the causal mechanism. Firstly, as discussed in part 2.2.2.2.2, 
lack of harmonization of China’s food safety rules created trade barriers for EU exports. Secondly, 
the reform process resulting from China’s fundamental food safety problems created the necessary 
opportunity for exchanges between EU and China on food safety regulation. Third parties’ 
engagement to support China’s food safety reforms only appears as a causal condition in the deal 
mechanism, as described in detail in part 6.1.2. Beyond that, IGOs or any other third parties’ 
activities to influence China’s food safety regulation do not play a role. What was rather 
remarkable, was the limited awareness of interviewees representing the EU commission of third 
parties’ activities.  
Lastly, I predicted that the respective motivation for supply safety and market access are necessary 
conditions. Here, a differentiation needs to be made. At first, the assumption holds true for both 
                                                          
130 As discussed in 5.7, I already excluded “interaction” from further analysis due to the very limited findings 
for any interaction. 
The outcome-explaining mechanisms for the EU Commission 
 
209 
mechanisms. It needed the specific motivation by the EU Commission to conduct activities 
addressing supply safety issues. Likewise, market access-oriented activities required the distinct 
motivation to act. However, the analysis showed that a large part of activities which supported a 
supply safety-objective did not need the respective motivation by the EU Commission, because 
they were sought after by the Chinese side. Specific supply safety-directed activities by the 
European Commission needed a respective specific motivation in product- or risk-specific 
instances. Expressed in formal terms, the trigger-mechanism and the deal-mechanism both are 
sufficient but not necessary to explain the full set of supply safety-activities. 
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Figure 16: Causal mechanisms explaining outcome for analysis of EU Commission 
(Source: own) 
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6.2 The outcome-explaining mechanisms for the GFSI 
This section mirrors the preceding section. I first review the analysis of section 5.5 to point out an 
additional factor relevant for the causal mechanisms explaining GFSI behaviour. Again, the pull 
for support from the Chinese side played an important role in the development. In the second 
part, I proceed by defining two causal mechanisms – one explaining supply safety motivated 
activities and another explaining market access motivated activities. Finally, I discuss the findings 
and recap the extent to which the initially identified factors contribute to the causal mechanisms. 
6.2.1 Additional causal component: Pull for TPS support 
The Chinese government also pulled for support from private actors to develop food safety 
regulation in China. Representatives from Western businesses report that Chinese authorities 
approached them repeatedly with requests for support (interview 6, 7 and 37). Notably, it also was 
the CNCA which approached GlobalGAP to learn about certification systems (interview 8 and 11). 
Chinese government’s interest in GFSI firstly rested on its interest to improve domestic food safety 
(as discussed above in 6.1.1.2). It pulled for GFSI and other TPS’ support, because TPS provide 
additional resources and ways to improve implementation and enforcement of food safety 
regulation. Audits can fill the void of insufficient state inspections. In fact, the Chinese 
government discovered voluntary standards and 3rd-party certification as one method to improve 
the situation and therefore created CNCA. As one GFSI expert explained: “My personal […] 
judgement […] is that China will come up with the solution towards GFSI [about the then 
pending China HACCP benchmarking – the author], because they have no other choice. They 
have no other choice. They have the same prisoner’s dilemma as everybody else: they just don’t 
have enough state inspectors to protect the whole country” (interview 26). Another GFSI 
representative confirmed that the Chinese government was very interested in capacity building, 
especially with regard to inspections (interview 29). A Chinese government representative 
confirms: “The government authorities alone can do little, therefore 3rd party certification is 
needed” (interview 36). The revision of the FSL in 2014 reconfirmed that the Chinese government 
perceives private approaches as part of the solution. The revised version introduced the concept of 
shared responsibility including the obligation of food businesses to ensure food safety 
(Kottenstede, 2014). The connection between this concept and the pull for GFSI-support becomes 
apparent in remarks made by Chinese companies’ representatives. With reference to this new 
regulation, representatives of Cofco and Vanguard, both GFSI members, stressed during the 2013 
CIFSQC in Beijing that GFSI had helped them to fulfil their legal obligation to take responsibility 
(Wan, 2013; Jiang, 2013).131 Accordingly, Teng Jiacai, Vice Minister of CFDA thanked GFSI at his 
speech during the 2014 GFSI Focus Day in Beijing “for support in improving food safety in China 
                                                          
131 COFCO is a Chinese state-owned company and the country’s largest food processor, manufacturer and 
trader. Vanguard is a retailer and belongs to Hong Kong based company China Resources. 
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und the world” and demanded that more Chinese companies should get involved in GFSI (Teng, 
2014). 
As discussed for the pull-factor in the public realm, China is also interested in TPS because 
certification facilitates food exports for Chinese producers. “If China HACCP is benchmarked 
against GFSI, it will be much easier for Chinese food producers to export their product”, argues a 
representative of the Chinese government (interview 36). The same point has also been made 
publicly during the 2014 GFSI Focus Day in Beijing by Liu Weijun, Vice Director of CNCA, as 
well as Gu Shaoping, Director of CNCA, during the 2013 CIFSQC in Beijing (Liu, 2014; Gu, 2013). 
6.2.2 Causal mechanisms  
I am now able to depict the causal mechanisms explaining the behaviour of TPS in China. The 
pull-factor is a necessary part of the causal mechanism explaining TPS market access-motivated 
behaviour. Before turning to this mechanism, I first describe the causal mechanism which 
illuminates the process leading to supply safety-motivated activities. 
6.2.2.1 Standard TPS-mechanism 
The first causal mechanism that explains influence of TPS in China mirrors the inherent logic and 
functioning of TPS in general, as explained in 2.2.2.1.2. Western, especially European, companies 
require their Chinese suppliers to obtain certificates of specific TPS (causal part 1). Thus, Chinese 
companies who wanted to export to the EU needed to obtain such certificates (causal part 2). As 
part of this certificate, CB conduct audits and thereby influence the way such Chinese companies 
are de facto regulated (causal part 4). Between causal part 2 and causal part 4, I include an 
additional China-specific part of the causal mechanism. As discussed in 5.5.2, Chinese companies 
and CBs circumvented Chinese regulation of certifications (causal part 3). If they would have 
followed Chinese regulation, proliferation of TPS in China would have been less. 
I refer to this causal mechanism as the standard TPS-mechanism, because it firstly describes the 
functioning of TPS for which they have been created for. This secondly also points to the fact that 
this mechanism has not especially been applied to China or Chinese suppliers. Quite to the 
contrary: the mechanism applies globally and simply was extended to China once the first Chinese 
suppliers applied for certifications. Thirdly, it is standard, because it represents the repeated and 
ongoing mechanism which is constantly iterated in the relationship between TPS and China.  
Lastly, there is an analogy to the import ban by the EU Commission. Chinese supplier can only sell 
to the EU, if there is demand from Europe. As one interviewee explained, especially for fresh 
produce, European retailers still widely refrain from sourcing in China at all because of food safety 
and related reputation risks (interview 6).  
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6.2.2.2 Localisation-mechanism  
The analysis in section 5.5 revealed that market access was the more dominant motivation for 
GFSI to become active in China. This points to a second, separate causal mechanism. It starts with 
the companies which are steering TPS and their interest in operating on the Chinese market 
(causal part 1). Secondly, in China they were confronted with suppliers which did not fulfil their 
requirements and a public regulation which did not sufficiently guarantee protection from unsafe 
food supply. In other word, they identified the state of the CFSR as deficient (causal part 2). In 
order to protect themselves from unsafe supply and associated risks for their reputation, the GFSI 
pushed for the proliferation of TPS in China (causal part 3). At this point in the causal mechanism, 
the Chinese government comes in. For the same reason for which the Chinese government pulled 
for the EU Commission’s support, namely the internal pressure to improve food safety, it was open 
to more TPS engagement in China (causal part 4). In addition, the Chinese government was 
confronted with a situation in which its certification- and TPS-regulation was de facto widely 
ignored (causal part 5). By establishing state-owned voluntary standards which were then 
benchmarked by GlobalGAP and GFSI respectively, the Chinese government achieved a 
localisation of TPS as with this, the benchmarked state-owned standards played or are likely to 
play the dominant role on the Chinese market (causal part 6 and 7).132 At the same time, the 
Chinese government limited the extent to which certificates are issued in China for un-licensed 
TPS, potentially restoring governmental control over the certification business (cf. Kottenstede, 
2017). Because of the adaption of GFSI and GlobalGAP to the Chinese regulatory circumstances as 
it is expressed in the benchmarking of CNCA-standards, I refer to this causal mechanism as the 
localisation-mechanism. 
6.2.3 Summary and discussion 
As for the EU Commission, I traced two causal mechanisms to explain GFSI behaviour. The first 
illustrates the process which confirms the SSH. As pointed out, it is a confirmation of the 
anticipated logic with which TPS regulate Chinese companies. Thus, I was able to partly confirm 
my theoretically deduced assumptions about TPS influence in China. It is the application of a 
globally used mechanism to China. In fact, this causal mechanism increases the confidence in the 
regulatory power of TPS. As discussed, TPS occurred in China despite Chinese legislation 
hindering their proliferation. The second causal mechanism represents the stronger dedication to 
influence China’s food safety regulation deriving from the motivation to access the Chinese 
market. Here, the Chinese government’s pull for support provided the necessary basis for GFSI to 
further establish TPS in China. It opened up and clarified the regulatory situation for TPS in 
China. Figure 17 depicts how both causal mechanisms are connected. It shows that the strict TPS 
                                                          
132 This can already be observed for ChinaGAP as the benchmarking was completed earlier. For 
ChinaHACCP, however, the benchmarking was only confirmed in 2015, so that no effects could be 
observed. 
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regulation in China is a necessary part in both causal mechanism. The interpretation is straight 
forward: The standard mechanism represents a short-term solution which developed in the 
certification market. The localisation mechanism represents a long-term approach to the same 
problem, potentially diminishing the relevance of the standard mechanism. However, this highly 
depends on the reliability of Chinese voluntary standards and Western companies trust in them 
(cf. Kottenstede, 2017). 
Two aspects need a short discussion in this regard. First, especially for the GFSI, the actual 
influence deriving from this causal mechanism on China’s food safety regulation remained rather 
hypothetical by the end of the observation period. While the causal mechanism provides an 
answer to the research question, why GFSI took action to influence China’s food safety regulation, 
GFSI can only claim very limited de facto influence. To date, it remains an investment to this end 
with unknown return. Secondly, to the extent to which GFSI’s activities (will) impact the 
behaviour of Chinese suppliers with regard to food safety, they tend to positively affect EU’s 
import safety. The argument is: GFSI advocates and requires food safety regulation based on 
Western standards (see 2.2.2.1.2). It thereby supports the proliferation of food safety-expertise and 
increases the food safety understanding, knowledge and capacities at the basic production level in 
China. This, in the long run, contributes to increasing the overall level of food safety in China. 
This far from being a certain development, but nevertheless a theoretically plausible development. 
When reflecting the conditions defined in the heuristic model on the outset, the different causal 
role played by the CFSR stands out. In contrast to the initial assumption, the state of CFSR is not a 
necessary condition for the SSH. Instead, as the analysis has shown, the standard TPS-mechanism 
had been used regardless of China’s food safety regulation as a default mechanism which generally 
applied to suppliers around the world. As for the localisation-mechanism, the principal 
assumption held true. The state of CFSR was a necessary condition. Trade, more specifically 
imports from China, are necessary for the standard TPS-mechanism, as they cause the request for 
TPS-certification in China. The last condition addresses the motivation of the actors. The 
motivation appears indirectly in the standard TPS-mechanism. There is no motivation necessary 
to specifically protect consumers from China’s food safety risks. It rather is part of the more 
fundamental considerations, why European companies require TPS-certifications from their 
suppliers in general. In contrast, the motivation to establish TPS in China was necessary condition 
for the localisation-mechanism. The information provided especially by interviewees does not 
suggest that GFSI’s activities in China were only due to request by the Chinese government. 
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Figure 17: Causal mechanisms explaining outcome for analysis of GFSI  
(Source: own) 
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6.3 Conclusion 
For the EU Commission and GFSI, I traced two causal mechanisms each. In both cases, one 
mechanism explains the SSH while the other explains the MAH. I was able to do so only after 
having identified causal parts from the empirical data presented in chapter 5. The conditions 
derived from the theoretical discussion in 2.2.2 were not sufficient to explain the full process.  
Between the public and private strand there are striking similarities in the causal mechanisms. 
First, in both cases the domestic food safety problems of China and the resulting pressure for 
improvements played an important role in facilitating EU activities which influenced China’s food 
safety regulation. For the EU Commission, the Chinese government’s own reform process created 
the window of opportunity. GFSI’s influence especially grew out of the interest of Western 
companies to access the Chinese domestic market and it was answer to the persisting domestic 
supply safety problems. Second, the causal mechanisms explaining the dominant MAH in both 
cases include some sort of arrangement with the Chinese government. This shows that an 
explanation of the EU’s influence on China’s food safety regulation cannot forego a consideration 
of the Chinese government’s motivation and behaviour.  
The fact that I was able to confirm and at times also to specify the conditions pre-defined in my 
research heuristic shows that the model helped to look at relevant causal parts. At the same time, 
it proved to be vitally important to conduct the research in an explorative manner, because it was 
only with this approach that I was able to identify causal components which I previously had not 
anticipated and which proved to be essential for describing sufficient causal mechanisms. 
However, the opposite is also true: some aspects I deemed to be important based on my theoretical 
reflections, played a minor role in the analysis of chapter 5 and chapter 6. The differentiation 
between product and process safety did not prove useful for the analysis as it has not provided 
additional insights. Yet another difficulty in the analysis resulted from the inconclusiveness of 
some observation. The information obtained did not always allow the differentiation made in my 
theoretical considerations. It proved difficult to distinguish the content of activities based on the 
separation of regulation in different components. In most of the cases, be it interviews or official 
documents, the terms technical support or capacity building are used. However, especially 
capacity building is inconclusive since it may relate to overall regulatory approaches, formulation 
of rules and standards, specific implementation aspects or knowledge for enforcement. Likewise, 
the reference to risk analysis or risk assessment being the content of activities is inconclusive. It 
may refer to including risk analysis in the regulatory approach (agenda setting) or the technical 
questions of application (implementation), to name two examples. There is one exception though: 
while implementation and enforcement appear less in the interviews and joint statements, the do 
more so in the 44 FVO reports. This indicates that implementation and enforcement are more 
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relevant from a supply safety perspective than from market access perspective, which is in line 
with my theoretical argument in chapter 2. 
In its pure form, outcome-explaining process tracing should produce one causal mechanism 
explaining a specific historical outcome. There should be only one repetition for the causal 
mechanism. Multiple instances of a causal mechanism rather point to generalizability. As the 
discussion in chapter 5 and 6 suggest, my findings lie somewhere in between. For all four 
mechanisms, I can claim that they explain the outcome for a specific historical configuration. 
With China having improved especially its technical knowledge in food safety, this specific 
situation has already changed. At the same time, the mechanisms have been iterated multiple 
times. The melamine crises led the EU Commission to push for more exchanges with the Chinese 
government on supply safety in general, but RASFF notification also triggered supply safety 
measures at later instances. Market access topics have been part of EUCTP-negotiations for each 
year. The TPS standard mechanism has taken place countless times for each certificate issued. 
Even the localisation of Western TPS via benchmarking has occurred twice, namely with 
GlobalGAP and GFSI. Thus, I suggest thinking of the four mechanisms as an abstract formulation 
of mechanisms that occurred multiple times and variations during the observed period. 
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7 Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
In this case study, I examined the activities undertaken by the EU Commission and the GFSI have 
undertaken to influence China’s food safety regulation since 2001 and the reasoning behind these 
activities. My starting point were two empirical observations brought together: China posed an 
exceptionally high risk to global food safety supplies and at the same time, the EU conducted 
intensive activities in China on topics related to food safety. Based on a review of the academic 
discourse on regulatory interdependence, I argued that the relationship between EU and China 
with regard to food safety and food trade is a special case, because it hardly falls within the 
categories used in theories about regulatory interdependence. Existing research had focused on 
regulatory interdependencies between highly regulated major markets (e.g. between USA and EU, 
Lofstedt and Vogel, 2001) or between developing countries and highly regulated countries. China 
escapes this categorization, as it possessed a food safety regulation equal to developing countries 
but already had become a major market. I therefore used the existing theories to develop a 
research heuristic which allowed me to approach the case in a theory-guided but nevertheless 
explorative manner. The ultimate aim was to identify the causal mechanisms by means of process 
tracing which explain the observation described above. 
The research heuristic suggested two possible motivations and their necessary conditions. The 
starting hypothesis is that the EU indeed became active in order to improve the safety of food 
imports (supply safety hypothesis). This reflects regulatory interdependency which derives from 
physical externalities. The discourse about regulatory interdependence additionally identified 
regulatory externalities. This led to a second hypothesis, namely that the EU’s activities served the 
purpose of gaining better market access (market access hypothesis). As I showed in 2.2.2.2.1 and 
2.2.2.2.2, both hypotheses are based on theoretical arguments and both specifically apply to the 
case of China. I argued that, against conventional wisdom, existing instruments for import safety 
may not be sufficient and that China potentially poses a specific severe risk. In addition, the SSH 
makes China a crucial case: If no evidence for the EU to influence China’s food safety regulation 
based on supply safety motivation can be found, this hypothesis is very unlikely to hold true for 
any other case. Likewise, I demonstrated that there is a case to be made for an explanation based 
on market access interests. The combination of an enormous market size with a preserved and 
widely different eating culture and diet and a lack of regulatory answers to changing eating habits 
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and its associated Western food products potentially causes negative regulatory externalities for 
countries which want to export to China.  
The review of literature on regulatory interdependence furthermore points to the increasing 
relevance of non-state forms of regulation, which partly emerged as an answer to the challenges 
deriving from globally spread supply chains. TPS have especially gained prominence in the food 
sector, which at least partly results from EU regulation stressing businesses’ responsibility to 
ensure food safety. Therefore, I extended both hypotheses and analysed how and why the EU 
Commission (representing EU public side) and the GFSI (representing TPS side) took actions to 
influence China’s food safety regulation between 2002 and 2014. My focus was on analysing this 
one special case in depth, with the conviction that a mechanistic understanding of causality can 
provide insights variable-based methods typically do not. The aim therefore was to identify by 
means of process tracing the causal mechanisms that provide an answer to these questions. Based 
on information gathered from 52 interviews with Western and Chinese experts, participation in 
13 food safety conferences and 428 documents, I retraced the processes.  
7.1 Essential findings: importance of economic interest 
The study showed that the necessary expectations for the pre-defined conditions in my research 
heuristic (see 2.2) were fulfilled for both hypotheses. The importance of food trade in both 
directions was high or even rose over time. The state of China’s food safety regulation gave reason 
for both supply safety- and market access-directed actions by EU actors. While IGOs were active 
in China and supported measures to increase supply safety, their actions were not seen as 
sufficient. Even more, IGOs partly were partners for EU actors to influence Chinese food safety 
regulation. However, the analysis revealed a decisive imbalance between the specific motivations. 
Market access clearly was the more dominant motivation for the EU Commission as well as TPS to 
influence China’s food safety regulation. It was more dominant especially as it has been pursued in 
an active manner. Supply safety plays a secondary, albeit not irrelevant role. The hypothesis that 
China, with its deep and far reaching food safety problems and rising food export position triggers 
import safety measures by the EU therefore needs to be put in context. As for the EU Commission, 
supply safety activities exist, but they are more of reactive nature and limited to short phases. In 
principle, the EU trusts its established import safety regime based on the monitoring based on 
RASFF, FVO audits and import bans and only selectively conducts China-specific activities. As for 
TPS, the balance between supply safety and market access is similar: TPS initially occurred in 
China as part of companies’ usage of third party-certification to protect themselves against supply 
safety risks. However, the more intense activities to boost TPS in China derived from the market 
access motivation. Companies behind TPS, especially the GFSI, wanted to safeguard their domestic 
business in China against supply safety risks within China. Summed up, economic motives were 
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the dominant drivers for influencing China’s food safety regulation. Thus, the answer to the 
research question, what motivated EU actors, can by answered by paraphrasing the popular words 
of the former US president Bill Clinton: It was the economy, stupid!  
Finding 1: EU Commission’s and TPS’ activities to influence China’s food safety regulation 
overall were rather motivated by economic interests than supply safety interests. 
A second finding of the analysis was that the Chinese government had an own interest in 
improving domestic food safety regulation and entered into a reform process to this end which 
stretched over about 10 years. This led to two phenomena which affected the EU’s activities. On 
the one hand, it provided a window of opportunity for the EU Commission’s push for their food 
safety-related interest. Because the Chinese government was in the process of changing regulation, 
it was more open to listen to suggestions how to change it. On the other hand, as part of the 
reform process, China’s government actively sought external expertise to build its own capacities 
with regard to developing regulation as well as implementing and enforcing it. This pull for 
support affected the EU Commission as well as TPS. In the case of the EU Commission, activities 
have been conducted on topics requested by the Chinese side. Such topics addressed issues 
relevant to improve China’s domestic food safety regulation. In other words: China requested 
activities, which (at least indirectly) contributed to improving the EU’s supply safety. This in turn, 
reduced the need for the EU Commission to push for activities increasing supply safety. In a 
similar vein, the CNCA pulled for support in establishing China HACCP as a voluntary standard in 
China. While this was not against the GFSI’s plan, this development was driven by the Chinese 
government.  
Finding 2: Chinese government authorities pulled for support from the EU Commission and 
TPS to improve the country’s food safety regulation. This explains a substantial part of 
activities by the EU Commission and TPS that appear to be directed at improving supply 
safety. 
I furthermore found that IGOs contributed to the development of the EU Commission’s activities. 
They supported the reform process and thereby contributed to the window of opportunity. In this 
regard, especially WHO’s involvement in the run-up to the FSL was helpful for the EU 
Commission and its EUCTP to connect with the reform process. In a similar, but less prominent 
manner, FAO enabled activities during the second phase of the EUCTP. What the analysis did not 
find, is any evidence for the anticipated potential effect that IGOs support of food safety 
regulation in China was a cause for less EU public or TPS involvement. Thus, in sum, IGOs’ 
involvement appears to have been a necessary only in the sense that the WHO and ADB 
contributed to China’s regulatory reform.  
Finding 3: WHO’s and FAO’s support of China’s food safety regulation reform provided a 
window of opportunity for the EU Commission. 
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Lastly, the data showed virtually no relevant interaction between the EU Commission and TPS. In 
fact, it is the mutual negligence which is striking. The most we can consider as interaction is the 
standard TPS-mechanism complementing the EU Commission’s import safety measures. By 
standard TPS-mechanism, I refer to the third party certification-system which are the essential 
element of TPS. However, especially from the EU Commission’s side this interaction had not been 
acknowledged which makes any influence on their behaviour questionable. Rather, the non-
interaction seems to reflect the dominant market-access-motivation, as market access does not 
provide grounds on which interaction makes sense. In market access, the interests of the EU 
Commission and TPS simply do not overlap. 
Finding 4: EU Commission’s and TPS’ actions were not substantially affected by interactions 
between both sides. 
The analysis thus provided me with different causal parts, partly as specification of the ex-ante 
defined conditions and secondly as a result of the explorative research and as an addition to the 
hypothesized research heuristic. With this set of causal components, I identified four sufficient 
causal mechanisms with each explaining a part of the outcome. Two mechanisms explain the EU 
Commission’s activities, two the TPS activities. The trigger-mechanism explicates the EU 
Commission’s supply safety-induced activities and denotes that it needed triggering incidents for 
the EU Commission to take action. Such incidents were either the broad appearance of unsafe 
imports of consumer products from China or import safety issues with specific foodstuffs. The 
more dominant mechanism describes a deal between the EU Commission and the Chinese 
government. Both sides had to agree on specific activities (or a set there of). This is the central 
element of this mechanism. Both sides needed to see their interests served in such activities. This 
led to a number of activities which served supply safety objectives, but effectively were requested 
by the Chinese government which needed such support as an answer to internal pressure to 
improve food safety regulation. In return, the EU had the opportunity to conduct activities 
directed at market access issues. Often, activities combined both elements. 
Finding 5: The activities conducted by the EU Commission to influence China’s food safety 
regulation which were motivated by supply safety can be explained by a trigger-mechanism. 
 
Finding 6: The activities conducted by the EU Commission to influence China’s food safety 
regulation which were motivated by market access can be explained by a deal-mechanism. 
With regard to TPS, the first causal mechanism reflects the standard mechanism that is built in 
TPS and justifies their existence. TPS occurred in China, because Western buyers requested their 
suppliers to provide certificates for TPS. It thus was a direct result of supply safety motivation. 
However, it had not been a supply safety consideration specifically directed at China but the result 
of general approach. While this only led to a limited development of TPS in China, it already 
occurred in a grey zone. Foreign CBs had issued certificates for western TPS in China without the 
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TPS being licensed as required by the strict Chinese regulation. The second mechanism explains a 
by far more active and directed development that aimed at increasing TPS proliferation in China. 
It rests on market access motivation of Western companies to enter the Chinese market mainly to 
serve the Chinese market. Just as they utilized TPS to safeguard themselves against food safety 
risks and associated reputation losses in the EU and other markets, they aimed at establishing this 
logic in China as well and adopted it to local circumstances. The driving actor is the GFSI which 
represents the majority of the most relevant TPS for food. 
Finding 7: The activities conducted by TPS to influence China’s food safety regulation 
which were motivated by supply safety can be explained by a standard TPS-mechanism. 
 
Finding 8: The activities conducted by TPS to influence China’s food safety regulation 
which were motivated by market access can be explained by a localisation-mechanism. 
7.2 My findings in context: contributions to the theoretical discourse 
With this study, I thus contributed to the wider discourse and understanding of the logics of 
regulatory interdependence. Now, I first briefly discuss the potential limitations of my research 
and then proceed by pointing out that my findings indeed deliver contributions to the wider 
theoretical discourse.  
It lies in the nature of a single case study and more precisely the purpose of an outcome-explaining 
process tracing approach that its results cannot be generalized. As I have argued in chapter 4, the 
argument rather goes the other way around: Given the historical specific circumstances of my 
case, any attempt to approach it with generalizable theories risks overseeing specific attributes. 
The result of this study illustrates exactly this point. The case was chosen as a crucial case for the 
SSH. The initial argument was as follows: If one accepts the argument that China presented an 
especially drastic case of import safety risks, we can conclude that in no other instance the EU 
would set out to influence a trading partner’s food safety regulation to improve supply safety. The 
analysis, however, showed that China’s own interest to improve food safety regulation – an aspect 
in the causal mechanism not anticipated – may indirectly have catered to the EU’s objective to 
improve import safety. Another potential limitation of my research seems to have limited effect 
on the overall results. I excluded other nations’ (e.g. the USA) activities to influence China’s food 
safety regulation from the analysis. However, asked for other actors involved in supporting China 
with changes in its food safety regulation, the interviewees showed little awareness of such 
activities and attached little importance to it. A potentially more problematic limitation lies in the 
fact that my analysis concentrated on the EU Commission.133 A full EU influence on China’s food 
                                                          
133 The concentration on the GFSI is much less problematic as it indeed represented the major TPS and 
included their activities (see 4.3). 
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safety regulation would need to include member states’ activities as well. First of all, this, would 
have exceeded the scope the of this paper, as individual process would have needed to be traced. 
Secondly, a concentration on the EU Commission can be justified as this is the organisation 
primarily responsible for food import safety. If anything, member states are likely to act in their 
individual market access interest.134 The theoretical considerations for the SSH thus would make 
less sense for member states. 
Yet another limitation roots in the empirical situation. The information available from EU public 
actors and TPS are substantially more detailed than the information from Chinese sources (see 
discussion in 4.4). This is especially true for interviews. In any case, especially for foreign 
researchers without an affiliation to Chinese institution, it is more time consuming to organize 
interviews. In many cases, interviews are impossible. This reflects a principle problem with 
political systems like in China which can be characterized as more hierarchical, less transparent 
and in some areas simply opaque. The answer to this situation, however, should not be to avoid 
research. Due to the research question, which focusses on the EU-side and its motivation, this 
study did not rely on Chinese governments’ insights too heavily and thus was only partially 
affected by this limitation. 
The understanding of case study research reflected in this study assumes that no single piece of 
research can claim to have untangled the complexity of social realities. Instead, this is the constant 
task of social research, to add evidence to further the validity of theoretical claims (cf. George and 
Bennett, 2005, pp. 90–91). Therefore, the potentially promising path for future research lies in 
following up on the potential theoretical suggestions which derive from this study. Again, the 
objective of this study was to explain a specific outcome and the findings cannot be readily 
transferred to other cases. However, the findings relate to specific aspects of the existing 
theoretical discourse on regulatory interdependence and transnational regulatory governance. 
First, the fact that China pulled strongly for support in upgrading its food safety regulation poses 
the question for the exact reason for this pull. As discussed, there indeed was domestic pressure. 
However, export may have played a role, too, as my data indicated at numerous points. In order to 
further validate the claim that market size matters in regulatory interdependence, more research 
on the exact reasons for the specific changes in China’s food safety regulation are needed. If indeed 
the objective of increased export played a major role, the condition of relative market size would 
need to be specified more. An in relation larger export market had been a necessary condition for 
the California effect and other theories which long to explain convergence of a smaller economy’s 
                                                          
134 Several separate pieces of information confirm this theoretical consideration: firstly, an EU document 
discussing market access mentions that member states had diverging interest with regard to the market 
access for specific products to China and thus would pursue their objectives individually; secondly, I came 
across several instances of member state activities on food safety with clear market access direction (e.g. by 
Denmark and Italy, interview 12, anonymous, 2015a; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2012). 
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regulation to the regulation of a bigger market. My findings suggest that export interests may play 
a relevant role between markets of similar size, too. Here, theories of policy transfer (Dolowitz 
and Marsh, 2000), policy learning (Haas, 1992) and lesson learning (Rose, 1991) could be helpful, 
as they take the perspective of the state which adopts a specific policy. These theories and their 
case studies provide insights how and why policies in one country derive from policies to a similar 
problem in another political country.  
The deal-mechanism reveals a striking similarity to the California effect from yet a different 
perspective (Vogel and Kagan, 2004). The California Effect describes how business interests lead to 
the stricter regulation in their home country as a result of trade. The findings here suggest another 
connection between business interests and changes in regulation. As for the California Effect 
Vogel and Kagan (2004) argue that market A adjusts its regulation in a specific field to the 
regulation of (the bigger and stricter regulated) market B because companies in country A depend 
on sales to market B. The mechanism is straight forward: the exporting companies in market A 
have a strong incentive to join with other interest groups to fight for regulation as strict as in 
market B, because this provides them with an advantage over their competition which is not 
fulfilling the stricter regulation. Thus, the California Effect argues that exports lead to a “trading 
up” (Vogel, 1995) of regulation in the exporting country. In contrast, in the case presented here, 
export interests lead to changes in the country exported to. The objective is to “harmonize” with 
the exporter’s regulation. The desired changes often represent a “trading down” in which Chinese 
regulation hindered EU exports because it was stricter than the corresponding EU regulation. In 
case of pththalates, for example, the EU Commission longed for a less strict maximum residue level 
in spirits. However, in the case of China, this was not necessarily always the case. In many cases, 
according standards for specific western products did not exist at all. 
The results presented in the previous chapters hint to another aspect discussed in regulatory 
theories. As discussed, market access seemed to be the dominant motive in comparison to supply 
safety. This suggests that business interests (in sales) prevailed over consumer interests (in health 
and safety). This in turn connects to Mancur Olson’s logic of collective action and the resulting 
argument that special interests are organized more easily and therefore tend to succeed in 
influencing regulation over broader interests which are less easily organized (Olson, 1971). Thus, 
my findings reflect the theory of regulatory capture in general (as discussed in chapter 2) and 
confirm that this logic applies beyond national borders as suggested by Büthe and Mattli (2013). 
Lastly, there are also points to be made for further research in the field of transnational regulatory 
governance. My findings help to further specify the vividly discussed hybridization of food safety 
governance in the EU and beyond (Verbruggen and Havinga, 2017). As for the EU, on the one 
hand, TPS de facto do regulate imports to the EU from China by demanding certification. On the 
other hand, I observed a decisive indifference between actors of both sides. This suggests that 
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there is room for more effective co-regulation (cf. Garcia Martinez et al., 2007). In a much more 
indirect sense, however, my research hints to a potential connection between the European 
Commission strand and the GFSI strand in the analysis. The EU Commissions exchange on food 
safety topics with the Chinese government may have contributed to the Chinese interest in GFSI. 
This hypothesis rests on the judgement that the Chinese government specifically followed the EU 
example when including the private responsibility for food safety in the 2014 revision of the FSL. 
This would imply, that China-EU exchanges on food safety had contributed to this regulatory 
change in China. At the same time, China – government as well as food companies – need to find 
practical answers, how Chinese food businesses can fulfil this new obligation. TPS and GFSI offer 
an answer to this question. This may have contributed to the interest of the Chinese government 
and Chinese major food companies like Cofco and Vanguard in GFSI. In short, a transfer of the 
EU’s concept of business responsibility for food safety to China may have been an essential 
element in driving GFSI and voluntary standards in China. My research cannot confirm this 
connection, but it would be an interesting connection worth following up on by scholars 
researching hybridization of regulatory governance as it would imply a transfer of “hybridization-
policy”. In any case, further research is needed to understand the emerging Chinese variant of 
hybridization of food safety governance, which rests on benchmarking state-owned voluntary 
standards by Western TPS (Kottenstede, 2017).  
7.3 Final reflections 
This study is an appraisal of a specific configuration between 2001 and 2014 and my findings are at 
least partly bound to the specific circumstances during this period. Changes in the circumstances 
may quickly alter the causal mechanisms. It seems the greater dynamic for change will come from 
China due to its ability to swiftly develop and implement new solutions on a wide scale. If there is 
the political will, little is impossible in China, it seems – whether it is relocating more than 1 
million people to build a damn (Chao, 2004) or the fast introduction of electric cars (Winton, 
2017). However, one should not be too confident about the progress of China’s food safety 
regulation. As described, the challenges are massive and the problem complex as well as deeply 
tied into the economic structure of the country. Still in 2017, basic problems like the disastrous 
hygienic situation in Chinese wet markets has not been solved (Minter, 2017). The government 
faces two rather cruel trade-offs: firstly, between economic development and costly 
environmental improvements which would mitigate the pressure on food safety and secondly 
between growing sufficient food for 1.3 billion people (at the risk of unstable safety) and safe food 
(at the cost of reduced productivity). Furthermore, as the melamine case showed, the risk of 
political priorities of the Communist Party of China (CPC) overruling food safety concerns 
remains (McGregor, 2010). As long as such cover-up approaches are likely, trust in any food safety 
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regulation can hardly be built – nor with trading partners and most likely neither with the 
Chinese public. However, Western risk perception research tells us, that a mere technical solution 
of risk regulation is insufficient. In order to achieve a socially accepted regulation of risks like food 
safety, trust is an essential component (Slovic, 1993). 
Thus, changes may also come from another side. Chinese consumers have increasingly become 
impatient with the enduring food safety problems (Wang, 2013). For some products like infant 
milk powder, those who can afford it, import them from outside of China (Wang, 2012). The 
perception and acceptance of risks – including food risks – seem to change, especially in the 
middle-class where ecologically and locally grown food become increasingly popular (Coonan, 
2013; Grassegger, 2013; Little, 2014). In rural areas organic farming grassroots movements emerge, 
partly with evangelistic attitudes, that perceive themselves as answer to the food safety problems 
they consider part of a wider set of negative social issues in modern China (Cody, 2016). All these 
aspects led scholars to wonder whether China is developing into a post-industrial risk society, in 
which technological modernisation is increasingly perceived as a risk to personal health and 
environmental safety (Thiers, 2003; Suttmeier, 2008; Yan, 2012).135 In the USA and the EU, 
transparency and participation have widely been proposed and often been implemented as 
answers to the question how to deal with critical perceptions of risks (Lofstedt, 2010; Renn, 2015). 
In the current political system of China, such approaches can hardly be imagined.136 So how can 
China ever reach a food safety regulation which does not lead to (perceived or real) food safety 
risks? What are the implications for regulatory interdependencies? Will China ever be willing, for 
example, to provide information similar to those shared by EU member states within the RASFF 
system?  
Such questions become much less speculative as they seem at first, when considering the 
discussions about free trade agreements with China. Switzerland has already led the way and 
established a free trade agreement with China (anonymous, 2014). With a USA currently 
withdrawing from concepts of free trade, already existing ideas about a similar free trade 
agreement between EU and China may gain new momentum (Maurice, 2016). Such bilateral trade 
arrangements increase the need for bilateral understandings, procedures and agreements for 
regulatory interdependencies, like food safety. At the same time, advancements in China’s food 
safety and regulatory capacities may soon change the balance between the EU and China. The 
deal-mechanism is not likely to last long. The more China has developed its own capacities, the 
less it is interested in outside advice and the less open it will be to outside influence. 
Internationally agreed standards like those provided by the IFSR are crucial for achieving a mutual 
understanding. A potentially diminishing role of the WTO and changing global power relations 
                                                          
135 Risk society is a concept developed by Ulrich Beck (1986). 
136 Although Tracy argues that in a wider, multifunctional and multimodal understanding some progress in 
transparency has been made in China (2016). 
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may also change the nature and results of the “food fights” (Post, 2005) in institutions like the 
Codex Alimentarius, where China is already leading to important working groups. Besides, the 
question is, what difference the private level of food safety regulation will make under such 
circumstances. The localisation-mechanism for TPS in China has only started. With no changes in 
the preferences of the Chinese government, the establishment of private food standards further 
consolidates the importance of private food safety regulation in the global food supply.  
All these aspects are highly political in their consequences. In the end, the question is who profits 
from the specific dealings with regulatory interdependencies. Do business interests overrule 
consumer interests in safe food to an undue extent – or vice versa? With a diminishing role of the 
WTO, rising influence of China in the debate on how to deal with food safety and the increase in 
bilateral trade agreements, the balance between consumer protection and free trade may need to 
be renegotiated. While many aspects of the future are uncertain, one basic logic is likely to 
remain: as long as the EU trades with China, the question how physical and regulatory 
interdependencies are managed with this country remains crucial. 
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8 Appendix 
8.1 Interviews 
Table 17: List of pre-interviews 
No. Affiliation Date & Time Place 
1 German public organisation 15.12.2011, 1pm-1.30pm Berlin 
2 European retailer 23.03.2012, 10.30am-12.00 Shanghai 
3 German public organisation 27.03.2012, 12.30pm-2pm Beijing 
4 EU public organisation 14.05.2012, 12.30am-1pm Shanghai 
5 EU public organisation 07.06.2012, 4.15pm-5.45pm Beijing 
6 German public organisation 08.06.2012, 12.15pm-2pm Beijing 
7 European certification body 11.06.2013, 10am-11pm Shanghai 
8 EU public organisation 01.11.2013, 3pm-5pm Beijing 
9 EU public organisation 02.11.2013, 12.20pm-3pm Beijing 
10 Chinese academic 05.11.2013, 2pm-2.45pm  Beijing 
11 Chinese private company 15.11.2013, 4.15pm-5pm Shanghai 
(Source: own) 
Table 18: List of interviews 
No. Affiliation Date & Time Place 
1 EU public organisation 29.04.2014, 3pm-4.40pm Beijing 
2 EU Commission 01.05.2014, 4pm-5.20pm Beijing 
3 EU public organisation 02.05.2014, 10.30am-12.10pm Beijing 
4 Private standard organisation 29.04.2014, 3pm-4pm Beijing 
5 Private standard organisation 14.05.2014, 11am-11.50am Cologne 
6 European retailer 04.06.2014, 3.15am-4.35am Düsseldorf  
(by phone) 
7 European retailer 03.06.2014, 9am-10.22am Shanghai 
8 German public organisation 11.06.2014, 7pm-8.06pm Frankfurt  
(by phone) 
9 European certification body 12.06.2014, 9.30am-10.10am Shanghai  
(by phone) 
10 Private standard organisation 18.06.2014, 10.10pm-11.50pm Cologne  
(by phone) 
11 Private standard organisation 05.11.2014, 1pm-1.40pm Shanghai 
12 Expert from EU member state 
government 
05.11.2014, 3.30pm-3.40pm Shanghai 
13 Chinese government 05.11.2014, 6.15pm-6.25pm Shanghai 
14 European food producer 10.11.2014, 12.30pm-2pm Shanghai 
15 Chinese university 19.11.2014, 3.10pm-3.50pm Beijing 
16 European industry association 01.12.2014, 12.40pm-2pm Shanghai 
17 EU member state government 18.12.2014, 10.40am-12.15pm Berlin 
18 Chinese government 26.01.2015, 8.20pm-9.20pm Beijing 
19 Chinese government 27.01.2015, 10.25am-11.20am Beijing 
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20 Chinese university 27.01.2015, 5.20pm-5.50pm Beijing 
21 Chinese government 28.01.2015, 10.20am-11.00am Beijing 
22 German public organisation 28.01.2015, 1.15pm-1.40pm Beijing 
23 German public organisation 29.01.2015, 11.45am-12.30pm Beijing 
24 European certification body 04.03.2015, 10.10am-10.55am Kuala 
Lumpur 
25 EU Commission 03.03.2015, 6.10pm-7.10pm Kuala 
Lumpur 
26 Private standard organisation 04.03.2015, 5:45pm-6.30pm Kuala 
Lumpur 
27 Private standard organisation 05.03.2015, 3.30pm-3.50pm Kuala 
Lumpur 
28 German public organisation 05.03.2015, 6pm-6.45pm Kuala 
Lumpur 
29 Private standard organisation 20.03.2015, 11.30pm-12.20am Paris  
(by phone) 
30 EU Commission 24.03.2015, 10.40am-11.20am Brussels 
31 EU Commission 25.03.2015, 11.10am-12.15pm Brussels 
32 Chinese university 04.05.2015, 3.20pm-4.10pm Beijing 
33 Chinese certification body 05.05.2015, 11.30am-12.30pm Beijing 
34 Chinese retailer organisation 06.05.2015, 2.30pm-3.30pm Beijing 
35 International governmental 
organisation 
07.05.2015, 10.25am-11.55am Beijing 
36 Chinese government 08.05.2015, 10.15am-11am Beijing 
37 European retailer 05.11.2013, 12:1am5-13pm Beijing 
  06.11.2014, 10am-11:15am Shanghai 
  13.12.2016, exchange via email  
38 German public organisation 09.02.2016, 3pm-4pm Bremen  
(by phone) 
39 German public organisation 28.06.2016, 10am-12pm Berlin 
40 Chinese private company 01.10.2016, 2.15pm-3.30pm San 
Francisco 
(phone) 
41 International Governmental 
Organisation 
26.10.2016, 3pm-3.45pm Beijing 
(phone) 
(Source: own) 
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8.2 Questionnaires 
8.2.1 Questionnaire European public/private organisation 
Question Specification 
 What is the background and purpose of your 
(organizations) activities in China with regard 
to food safety?  
 
 What role does safeguarding European 
consumers from unsafe food play? 
 What role does trade facilitation play? 
 On the Chinese side, who are your partners?  
 Who else is active in supporting China’s food 
safety regulation and what do they do? 
 Did this change over time? 
 Which are the most important actors and 
relationships for your work beside Chinese 
partners? 
 What are the core themes you are discussing 
with the Chinese side? 
 
 Do they include one of the following: policy 
ideals/goals | Institutions | 
regulatory/administrative/judicial tools| 
ideas/ideologies | personnel? 
 To what extent are you involved in China in 
agenda setting | rule formulation | 
implementation |monitoring |enforcement 
 Did the focus of your work change over 
time? 
 To what degree are your activities due to 
requests from the Chinese side? 
 Please describe the expectations from your side 
and Chinese side to your organisations 
activities in China and the differences between 
both. 
 What are examples for especially diverging 
interests? 
 Did this change over time? 
 In which areas have you been most successful 
and what proofed to be too difficult to 
accomplish? 
 What are major achievements? 
 
 Which were critical, important moments in 
working with the Chinese side? 
 
 What circumstances particularly facilitate or 
hinder your activities?  
 
 Where and how do you exchange with other 
actors?  
 
 How do the activities by European companies / 
European government organisations to support 
China’s food safety relate to your work? 
 How has the relationship with other actors 
developed in quantity and quality? 
 Who would you recommend interviewing 
further? 
 
 
8.2.2 Questionnaire Chinese expert 
Question Specification 
 When Chinese government organisations 
exchange and collaborate with European or US 
organisations about food safety: What kind of 
expertise are they specifically interested in? 
 Are Chinese government institutions 
interested in expertise in risk assessment, 
rule-making, implementation, monitoring, or 
enforcement? 
 How did this change over time? 
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 How does the interest in collaborating on 
China’s food safety differ between Chinese 
government organisations and foreign 
government organisation? 
 How did this change over time? 
 What are the specific measures and activities of 
exchange and cooperation between Chinese 
government organisations and European or US 
organisations? 
 How did this change over time? 
 Is exchange and collaboration with EU and US 
organisation more based on China’s request or 
their request? 
 
 How did this change over time? 
 
 Which European countries are in your 
experience most active in supporting China’s 
food safety and how does this compare to the 
US?  
 How did this change over time? 
 
8.2.3 Questionnaire third party 
Question Specification 
 What do you/your organisation do to support 
China’s food safety? 
 
 Did this change over time? 
 
 Are your activities based on sourcing food in 
China or providing food to China? 
 Did this change over time? 
 To what degree are your activities due to 
requests from the Chinese side? 
 
 Did this change over time? 
 Please describe the expectations from your 
side and Chinese side to your organisations 
activities in China and the differences 
between both. 
 How do your activities compare to the 
approach taken by European 
countries/companies? 
 Did this change over time? 
 What circumstances particularly facilitate or 
hinder your activities?  
 
 Where and how do you exchange with other 
actors?  
 Did this change over time? 
 How do the activities by your country’s 
companies / your country’s government 
organisations to support China’s food safety 
relate to your work? 
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8.3 Procedure for sourcing of documents 
Procedure applied to retrieve information from the EU Commission’s website: 
 The press release database RAPID was search for the keyword “China” for the period 
2001-2014 and the following policy fields 
o Agriculture and rural development: 54 results of which 34 were taken in to the 
analysis 
o Consumer policy: 4 results of which 0 were taken into the analysis (because all 
were non-food related) 
o Health: 3 results of which 1 was taken into the analysis (of the other one was non-
food related and on a RASFF-report) 
o International cooperation and development: 46 results of which 4 were taken into 
the analysis (because the rest were non-food related information) 
o Justice, consumer and gender equality: 84 results which led to a refining of the 
research,  
 with the additional keyword “food”: 2 results of which 1 was taken into 
the analysis (other was not food related) 
 with the additional keyword “agriculture”: 1 results of which 0 was taken 
into the analysis (other was not food related) 
 with the additional keyword “sanitary”: 0 results 
 with the additional keyword “sps”: 0 results 
 with the additional keyword “product safety”: 7 results of which 2 were 
taken in to the analysis (rest non-food related) 
 The EEAS website Beijing was scanned for the topic of food safety 
 The website of DG AGRI was scanned for reports on China-relations 
 The website of DG SANTE was scanned for the “Better Training for Safer Food” (BTSF) 
program. The annual BTSF reports were then scanned for all China related information. 
 The website of DG TRADE was scanned for all China related documents in the “more 
documents on China” section for the time period 2001-2014. Of the resulting 412 
documents only those with a relation to the topics of food and china were taken into the 
analysis. 
 All audit reports by the EU Food and Veterinary Office in the period 2001-2015 for China 
were taken into the analysis 
 Usage of search function on the EU Commissions website to complete specific topics 
identified during the previous search for documents, i.e. all documents related to EU-
China Summits, HED/HETD, EU-China Joint Economic and Trade Committee 
 The EUCTP website was scanned for all brief activity reports and annual plans (partly by 
using web archive tools to retrieve documents no longer on the current EUCTP website) 
 The FAO website was scanned for all China-related documents 
 The WHO website was scanned for all China-related documents 
 The ADB website was scanned for all China and food safety-related documents 
Websites constantly monitored between 2012 and 2014 for latest food safety developments:  
 www.chinadaily.com.cn 
 www.foodnavigator.com 
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 www.foodnavigator-asia.com 
 www.barfblog.com 
 
Newsletters monitored between 2012 and 2014 for latest food safety developments: 
 Euraxess China newsletter 
 Health and Food Safety e-News update published by DG SANTE 
 Press release newsletter of the BfR 
 EUCTP newsletter 
 LinkedIn EU Food Law newsletter 
 Sinocism newsletter 
 ICTSD newsletter 
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8.4 EUCTP activities 
Table 19: Assessment of EUCTP I and II activities 
No Code Title Date Assessment 
EUCTP I 
1 A0009 AQSIQ Food Safety Workshop Nov-04 MarAcc/pull 
2 unspec. Study on Fusel Oils* Sep-04 market access 
3 A0010 Global Food Safety Forum Nov-04 SupSaf/pull 
4 A0008 Agricultural Biotech Symposium Nov-04 none 
5 A0018 Forum - China and the WTO: Meeting the Challenges Ahead Dec-04 market access 
6 A0030 Workshop on Farmers’ Cooperative Law Apr-05 SupSaf/pull 
7 A0002 GI Study Visit to Europe May-05 market access 
8 A0047 Round Table Discussion: Implications of new legislative developments 
for food sector in Europe 
Jun-05 market access 
9 A0043 National Training on Agriculture International Exchange and 
Cooperation System 
Jun-05 MarAcc/pull 
10 A0032 Study of Impact Tariff Reduction Formulae on Agricultural Trade Aug-05 none 
11 A0033 Study of the Impact of the Elimination of Export Subsidies on 
Agricultural Trade 
Oct-05 none 
12 A0052 EU-China GIs Seminars Nov-05 market access 
13 A0053 Study Visit on EU Agriculture Policies Nov-05 SupSaf/pull 
14 A0052 Laboratory Security Training for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Dec-05 supply safety 
15 A0073 DRC Food Safety Mission to EU Dec-05 MarAcc/pull 
16 A0045 Plant Breeder Rights Study Apr-06 market access 
17 A0098 DG SANCO Food Safety Strategy Meeting Jul-06 SupSaf/pull 
18 A0104 EU-China Seminar on the Protection of Geographical Indications Nov-06 market access 
19 A0121 EU-China Workshop on GI Administrative Cooperation Dec-06 market access 
20 A0056 Agriculture and SPS Internship Programme Jan-07 market access 
21 A0123 EU-China GMO Detection Training Jan-07 MarAcc/pull 
22 A0133 Workshop - Overview of Chinese Agriculture and Agricultural Policies Mar-07 none 
23 A0127 AQSIQ Food Safety Training Mar-07 MarAcc/pull 
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24 A0131 EU-China Traceability Management and Pesticide Control Training  Mar-07 SupSaf/pull 
25 A0126 China participation to the expert meeting on Pilot ASEAN Rapid Alert 
System for Food and Feed (RASFF) 
Apr-07 supply safety 
26 A0133b Workshop - Food Safety Control: Policies and Issues May-07 none 
27 A0146 Information session on WHO proposal for Regulatory and Strategic 
Framework for Food Safety in the PRC 
Jun-07 MarAcc/pull 
28 A0147 EU-China Traceability Management and Pesticide Control Training Jun-07 SupSaf/pull 
29 A0159 EU-China Workshop on GI Administrative Cooperation Jun-07 market access 
30 A0079 EU-China Roundtable on Prospects for Fruit and Vegetable Trade Jul-07 market access 
31 A0170 Food Safety Brochures Sep-07 SupSaf/pull 
32 A0166 SFDA Food Safety Senior Fellowship  Oct-07 SupSaf/pull 
33 A0194 Support to China Organic Food Certification Center (COFCC) Annual 
Organic Training 
Nov-07 SupSaf/pull 
34 A0198 Traceability visibility activity: CCTV interview Dec-07 SupSaf/pull 
35 A0057 Study on the Impacts of GI’s on rural development in China Jan-08 market access 
36 A0133c Workshop - Current and Future Directions in China's GMO Policy Jan-08 none 
37 A0197 Agricultural and SPS Internship Programme Apr-08 MarAcc/pull 
38 A0199 Traceability Management and Pesticide Control Training Apr-08 SupSaf/pull 
39 A0208 Food Contact Material Training Apr-08 supply safety 
40 A0219 Food Contact Material Dissemination Tools Apr-08 supply safety 
41 A0107 Q&A Manual: European Union Legislation on Geographical Indications May-08 market access 
42 A0171 Report on China Organic Agriculture Situation and Challenges May-08 SupSaf/pull 
43 A0133d Workshop - Organic Agriculture in China Jun-08 none 
44 A0215 GMO Internship Programme Jun-08 MarAcc/pull 
45 A0231 Dissemination workshops of EUCTP report on China Organic 
Agriculture 
Jul-08 SupSaf/pull 
46 A0238 Food Contact Materials Internship Nov-08 supply safety 
47 A0133e Workshop - Land Reform Dec-08 none 
48 A0259 EU-China Practical Training of GM Rice and Rice Products Detection 
Method 
Apr-09 SupSaf/pull 
49 A0260 Study Visit on GMO Detection Methods May-09 MarAcc/pull 
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50 A0229 Report on Sustainable Aquaculture in South China: Shrimp and Tilapia 
Farming in Hainan And Guangdong 
Jun-09 SupSaf/pull 
51 A0227 EU-China Workshop on Environmental Sustainability in Aquaculture Jun-09 MarAcc/pull 
52 A0288 EU-China Workshop on Practical Implementation of Risk Assessment Sep-09 MarAcc/pull 
53 A0289 EU-China Food Safety Risk Assessment Training for Experts Sep-09 MarAcc/pull 
54 A0290 EU-China Training on Food Safety Risk Surveillance Principles and 
Methodology Food Safety Risk 
Oct-09 SupSaf/pull 
55 A0291 EU-China Training on the Development of Food Safety Standards Oct-09 market access 
56 A0272 EU-China Food Safety Workshop Nov-09 SupSaf/pull 
EUCTP II 
57 A029-
C3 
Seminar on Geographical Indications Mar-11 market access 
58 A027-
C3 
Technical Consultation on EU GI Products Mar-11 market access 
59 A012-
C3 
EU-China Workshop on BSE Mar-11 market access 
60 A034-
C3 
Study visit for EU milk safety systems Jun-11 market access 
61 A060-
C3 
Seminar on Registration and Protection of Agro-product Gis Sep-11 market access 
62 A042-
C3 
Study visit for the Regulation and Practices Performed by the EU MS to 
ensure Chemical Residue Standard Compliance of Agriculture Products 
Sep-11 SupSaf/pull 
63 A035-
C3 
Technical Training to Improve the Capacity of BSE Risk Analysis Oct-11 market access 
64 A053-
C3 
workshop on Food Safety Standards Nov-11 market access 
65 A097-
C3 
Workshop on Agro-Product Processing Dec-11 MarAcc/pull 
66 A108-
C3 
The use of traceability to support food safety and the implementation of 
the Food Safety Law 
Mar-12 SupSaf/pull 
67 A114-
C3 
Standards, Management and Traceability of Alcoholic Beverages Apr-12 Market 
access 
68 A138-
C3 
Harmonising Animal Health Reference Laboratory Standards Apr-12 SupSaf/pull 
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69 A122-
C3 
The EU Quality Assessment System for Imports of Peanut Products May-12 supply safety 
70 A129-
C3 
The EU regulations, standards, production practices and safety of 
medical specialties derived from milk (study visit) 
May-12 MarAcc/pull 
71 A142-
C3 
Programs to certify and control the production of organic agricultural 
products 
May-12 SupSaf/pull 
72 A166-
C3 
Standardising Animal Health Reference Laboratories Jul-12 SupSaf/pull 
73 A169-
C3 
Technical Assistance to Support GMO Inspection Jul-12 SupSaf/pull 
74 A149-
C3 
Consultation to Harmonise Animal Health Reference Laboratory 
Standards 
Oct-12 SupSaf/pull 
75 A363-
C3 
EU-China forum on technologies used in food safety and product 
authentication  
Oct-12 MarAcc/pull 
76 A150-
C3 
EU-China Forum on Technologies Used in Food Safety and Product 
Authentication 
Nov-12 market access 
77 A193-
C3 
Seminar on Feed Materials Safety and Quality Management Nov-12 SupSaf/pull 
78 A220-
C3 
Seminar on the Management and Surveillance of Zoonosis to Improve 
the Capacity of Animal Health Reference Laboratories 
Dec-12 SupSaf/pull 
79 A141-
C3 
EU Practices on Laboratory Testing, Surveillance and Risk Analysis for 
Schmallenberg Disease 
Dec-12 market access 
80 A013-
C3 
EU‐China Workshop on Standards for Alcoholic Beverages Jan-13 market access 
81 A209-
C3 
Enhance Laboratory Capacity to Support Animal Diseases Surveillance Mar-13 SupSaf/pull 
82 A228-
C3 
Validation of Laboratory Diagnostic Tools for Schmallenberg Disease Mar-13 market access 
83 A229-
C3 
EU-China Seminar on Antimicrobial Resistance in the Veterinary and 
Food Sector 
Mar-13 supply safety 
84 A280-
C3 
Enhance Laboratory Capacity to Support Animal Diseases Surveillance Mar-13 SupSaf/pull 
85 A239-
C3 
Workshop on Risk Assessment of Phthalates in Food Apr-13 market access 
86 A256-
C3 
EU-China Workshop on Aquafeed  
Formulation, Feed Quality and Safety Control 
May-13 supply safety 
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87 A275-
C3 
EU Regulations related to the International Trade of Nut Products Jun-13 supply safety 
88 A249-
C3 
Consultation to Harmonise Animal Health Reference Laboratory 
Standards 
Jun-13 SupSaf/pull 
89 A258-
C3 
Risk Assessment for Agro-products Jun-13 SupSaf/pull 
90 A271-
C3 
EU Standards and Regulations Governing Manufacture Practices for 
Veterinary Drugs 
Jun-13 supply safety 
91 A274-
C3 
Slaughtering Industry Forum Jun-13 SupSaf/pull 
92 A251-
C3 
Impact of Animal and Human Health Control Systems on Animal 
Origin Food Safety 
Jul-13 SupSaf/pull 
93 A252-
C3 
Increasing the Capacity of Animal Health Surveillance Systems Jul-13 SupSaf/pull 
94 A231-
C3 
Epidemiology Training Workshop for Chinese Executives Jul-13 SupSaf/pull 
95 A277-
C3 
Food Safety and Risk Regulation (study assignment) Jul-13 MarAcc/pull 
96 A204-
C3 
HACCP in international transportation and mycotoxins in peanuts Aug-13 supply safety 
97 A250-
C3 
Workshop on Agro-Product Processing Technology Sep-13 MarAcc/pull 
98 A272-
C3 
Seminar on EU Regulations to process feed and maintain feed catalogues Sep-13 SupSaf/pull 
99 A292-
C3 
Workshop to simulate a Codex Alimentarius session Oct-13 none 
100 A298‐
C3 
Workshop on quality and trade of olive oil  Oct-13 market access 
101 A301-
C3 
Roundtable on Animal Health Risk Assessment Nov-13 SupSaf/pull 
102 A304-
C3 
Seminar on understanding the EU system to govern residues in 
Agriculture 
Nov-13 SupSaf/pull 
103 A306-
C3 
Consultation to Harmonise Animal Health Reference Laboratories Nov-13 SupSaf/pull 
104 A291-
C3 
Food Additive Risk Analysis and Safety Standards Dec-13 MarAcc/pull 
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105 A297-
C3 
EU regulatory and scientific approach on wine and Alcoholic beverages 
safety and authenticity 
Dec-13 market access 
106 A293-
C3 
EU Governance to ensure animal origin food safety Jan-14 market access 
107 A318-
C3 
Laboratory exchange to fight counterfeiting in trade of alcoholic 
beverages and to enhance quality and safety of alcoholic products  
Mar-14 market access 
108 A300-
C3 
Internship at DG MARE Mar-14 none 
109 A319-
C3 
Enhancing Laboratory Capacity to Support Animal Diseases 
Surveillance 
Apr-14 SupSaf/pull 
110 A325-
C3 
Harmonisation of risk analysis, standards and management of food 
contact materials 
May-14 supply safety 
111 A332-
C3 
Technical Standards and authenticity of agricultural products May-14 MarAcc/pull 
112 A362-
C3 
Biosafety management of animal health laboratories May-14 Market 
access 
113 A331-
C3 
The EU Governance strategy to ensure food and feed safety Jun-14 SupSaf/pull 
114 A336-
C3 
International Standards: The basis for policy making for animal origin 
products 
Jun-14 market access 
115 A338-
C3 
EU Regulation and practices to ensure feed security and safety Jun-14 market access 
116 A359-
C3 
Impact of animal and human health control systems on animal origin 
food safety 
Jul-14 SupSaf/pull 
117 A360-
C3 
Increasing the risk analysis capacity of animal health surveillance 
systems 
Jul-14 SupSaf/pull 
118 A361-
C3 
Epidemiology and risk analysis for Chinese Executives Jul-14 SupSaf/pull 
119 A364-
C3 
Study assignment on Standards, Food safety and Risk Regulation Jul-14 SupSaf/pull 
120 A337-
C3 
Application of models in risk assessment Aug-14 SupSaf/pull 
121 A371-
C3 
EU standards and regulations to control African Swine fever Oct-14 market access 
122 A383-
C3 
EU Regulations and practices to assess risk in agricultural products Oct-14 SupSaf/pull 
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123 A386-
C3 
Consultation to Harmonise Animal Health Reference Laboratories Oct-14 SupSaf/pull 
124 A390-
C3 
Simulation of Codex Alimentarius Sessions Nov-14 none 
125 A385-
C3 
EU regulations to ensure safe international transportation for 
agricultural  
products 
Dec-14 supply safety 
126 A408-
C3 
Increasing the risk analysis capacity of the animal disease surveillance 
systems 
Apr-15 SupSaf/pull 
127 A409-
C3 
Impact of Animal and Human Health Control Systems on Animal 
Origin Food Safety 
Apr-15 SupSaf/pull 
128 A424-
C3 
Control measures for animal origin products during disease outbreaks May-15 market access 
129 A425-
C3 
Technical consultation on food safety risk assessment Jun-15 MarAcc/pull 
130 A447-
C3 
EU regulations, standards and best practices to ensure the safety of 
agricultural products 
Jun-15 market access 
131 A433-
C3 
EU Standards and regulations governing slaughterhouses and meat 
processing plants 
Jun-15 SupSaf/pull 
132 A443-
C3 
EU management of risk communication and data exchanges Jul-15 SupSaf/pull 
133 A445-
C3 
Food Safety Legislation and Governance (study assignment) Jul-15 MarAcc/pull 
134 A446-
C3 
Food Safety surveillance and risk assessment Jul-15 SupSaf/pull 
135 A330-
C3 
EU regulations to govern animal waste disposal Sep-15 MarAcc/pull 
136 A453-
C3 
EU-China exchanges on food safety governance Sep-15 market access 
137 A444-
C3 
Seminar on food safety legislation and regulation Nov-15 market access 
138 A451-
C3 
Standardization of Animal Health Reference Laboratories Nov-15 SupSaf/pull 
139 A457-
C3 
EU standards and regulations to control animal disease Nov-15 market access 
140 A458- International standards for regionalization and zoning to mitigate risk Nov-15 market access 
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C3 during animal disease outbreaks  
141 A460-
C3 
EU-China roundtable on the global integration of the Chinese dairy 
industry 
Nov-15 MarAcc/pull 
142 A441-
C3 
Comparison of the current oenological practices in China and the EU Dec-15 market access 
143 A394-
C3 
Enhancing Laboratory capacity to support animal diseases surveillance Dec-15 SupSaf/pull 
144 A465-
C3 
EU-China Seminar Antimicrobial resistance prevention Mar-16 Supply Safety 
*not listed in final achievement report because under different component 
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